Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

==== 13.11.1.1 Progress on Adaptation Planning and Implementation ====

<div id="h3-44-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

The solution space for climate change adaptation has expanded across European regions since AR5 ( ''high confidence'' ). European countries are increasingly planning to adapt to observed impacts and projected climate risks across scales of government ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Lesnikowski--2016|Lesnikowski et al., 2016]] ; [[#Russel--2020|Russel et al., 2020]] ). Whereas in 2009, only nine EU countries had developed a National Adaptation Strategy (NAS) ( [[#Biesbroek--2010|Biesbroek et al., 2010]] ; [[#EEA--2014|EEA, 2014]] ), by mid-2020 all EU member states and several other European countries had adopted at least a NAS and/or revised and updated prior strategies (Figure 13.34, bottom; [[#Klostermann--2018|Klostermann et al., 2018]] ; [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ). Progress is also observed at the level of the EU with the adoption of the new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change in 2021 (European Comission, 2021a), and regionally, particularly in federalist and decentralised states ( [[#Steurer--2018|Steurer and Clar, 2018]] ; [[#EEA--2020b|EEA, 2020b]] ; [[#Pietrapertosa--2021|Pietrapertosa et al., 2021]] ), and locally, with an increasing number of European cities planning for climate risks ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#13.6.2.1|Section 13.6.2.1]] ; see Box 13.3; Chapter 6; [[#Aguiar--2018|Aguiar et al., 2018]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; [[#Grafakos--2020|Grafakos et al., 2020]] ). There is evidence of action across sectors and scales, even in European countries where national adaptation frameworks are absent ( ''medium confidence'' ) (Figure 13.34; [[#De%20Gregorio%20Hurtado--2015|De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pietrapertosa--2018|Pietrapertosa et al., 2018]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ). However, the implementation gap identified in AR5 ( [[#Chambwera--2014|Chambwera et al., 2014]] ), that is, the gap between defined goals and ambitions and actual implemented actions on the ground, persists in Europe ( [[#Aguiar--2018|Aguiar et al., 2018]] ; [[#Russel--2020|Russel et al., 2020]] ; [[#UNEP--2021|UNEP, 2021]] ).

<div id="_idContainer104" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:3ea1822f40aeae2e82f87b644cff5ad8 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_13_034.png]]

'''Figure 13.34 |''' '''Progress of national adaptation in Europe in 2018 and status of national adaptation plans and strategies in 2020.''' Data on the progress of national adaptation are from the self-reported status of EU member states, as documented in the Adaptation Scoreboard for Country fiches (SWD(2018)460). The status of national adaptation plans and strategies data are from EEA Report 6/2020 ( [[#EEA--2020a|EEA, 2020a]] ), the ClimateADAPT portal ( [[#EEA--2021a|EEA, 2021a]] ) and the Grantham Institute database ‘Climate Change Laws of the World’ ( [[#Grantham%20Research%20Institute--2021|Grantham Research Institute, 2021]] ).

The drivers of adaptation progress in Europe differ across sectors and regions. Common drivers include: experienced climatic events, improved climatic information, societal pressures to act, projected economic and societal costs of climate change, participation in (city) networks, societal and political leadership, and changes in national and European policies and legislation ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#EEA--2014|EEA, 2014]] ; [[#Massey--2014|Massey et al., 2014]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ). The availability of knowledge, human and financial resources appears important for proactive adaptation ( [[#Termeer--2012|Termeer et al., 2012]] ; [[#Sanderson--2018|Sanderson et al., 2018]] ), while adaptation is also strongly dependent on economic and social development ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Sanderson--2018|Sanderson et al., 2018]] ). How adaptation is governed differs substantially across Europe ( [[#Clar--2019|Clar, 2019]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2021|Lesnikowski et al., 2021]] ). Political commitment, persistence and consistent action across scales of government is critical to move beyond planning for adaptation (Steps A–C in Figure 13.34) and to ensure adequacy of implementation (Steps D and E in Figure 13.34) ( [[#Howlett--2017|Howlett and Kemmerling, 2017]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2021|Lesnikowski et al., 2021]] ; [[#Patterson--2021|Patterson, 2021]] ).

The scope of climate risks included in European adaptation policies and plans (Step B in Figure 13.34) is generally broad ( [[#EEA--2018a|EEA, 2018a]] ). Systemic and cascading risks ( [[#13.10|Section 13.10]] ) are often recognised, but most conventional risk assessment methods that inform adaptation planning are ill-equipped to deal with these effects (Adger et al., 2018). For example, transboundary risks emerging in regions outside of Europe are considered only by a few countries such as the UK and Germany ( [[#13.9.3|Section 13.9.3]] ). European climate change adaptation strategies and national policies are generally weak on gender, sexual orientation, as well as other social equality issues (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18; [[#Boeckmann--2014|Boeckmann and Zeeb, 2014]] ; [[#Allwood--2020|Allwood, 2020]] ).

Many near-term investment decisions have long-term consequences, and planning and implementation (Steps C and D in Figure 13.34) can take decades, particularly for critical infrastructure planning in Europe ( [[#Zandvoort--2017|Zandvoort et al., 2017]] ; [[#Pot--2018|Pot et al., 2018]] ). Consequently, there are calls to expand planning horizons, to consider long-term uncertainties to prevent lock-in decision dependencies, to seize opportunities and synergies from other investments (e.g., socioeconomic developments and systems transitions) and to broaden the range of considered possible impacts (e.g., [[#Frantzeskaki--2019|Frantzeskaki et al., 2019]] ; Marchau, 2019; [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2020b|Haasnoot et al., 2020b]] ). Yet, high GWL scenarios beyond 2100 are often not considered in climate-change adaptation planning due to a lack of perceived usability, missing socioeconomic information, constraining institutional settings and conflicting decision-making timeframes ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Lourenco--2019|Lourenco et al., 2019]] ; [[#Taylor--2020|Taylor et al., 2020]] ). High GWL scenarios are often seen as having a low probability of occurrence, resulting in inaction or incremental rather than transformative adaptation responses to projected climate risks ( [[#Dunn--2017|Dunn et al., 2017]] ). Extending planning horizons to beyond 2100 increases deep uncertainties for decision makers as a result of unclear future socioeconomic and climatic changes. For adaptation to SLR along Europe’s coast, for example, there are already considerable uncertainties during this century ( [[#Fox-Kemper--2021|Fox-Kemper et al., 2021]] ).

Adaptive planning and decision making are still limited across Europe ( ''high confidence'' ). Prominent examples of adaptive plans include the flood defence systems for the City of London ( [[#Ranger--2013|Ranger et al., 2013]] ; [[#Kingsborough--2016|Kingsborough et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hall--2019|Hall et al., 2019]] ) and the Netherlands ( [[#Van%20Alphen--2016|Van Alphen, 2016]] ; [[#Bloemen--2019|Bloemen et al., 2019]] ). Adaptation pathways also have been developed for planning urban water supply ( [[#Kingsborough--2016|Kingsborough et al., 2016]] ; [[#Erfani--2018|Erfani et al., 2018]] ), urban drainage ( [[#Babovic--2019|Babovic and Mijic, 2019]] ) and wastewater systems (Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17; [[#Sadr--2020|Sadr et al., 2020]] ). Flexible strategies are increasingly considered by European countries (e.g., [[#Stive--2013|Stive et al., 2013]] ; [[#Kreibich--2015|Kreibich et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bubeck--2017|Bubeck et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2019|Haasnoot et al., 2019]] ) but require appropriate design to be effective ( [[#Metzger--2021|Metzger et al., 2021]] ).

Monitoring and evaluation of adaptation action is done only in some European countries (Step E in Figure 13.34) but is important for adjusting planning, if needed ( [[#Hermans--2017|Hermans et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2018|Haasnoot et al., 2018]] ), and enhancing transparency and accountability of progress ( [[#Mees--2019|Mees and Driessen, 2019]] ). In the Netherlands, a comprehensive monitoring system has been put in place, including signals for adaptation that support decisions on when to implement adaptation options or to adjust plans ( [[#Hermans--2017|Hermans et al., 2017]] ; [[#Haasnoot--2018|Haasnoot et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bloemen--2019|Bloemen et al., 2019]] ).

<div id="13.11.1.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="mainstreaming-and-coordination"></span>