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==== 10.6.2.1 Motivation and Regional Context ==== <div id="h3-55-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Cape Town’s ‘Day Zero’ water crisis in 2018 threatened a shut-down of water supply to 3.4 million inhabitants of the city and resulted in domestic water use restriction of 50 litres per person per day lasting for nine months (pre-drought unconstrained water use was about 170 litres per person per day, [[#DWA--2013|DWA, 2013]] ), punitive water tariffs, and temporary closure of irrigation systems. Problems with water supply in many large cities in developing countries are endemic and rarely reported internationally. The water crisis in Cape Town attracted considerable international attention to a city with functional government structures, well-developed services (compared to other urban centres in Africa), a centre of international tourism, and an economic hub with GDP of 22 billion USD (about 7,500 USD per capita, [[#Gallie--2018|Gallie et al., 2018]] ). Economic and social impacts of the crisis were significant. Loss of revenue for companies of all sizes resulted not only from the scaling down of water-dependent activities, but also from the need to invest in water-efficient technologies and processes. Tourism was affected through reduced arrivals and bookings, although only temporarily ( [[#CTT--2018|CTT, 2018]] ). In the agricultural sector, 30,000 people were laid-off and production dropped by 20% ( [[#Piennaar--2018|Piennaar and Boonzaaier, 2018]] ). The crisis initially polarized society, with conflict emerging between various water users and erosion of trust in the government, but eventually social cohesion and an acute awareness of limited water resources emerged ( [[#Robins--2019|Robins, 2019]] ). Cape Town’s crisis resulted from a combination of a strong, rare multi-year meteorological drought (Figure 10.18), estimated at 1 in 300 years ( [[#Wolski--2018|Wolski, 2018]] ), and factors related to the nature of the water supply system, operational water management and water resource policies. Cape Town was very successful in implementing water-saving actions after the previous drought of 2000–2003, reducing water losses from over 22% to 15% ( [[#Frame--2007|Frame and Killick, 2007]] ; [[#DWA--2013|DWA, 2013]] ), breaking the previous coupling of growth in water demand with growth in population. As a consequence, Cape Town won a Water Smart City award from the C40 Cities program only three years prior to the crisis. However, the water-saving actions, together with changing priorities in water resource provision from infrastructure-oriented towards resource and demand management, may well have led to delays in implementation of the expansion of water supply infrastructure ( [[#Muller--2018|Muller, 2018]] ). The expansion plan, formulated a decade prior to the crisis, included an expectation of long-term climate-change drying in the region ( [[#DWAF--2007|DWAF, 2007]] ). The crisis also exposed structural deficiencies of water management and inadequacy of a policy process in which decisions about local water resources are taken at a national level, particularly in a situation of political tension ( [[#Visser--2018|Visser, 2018]] ). The crisis was widely seen as a harbinger of future problems to be faced by the city, and a highlight of vulnerability of many cities in the world resulting from the interplay of three factors: (i) the fast urban-population growth, (ii) the economic, policy, infrastructural and water resource paradigms and constraints, and (iii) anthropogenic climate change. <div id="_idContainer052" class="Basic-Text-Frame"></div> [[File:f0461f69d2ef1358dc143bf1faf712d8 IPCC_AR6_WGI_Figure_10_18.png]] '''Figure 10.1''' '''8 |''' '''Historical and projected rainfall and Southern Annular Mode (SAM) over the Cape Town region. (a)''' Yearly accumulation of rainfall (in mm) obtained by summing monthly totals between January and December, with the drought years 2015 (orange), 2016 (red), and 2017 (purple) highlighted in colour. '''(b)''' Monthly rainfall for the drought years (in colour) compared with the 1981–2014 climatology (grey line). Rainfall in (a) and (b) is the average of 20 quality controlled and gap-filled series from stations within the Cape Town region (31°S–35°S, 18°W–20.5°W). '''(c)''' Time series of the SAM index and of historical and projected rainfall anomalies (%, baseline 1980–2010) over the Cape Town region. Observed data presented as 30-year running means of relative total annual rainfall over the Cape Town region for station-based data (black line, average of 20 stations as in (a) and (b), and gridded data (average of all gridcells falling within 31°S–35°S, 18°W–20.5°W), GPCC (green line) and CRU TS (olive line). Model ensemble results presented as the 90th-percentile range of relative 30-year running means of rainfall and the SAM index from 35 CMIP5 (blue shading) and 35 CMIP6 (red shading) simulations, 6 CORDEX simulations driven by 1 to 10 GCMs (cyan shading), 6 CCAM (purple shading) simulations from individual ensemble members, and 50 members from the MIROC6 SMILE simulations (orange shading). The light blue, dark red and yellow lines correspond to NCEP/NCAR, ERA20C and 20CR, respectively. The SAM index is calculated from sea level pressure reanalysis and GCM data as per [[#Gong--1999|Gong and Wang (1999)]] and averaged over the aforementioned bounding box. CMIP5, CORDEX and CCAM projections use RCP8.5, and CMIP6 and MIROC6 SMILE projections use SSP5-8.5. '''(d)''' Historical and projected trends in rainfall over the Cape Town region and in the SAM index. Observations and gridded data processed as in (c). Trends calculated as Theil-Sen trend with block-bootstrap confidence interval estimate. Markers show median trend, bars 95% confidence interval. Global models in each CMIP group were ordered according to the magnitude of trend in rainfall, and the same order is maintained in panels showing trends in the SAM. Further details on data sources and processing are available in the chapter data table (Table 10.SM.11). <div id="10.6.2.2" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="the-regions-climate"></span>
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