Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-4 (section)

=== CCP4.2.2 Economic Vulnerability ===

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All Mediterranean countries are vulnerable to climate change across most socioeconomic sectors. In low-income countries of the Basin, a 1.1-point reduction of gross domestic product (GDP) could occur as a consequence of 1°C rise warming ( [[#Radhouane--2013|Radhouane, 2013]] ). In Morocco, GDP impacts of climate change could be -3% to +0.4% by 2050 relative to 2003 ( [[#Ouraich--2018|Ouraich and Tyner, 2018]] ). In Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, approximately 10–13% of GDP loss is projected for an increase in global mean temperature of 4.8°C by 2100 ( [[#Kompas--2018|Kompas et al., 2018]] ). In Southern Europe, mean labour productivity loss would shrink by approximately 2% under 2°C warming, along with a GDP loss of 0.1% by the 2030s, reaching 0.4% by the 2080s ( [[#Szewczyk--2018|Szewczyk et al., 2018]] ).

Freshwater resources are vulnerable to climate change and growing demand, notably from agriculture ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.1|Section 4.1.3]] ; [[#Gudmundsson--2017|Gudmundsson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Zabalza-Martínez--2018|Zabalza-Martínez et al., 2018]] ; [[#Masseroni--2020|Masseroni et al., 2020]] ). The share of GDP and population exposed to high or very high water stress in MENA countries is 71% and 61%, respectively, compared to 22% and 36% in the world ( [[#World%20Bank--2018|World Bank, 2018]] ). Freshwater resources are also vulnerable to sea level rise and associated salinisation ( [[#Ali--2016|Ali and El-Magd, 2016]] ; [[#Wassef--2016|Wassef and Schüttrumpf, 2016]] ; [[#Twining-Ward--2018|Twining-Ward et al., 2018]] ). Due to the impact of climate change on water supplies (−14% to −6%), MENA countries are projected to experience high losses in GDP by 2050 ( [[#World%20Bank--2016|World Bank, 2016]] ).

The agricultural sector is important for most Mediterranean economies, both in terms of GDP and employment, with its share of the total GDP in the region at 6.7% in 2016 ( [[#Kutiel--2019|Kutiel, 2019]] ). Water stress in southern countries is largely driven by growing demand from agriculture, with a potential water deficit of 28–47% by 2030 ( [[#Sebri--2017|Sebri, 2017]] ). In Spain, 11 out of 15 river basin districts are under water stress due to demand from agriculture ( [[#Vargas--2019|Vargas and Paneque, 2019]] ). In Greece, the largest agricultural region (Thessaly) where 70% of the irrigation water comes from groundwater, is under water stress ( [[#Gemitzi--2018|Gemitzi and Lakshmi, 2018]] ). Water scarcity and high dependence on rain-fed agriculture make MENA countries vulnerable to warming and reduced rainfall, associated with high irrigation requirements ( [[#Dhehibi--2015|Dhehibi et al., 2015]] ; [[#Fader--2016|Fader et al., 2016]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2016|World Bank, 2016]] ; 2018; [[#Asseng--2018|Asseng et al., 2018]] ). This is exacerbated by poverty and political instability ( [[#Price--2017|Price, 2017]] ). For cropping systems in MENA countries, the Nile Valley and the western parts of North Africa on the Atlas Mountains are classified as the areas with highest vulnerability ( [[#ESCWA--2017|ESCWA, 2017]] ). Grassland and pastoral systems are also vulnerable to increasing drought, notably in the western part of the basin ( [[#Balzan--2020|Balzan et al., 2020]] ). Increased heat stress in summer negatively impacts animal health and welfare, i.e., increased incidence of diseases and mortality or lower fertility (Lacetera 2019).

As MENA countries are net food importers, they are not only vulnerable to the impact of climate change on food production in the Mediterranean region, but also the climate impacts on food production elsewhere, for example, in China and Russia ( [[#Waha--2017|Waha et al., 2017]] ). The agri-food sector in the Mediterranean region is also important for global food security because several large producing countries in the region, such as France, Italy and Morocco, are net exporters of many essential micronutrients to low- and lower-middle-income countries. Changing quantity and quality of production would have direct (availability) and indirect (price signals) impacts on their trade partners.

The economic value of fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea is over USD 3.4 billion ( [[#Randone--2017|Randone et al., 2017]] ), with about 76,250 fishing vessels in 2019 ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ), most of them (about 62%) in the eastern and central Mediterranean ( [[#FAO--2018|FAO, 2018]] ). Total employment on-board fishing vessels is 202,000 and six countries, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Egypt, account for approximately 82% of total employment ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ). About 78% of the fish stocks in the Mediterranean are currently fished at unsustainable levels ( [[#Galli--2015|Galli et al., 2015]] ). The share of stocks in overexploitation has decreased from 88% in 2012 to 75% in 2018 ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ). Nearly half of the catches consist of small pelagic species (anchovies, sardines, herrings), which are very vulnerable to increased seawater temperatures ( [[#FAOSTAT--2019|FAOSTAT, 2019]] ). Turkey is particularly sensitive to climate change in the fisheries sector ( [[#Turan--2016|Turan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hidalgo--2018|Hidalgo et al., 2018]] ). Fisheries in northern countries are less vulnerable because they have a greater capacity to adapt (i.e., more assets, flexibility, learning potential and social organisation), while southern countries are more vulnerable ( [[#Ding--2017|Ding et al., 2017]] ). The reduction of fish availability directly impacts the income of employees, for example, in the Italian fisheries industry ( [[#Tulone--2019|Tulone et al., 2019]] ).

Mediterranean forests are diverse and play a major ecological and social role through significant ecosystem services, including wood, but also their recreational value and production of non-wood goods, such as mushrooms ( [[#Ding--2016|Ding et al., 2016]] ; [[#Peñuelas--2017|Peñuelas et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gauquelin--2018|Gauquelin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Herrero--2019|Herrero et al., 2019]] ). Many forests grow at the dry margin of their distribution area; therefore, projected drier conditions will affect their productivity and health ( [[#Doblas-Miranda--2017|Doblas-Miranda et al., 2017]] ; [[#Dorado-Liñán--2019|Dorado-Liñán et al., 2019]] ; [[#Sangüesa-Barreda--2019|Sangüesa-Barreda et al., 2019]] ). Vulnerability to wildfire is a significant matter of concern, particularly in the northern and southwestern Mediterranean region ( [[#Ager--2014|Ager et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gomes%20da%20Costa--2020|Gomes da Costa et al., 2020]] ). In Córdoba (Spain), for example, fire suppression costs have increased by 66–87% in the last decade ( [[#Molina--2019|Molina et al., 2019]] ).

The Mediterranean region accounts for one-third of global tourism with 330 million tourists in 2016 ( [[#Tovar-Sánchez--2019|Tovar-Sánchez et al., 2019]] ). Before the COVID-19 crisis, international tourist arrivals were assumed to increase by 60% between 2015 and 2030, reaching 500 million. In 2015, tourism supported 15% of the total employment in the region ( [[#Randone--2017|Randone et al., 2017]] ). France, Spain, Italy and Greece are the top tourist destinations ( [[#UNWTO--2016|UNWTO, 2016]] ), but the highest growth was in Turkey, Croatia and Albania during 1995–2015 (MGI, 2017). The tourism industry is vulnerable to climate change, particularly in low-income countries ( [[#Dogru--2016|Dogru et al., 2016]] ; [[#Dogru--2019|Dogru et al., 2019]] ). Coastal tourism in the region generates USD 300 billion annually followed by marine tourism (USD 110 billion) ( [[#Radhouane--2013|Radhouane, 2013]] ; [[#Randone--2017|Randone et al., 2017]] ).

By providing around 550,000 jobs in the Mediterranean region, the maritime transport and trade industry comprises approximately 20–40% of GDP. As a hub for trade, the Mediterranean, with approximately 600 ports of different sizes, accounts for 25% of all international seaborne trade, including 22% of oil trade. In the region, the shift to green energy to combat climate change would significantly influence the structure of foreign trade in terms of commodities and maritime energy transport flows ( [[#Manoli--2021|Manoli, 2021]] ).

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