Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-18 (section)

=== 18.2.2 Understanding Development in CRD ===

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Development in this report is defined as efforts, both formal and informal, to improve standards of human well-being, particularly in places historically disadvantaged by colonialism and other features of early global integration. Development is not limited to the SDGs, however these represent an internationally agreed sub-set of goals. Prior IPCC reports employed development as a typological framing of the current state of a given country or population ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.1.4|Section 1.1.4]] ). Such framings frequently rest upon measures of economic activity, using them as proxies for the wider well-being of the population whose activity is measured. For example, the level of GDP is often equated with levels of social welfare, even though as a measure of market output, it can be an inadequate metric for gauging well-being over time, particularly in its environmental and social dimensions ( [[#Van%20den%20Bergh--2007|Van den Bergh, 2007]] ; Stiglitz et al., 2009).

The result of this broad framing linking economic growth to human well-being has been decades of policies, programmes and projects aimed at growing economies at scales from the household to regional and global. However, linking development to past and current modes of economic growth creates significant challenges for CRD, as it implies that the very processes that have contributed to current climate challenges, including economic growth and the resource use and energy regimes it relies upon, are also the pathways to improvements in human well-being. This places climate resilience and development in opposition to one another.

While there are many possible successful pathways to future development in the context of climate change, history shows that pathways positive for the vast majority of people typically induce significant impacts and costs, especially on marginal and vulnerable people ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Hickel--2017|Hickel, 2017]] ). Frequently, considerations for social difference and equity are side-lined in these processes, for example through the assumption that a growing economy lifts opportunity for all, further marginalising those who are the most vulnerable to climate change ( [[#Matin--2018|Matin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Diffenbaugh--2019|Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019]] ).

The Agenda 2030 and its 17 SDGs and 169 targets seeks to ‘leave no one behind’ through five pillars (5Ps): People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership ( [[#United%20Nations--2015|United Nations, 2015]] ). The five pillars align with the dimensions of development that influence motion towards or away from CRD. The focus on '''people''' refers to inclusion rather than exclusion, and the extent to which people are empowered or disempowered to make decisions about their well-being, determine their futures and be in a position to assert their rights. This means being able to make decisions that determine whether people are on a pathway towards or away from CRD (Figure 18.1–18.3). The focus on '''planet''' refers to protecting the planet, ensuring a balance of ecosystems, biodiversity and human activities, and giving equal space and respect for its integrity. The focus on '''prosperity''' refers to equity in well-being grounded in unanimity over shared goals and resources, rather than individualism, and economic, social and technological progress grounded in stewardship and care, rather than exploitation. The focus on '''partnership''' refers to mutual respect embedded in solidarity that recognises multiple worldviews and their respective knowledges, rather than singular or hierarchy of knowledge, and acknowledges inherent nature-society connections, rather than posing nature as opposites or competitors. The focus on '''peace''' emphasises the need for just and equitable societies. These five pillars are inter-related but local and national contexts situate current status differently around the world. Successful achievement of Agenda 2030 is aligned with a safe climate with adequate mitigation and adaptation, and effective and inclusive systems transitions. With these conditions, a high CRD world can be attained, noting that when approached individually, the transformative potential of the SDGs is limited ( [[#Veland--2021|Veland et al., 2021]] ).

The need for transformational changes across sectors and scales to address the urgency and scope of action needed to enable a climate-resilient future in which goals such as the SDGs might be realised requires attention to the specific ways in which development action is defined and enacted (Box 18.1).

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==== 18.2.2.1 Development Perspectives ====

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Development is about ‘improvement’. However there have been different and often conflicting viewpoints on the improvement of ‘what’ and ‘how’ to improve. The diversity of positions has resulted in a multitude of metrics to track development, some more influential than others on policy. Alternative measures of development, while numerous, generally seek to nuance the connection between economic growth and human well-being. Because they maintain core notions of progress and, in some cases, economic growth seen in more mainstream models of development, they are less vehicles for transformation than continuations of thinking and action fundamentally at odds with the needs of CRD. These include the Measure of Economic Welfare ( [[#Nordhaus--1973|Nordhaus and Tobin, 1973]] ), the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare ( [[#Cobb--1989|Cobb and Daly, 1989]] ), the Genuine Progress Indicator ( [[#Escobar--1995|Escobar, 1995]] ), the Adjusted Net Saving Index or the Genuine Savings Index (GSI), The Human Development Index (HDI), the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016a), the Gender Development Index, the Gender Inequality Index, the Multidimensional Poverty Index, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) ( [[#Daly--1989|Daly and Cobb, 1989]] ), the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) ( [[#Kubiszewski--2013|Kubiszewski et al., 2013]] ), Gross National Happiness (GNH) ( [[#Ura--2004|Ura and Galay, 2004]] ), Measures of Australia’s Progress (MAP) ( [[#Trewin--2004|Trewin and Hall, 2004]] ), the OECD Better Life Index ( [[#OECD--2019a|OECD, 2019a]] ) and the Happy Planet Index ( [[#NEF--2016|NEF, 2016]] ).

In terms of their historical trajectory, different perspectives on development can be broadly divided into five categories.

# ''Development as economic growth (1950s onwards)'' : Equating development with economic growth was a natural outcome of the dominance of economics as the major discipline to study problems of newly independent countries in the 1950s ( [[#Escobar--1995|Escobar, 1995]] ), measured through GDP. Environment was not a policy concern in the immediate period after decolonisation. The GDP measure has withstood the test of time, in spite of being an inexact measure of human well-being, and is the widely used metric globally to track development. Recent improvements to GDP have tried to account for environmental factors ( [[#Gundimeda--2007|Gundimeda et al., 2007]] ; [[#United%20Nations--2021|]] [[#United%20Nations--2021|United Nations, 2021]] ).
# ''Development as distributional improvements (1970s onwards)'' : That economic growth does not automatically result in decline in poverty and improved distribution of income became apparent in the 1970s. Welfare measures were thus promoted that involved ‘redistribution with growth’ ( [[#Chenery--1974|Chenery, 1974]] ). These distributional concerns have re-emerged in the last two decades with the widening gap between the richer and poorer groups of the population ( [[#Chancel--2019|Chancel and Piketty, 2019]] ) and also the increased attention to ‘ecological distribution conflicts’ ( [[#Martinez-Alier--2021|Martinez-Alier, 2021]] ). The political economy perspective, highlighting continued dependencies of countries in the Global South on the Global North, now evolved into political ecology highlighting environmental concerns between and within countries. Environment was not yet a policy priority, despite the links between development and environment becoming clearer.
# ''Development as participation (1980s onwards)'' : Bottom-up responses emphasising sustainable livelihoods and local-level development emerged in the 1980s. The movement, which involved independent and uncoordinated efforts by grassroots activists, social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), became ‘mainstreamed’ into development in the 1990s ( [[#Chambers--2012|Chambers, 2012]] ). The multi-dimensional nature of poverty was acknowledged at the global policy level ( [[#World%20Bank--2000|World Bank, 2000]] ) and there was wider acceptance of the role of non-economics social sciences as well as critical approaches in research on development and poverty ( [[#Thomas--2008|Thomas, 2008]] ). Participatory development involved decentralisation and local planning, emphasising protection of local natural resources in addition to improving living standards.
# ''Development as expansion of human capabilities (1980s onwards)'' : The human development and capabilities approach was the first formidable response to the GDP-centric view of development ( [[#Sen--2000|Sen, 2000]] ; [[#Deneulin--2009|Deneulin and Shahani, 2009]] ). Studies showed that improvements in income did not necessarily improve human well-being in other dimensions such as health and education, or more broadly put, ‘freedoms’ (Ruggeri Laderchi et al., 2003). The capabilities idea was influential in global policy making through Human Development Reports and metrics such as Human Development Index (HDI) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). However, environmental sustainability was not a major component in this approach until much later ( [[#Alkire--2018|Alkire and Jahan, 2018]] ). Recent improvements to HDI such as the planetary pressures-adjusted HDI ( [[#United%20Nations--2020|United Nations, 2020]] ) is a step in this direction.
# ''Development as post-growth (2010 onwards)'' : The late 1980s saw a big push towards taking the environment to the centre of the global policy agenda ( [[#World%20Commission%20on%20Environment%20and%20Development--1987|World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987]] ). However, progress in addressing environmental questions has been slow. As compared with Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), SDGs aim to tackle environmental concerns by explicitly tracking progress on multiple indicators. Nevertheless, the approach in these policy propositions sits largely within the economic growth framework itself. The climate change challenge and the financial crisis of 2008 led many scholars, ecological economists and environmental social scientists in particular, to argue for a post-growth world. Post-growth ( [[#Jackson--2021|Jackson, 2021]] ), degrowth ( [[#Kallis--2018|Kallis, 2018]] ; [[#Hickel--2021|Hickel et al., 2021]] ) and other environmentalist scholarship takes inspiration from critiques of development such as post-development ( [[#Escobar--1995|Escobar, 1995]] ). The argument here is not for better metrics but for imagining and working towards systemic change in the wake of the climate crisis. The challenge however is how to account for historical differences in economic growth and living standards between the Global North and the Global South and to protect the interests of Global South in the spirit of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ to climate change adaptation and mitigation. As empirical studies in the Global South have demonstrated ( [[#Lele--2018|Lele et al., 2018]] ), developing countries face multiple stressors, climate change being just one among them, and there are multiple normative concerns in developing country contexts, such as equity and justice, and not merely resilience ( ''very high confidence'' ).

Achieving CRD requires framings of development that move away from linear paradigms of development as material progress by focusing on diversity and heterogeneity, well-being and equality, not only in contemporary practices, but also pathways of change over time ( [[#Gibson-Graham--2005|Gibson-Graham, 2005]] ; [[#Gibson-Graham--2006|Gibson-Graham, 2006]] ). Such approaches, which are fundamentally aligned with ecological and ecosystem-based environmental assessments that identified heterogeneity of approaches and actions as the most effective path to a sustainable world ( [[#Millennium%20Ecosystem%20Assessment--2005|Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005]] ), emphasise the importance of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, not merely as alternative sources of information about the world, but as different paradigms of well-being ( [[#Kallis--2018|Kallis, 2018]] ). These include Indigenous and local knowledge that provide alternatives to these framings of the world (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG). This broad reframing of development includes a focus on visions such as ‘buen vivir’ ( [[#Cubillo-Guevara--2014|Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014]] ; [[#Walsh--2018|Walsh, 2018]] ; [[#Acosta--2019|Acosta et al., 2019]] ), ecological Swaraj ( [[#Kothari--2014|Kothari et al., 2014]] ; [[#Demaria--2017|Demaria and Kothari, 2017]] ; [[#Shiva--2017|Shiva, 2017]] ) and Ubuntu ( [[#Dreyer--2015|Dreyer, 2015]] ; [[#Ewuoso--2019|Ewuoso and Hall, 2019]] ), among others. All are linked by relationships with nature radically different from the Western mechanistic vision, presenting not only framings of development and the environment that yield locally appropriate CRDPs, but serve as examples of alternative ways of living in balance with nature that might inform similar thinking in other places.

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==== 18.2.2.2. Complexity of Development and Climate Action ====

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Differing perspectives on development are in part determined by the multiple diverse priorities held by different actors and nations. Another reason is that development is not a linear process with a single goal, and active development planning requires simultaneously taking multiple processes and factors into account. This is well illustrated by growing attention to climate security. The AR5 delivered conflicting messages regarding climate change and security ( [[#Gleditsch--2014|Gleditsch and Nordås, 2014]] ), yet the understanding of climate-related security risks has made substantial progress in recent years ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2021|von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021]] ). Although there remains considerable research gaps in certain regions ( [[#Adams--2018|Adams et al., 2018]] ), a large body of qualitative and quantitative studies from different disciplines provides new insight into the relationship of climate change and security ( [[#Buhaug--2015|Buhaug, 2015]] ; [[#De%20Juan--2015|De Juan, 2015]] ; [[#Brzoska--2016|Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Abrahams--2017|Abrahams and Carr, 2017]] ; [[#Sakaguchi--2017|Sakaguchi et al., 2017]] ; Moran et al, 2018; [[#Scheffran--2020|Scheffran, 2020]] ). Though not the only cause ( [[#Sakaguchi--2017|Sakaguchi et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ), climate change undermines human livelihoods and security, because it increases the populations vulnerabilities, grievances and political tensions through an array of indirect—at times nonlinear—pathways, thereby increasing human insecurity and the risk of violent conflict ( [[#van%20Baalen--2018|van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2021|von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021]] ). Indeed, context, as well as timing and spatial distribution, matter and need to be accounted for ( [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ).

In line with this better understanding, climate change and security have been reframed in the political space, to focus more on human security. The solutions to climate-related security risks cannot be military, but are linked to development and people’s vulnerabilities in complex social and politically fragile settings ( [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ). This has resulted in integration of climate-related security risk into institutional and national frameworks ( [[#Dellmuth--2018|Dellmuth et al., 2018]] ; [[#Scott--2018|Scott and Ku, 2018]] ; [[#Aminga--2020|Aminga and Krampe, 2020]] ), including several Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) ( [[#Jernnäs--2019|Jernnäs and Linnér, 2019]] ; [[#Remling--2021|Remling, 2021]] ). One example is the UN Climate Security Mechanism—set up in 2018 between UNDP, UNEP and UN DPPA to help the UN more systematically address climate-related security risks and devise prevention and management strategies. Yet work remains in bridging these concerns with practical responses on the ground ( [[#Busby--2021|Busby, 2021]] ). Especially since emerging research building on the maladaptation literature shows that this practice cannot just mean adding adaptation and mitigation to the mix of development strategies in a given location, as this may have unintended and unanticipated effects and might even backfire completely ( [[#Dabelko--2013|Dabelko et al., 2013]] ; [[#Magnan--2020|Magnan et al., 2020]] ; [[#Mirumachi--2020|Mirumachi et al., 2020]] ; [[#Schipper--2020|Schipper, 2020]] ; [[#Swatuk--2021|Swatuk et al., 2021]] ). In extremely underdeveloped, fragile contexts such as Afghanistan, the local-level side effects of climate adaptation and mitigation projects might result in different development outcomes and question the potential for sustainable peace ( [[#Krampe--2021|Krampe et al., 2021]] ). Given the clearer understanding of the intertwined nature of climate change, security and development—especially in fragile and conflict affected regions—a rethinking of how to transfer this knowledge into policy solutions is necessary for the formulation of CRD.

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