Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-13 (section)

==== 13.11.2.2 Communities, Households and Citizens ====

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Planned behavioural adaptation remains limited among European households ( ''high confidence'' ), with few examples that can be considered transformative (e.g., structural, long-term, collective) ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Wilson--2020|Wilson et al., 2020]] ). One Swedish survey of householders at risk of extreme weather events (e.g., floods, storms) found evidence of some organisational measures (e.g., bringing possessions inside prior to a storm, preparing for power cuts with candles, etc.), but very few households took any other (technical, social, nature-based, or economic) measures ( [[#Brink--2019|Brink and Wamsler, 2019]] ). Similarly, few at risk of flooding are taking action (Sections 13.2.1, 13.6.1; [[#Stojanov--2015|Stojanov et al., 2015]] ); for example, there is little public take-up of available municipal support for individual adaptation in Germany ( [[#Wamsler--2016|Wamsler, 2016]] ). Water efficiency measures in anticipation of, or response to, drought are also limited ( [[#Bryan--2019|Bryan et al., 2019]] ), although water reuse in Mediterranean and some other EU (e.g., the UK and the Netherlands) countries is increasing ( [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] ; [[#Aparicio--2017|Aparicio, 2017]] ). Among the adaptation responses recorded, few are perceived as opportunities ( [[#Taylor--2014|Taylor et al., 2014]] ; [[#Simonet--2016|Simonet and Fatorić, 2016]] ). There is currently little European research on public responses to risks other than flooding, heat stress and drought, such as vector-borne disease, and to multiple and cascading risks ( [[#13.7|Section 13.7]] ; [[#van%20Valkengoed--2019|van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019]] ).

Perceived personal responsibility for tackling climate change remains low across the EU (Figure 13.35) and partly explains why household adaptation remains limited ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Taylor--2014|Taylor et al., 2014]] ; [[#van%20Valkengoed--2019|van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019]] ), despite risk perception apparently growing (Figure Box 13.2.1; [[#Capstick--2015|Capstick et al., 2015]] ; [[#Poppel--2015|Poppel et al., 2015]] ; [[#BEIS--2019|BEIS, 2019]] ). Householders’ risk perception and concern about climate change fluctuates in response to media coverage and significant weather or sociopolitical events ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Capstick--2015|Capstick et al., 2015]] ). On average across Europe, and particularly in relation to gradual change, compared with experts, non-experts continue to underestimate climate-change risks ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Taylor--2014|Taylor et al., 2014]] ), have low awareness of adaptation options, and confuse adaptation and mitigation (Harcourt, 2019), suggesting a need for improved climate literacy among the public. Indeed, fostering learning and coping capacity supports robust adaptation pathways ( [[#Jäger--2015|Jäger et al., 2015]] ).

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'''Figure 13.35 |''' '''Trends in perceived climate-change risks and responsibility for tackling climate change across EU-28; data collected from around 1000 respondents per country for each year surveyed (European Comission, 2017)'''

There is strong public support for adaptation policy (e.g., building flood defences), particularly within the UK, France, Norway and Germany ( [[#Doran--2018|Doran et al., 2018]] ). Although, in some cases such public adaptation can undermine motivation for householders to take adaptation measures ( [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] ), public adaptation can also increase householder motivations, with perceived efficacy of action a strong predictor of adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Moser--2014|Moser, 2014]] ; [[#van%20Valkengoed--2019|van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019]] ). However, there are also structural and economic barriers to household adaptation due to lack of policy incentives or regulations. For example, water-saving devices in homes could halve consumption, but lack of economic benefits to householders are barriers to adoption; and lack of standards as well as societal hesitation may explain low levels of water reuse in Europe ( [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] ; [[#EEA--2017b|EEA, 2017b]] ). Conversely, water meters and higher tariffs have been found to reduce water consumption only in combination with other measures ( [[#EEA--2017b|EEA, 2017b]] ; [[#Bryan--2019|Bryan et al., 2019]] ).

As well as temporal trends in climate-change risk perception, the literature since AR5 continues to show much heterogeneity (both within and between nations) among householders in respect of risk perception ( ''high confidence'' ). Higher climate-change risk perceptions have been observed in Spain, Portugal, Iceland and Germany (Figure 13.2); at the individual level, women, younger age groups, more educated, left-leaning and those with more ‘self-transcendent’ values perceive more negative impacts from climate change, although the strength of these relationships varies across European nations ( [[#Clayton--2015|Clayton et al., 2015]] ; [[#Doran--2018|Doran et al., 2018]] ; [[#Poortinga--2019|Poortinga et al., 2019]] ; [[#Duijndam--2021|Duijndam and van Beukering, 2021]] ). Stronger evidence exists since AR5 that experience of extreme weather events can shape climate-change risk perceptions, if these events are attributed to climate change or evoke negative emotions ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Clayton--2015|Clayton et al., 2015]] ; [[#Demski--2017|Demski et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ogunbode--2019|Ogunbode et al., 2019]] ). Proximity to climate hazards does not predict adaptation responses in a straightforward way: in Portugal, those living by the coast were more ''likely'' to attribute local natural hazards to climate change and to take some adaptive measures ( [[#Luís--2017|Luís et al., 2017]] ); while waterside residents in flood-prone regions of France and Austria were more resistant to relocation, due to higher place attachment ( [[#Adger--2013|Adger et al., 2013]] ; [[#Rey-Valette--2019|Rey-Valette et al., 2019]] ; [[#van%20Valkengoed--2019|van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019]] ; [[#Seebauer--2020|Seebauer and Winkler, 2020]] ). Migration from threatened regions is discussed in [[#13.8.1.3|Section 13.8.1.3]] .

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