Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-7 (section)

==== 7.4.5.1 Environmental Cooperation and Peacebuilding ====

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''The environment can form the basis for active peacebuilding, and a sustainable natural environment is important for ongoing peace'' ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ) ''.'' EP is a framework increasingly utilised to understand the diverse ways in which the natural environment supports peace and can be utilised in peacebuilding; key tenets include preserving the natural environment such that degradation does not contribute to violence, protecting natural resources during conflict and using natural resources to support post-conflict economic recovery ( [[#Kron--2019|Kron, 2019]] ). EP frames natural resources as facilitating peace rather than driving conflict ( [[#Dresse--2019|Dresse et al., 2019]] ) with emerging literature analysing what this means in practice ( [[#Kovach--2016|Kovach and Conca, 2016]] ; [[#Krampe--2017|Krampe, 2017]] ; [[#Ide--2019|Ide, 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2021|Ide et al., 2021]] ; [[#Johnson--2021|Johnson, 2021]] ; [[#Kalilou--2021|Kalilou, 2021]] ). There is emergent evidence for the success of EP pathways. For example, a natural resource sharing agreement on the Kenya–Uganda border was able to reconcile spatial, logistical and conceptual barriers to addressing climate risks in development contexts ( [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ). However, the long-term impacts of EP approaches on sustaining peace are yet to be monitored and evaluated ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide and Tubi, 2020]] ). EP may be successful depending on the context and the element of peace being built ( [[#Johnson--2021|Johnson, 2021]] ) or undermine processes when environmental arguments are co-opted for geopolitical purposes ( [[#Barquet--2015|Barquet, 2015]] ) or to depoliticise conflict ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide, 2020]] ).

''Formal institutional arrangements for natural resource management can contribute to transnational cooperation'' ( ''high confidence'' ) ''(see also Chapter 4)'' . Evidence from transboundary water sharing agreements provides evidence for cooperation rather than conflict over resources ( [[#Timmerman--2017|Timmerman et al., 2017]] ; [[#Timmerman--2020|Timmerman, 2020]] ; [[#Dinar--2015|Dinar et al., 2015]] ). Transboundary water agreements and river basin organisations help build robust institutions that facilitate trust and relationship building that have benefits in other domains ( ''strong agreement, medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Dombrowsky--2010|Dombrowsky, 2010]] ; [[#Krampe--2018|Krampe and Gignoux, 2018]] ; [[#Barquet--2014|Barquet et al., 2014]] ; Ide and Detges 2018). However, outcomes can be mixed, and the international and top down nature of these approaches may limit their transferability to intra-state conflicts at local levels ( [[#Rigi--2020|Rigi and Warner, 2020]] ; [[#Ide--2021|Ide et al., 2021]] ; [[#Krampe--2021|Krampe et al., 2021]] ).

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