Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-16 (section)

== 16.1 Introduction and Framing ==

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=== 16.1.1 Objective of the Chapter ===

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Anthropogenic climate change poses risks to many human and ecological systems. These risks are increasingly visible in our day-to-day lives, including a growing number of disasters that already bear a fingerprint of climate change. There is increasing concern about how these risks will shape the future of our planet—our ecosystems, our well-being and development opportunities. Policymakers are asking what is known about the risks, and what can be done about them. Many people, especially youth, around the world are calling for urgency, ambition and action. Companies are wondering how to manage new threats to their bottom line, or how to grasp new opportunities. On top of this growing concern about climate change, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has exposed vulnerabilities to shocks, significantly aggravated climate-related risks, and posed new questions about how to achieve a green, resilient and inclusive recovery (see Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7).

The three synthesis chapters of this report (Chapters 16, 17 and 18) aim to address these concerns. They synthesise information from across all thematic and regional chapters of the Working Group II (WGII) IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) and the recent IPCC Special Reports on Global Warming of 1.5°C, on Climate Change and Land, and on Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SR15 ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ), SRCCL ( [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ) and SROCC ( [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] )), but also include an independent assessment of the literature, especially literature that cuts across sectors and regions.

[https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-16 Chapter 16] lays the groundwork by synthesising the state of knowledge on the observed impacts of climate change ( [[#16.2|Section 16.2]] ) and ongoing adaptation responses ( [[#16.3|Section 16.3]] ), the limits to adaptation ( [[#16.4|Section 16.4]] ), and the key risks we should be concerned about, how these risks evolve with global temperature change, and also how they depend on future development and adaptation efforts (Sections 16.5, 16.6). It thus brings together elements that were assessed in different chapters in previous assessments, especially the Third, Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (TAR, AR4 and AR5, respectively). Background on specific methodological aspects of this chapter is provided in Supplementary Material (SM).

The strong link between risks, adaptation and development connects this chapter closely to Chapters 17 and 18. [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-17|Chapter 17]] assesses decision -making: what do we know about the ways to manage risks in a warming climate (including in the context of the key risks and limits to adaptation identified in this chapter)? [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-18|Chapter 18]] puts all of this information into the perspective of climate resilient development pathways: how can we achieve sustainable development given the additional challenges posed by climate change?

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=== 16.1.2 Risk Framing ===

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In the IPCC AR6, ‘risk’ is defined as the potential for adverse consequences for human or ecological systems, recognising the diversity of values and objectives associated with such systems. Relevant adverse consequences include those on lives, livelihoods, health and well-being, economic, social and cultural assets and investments, infrastructure, services (including ecosystem services), ecosystems and species ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1|Chapter 1]] this volume, SR15 ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] )). The AR6 definition explicitly notes that ‘risks can arise from potential impacts of climate change as well as human responses to climate change.’

The main risks assessed here relate to the potential ''impacts'' of climate change. In recent years, the growing visibility of current climate impacts has resulted in a stronger focus on understanding and managing such risk across time scales, rather than just for the longer-term future. Examples include the rapid growth in attribution of specific extreme weather events, the use of scientific evidence of climate change impacts in legal cases, and the context of the Paris Agreement’s Article 8 on ‘averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage’ associated with climate change, but also the stronger links between adaptation and disaster risk reduction, including early-warning systems, wider discussions on how to build resilience in the face of a more volatile climate, and attention for limits to adaptation that are already being reached.

Of course, the scale of these risks is also determined by the ''responses'' to climate change, mainly in how they reduce risk, but also how they may create risks (sometimes inadvertently, and sometimes to others than those who implement the response, in other places, or later in time). Our focus is on adaptation responses, given that mitigation is covered in Working Group III (WGIII) AR6, but we acknowledge certain important interactions, such as biomass production as an alternative to fossil fuels which can compete with food production and thus aggravate adaptation challenges. Given that SRM could also be considered a response with significant implications for climate risks across scales, this chapter also includes Cross-Working Group Box SRM.

This assessment focuses primarily on ''adverse'' consequences of climate change. However, climate change also has ''positive'' implications (benefits and opportunities) for certain people and systems, although there are gaps in the literature on these positive effects. Some risks assessed in this chapter are actually about a balance between positive and negative effects of climate change (and of response options, especially adaptation). In those contexts, we assess the combined effect of both, aiming to identify not only the aggregate impacts (the balance between positive and negative effects) but also the distributional aspects (winners and losers). A more comprehensive discussion of the decision-making related to such trade-offs in relation to adaptation is provided in Chapter 17.

This chapter’s assessment takes a global perspective, although many risks and responses materialise at the local or national scale. We use case studies to illustrate the ways these risks aggregate across scales, again with particular concern for distributional aspects.

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=== 16.1.3 Storyline of the Chapter, and What’s New Compared with Previous Assessments ===

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Figure 16.1 illustrates the elements covered by the chapter, which can be summarised as four key questions.

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[[File:cda0cfe3dc0f5a0ba31591e24a95e8f6 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_16_001.png]]

'''Figure 16.1 |''' '''Illustrative storyline of the chapter highlighting the central questions addressed in the various sections, from realised risks (observed impacts) to future risks (key risks and reasons for concern), informed by adaptation-related responses and the limits to adaptation.''' The arrows illustrate actions to reduce hazard, exposure and vulnerability, which shape risks over time. Accordingly, the green areas at the centre of the propeller diagrams indicate the ability for such solutions to reduce risk, up to certain adaptation limits, leaving the white residual risk (or observed impacts) in the centre. The shading of the right-hand-side propeller diagram compared with the non-shaded one on the left reflects some degree of uncertainty about future risks. The figure builds on the conceptual framework of risk–adaptation relationships used in SROCC ( [[#Garschagen--2019|Garschagen et al., 2019]] ).

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==== 16.1.3.1 What Impacts Are Being Experienced? ====

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This assessment of climate-related impacts that are already taking place is covered in [[#16.2|Section 16.2]] , which aims to differentiate between observed changes in climate hazards (also called ‘climate impact drivers’ in IPCC Working Group I) and the exposure and vulnerability of human and ecological systems.

Observed impacts of climate change were synthesised in the TAR, AR4 and AR5. The TAR found that recent regional climate changes had already affected many physical and biological systems, with preliminary indications that some human systems had been affected, primarily through floods and droughts. AR4 found ''likely'' [[#footnote-001|2]] discernible impacts on many physical and biological systems, and more ''limited evidence'' for impacts on human environments. AR5 devoted a separate chapter to observed impacts, which found growing evidence of impacts on human and ecological systems on all continents and across oceans ( [[#Cramer--2014|Cramer et al., 2014]] ).

[[#16.2|Section 16.2]] reports on the expanded literature since then, generally reflecting a growing and more certain impact of climate change on humans and ecological systems.

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==== 16.1.3.2 What Responses Are Being Undertaken? ====

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[[#16.3|Section 16.3]] provides, for the first time, a comprehensive synthesis of observed adaptation-related responses to the rising risks.

Such adaptation responses were first covered in the TAR, and further developed in the AR4 and AR5. For instance, AR5 [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-15|Chapter 15]] notes that adaptation to climate change was transitioning from a phase of awareness to the construction of actual strategies and plans in societies ( [[#Mimura--2014|Mimura et al., 2014]] ) but did not include a comprehensive mapping of responses.

Based on such a comprehensive mapping, [[#16.3|Section 16.3]] finds growing evidence of adaptation-related responses, although these are dominated by minor modifications to usual practices or measures for dealing with extreme weather events, and there is ''limited evidence'' for the extent to which they reduce climate risk.

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==== 16.1.3.3 What are the limits to adaptation? ====

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The literature on limits to adaptation, which is covered in [[#16.4|Section 16.4]] , has strongly evolved since AR5, including links to discussions on loss and damage in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of AR4 noted that there was no clear picture of the limits to adaptation, or the cost, AR5 [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-16 Chapter 16] ( [[#Klein--2014|Klein et al., 2014]] ) reported increasing insights emerging from the interactions between climate change and biophysical and socioeconomic constraints, and highlighted the fact that limits could be both hard and soft. It also noted that residual losses and damages will occur from climate change despite adaptation and mitigation action. However, AR5 [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-16 Chapter 16] still found that the empirical evidence needed to identify limits to adaptation of specific sectors, regions, ecosystems or species that can be avoided with different greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation pathways was lacking.

[[#16.4|Section 16.4]] provides a more comprehensive assessment of limits to adaptation, highlighting again that limits to adaptation are not fixed, but are properties of dynamic socio-ecological systems. They are shaped not only by the magnitude of the climate hazards (e.g., the amount of sea level rise in low-lying coasts and islands) and the exposure and vulnerability to those hazards (e.g., people and assets in those areas), but also by physical, infrastructural and social tolerance thresholds and adaptation choices of actors in societies (e.g., the decision to migrate from locations strongly impacted by climate change). The evolution of such socioeconomic systems over time, including their interaction with the changing physical climate, determines the evolution of limits to adaptation.

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==== 16.1.3.4 What Future Risks Are of Greatest Concern? ====

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The fourth and final element of the chapter is the question about the risks we face, and which ones we should be most concerned about. This is addressed in Sections 16.5 and 16.6.

[[#16.5.1|Section 16.5.1]] presents a full discussion of ‘key risks’, synthesised from across all chapters, defined as those risks that are potentially severe and therefore especially relevant to the interpretation of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ in the terminology of UNFCCC Article 2.

In 2015, the Paris Agreement established the goal of ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’. However, assessment of key risks across a range of future warming levels remains a high priority for several reasons: (1) understanding risks at higher levels of warming can help prepare for them, should efforts to limit warming be unsuccessful ( [[#UNEP--2017|UNEP, 2017]] ); (2) understanding risks at higher levels can inform the benefits of limiting warming to lower levels; (3) in addition, there is continued debate about whether warming limits should be at or rather somewhere below 2°C (in particular at 1.5°C); and (4) there is a more explicit recognition that key risks can result not only from increased warming, but also from changes in the exposure and vulnerability of society, and from a lack of ambitious adaptation efforts. Thus, relatively limited warming does not automatically imply that key risks will not occur. In assessing key risks, we have applied four criteria: magnitude of adverse consequences, likelihood of adverse consequences, temporal characteristics of the risk, and ability to respond. Of course, this is an aggregated approach to what is dangerous; it should be noted that in practice, ‘dangerous’ will occur at a myriad of temperature levels depending on who or what is at risk (and their circumstances), geographic scale and time scale.

A new element is that we particularly look at a set of eight ‘representative key risks’ that exemplify the underlying set of key risks identified in the earlier chapters: risk to the integrity of low-lying coastal socio-ecological systems, risk to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems, risk to critical physical infrastructure and networks, risk to living standards (including economic impacts, poverty and inequality), risk to human health, risk to food security, risk to water security, and risk to peace and human mobility ( [[#16.5.2.3|Section 16.5.2.3]] ).

Another increased focus relates to the issue of compound risks. This includes risks associated with compound hazards (Working Group I AR6 Chapter 11, [[#Seneviratne--2021|Seneviratne et al., 2021]] ), but also implications for future risk when repeated impacts erode vulnerability, as well as through transboundary effects (including effects both from one system to a neighbouring one, as well as from one system to a distant one), also discussed in the cross-chapter box on inter-regional risks and adaptation (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG in this Chapter).

[[#16.6|Section 16.6]] maps the representative key risks in [[#16.5|Section 16.5]] to the SDGs, noting both direct and indirect implications for climate resilient development as assessed in Chapter 18.

Finally, [[#16.6|Section 16.6]] presents an updated assessment of the so-called Reasons for Concern (RFC): risks related to unique and threatened systems, extreme events, distribution of impacts, aggregate impacts (including the cross-chapter box on the global economic impacts of climate change and the social cost of carbon, Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC) and the risk of irreversible and abrupt transitions.

The AR4 and AR5 each also evaluated the most important climate risks, framed firstly in terms of the state of knowledge relevant to Article 2 of the UNFCCC. The TAR first synthesised this knowledge in five RFCs. AR4 identified a set of ‘key vulnerabilities’ and provided an update of the RFCs. AR5 further refined a new risk framework developed in the IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), and used it to assess ‘key risks’ and provide another update of the overarching RFCs, drawing as well on Cramer et al.’s (2014) assessment of observed changes.

Our risk assessment also further builds on risk assessments from the Special Reports that are part of the AR6 cycle, that is, SR15, SRCCL and SROCC. While since AR4 the RFC assessment framework has remained largely consistent, refinements in methodology have included the consideration of different risks, the role of adaptation, use of confidence statements, more formalised protocols and standardised metrics ( [[#Zommers--2020|Zommers et al., 2020]] ). In subsequent assessment cycles, the risk level at a given temperature has generally increased, reflecting accumulating scientific evidence ( [[#Zommers--2020|Zommers et al., 2020]] ).

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=== 16.1.4 Drivers of Exposure and Vulnerability ===

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Climate-related impacts, risks and responses all take place against a backdrop of trends in exposure and vulnerability driven by demographics, socioeconomic development (including inequalities) and ecosystem degradation. Other global trends that are shaping climate risks include technological innovation, shifts in global power relations, and resource scarcity ( [[#Retief--2016|Retief et al., 2016]] ). Note that these global trends may ''increase'' but also ''reduce'' exposure and/or vulnerability, for instance when growing incomes, savings and social protection systems increase resilience in the face of shocks and stresses. Drivers and future trends in vulnerability and exposure—next to climate-induced changes in natural hazards—therefore need to be considered in comprehensive risk assessments and eventually adaptation solutions, but empirical research suggests that they remain to be underemphasised in current national adaptation planning ( [[#Garschagen--2021a|Garschagen et al., 2021a]] ).

While these risk drivers are often listed separately, they are often closely interconnected, including between human and ecological systems, and increasingly also through climate risks and responses (e.g., [[#Simpson--2021|Simpson et al., 2021]] ). Climate impacts increasingly affect these drivers, and may compete with financial resources that could otherwise be applied for development, mitigation, adaptation and resilience building, also affecting inequalities (e.g., [[#Taconet--2020|Taconet et al., 2020]] ).

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==== 16.1.4.1 Demographics ====

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Population growth (or decline) can result in increasing (or decreasing) pressure on natural resources (e.g., soils, water and fish stocks) ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ), and can result in the expansion of densely populated areas ( [[#Cardona--2012|Cardona et al., 2012]] ; [[#Day--2016|Day et al., 2016]] ). The majority of the population in the coming decades will be in urban areas. While urbanisation can have many benefits that reduce vulnerability, such as employment opportunities and increased income, better access to healthcare and education, and improved infrastructure, unsustainable urbanisation patterns can create challenges for resource availability, exacerbate pollution levels ( [[#Rode--2015|Rode et al., 2015]] ) and increase exposure to some risks. For example, ~10% of the global population live in low-elevation coastal zones (in 2000; areas &lt;10 m of elevation) ( [[#McGranahan--2007|McGranahan et al., 2007]] ; [[#Neumann--2015|Neumann et al., 2015]] ), which is expected to increase by 5% to 13.6% by 2100 depending on the population scenario ( [[#Neumann--2015|Neumann et al., 2015]] ; [[#Jones--2016|Jones and O’Neill, 2016]] ). Building assets and infrastructure in naturally risk-prone areas are also projected to increase ( [[#Magnan--2019|Magnan et al., 2019]] ), which may also lead to environmental degradation that can further aggravate risk, such as destruction of wetlands that buffer against floods ( [[#Schuerch--2018|Schuerch et al., 2018]] ; [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ). Demographic trends, coupled with changes in income, can also result in increasing demands for land, food, water and energy, and therefore in major changes in land use and cover change (Arneth, 2019). The observed and projected population decline in some rural areas also has implications for vulnerability and exposure. In addition, demographic changes such as ageing may increase vulnerability to some climate hazards, including heat stress ( [[#Byers--2018|Byers et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rohat--2019a|Rohat et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Rohat--2019b|Rohat et al., 2019b]] ).

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==== 16.1.4.2 Biodiversity and Ecosystems ====

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Rapidly accelerating trends in human impacts on global ecosystems and biodiversity, especially in the past five decades, have resulted in precipitous declines in the numbers of many wild species on land and in the ocean, transformation of the terrestrial land surface for agricultural production, and the pervasive spread of alien and invasive species ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ). As a result, the capacity of ecosystems to support human society is thought to be coming under threat. For instance, the fraction of all primary production being appropriated for human use has doubled over the course of the 20th century (to about 25% in 2005), although it has grown at a slower rate than human population ( [[#Krausmann--2013|Krausmann et al., 2013]] ). Future projections significantly depend on bioenergy production, signalling one of the feedbacks between responses to climate change and climate risks.

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==== 16.1.4.3 Poverty Trends and Socioeconomic Inequalities within and across Societies ====

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Poverty contributes to exposure and vulnerability by limiting access of individuals, households and communities to economic resources and restraining adaptive capacities (e.g., for food and energy supply, or for financing adaptation responses) ( [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017]] ). Over the past decades, until the COVID-19 pandemic, global poverty rates have declined rapidly. Between 1981 and 2015, the share of global population living in extreme poverty (under the international poverty line of USD 1.90 d −1 ) declined from 42% to 10%, leaving 736 million people in extreme poverty, concentrated in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2018). This general reduction in poverty across the world is accompanied by a decrease in vulnerability to many types of climate change impacts ( ''medium confidence'' ). However, the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly increased extreme poverty by about 100 million people in 2020, with disproportionate economic impacts on the poorest, most fragile and smaller countries ( [[#World%20Bank--2021|World Bank, 2021]] ) and significant implications for vulnerability to climate change (see also Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7).

The majority of the population in poverty are smallholder farmers and pastoralists, whose livelihoods critically depend on climate-sensitive natural ecosystems, such as through semi-subsistence agriculture where food consumption is primarily dependent on households’ own food production ( [[#Mbow--2019|Mbow et al., 2019]] ). A significant share of this population is affected by armed conflict, which deters economic development and growth and increases local dependence on subsistence agriculture ( [[#Serneels--2015|Serneels and Verpoorten, 2015]] ; [[#Braithwaite--2016|Braithwaite et al., 2016]] ; [[#Tollefsen--2017|Tollefsen, 2017]] ), and aggravating humanitarian challenges (e.g., [[#ICRC--2020|ICRC, 2020]] ). Extreme weather events, particularly droughts, can result in poverty traps keeping people poor or making them poorer, resulting in widening inequalities within and across countries.

Climate risks are also strongly related to other inequalities, often but not always intersecting with poverty. AR5 found with ''very high confidence'' that differences in vulnerability and exposure arise from multi-dimensional inequalities, often produced by uneven development processes. These inequalities relate to geographic location, as well as economic, political and socio-cultural aspects, such as wealth, education, race/ethnicity, religion, gender, age, class/caste, disability and health status ( [[#Oppenheimer--2014|Oppenheimer et al., 2014]] ). Since AR5, a number of studies have confirmed and refined this assessment, especially also regarding socioeconomic inequality and poverty ( [[#Hallegatte--2016|Hallegatte et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017]] ; [[#Pelling--2019|Pelling and Garschagen, 2019]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2020|Hallegatte et al., 2020]] ). Poor people more often live in exposed areas such as wastelands or riverbanks ( [[#Garschagen--2015|Garschagen and Romero-Lankao, 2015]] ; [[#Winsemius--2018|Winsemius et al., 2018]] ). Also, poor people lose more of their total wealth to climatic hazards, receive less post-shock support from their often-times equally poor social networks, and are often not covered by social protection schemes ( [[#Leichenko--2014|Leichenko and Silva, 2014]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2016|Hallegatte et al., 2016]] ). Countries with high inequality tend to have above-average levels of exposure and vulnerability to climate hazards ( [[#BEH%20UNU-EHS--2016|BEH UNU-EHS, 2016]] ). Many socioeconomic models used in climate research have been found to have a limited ability to capture and represent the poor at a larger scale ( [[#Rao--2019|Rao et al., 2019]] ; [[#Rufat--2019|Rufat et al., 2019]] ). However, an analysis of 92 countries found that relative income losses and other climate change impacts were disproportionately high among the poorest ( [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017]] , see [[#16.2|Section 16.2.6]] ). There have also been advances in detecting and attributing the impacts of climate change and vulnerability at household scale and specifically on women’s agency and adaptive capacity ( [[#Rao--2019|Rao et al., 2019]] ). The distribution of impacts and responses (adaptation and mitigation) affects inequality, not just between countries but also within countries (e.g., [[#Tol--2020|Tol, 2020]] ) and between different people within societies. Distribution has so far largely been thought of in a geographical sense, but identifying those most at risk requires an additional focus on the social distribution of impacts, responses, and resilience, as influenced for instance by differential social protection coverage ( [[#Tenzing--2020|Tenzing, 2020]] ).

Many climate responses interact with all of these global risk drivers. Some raise additional equity concerns about marginalising those most vulnerable and exacerbating social conflicts ( [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ), leading to wider questions about the governance of climate risks (and impacts) across scales. Hence, our assessment of impacts, responses and risks is complemented by the assessment of governance and the enabling environment for risk management in Chapter 17, and of climate resilient development in Chapter 18.

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