Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-1 (section)

=== 1.2.1 Land system change, land degradation, desertification and food security ===

<div id="section-1-2-1-1-future-trends-in-the-global-land-system"></div>

<span id="future-trends-in-the-global-land-system"></span>
==== 1.2.1.1 Future trends in the global land system ====

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Human population is projected to increase to nearly 9.8 (± 1) billion people by 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100 (United Nations 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r241|241]]</sup> ). More people, a growing global middle class (Crist et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r242|242]]</sup> ), economic growth, and continued urbanisation (Jiang and O’Neill 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r243|243]]</sup> ) increase the pressures on expanding crop and pasture area and intensifying land management. Changes in diets, efficiency and technology could reduce these pressures (Billen et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r244|244]]</sup> ; Popp et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r245|245]]</sup> ; Muller et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r246|246]]</sup> ; Alexander et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r247|247]]</sup> ; Springmann et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r248|248]]</sup> ; Myers et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r249|249]]</sup> ; Erb et al. 2016c <sup>[[#fn:r250|250]]</sup> ; FAO 2018b <sup>[[#fn:r251|251]]</sup> ) (Sections 5.3 and 6.2.2).

Given the large uncertainties underlying the many drivers of land use, as well as their complex relation to climate change and other biophysical constraints, future trends in the global land system are explored in scenarios and models that seek to span across these uncertainties (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). Generally, these scenarios indicate a continued increase in global food demand, owing to population growth and increasing wealth. The associated land area needs are a key uncertainty, a function of the interplay between production, consumption, yields, and production efficiency (in particular for livestock and waste) (FAO 2018b; van Vuuren et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r252|252]]</sup> ; Springmann et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r253|253]]</sup> ; Riahi et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r254|254]]</sup> ; Prestele et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r255|255]]</sup> ; Ramankutty et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r256|256]]</sup> ; Erb et al. 2016b <sup>[[#fn:r257|257]]</sup> ; Popp et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r258|258]]</sup> ) (Section 1.3 and Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). Many factors, such as climate change, local contexts, education, human and social capital, policy-making, economic framework conditions, energy availability, degradation, and many more, affect this interplay, as discussed in all chapters of this report.

Global telecouplings in the land system, the distal connections and multidirectional flows between regions and land systems, are expected to increase, due to urbanisation (Seto et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r259|259]]</sup> ; van Vliet et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r260|260]]</sup> ; Jiang and O’Neill 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r261|261]]</sup> ; Friis et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r262|262]]</sup> ), and international trade (Konar et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r263|263]]</sup> ; Erb et al. 2016b; Billen et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r264|264]]</sup> ; Lassaletta et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r265|265]]</sup> ). Telecoupling can support efficiency gains in production, but can also lead to complex cause–effect chains and indirect effects such as land competition or leakage (displacement of the environmental impacts; see Glossary), with governance challenges (Baldos and Hertel 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r266|266]]</sup> ; Kastner et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r267|267]]</sup> ; Liu et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r268|268]]</sup> ; Wood et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r269|269]]</sup> ; Schröter et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r270|270]]</sup> ; Lapola et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r271|271]]</sup> ; Jadin et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r272|272]]</sup> ; Erb et al. 2016b; Billen et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r273|273]]</sup> ; Chaudhary and Kastner 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r274|274]]</sup> ; Marques et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r275|275]]</sup> ; Seto and Ramankutty 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r276|276]]</sup> ) (Section 1.2.1.5). Furthermore, urban growth is anticipated to occur at the expense of fertile (crop)land, posing a food security challenge, in particular in regions of high population density and agrarian-dominated economies, with limited capacity to compensate for these losses (Seto et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r277|277]]</sup> ; Güneralp et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r278|278]]</sup> ; Aronson et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r279|279]]</sup> ; Martellozzo et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r280|280]]</sup> ; Bren d’Amour et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r281|281]]</sup> ; Seto and Ramankutty 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r282|282]]</sup> ; van Vliet et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r283|283]]</sup> ).

Future climate change and increasing atmospheric CO <sub>2</sub> concentration are expected to accentuate existing challenges by, for example, shifting biomes or affecting crop yields (Baldos and Hertel 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r284|284]]</sup> ; Schlenker and Lobell 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r285|285]]</sup> ; Lipper et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r286|286]]</sup> ; Challinor et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r287|287]]</sup> ; Myers et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r288|288]]</sup> ) (Section 5.2.2), as well as through land-based climate change mitigation. There is ''high confidence'' that large-scale implementation of bioenergy or afforestation can further exacerbate existing challenges (Smith et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r289|289]]</sup> ) (Section 1.3.1 and Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 6).

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==== 1.2.1.2 Land degradation ====

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As discussed in Chapter 4, the concept of land degradation, including its definition, has been used in different ways in different communities and in previous assessments (such as the IPBES Land Degradation and Restoration Assessment). In the SRCCL, land degradation is defined as a ''negative trend in land condition, caused by direct or indirect human-induced processes including anthropogenic climate change, expressed as long-term reduction or loss of at least one of the following: biological productivity, ecological integrity or value to humans.'' This definition applies to forest and non-forest land (Chapter 4 and Glossary).

Land degradation is a critical issue for ecosystems around the world due to the loss of actual or potential productivity or utility (Ravi et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r291|291]]</sup> ; Mirzabaev et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r292|292]]</sup> ; FAO and ITPS 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r293|293]]</sup> ; Cerretelli et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r294|294]]</sup> ). Land degradation is driven to a large degree by unsustainable agriculture and forestry, socio-economic pressures, such as rapid urbanisation and population growth, and unsustainable production practices in combination with climatic factors (Field et al. 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r295|295]]</sup> ; Lal 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r296|296]]</sup> ; Beinroth et al. 1994 <sup>[[#fn:r297|297]]</sup> ; Abu Hammad and Tumeizi 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r298|298]]</sup> ; Ferreira et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r299|299]]</sup> ; Franco and Giannini 2005 <sup>[[#fn:r300|300]]</sup> ; Abahussain et al. 2002 <sup>[[#fn:r301|301]]</sup> ).

Global estimates of the total degraded area vary from less than 10 million km <sup>2</sup> to over 60 million km <sup>2</sup> , with additionally large disagreement regarding the spatial distribution (Gibbs and Salmon 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r302|302]]</sup> ) (Section 4.3). The annual increase in the degraded land area has been estimated as 50,000–100,000 million km <sup>2</sup> yr <sup>–1</sup> (Stavi and Lal 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r303|303]]</sup> ), and the loss of total ecosystem services equivalent to about 10% of the world’s GDP in the year 2010 (Sutton et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r304|304]]</sup> ). Although land degradation is a common risk across the globe, poor countries remain most vulnerable to its impacts. Soil degradation is of particular concern, due to the long period necessary to restore soils (Lal 2009; Stockmann et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r305|305]]</sup> ; Lal 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r306|306]]</sup> ), as well as the rapid degradation of primary forests through fragmentation (Haddad et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r307|307]]</sup> ). Among the most vulnerable ecosystems to degradation are high-carbon- stock wetlands (including peatlands). Drainage of natural wetlands for use in agriculture leads to high CO <sub>2</sub> emissions and degradation ( ''high confidence'' ) (Strack 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r308|308]]</sup> ; Limpens et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r309|309]]</sup> ; Aich et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r310|310]]</sup> ; Murdiyarso et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r311|311]]</sup> ; Kauffman et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r312|312]]</sup> ; Dohong et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r313|313]]</sup> ; Arifanti et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r314|314]]</sup> ; Evans et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r315|315]]</sup> ). Land degradation is an important factor contributing to uncertainties in the mitigation potential of land-based ecosystems (Smith et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r316|316]]</sup> ). Furthermore, degradation that reduces forest (and agricultural) biomass and soil organic carbon leads to higher rates of runoff ( ''high confidence'' ) (Molina et al. 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r317|317]]</sup> ; Valentin et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r318|318]]</sup> ; Mateos et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r319|319]]</sup> ; Noordwijk et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r320|320]]</sup> ) and hence to increasing flood risk ( ''low confidence'' ) (Bradshaw et al. 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r321|321]]</sup> ; Laurance 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r322|322]]</sup> ; van Dijk et al. 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r323|323]]</sup> ).

<div id="section-1-2-1-3-desertification"></div>

<span id="desertification"></span>
==== 1.2.1.3 Desertification ====

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The SRCCL adopts the definition of the UNCCD of desertification, being land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas (drylands) (Glossary and Section 3.1.1). Desertification results from various factors, including climate variations and human activities, and is not limited to irreversible forms of land degradation (Tal 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r930|930]]</sup> ; Bai et al. 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r931|931]]</sup> ). A critical challenge in the assessment of desertification is to identify a ‘non-desertified’ reference state (Bestelmeyer et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r324|324]]</sup> ). While climatic trends and variability can change the intensity of desertification processes, some authors exclude climate effects, arguing that desertification is a purely human-induced process of land degradation with different levels of severity and consequences (Sivakumar 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r325|325]]</sup> ).

As a consequence of varying definitions and different methodologies, the area of desertification varies widely (D’Odorico et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r326|326]]</sup> ; Bestelmeyer et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r327|327]]</sup> ; and references therein). Arid regions of the world cover up to about 46% of the total terrestrial surface (about 60 million km <sup>2</sup> ) (Pravalie 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r328|328]]</sup> ; Koutroulis 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r329|329]]</sup> ). Around 3 billion people reside in dryland regions (D’Odorico et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r330|330]]</sup> ; Maestre et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r331|331]]</sup> ) (Section 3.1.1). In 2015, about 500 (360–620) million people lived within areas which experienced desertification between 1980s and 2000s (Figure 1.1and Section 3.1.1). The combination of low rainfall with frequently infertile soils renders these regions, and the people who rely on them, vulnerable to both climate change, and unsustainable land management ( ''high confidence'' ). In spite of the national, regional and international efforts to combat desertification, it remains one of the major environmental problems (Abahussain et al. 2002 <sup>[[#fn:r332|332]]</sup> ; Cherlet et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r333|333]]</sup> ).

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<span id="food-security-food-systems-and-linkages-to-land-based-ecosystems"></span>
==== 1.2.1.4 Food security, food systems and linkages to land-based ecosystems ====

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The High Level Panel of Experts of the Committee on Food Security define the food system as to “gather all the elements (environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, etc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the output of these activities, including socio-economic and environmental outcomes” (HLPE 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r334|334]]</sup> ). Likewise, food security has been defined as “a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r335|335]]</sup> ). By this definition, food security is characterised by food availability, economic and physical access to food, food utilisation and food stability over time. Food and nutrition security is one of the key outcomes of the food system (FAO 2018b <sup>[[#fn:r336|336]]</sup> ; Figure 1.4).

After a prolonged decline, world hunger appears to be on the rise again, with the number of undernourished people having increased to an estimated 821 million in 2017, up from 804 million in 2016 and 784 million in 2015, although still below the 900 million reported in 2000 (FAO et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r337|337]]</sup> ) (Section 5.1.2). Of the total undernourished in 2018, for example, 256.5 million lived in Africa, and 515.1 million in Asia (excluding Japan). The same FAO report also states that child undernourishment continues to decline, but levels of overweight populations and obesity are increasing. The total number of overweight children in 2017 was 38–40 million worldwide, and globally up to around two billion adults are by now overweight (Section 5.1.2). FAO also estimated that close to 2000 million people suffer from micronutrient malnutrition (FAO 2018b <sup>[[#fn:r338|338]]</sup> ).

Food insecurity most notably occurs in situations of conflict, and conflict combined with droughts or floods (Cafiero et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r339|339]]</sup> ; Smith et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r340|340]]</sup> ). The close parallel between food insecurity prevalence and poverty means that tackling development priorities would enhance sustainable land use options for climate mitigation.

Climate change affects the food system as changes in trends and variability in rainfall and temperature variability impact crop and livestock productivity and total production (Osborne and Wheeler 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r341|341]]</sup> ; Tigchelaar et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r342|342]]</sup> ; Iizumi and Ramankutty 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r343|343]]</sup> ), the nutritional quality of food (Loladze 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r344|344]]</sup> ; Myers et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r345|345]]</sup> ; Ziska et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r346|346]]</sup> ; Medek et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r347|347]]</sup> ), water supply (Nkhonjera 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r348|348]]</sup> ), and incidence of pests and diseases (Curtis et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r349|349]]</sup> ). These factors also impact on human health, increasing morbidity and affecting human ability to process ingested food (Franchini and Mannucci 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r350|350]]</sup> ; Wu et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r351|351]]</sup> ; Raiten and Aimone 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r352|352]]</sup> ). At the same time, the food system generates negative externalities (the environmental effects of production and consumption) in the form of GHG emissions

(Sections 1.1.2 and 2.3), pollution (van Noordwijk and Brussaard 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r353|353]]</sup> ; Thyberg and Tonjes 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r354|354]]</sup> ; Borsato et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r355|355]]</sup> ; Kibler et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r356|356]]</sup> ), water quality (Malone et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r357|357]]</sup> ; Norse and Ju 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r358|358]]</sup> ), and ecosystem services loss (Schipper et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r359|359]]</sup> ; Eeraerts et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r360|360]]</sup> ) with direct and indirect impacts on climate change and reduced resilience to climate variability. As food systems are assessed in relation to their contribution to global warming and/or to land degradation (e.g., livestock systems) it is critical to evaluate their contribution to food security and livelihoods and to consider alternatives, especially for developing countries where food insecurity is prevalent (Röös et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r361|361]]</sup> ; Salmon et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r362|362]]</sup> ).

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<span id="food-system-and-its-relations-to-land-and-climatethe-food-system-is-conceptualised-through-supply-production-processing-marketing-and-retailing-and-demand-consumption-and-diets-that-are-shaped-by-physical-economic-social-and-cultural-determinants-influencing-choices-access-utilisation-quality-safety-and-waste.-food-system-drivers-ecosystem-services-economics-and-technology-social-and-cultural-norms"></span>
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'''Food system (and its relations to land and climate):The food system is conceptualised through supply (production, processing, marketing and retailing) and demand (consumption and diets) that are shaped by physical, economic, social and cultural determinants influencing choices, access, utilisation, quality, safety and waste. Food system drivers (ecosystem services, economics and technology, social and cultural norms […]'''
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[[File:9de221615672da9f46259732059f7d27 Figure-1.4-1024x699.jpg]]

Food system (and its relations to land and climate):The food system is conceptualised through supply (production, processing, marketing and retailing) and demand (consumption and diets) that are shaped by physical, economic, social and cultural determinants influencing choices, access, utilisation, quality, safety and waste. Food system drivers (ecosystem services, economics and technology, social and cultural norms and traditions, and demographics) combine with the enabling conditions (policies, institutions and governance) to affect food system outcomes including food security, nutrition and health, livelihoods, economic and cultural benefits as well as environmental outcomes or side-effects (nutrient and soil loss, water use and quality, GHG emissions and other pollutants). Climate and climate change have direct impacts on the food system (productivity, variability, nutritional quality) while the latter contributes to local climate (albedo, evapotranspiration) and global warming (GHGs). The land system (function, structures, and processes) affects the food system directly (food production) and indirectly (ecosystem services) while food demand and supply processes affect land (land-use change) and land-related processes (e.g., land degradation, desertification) (Chapter 5).

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<div id="section-1-2-1-5-challenges-arising-from-land-governance"></div>

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==== 1.2.1.5 Challenges arising from land governance ====

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Land-use change has both positive and negative effects: it can lead to economic growth, but it can become a source of tension and social unrest leading to elite capture, and competition (Haberl 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r363|363]]</sup> ). Competition for land plays out continuously among different use types (cropland, pastureland, forests, urban spaces, and conservation and protected lands) and between different users within the same land-use category (subsistence vs commercial farmers) (Dell’Angelo et al. 2017b <sup>[[#fn:r364|364]]</sup> ). Competition is mediated through economic and market forces (expressed through land rental and purchases, as well as trade and investments). In the context of such transactions, power relations often disfavour disadvantaged groups such as small-scale farmers, indigenous communities or women (Doss et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r365|365]]</sup> ; Ravnborg et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r366|366]]</sup> ). These drivers are influenced to a large degree by policies, institutions and governance structures. Land governance determines not only who can access the land, but also the role of land ownership (legal, formal, customary or collective) which influences land use, land-use change and the resulting land competition (Moroni 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r367|367]]</sup> ).

Globally, there is competition for land because it is a finite resource and because most of the highly productive land is already exploited by humans (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r368|368]]</sup> ; Lambin 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r369|369]]</sup> ; Venter et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r370|370]]</sup> ). Driven by growing population, urbanisation, demand for food and energy, as well as land degradation, competition for land is expected to accentuate land scarcity in the future (Tilman et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r371|371]]</sup> ; Foley et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r372|372]]</sup> ; Lambin 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r373|373]]</sup> ; Popp et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r374|374]]</sup> ) ( ''robust evidence, high agreement'' ). Climate change influences land use both directly and indirectly, as climate policies can also a play a role in increasing land competition via forest conservation policies, afforestation, or energy crop production (Section 1.3.1), with the potential for implications for food security (Hussein et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r375|375]]</sup> ) and local land-ownership.

An example of large-scale change in land ownership is the much-debated large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) by investors which peaked in 2008 during the food price crisis, the financial crisis, and has also been linked to the search for biofuel investments (Dell’Angelo et al. 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r376|376]]</sup> ). Since 2000, almost 50 million hectares of land have been acquired, and there are no signs of stagnation in the foreseeable future (Land Matrix 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r377|377]]</sup> ).The LSLA phenomenon, which largely targets agriculture, is widespread, including Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America (Rulli et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r378|378]]</sup> ; Nolte et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r379|379]]</sup> ; Constantin et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r380|380]]</sup> ). LSLAs are promoted by investors and host governments on economic grounds (infrastructure, employment, market development) (Deininger et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r381|381]]</sup> ), but their social and environmental impacts can be negative and significant (Dell’Angelo et al. 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r382|382]]</sup> ).

Much of the criticism of LSLA focuses on its social impacts, especially the threat to local communities’ land rights (especially indigenous people and women) (Anseeuw et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r383|383]]</sup> ) and displaced communities creating secondary land expansion (Messerli et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r384|384]]</sup> ; Davis et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r385|385]]</sup> ). The promises that LSLAs would develop efficient agriculture on non-forested, unused land (Deininger et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r386|386]]</sup> ) has so far not been fulfilled. However, LSLA is not the only outcome of weak land governance structures (Wang et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r387|387]]</sup> ): other forms of inequitable or irregular land acquisition can also be home-grown, pitting one community against a more vulnerable group (Xu 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r388|388]]</sup> ) or land capture by urban elites (McDonnell 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r389|389]]</sup> ). As demands on land are increasing, building governance capacity and securing land tenure becomes essential to attain sustainable land use, which has the potential to mitigate climate change, promote food security, and potentially reduce risks of climate-induced migration and associated risks of conflicts (Section 7.6).

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