Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.4.5 Adaptation Solutions for Reducing Conflict Risks ===

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There has been increased activity within the international community to understand and address climate–conflict linkages since AR5, with high level actions including the UN Climate Security Mechanism, launched in 2018 and tasked with providing integrated climate risk assessments to the United Nations Security Council and other UN bodies in partnership with UN and external actors (DPPA et al., 2020). G7 governments initiated an integrated agenda for resilience ( [[#Rüttinger--2015|Rüttinger et al., 2015]] ) and the Berlin Call for Action in 2019 sought a foreign policy platform to address climate security concerns, focusing on risk-informed planning, enhanced capacity for action within the UN and improvements to operational response to climate security risks (Federal Foreign Office, 2019). The non-peer-reviewed literature that currently addresses these policy dimensions is often generated by a small number of consultancies funded by governments from the Global North and can lack diverse perspectives and priorities.

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==== 7.4.5.1 Environmental Cooperation and Peacebuilding ====

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''The environment can form the basis for active peacebuilding, and a sustainable natural environment is important for ongoing peace'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' EP is a framework increasingly utilised to understand the diverse ways in which the natural environment supports peace and can be utilised in peacebuilding; key tenets include preserving the natural environment such that degradation does not contribute to violence, protecting natural resources during conflict and using natural resources to support post-conflict economic recovery ( [[#Kron--2019|Kron, 2019]] ). EP frames natural resources as facilitating peace rather than driving conflict ( [[#Dresse--2019|Dresse et al., 2019]] ) with emerging literature analysing what this means in practice ( [[#Kovach--2016|Kovach and Conca, 2016]] ; [[#Krampe--2017|Krampe, 2017]] ; [[#Ide--2019|Ide, 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2021|Ide et al., 2021]] ; [[#Johnson--2021|Johnson, 2021]] ; [[#Kalilou--2021|Kalilou, 2021]] ). There is emergent evidence for the success of EP pathways. For example, a natural resource sharing agreement on the Kenya–Uganda border was able to reconcile spatial, logistical and conceptual barriers to addressing climate risks in development contexts ( [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ). However, the long-term impacts of EP approaches on sustaining peace are yet to be monitored and evaluated ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide and Tubi, 2020]] ). EP may be successful depending on the context and the element of peace being built ( [[#Johnson--2021|Johnson, 2021]] ) or undermine processes when environmental arguments are co-opted for geopolitical purposes ( [[#Barquet--2015|Barquet, 2015]] ) or to depoliticise conflict ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide, 2020]] ).

''Formal institutional arrangements for natural resource management can contribute to transnational cooperation'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(see also Chapter 4)'' . Evidence from transboundary water sharing agreements provides evidence for cooperation rather than conflict over resources ( [[#Timmerman--2017|Timmerman et al., 2017]] ; [[#Timmerman--2020|Timmerman, 2020]] ; [[#Dinar--2015|Dinar et al., 2015]] ). Transboundary water agreements and river basin organisations help build robust institutions that facilitate trust and relationship building that have benefits in other domains ( ''strong agreement, medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Dombrowsky--2010|Dombrowsky, 2010]] ; [[#Krampe--2018|Krampe and Gignoux, 2018]] ; [[#Barquet--2014|Barquet et al., 2014]] ; Ide and Detges 2018). However, outcomes can be mixed, and the international and top down nature of these approaches may limit their transferability to intra-state conflicts at local levels ( [[#Rigi--2020|Rigi and Warner, 2020]] ; [[#Ide--2021|Ide et al., 2021]] ; [[#Krampe--2021|Krampe et al., 2021]] ).

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==== 7.4.5.2 Adaptation in Fragile Settings ====

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''Climate-resilient peacebuilding has the potential to limit the impact of future climate change on peace efforts'' ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Practical guidance has been developed, driven by policy concerns on climate–conflict links. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the European Union and Adelphi have developed a toolkit for addressing climate fragility risks in peacebuilding, adaptation and livelihoods support (UNEP et al., 2019). [[#Crawford--2015|Crawford et al. (2015)]] provide recommendations for climate-resilient peacebuilding consistent with the UN Secretary General’s five peacebuilding principles, including integrating ex-combatants through the construction of climate-resilient infrastructure, using climate impacts as a platform to engage previously conflicting groups, developing national DRR and management strategies, and climate-proofing economic development activities. The USAID, in a report prepared for the Adaptation Thought Leadership and Assessments (ATLAS) programme (Adelphi &amp; Chemonics International, 2020) that drew upon resilience and peacebuilding programmes in the Horn of Africa, recommend two critical conditions to ensure activities address compound climate fragility risks. Firstly, conducting local analyses of the links between climate, conflict and fragility to identify specific risks to target and, secondly, ensuring long-term commitment with a focus on participation and flexibility.

''Conflict-sensitive adaptation that focuses on institutional frameworks, conflict management and governance mechanisms has the potential to address complex interacting risks and emergencies over the long term'' ( ''medium agreement, limited evidence'' ) ''( [[#Scheffran--2012|Scheffran et al., 2012]] ; [[#Matthew--2018|Matthew, 2018]] ; [[#Okpara--2018|Okpara et al., 2018]] )'' . However, most adaptation activities are planned and implemented under development or climate finance funds without systematic integration of conflict sensitivity, and National Adaptation strategies rarely and only implicitly address conflict and potential changes to power relations ( [[#Tänzler--2019|Tänzler et al., 2019]] ). Practitioners and policy researchers have attempted to address this gap by developing guidance and delivering training (e.g., Tänzler et al. (2019); [[#Bob--2014|Bob and Bronkhorst (2014)]] ). However, there are real challenges relating to discounting indirect impacts on conflict and maladaptation ( [[#Asplund--2020|Asplund and Hjerpe, 2020]] ) and risks of unintended outcomes ( [[#Mirumachi--2020|Mirumachi et al., 2020]] ). [[#Crawford--2020|Crawford and Church (2020)]] highlight the synergies between adaptation planning under the UNFCCC’s National Adaptation Plan process and conflict reduction. Discussing development more broadly, [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams (2020)]] suggests three barriers to development that incorporate conflict–climate risks: geographically disconnected impacts and outcomes, the discourse of climate as a threat multiplier (rather than underlying peace) and teleconnected risks occurring at different scales. Effective approaches rely on understanding local power dynamics and social relations (Sovacool 2018; Roth et al. 2019; Sapiains et al. 2021) ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ).

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==== 7.4.5.3 Gender-Based Approaches to Peacebuilding ====

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''Gender-based approaches provide novel under-utilised pathways to achieving sustainable peace'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' Security council resolutions have encouraged the incorporation of gender analysis into peacebuilding and research has shown that taking into account the gendered nature of networks and dialogues opens new avenues for cooperation that are conflict sensitive ( [[#Dunn--2015|Dunn and Matthew, 2015]] ), creating potential for women’s rights and advocacy groups to be drivers of peace (Céspedes-Báez, 2018). For example, women are working to reduce climate vulnerability security risks in urban settings by entering local politics and joining community-based organised and civil society networks ( [[#Kellog--2020|Kellog, 2020]] ). The gendered nature of vulnerability and access to natural resources (Sections 4.6.4, 4.7.5.3, 5.4.2.3, 5.5.2.6, 5.8.2.2; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18) will influence the efficacy of interventions to prevent conflict or to build durable peace ( [[#Pearse--2017|Pearse, 2017]] ; [[#Chandra--2017|Chandra et al., 2017]] ; [[#Fröhlich--2018|Fröhlich et al., 2018]] ). However, this understanding has not so far resulted in widespread employment of gender-led analyses ( [[#Fröhlich--2015|Fröhlich and Gioli, 2015]] ). This represents a key opportunity for expansion of the solution space for climate-related conflict. Analysis of peace processes more generally demonstrates the benefits of women’s participation in peace processes for devising strategies for building peace ( [[#Paffenholz--2018|Paffenholz, 2018]] ; [[#Cárdenas--2021|Cárdenas and Olivius, 2021]] ) and for the durability of that peace ( [[#Shair-Rosenfield--2017|Shair-Rosenfield and Wood, 2017]] ; [[#Krause--2018|Krause et al., 2018]] ).

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