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==== 8.2.1.5 The Long-lasting Effects of Climate Change on Poverty and Inequality ==== <div id="h3-5-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> New studies document the long-term effects of climate change impacts on people’s livelihoods that persist long after a hazard event. For example, the impact of drought on livelihoods and food security is still recognisable in Mali, 30 years after 1982–1984, the period of most intense drought during the protracted late 20th century drying of the Sahel. The most food secure households associated with persistent drought-induced famine were those that diversified livelihoods away from subsistence agriculture during and after the famine ( [[#Giannini--2017|Giannini et al., 2017]] ). Meanwhile, a larger fraction of households with fewer livelihood activities, lower food security with higher reliance on detrimental nutrition-based coping strategies (such as reducing the quantity or quality of meals) were those unable to diversify livelihoods 30 years previously. Sufficient time has passed to consider the long-term outcomes for the poor in extreme cases featured in previous IPCC assessments, including Hurricane Katrina (2005) (e.g., [[#Fussell--2015|Fussell, 2015]] ; [[#Raker--2019|Raker et al., 2019]] ) and Hurricane Mitch (1998) (e.g., [[#Alaniz--2017|Alaniz, 2017]] ), forewarning that recovery is complex and requires significant sustained long-term investment in ‘soft’ aspects of development, including community organisation and mental health ( [[#O’Neill--2020|O’Neill et al., 2020]] ; [[#Fraser--2021|Fraser et al., 2021]] ). The IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C concluded that climate change has already increased the probability and intensity of individual extreme weather events occurring ( [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ), and our new baseline consideration should be that serious climate change impacts are already being experienced by the most vulnerable, with long-term implications for development (Box 8.1; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ). In both developing and developed countries the disproportionate impacts of the compounding effects of climate change on development are felt by the most disadvantaged. For example, the residual impacts of storms like Hurricane Maria (see [[#8.2.1.1|Section 8.2.1.1]] ) illustrate how rising temperatures, extreme weather events, coral bleaching and sea level rise come together and create compounding hazard-cascades to leave long-lasting effects on the lives of the poor, as well as their food and water security, health, livelihoods and prospects for sustainable development—not only in developing countries ( [[#Adger--2014|Adger et al., 2014]] ; [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ; [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2018|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ), but also in highly inequitable industrialised countries within the same region ( [[#Gamble--2016|Gamble et al., 2016]] ). According to the US National Climate Assessment ( [[#USGCRP--2018|USGCRP, 2018]] ), damages caused to communities by Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017 sparked unprecedented humanitarian crises. Hurricane Maria, a category 5 hurricane, passed through Dominica, St Croix and Puerto Rico and is considered the worst climate disaster in recorded history to affect those islands ( [[#Rodríguez-Díaz--2018|Rodríguez-Díaz, 2018]] ). Approximately 200,000 people migrated from Puerto Rico to the mainland USA in the weeks following the storm ( [[#Alexander--2019|Alexander et al., 2019]] ). Estimates for direct and indirect casualties in Puerto Rico point out a total of 4645 excess deaths, equivalent to a 62% increase in the mortality rate ( [[#Kishore--2018|Kishore et al., 2018]] ). The example of Hurricane Maria and Puerto Rico illustrates that vulnerability is part of a long history of discrimination and colonial governance, which led to greater impacts on the island ( [[#Moleti--2020|Moleti et al., 2020]] ). In Puerto Rico, the economic costs of the collapse of the island’s energy, water, transport, and communication infrastructures are estimated to range from USD 25 to USD 43 billion (USD in 2017), further indebting the island and putting its long-term development at risk. Meanwhile the economic impacts of Hurricanes Irma and Maria on the Caribbean region are estimated between USD 27 and USD 48 billion, and have long-term implications for state budgets for infrastructure supporting development of the poorest. New evidence provides little expectation of net positive impacts of climate change for the poor ( [[#Hallegatte--2015|Hallegatte et al., 2015]] ). Nevertheless, some benefits of climate change adaptation include improved disaster preparedness, the accumulation of social assets, economic benefits of agricultural diversification and benefits associated with migration, as well as the political benefits of collective action ( [[#Pelling--2018|Pelling et al., 2018]] ). In contrast, wealthier tiers of society facing climate change impacts are more able to liquidate assets to avoid losses from climate change, to be formally compensated for losses ( [[#Fang--2019|Fang et al., 2019]] ) and employ social positions to leverage gains from adaptation ( [[#Nadiruzzaman--2015|Nadiruzzaman and Wrathall, 2015]] ). The poor frequently suffer the direct and indirect impacts of climate change, including the cost of adopting adaptive measures ( [[#Atteridge--2018|Atteridge and Remling, 2018]] ; [[#Bro--2020|Bro et al., 2020]] ). Costs to the poor may also include the secondary impacts of first-order adaptation activities, including the livelihood consequences to people migrating due to climate change impacts. The poor frequently bear indirect impacts of adaptation interventions, such as flood protection barriers, which may displace flood waters away from high-income populations toward poorer communities ( [[#Mustafa--2011|Mustafa and Wrathall, 2011]] ). Adaptation programming may also indirectly affect the poor as public resources are drawn into risk reduction interventions, and away from spending on social welfare and safety nets ( [[#Eriksen--2015|Eriksen et al., 2015]] ). Measures to enhance social welfare and safety nets themselves help enhance the poor’s resilience to climate impacts because they focus on non-climatic stressors affecting livelihoods, which interact with climate hazards. Therefore, diverting attention away from safety nets may in fact undermine adaptation efforts ( [[#Leichenko--2019|Leichenko and O’Brien, 2019]] ; [[#Tenzing--2020|Tenzing, 2020]] ). <div id="8.2.1.6" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="interactions-between-climate-hazards-and-social-ecological-thresholds"></span>
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