Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.11.1 Policy Responses, Options and Pathways ===

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==== 13.11.1.1 Progress on Adaptation Planning and Implementation ====

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The solution space for climate change adaptation has expanded across European regions since AR5 ( ''high confidence'' ). European countries are increasingly planning to adapt to observed impacts and projected climate risks across scales of government ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Lesnikowski--2016|Lesnikowski et al., 2016]] ; [[#Russel--2020|Russel et al., 2020]] ). Whereas in 2009, only nine EU countries had developed a National Adaptation Strategy (NAS) ( [[#Biesbroek--2010|Biesbroek et al., 2010]] ; [[#EEA--2014|EEA, 2014]] ), by mid-2020 all EU member states and several other European countries had adopted at least a NAS and/or revised and updated prior strategies (Figure 13.34, bottom; [[#Klostermann--2018|Klostermann et al., 2018]] ; [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ). Progress is also observed at the level of the EU with the adoption of the new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change in 2021 (European Comission, 2021a), and regionally, particularly in federalist and decentralised states ( [[#Steurer--2018|Steurer and Clar, 2018]] ; [[#EEA--2020b|EEA, 2020b]] ; [[#Pietrapertosa--2021|Pietrapertosa et al., 2021]] ), and locally, with an increasing number of European cities planning for climate risks ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#13.6.2.1|Section 13.6.2.1]] ; see Box 13.3; Chapter 6; [[#Aguiar--2018|Aguiar et al., 2018]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). There is evidence of action across sectors and scales, even in European countries where national adaptation frameworks are absent ( ''medium confidence'' ) (Figure 13.34; [[#De%20Gregorio%20Hurtado--2015|De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pietrapertosa--2018|Pietrapertosa et al., 2018]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ). However, the implementation gap identified in AR5 ( [[#Chambwera--2014|Chambwera et al., 2014]] ), that is, the gap between defined goals and ambitions and actual implemented actions on the ground, persists in Europe ( [[#Aguiar--2018|Aguiar et al., 2018]] ; [[#Russel--2020|Russel et al., 2020]] ; [[#UNEP--2021|UNEP, 2021]] ).

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'''Figure 13.34 |''' '''Progress of national adaptation in Europe in 2018 and status of national adaptation plans and strategies in 2020.''' Data on the progress of national adaptation are from the self-reported status of EU member states, as documented in the Adaptation Scoreboard for Country fiches (SWD(2018)460). The status of national adaptation plans and strategies data are from EEA Report 6/2020 ( [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ), the ClimateADAPT portal ( [[#EEA--2021a|EEA, 2021a]] ) and the Grantham Institute database ‘Climate Change Laws of the World’ ( [[#Grantham%20Research%20Institute--2021|Grantham Research Institute, 2021]] ).

The drivers of adaptation progress in Europe differ across sectors and regions. Common drivers include: experienced climatic events, improved climatic information, societal pressures to act, projected economic and societal costs of climate change, participation in (city) networks, societal and political leadership, and changes in national and European policies and legislation ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#EEA--2014|EEA, 2014]] ; [[#Massey--2014|Massey et al., 2014]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ). The availability of knowledge, human and financial resources appears important for proactive adaptation ( [[#Termeer--2012|Termeer et al., 2012]] ; [[#Sanderson--2018|Sanderson et al., 2018]] ), while adaptation is also strongly dependent on economic and social development ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Sanderson--2018|Sanderson et al., 2018]] ). How adaptation is governed differs substantially across Europe ( [[#Clar--2019|Clar, 2019]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2021|Lesnikowski et al., 2021]] ). Political commitment, persistence and consistent action across scales of government is critical to move beyond planning for adaptation (Steps A–C in Figure 13.34) and to ensure adequacy of implementation (Steps D and E in Figure 13.34) ( [[#Howlett--2017|Howlett and Kemmerling, 2017]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2021|Lesnikowski et al., 2021]] ; [[#Patterson--2021|Patterson, 2021]] ).

The scope of climate risks included in European adaptation policies and plans (Step B in Figure 13.34) is generally broad ( [[#EEA--2018a|EEA, 2018a]] ). Systemic and cascading risks ( [[#13.10|Section 13.10]] ) are often recognised, but most conventional risk assessment methods that inform adaptation planning are ill-equipped to deal with these effects (Adger et al., 2018). For example, transboundary risks emerging in regions outside of Europe are considered only by a few countries such as the UK and Germany ( [[#13.9.3|Section 13.9.3]] ). European climate change adaptation strategies and national policies are generally weak on gender, sexual orientation, as well as other social equality issues (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18; [[#Boeckmann--2014|Boeckmann and Zeeb, 2014]] ; [[#Allwood--2020|Allwood, 2020]] ).

Many near-term investment decisions have long-term consequences, and planning and implementation (Steps C and D in Figure 13.34) can take decades, particularly for critical infrastructure planning in Europe ( [[#Zandvoort--2017|Zandvoort et al., 2017]] ; [[#Pot--2018|Pot et al., 2018]] ). Consequently, there are calls to expand planning horizons, to consider long-term uncertainties to prevent lock-in decision dependencies, to seize opportunities and synergies from other investments (e.g., socioeconomic developments and systems transitions) and to broaden the range of considered possible impacts (e.g., [[#Frantzeskaki--2019|Frantzeskaki et al., 2019]] ; Marchau, 2019; [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2020b|Haasnoot et al., 2020b]] ). Yet, high GWL scenarios beyond 2100 are often not considered in climate-change adaptation planning due to a lack of perceived usability, missing socioeconomic information, constraining institutional settings and conflicting decision-making timeframes ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Lourenco--2019|Lourenco et al., 2019]] ; [[#Taylor--2020|Taylor et al., 2020]] ). High GWL scenarios are often seen as having a low probability of occurrence, resulting in inaction or incremental rather than transformative adaptation responses to projected climate risks ( [[#Dunn--2017|Dunn et al., 2017]] ). Extending planning horizons to beyond 2100 increases deep uncertainties for decision makers as a result of unclear future socioeconomic and climatic changes. For adaptation to SLR along Europe’s coast, for example, there are already considerable uncertainties during this century ( [[#Fox-Kemper--2021|Fox-Kemper et al., 2021]] ).

Adaptive planning and decision making are still limited across Europe ( ''high confidence'' ). Prominent examples of adaptive plans include the flood defence systems for the City of London ( [[#Ranger--2013|Ranger et al., 2013]] ; [[#Kingsborough--2016|Kingsborough et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hall--2019|Hall et al., 2019]] ) and the Netherlands ( [[#Van%20Alphen--2016|Van Alphen, 2016]] ; [[#Bloemen--2019|Bloemen et al., 2019]] ). Adaptation pathways also have been developed for planning urban water supply ( [[#Kingsborough--2016|Kingsborough et al., 2016]] ; [[#Erfani--2018|Erfani et al., 2018]] ), urban drainage ( [[#Babovic--2019|Babovic and Mijic, 2019]] ) and wastewater systems (Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17; [[#Sadr--2020|Sadr et al., 2020]] ). Flexible strategies are increasingly considered by European countries (e.g., [[#Stive--2013|Stive et al., 2013]] ; [[#Kreibich--2015|Kreibich et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bubeck--2017|Bubeck et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2019|Haasnoot et al., 2019]] ) but require appropriate design to be effective ( [[#Metzger--2021|Metzger et al., 2021]] ).

Monitoring and evaluation of adaptation action is done only in some European countries (Step E in Figure 13.34) but is important for adjusting planning, if needed ( [[#Hermans--2017|Hermans et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2018|Haasnoot et al., 2018]] ), and enhancing transparency and accountability of progress ( [[#Mees--2019|Mees and Driessen, 2019]] ). In the Netherlands, a comprehensive monitoring system has been put in place, including signals for adaptation that support decisions on when to implement adaptation options or to adjust plans ( [[#Hermans--2017|Hermans et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2018|Haasnoot et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bloemen--2019|Bloemen et al., 2019]] ).

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==== 13.11.1.2 Mainstreaming and Coordination ====

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Coordinated responses are necessary to prevent inefficient and costly action ( [[#Biesbroek--2021|Biesbroek, 2021]] ), balance under- and overreaction to climate risks ( [[#Peters--2017|Peters et al., 2017]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2019|Biesbroek and Candel, 2019]] ), prevent redistributing vulnerability and maladaptive actions ( [[#Atteridge--2018|Atteridge and]] [[#Remling--2018|Remling, 2018]] ; [[#Albizua--2019|Albizua et al., 2019]] ; [[#Neset--2019|Neset et al., 2019]] ), and ensure timely implementation ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Benson--2017|Benson and Lorenzoni, 2017]] ). Since AR5, progress has been made to increase coordinated adaptation actions, but so far this is limited to a few sectors (mostly water management and agriculture) and European countries and regions (mostly SEU, and WCE depending on impact) ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#13.11.2|Section 13.11.2]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2016|Lesnikowski et al., 2016]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2020|Biesbroek and Delaney, 2020]] ; [[#Booth--2020|Booth et al., 2020]] ). Despite evidence of emerging bottom-up (e.g., citizens and business) and top-down initiatives (e.g., governmental plans and instruments to ensure action), there are considerable barriers to mainstreaming adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Runhaar--2018|Runhaar et al., 2018]] ).

While mainstreaming of adaptation into other policy domains has been advocated as an enabler for adaptation, it may have resulted in incremental rather than transformational adaptation, and may not be sufficient to close the adaptation gap ( [[#Andersson--2018|Andersson and Keskitalo, 2018]] ; [[#Remling--2018|Remling, 2018]] ; [[#Scoville-Simonds--2020|Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020]] ).

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==== 13.11.1.3 Climate Services and Local Knowledge ====

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Climate services to support adaptation decision making of governments and businesses across Europe have rapidly increased since AR5, partly as a result of national and EU investments such as the Copernicus C3S service ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Street--2016|Street, 2016]] ; [[#Soares--2019|Soares and Buontempo, 2019]] ). These services are increasingly used in NEU, SEU and WCE, for example, in energy and risk prevention in coastal and riverine cities, stimulating regulations and bottom-up initiatives ( [[#Cavelier--2017|Cavelier et al., 2017]] ; [[#Le%20Cozannet--2017|Le Cozannet et al., 2017]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; [[#Howard--2020|Howard et al., 2020]] ). However, climate service efficacy is rarely systematically evaluated ( [[#Cortekar--2020|Cortekar et al., 2020]] ). Barriers to use include: lack of perceived usefulness of climate information to organisations and expertise to use the information, outdated statistics, mismatch between needs and type of information made available, insufficient effective engagement between providers and recipients of climate information and lack of business models to sustain climate services over time ( ''high evidence, medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Cavelier--2017|Cavelier et al., 2017]] ; [[#Räsänen--2017|Räsänen et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bruno%20Soares--2018|Bruno Soares et al., 2018]] ; [[#Christel--2018|Christel et al., 2018]] ; [[#Oberlack--2018|Oberlack and Eisenack, 2018]] ; [[#Hewitt--2020|Hewitt et al., 2020]] ). Adaptation-decision support platforms also face challenges regarding updating, training and engagement with users ( [[#EEA--2015|EEA, 2015]] ; [[#Palutikof--2019|Palutikof et al., 2019]] ).

In addition to scientific knowledge, traditional and local knowledge can enable adaptation action ( [[#Huntington--2017|Huntington et al., 2017]] ) as is the case with indigenous-led ecosystem restoration in the European Arctic ( [[#Brattland--2018|Brattland and]] [[#Mustonen--2018|Mustonen, 2018]] ). There is a need to draw on surviving Indigenous knowledge systems in Europe (Greenland, Nenets, Khanty, Sámi, Veps, Ingrian) as unique, endemic ways of knowing the world that can position present and historical change in context and offer unique reflections of change in the future ( [[#Ogar--2020|Ogar et al., 2020]] ; [[#Mustonen--2021|Mustonen et al., 2021]] ).

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==== 13.11.1.4 Financing Adaptation and Financial Stability ====

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Dedicated financial resources for the implementation of NAS and plans are a key enabling factor for successful adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ) (Chapter 17; [[#Russel--2020|Russel et al., 2020]] ). Yet, only 14 EU countries have announced such budget allocations in their plans and strategies; and even if budget numbers are available, they are difficult to compare ( [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ). Current adaptation spending varies greatly across and within European countries, partly reflecting (sub)national adaptation priorities or financing sources targeting investment projects ( [[#López-Dóriga--2020|López-Dóriga et al., 2020]] ; [[#Russel--2020|Russel et al., 2020]] ) and competing statutory priorities ( [[#Porter--2015|Porter et al., 2015]] ). European government budgets are also burdened by climate-change damages today, particularly after huge flooding events, and austerity following financial crises, limiting anticipatory action ( [[#Penning-Rowsell--2015|Penning-Rowsell and Priest, 2015]] ; [[#Miskic--2017|Miskic et al., 2017]] ; [[#Schinko--2017|Schinko et al., 2017]] ; [[#Slavíková--2020|Slavíková et al., 2020]] ). National adaptation funding in EU member states is complemented by EU funding (e.g., European Structural and Investment Funds, European Regional Development Funds, and LIFE program). While the EU spending target on climate action increased from 20% in 2016–2020 to 25% in 2021–2026, most spending is going into mitigation, not adaptation ( [[#Berkhout--2015|Berkhout et al., 2015]] ; [[#Hanger--2015|Hanger et al., 2015]] ; [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ).

With higher warming levels, financing needs are ''likely'' to increase ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Mochizuki--2018|Mochizuki et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bachner--2019|Bachner et al., 2019]] ; [[#Parrado--2020|Parrado et al., 2020]] ), and governments can address this higher need by cutting other expenditures, increasing taxes or by increasing the fiscal deficit ( [[#Miskic--2017|Miskic et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mochizuki--2018|Mochizuki et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bachner--2019|Bachner et al., 2019]] ). Yet, the requirement for fiscal consolidation that will be needed after the COVID-19 pandemic (Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7) may also lead to a cessation of adaptation spending, as evidenced by the expenditure drop in coastal protection in Spain after the financial crisis in 2008 ( [[#López-Dóriga--2020|López-Dóriga et al., 2020]] ). Governments can shift the financial burden to beneficiaries of adaptation, as suggested, for example, for coastal protection and riverine flooding ( [[#Jongman--2014|Jongman et al., 2014]] ; [[#Penning-Rowsell--2015|Penning-Rowsell and Priest, 2015]] ; [[#Bisaro--2018|Bisaro and Hinkel, 2018]] ). There is also an increase in financial mechanisms to accelerate private adaptation actions, including adaptation loans, subsidies, direct investments and novel public–private arrangements. For example, the European Investment Bank created a finance facility to support European regions through loans to implement adaptation projects ( [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ).

Since AR5, new evidence has emerged that climate change may deteriorate financial stability both at the global and European scales ( [[#Campiglio--2018|Campiglio et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dafermos--2018|Dafermos et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lamperti--2019|Lamperti et al., 2019]] ; [[#ECB--2021a|ECB, 2021a]] ). The European Central Bank, the European Systemic Risk Board, and several national central banks in NEU and WCE have started to systematically assess the consequences of climate risks for financial stability and plan to integrate climate stress testing into their supervisory tools ( [[#Batten--2016|Batten et al., 2016]] ; [[#ECB--2021a|ECB, 2021a]] ; [[#ECB--2021b|ECB, 2021b]] ).

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'''Box 13.3 | Climate Resilient Development Pathways in European Cities'''
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Climate resilient development (CRD) in European cities offers synergies and co-benefits from integrating adaptation and mitigation with environmental, social and economic sustainability ( [[#Geneletti--2016|Geneletti and Zardo, 2016]] ; [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). Climate networks (e.g., Covenant of Mayors), funding (e.g., Climate-KIC), research programmes (e.g., Horizon Europe), European and national legislation, international treaties and the identification of co-benefits contribute to the prioritisation of climate action in European cities ( [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al., 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; [[#CDP--2020|CDP, 2020]] ). Still, mitigation and adaptation remain largely siloed and sectoral ( [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al., 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). An assessment of the integration of mitigation and adaptation in urban climate-change action plans in Europe found only 147 cases in a representative sample of 885 cities ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ).

In European cities, CRD is most evident in the areas of green infrastructure, energy-efficient buildings and construction, and active and low-carbon transport ( [[#Pasimeni--2019|Pasimeni et al., 2019]] ; [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). Nature-based Solutions, such as urban greening, often integrate adaptation and mitigation in sustainable urban developments and are associated with increasing natural and social capital in urban communities, improving health and well-being, and raising property prices ( [[#Geneletti--2016|Geneletti and Zardo, 2016]] ; [[#Pasimeni--2019|Pasimeni et al., 2019]] ; [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). Barriers to CRD in European cities include limitations in: funding, local capacity, guidance documents and quantified information on costs, co-benefits and trade-offs ( [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). Pilot projects are used to initiate CRD transitions ( [[#Nagorny-Koring--2018|Nagorny-Koring and Nochta, 2018]] ). Malmö (Sweden) and Milan (Italy) are two examples to illustrate the strategies and challenges of two European cities attempting to implement CRDP.

'''Malmö (population 300,000):''' Since the 1990s, Malmö has been transitioning towards an environmentally, economically and socially sustainable city, investing in eco-districts (redeveloped areas that integrate and showcase the city’s sustainability strategies) and adopting ambitious adaptation and mitigation targets. The city has focused on energy-efficient buildings and construction, collective and low-carbon transportation, and green spaces and infrastructure ( [[#Anderson--2014|Anderson, 2014]] ; [[#Malmo%20Stad--2018|Malmo Stad, 2018]] ). Malmö has developed creative implementation mechanisms, including a ‘climate contract’ between the city, the energy distributor and the water and waste utility to co-develop the climate-smart district, Hyllie ( [[#Isaksson--2018|Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018]] ; [[#Kanters--2018|Kanters and Wall, 2018]] ; [[#Parks--2019|Parks, 2019]] ). Flagship eco-districts play a central role in the city’s transition, in the wider adoption of CRD and in securing implementation partners ( [[#Isaksson--2018|Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018]] ; [[#Stripple--2019|Stripple and Bulkeley, 2019]] ). The city has also leveraged its status as a CRD leader to attract investment. The private sector views CRD as profitable, due to the high demand and competitive value of these developments ( [[#Holgersen--2015|Holgersen and Malm, 2015]] ). Malmö adopted the SDGs as local goals and the city’s Comprehensive Plan is evaluated based on them, for example, considering gender in the use, access and safety of public spaces, and emphasising development that facilitates climate-resilient lifestyles ( [[#Malmo%20Stad--2018|Malmo Stad, 2018]] ). Malmö also engages stakeholders via dialogue with residents, collaboration with universities and partnerships with industry and service providers ( [[#Kanters--2018|Kanters and Wall, 2018]] ; [[#Parks--2019|Parks, 2019]] ). Despite measurable and monitored targets, and supportive institutional arrangements, sustainability outcomes for the flagship districts have been tempered by developers’ market-oriented demands ( [[#Holgersen--2015|Holgersen and Malm, 2015]] ; [[#Isaksson--2018|Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018]] ) and there is limited low-income housing in climate-resilient districts ( [[#Anderson--2014|Anderson, 2014]] ; [[#Holgersen--2015|Holgersen and Malm, 2015]] ).

'''Milan (population 1.4 million):''' Milan is taking a CRD approach to new developments ( [[#Comune%20di%20Milano--2019|Comune di Milano, 2019]] ). From 2020, new buildings must be carbon neutral and reconstructions must reduce the existing land footprint by at least 10%. The Climate and Air Plan (CAP) and the city’s Master Plan ( [[#Comune%20di%20Milano--2019|Comune di Milano, 2019]] ) focus on low-carbon, inclusive and equitable development. The CAP is directed at municipal and private assets, and individual- to city-scale actions. In 2020, Milan released a revised Adaptation Plan and the Open Streets Project to ensure synergies between the COVID-19 response and longer-term CRD. Examples include strengthening neighbourhood-scale disaster response and reallocating street space for walking and cycling ( [[#Comune%20di%20Milano--2020|Comune di Milano, 2020]] ). Milan emphasises institutionalisation of CRD via a dedicated resilience department, and through active participation in climate networks and projects that support learning and exchange. Climate network commitments are cited in the city’s Master Plan and CAP guidelines as driving more ambitious deadlines and emissions targets ( [[#Comune%20di%20Milano--2019|Comune di Milano, 2019]] ). Implementation of Milan’s plans remains a challenge, despite dedicated resources and commitment.

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