Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

==== 13.11.2.1 Private Sector ====

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Within the private sector, there tends to be a preference for ‘soft’ (e.g., knowledge generation) than ‘hard’ (e.g., infrastructure) adaptation measures ( [[#Goldstein--2019|Goldstein et al., 2019]] ), in contrast to government-led responses typically favouring hard measures ( [[#Pranzini--2015|Pranzini et al., 2015]] ). However, there also remains diversity across sectors and organisations in the degree and type of adaptation response ( [[#Trawöger--2014|Trawöger, 2014]] ; [[#Dannevig--2016|Dannevig and Hovelsrud, 2016]] ; [[#Ray--2017|Ray et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ricart--2019|Ricart et al., 2019]] ). Whereas some sectors, such as flood management, banking and insurance, and energy ( [[#Bank%20of%20England--2015|Bank of England, 2015]] ; [[#Gasbarro--2016|Gasbarro and Pinkse, 2016]] ; [[#Bank%20of%20England--2019|Bank of England, 2019]] ; [[#Botzen--2019|Botzen et al., 2019]] ), have generally made moderate progress on adaptation planning across Europe, there are key vulnerable economic sectors that are in earlier stages, including aviation ( [[#Burbidge--2018)|Burbidge, 2018)]] , ports and shipping ( [[#Becker--2018|Becker et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ng--2018|Ng et al., 2018]] ), and ICT ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#EEA--2018b|EEA, 2018b]] ). There is also some evidence of ‘short-sighted’ adaptation or maladaptation; for example, in winter tourism there is a preference for technical and reactive solutions (e.g., artificial snow) that will not be sufficient under high levels of warming ( [[#13.6.1.4|Section 13.6.1.4]] ).

Where adaptation is considered by companies, it is typically triggered either by the experience of extreme weather events that led to business disruptions ( [[#McKnight--2019|McKnight and Linnenluecke, 2019]] ) or is included into corporate risk management in response to regulatory, shareholder or customer pressure ( [[#Averchenkova--2016|Averchenkova et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gasbarro--2017|Gasbarro et al., 2017]] ). For instance, following the implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure by the European Commission in 2019, 50 publicly listed companies revealed their exposure to their physical climate risks in 2020 ( [[#CDSB--2020|CDSB, 2020]] ). But even if companies experience extreme weather events or stakeholder pressure, they may not adapt because they underestimate their vulnerability (Table 13.1; [[#Pinkse--2019|Pinkse and Gasbarro, 2019]] ). For example, key barriers to adaptation among Greek firms include both external (e.g., lack of support and/or guidance) and internal factors (e.g., few resources, managerial perceptions) ( [[#Halkos--2018|Halkos et al., 2018]] ). Lack of knowledge, feeling climate change is not a salient risk, and lack of social learning or collaboration appear to be key barriers to private-sector adaptation ( [[#13.1|Section 13.1]] 6.2.2; [[#Dinca--2014|Dinca et al., 2014]] ; [[#André--2017|André et al., 2017]] ; [[#Romagosa--2017|Romagosa and Pons, 2017]] ; [[#Esteve--2018|Esteve et al., 2018]] ; [[#Luís--2018|Luís et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ng--2018|Ng et al., 2018]] ). There remains little research on private-sector awareness of, or responses to, cascading or compound risks associated with climate change ( [[#Miller--2018|Miller and]] [[#Pescaroli--2018|Pescaroli, 2018]] ; [[#Pescaroli--2018|Pescaroli, 2018]] ).

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