Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-4 (section)

=== CCP4.2.3 Social and Human Vulnerability ===

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With population growth, food demand in the region increases and will continue to do so, while regional food production on land and from the sea is threatened by climate change, creating the need for additional import. In MENA countries, livestock production increased by 25% in 1993–2013, causing animal feed imports to increase to about 32% of the total food import in 2014 ( [[#FAO--2018|FAO, 2018]] ), thereby increasing food import dependence of southern countries ( [[#INRA--2015|INRA, 2015]] ; [[#Saladini--2018|Saladini et al., 2018]] ). Sharp increases in international food prices since 2007 have caused inflation, trade deficits, fiscal pressure, increased poverty and political instability, all affecting food supply, notably in the south and east of the region ( [[#Harrigan--2011|Harrigan, 2011]] ; [[#Kamrava--2012|Kamrava and Babar, 2012]] ; [[#Ferragina--2015|Ferragina and Canitano, 2015]] ; [[#Paciello--2015|Paciello, 2015]] ).

Heat waves and other climatic extremes affect densely populated urban centres and coastal regions, causing health risks for vulnerable groups, in particular those who live in poverty with substandard housing ( [[#Paz--2016|Paz et al., 2016]] ; [[#Scortichini--2018|Scortichini et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rohat--2019|Rohat et al., 2019]] ). Nights with temperatures higher than 23°C have been increasing, with a corresponding increase in health risks ( [[#Royé--2017|Royé, 2017]] ). Human health is also vulnerable to other risks altered by climate change, either directly through droughts, floods, fires and so forth or indirectly through impacts on disease vectors, air pollution, water quality and food security ( [[#Negev--2015|Negev et al., 2015]] ). Cases of dengue fever were recently reported from several countries, and there is an apparent threat of outbreaks transmitted by ''Aedes'' mosquitoes in the northern Mediterranean ( [[#Semenza--2016|Semenza et al., 2016]] ; [[#Semenza--2017|Semenza and Suk, 2017]] ). The most vulnerable to climate impacts are the elderly, pregnant women, children, the chronically ill, the obese and people with cognitive impairment ( [[#Linares--2015|Linares et al., 2015]] ; [[#Paravantis--2017|Paravantis et al., 2017]] ).

One-third of the Mediterranean population (about 150 million people) currently lives close to the sea, often in growing urban regions and with infrastructure vulnerable to sea level rise (Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; [[#Briche--2016|Briche et al., 2016]] ; [[#UN%20DESA--2017|UN DESA, 2017]] ). Future exposure to sea level rise is related to demographic growth. All SSPs project an increase of coastal population in the Mediterranean region to 2050. By 2100, coastal population could grow by up to 130%, mostly in the south, but it could also drop by 20% for SSP1 ( [[#Reimann--2018b|Reimann et al., 2018b]] ). Overall, countries in the southeastern Mediterranean are most vulnerable to coastal risks, but the exposure is also high in the northern Mediterranean ( [[#Satta--2017|Satta et al., 2017]] ).

In terms of the number of people, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia are the most exposed countries to sea level rise ( [[#World%20Bank--2014|World Bank, 2014]] ), and this difference is projected to increase under SSP2-4 ( [[#Reimann--2018a|Reimann et al., 2018a]] ). Among MENA countries, Egypt is particularly exposed with several coastal cities at risk of inundation ( [[#Frihy--2010|Frihy et al., 2010]] ; [[#Solyman--2020|Solyman and Abdel Monem, 2020]] ; [[#Elshinnawy--2021|Elshinnawy and Almaliki, 2021]] ). In the Nile Delta, between 1500 and 2600 km 2 of land are projected to be exposed to flooding by 2100 by a sea level rise of 0.75 m (median sea level rise scenario for SSP5-85) and additional subsidence up to 0.25 m, threatening around 6.3 million residents (Figure CCP4.6; [[#Ali--2016|Ali and El-Magd, 2016]] ; [[#Solyman--2020|Solyman and Abdel Monem, 2020]] ). Basin-wide economic losses are estimated at USD 5 billion, assuming a rise of sea levels by 1.26 m in 2100 ( [[#Frihy--2010|Frihy et al., 2010]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2014|World Bank, 2014]] ).

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[[File:ed9ed021c20f432a029105a5fbc4a707 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_CCP4_006.png]]

'''Figure CCP4.6 |''' '''Present-day and projected exposure to sea level rise in the Nile Delta, due to sea level change and land subsidence: (a) current exposure, (b) exposure for 2°C of global warming by 2100, (c) exposure for 3°C of global warming by 2100, (d) exposure for a high-end sea level rise scenario involving additional mass losses from the Antarctica ice sheet (Frihy et al.''' ''', 2010; [[#Ali--2016|Ali and El-Magd, 2016]] ; [[#Kulp--2019|Kulp and Strauss, 2019]] ); sea level scenarios from WG1 AR6 Chapter 9, Fox-Kemper et al., 2021; see [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] Supplementary Material for additional details.'''

The Mediterranean area is characterised by high human mobility, mostly within countries, but also between them (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7; [[#Charef--2016|Charef and Doraï, 2016]] ; Ben [[#Youssef--2017|Youssef et al., 2017]] ). In 2017, the value of remittances from migrants was about 16% of southern Mediterranean countries’ exports to the European Union (EU) ( [[#Alcidi--2019|Alcidi et al., 2019]] ). Impacts of recent climate change, notably drought and their effects on human livelihoods and vulnerability, may have contributed to migration decisions, although there is debate about the relative importance ( [[#Kelley--2015|Kelley et al., 2015]] ; [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Hamed--2018|Hamed et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ash--2020|Ash and Obradovich, 2020]] ). One study of five MENA countries estimated that extreme climate events account for about 10–20% of migration, with an expected increase of the role of environmental factors in the future as climatic conditions deteriorate further ( [[#Wodon--2014|Wodon et al., 2014]] ).

Improved sharing and co-production of knowledge can support climate adaptation practices, ensure their implementation and thereby reduce vulnerability ( [[#Nguyen--2019|Nguyen et al., 2019]] ), for example, in the water sector ( [[#Iglesias--2015|Iglesias and Garrote, 2015]] ; [[#Iglesias--2018|Iglesias et al., 2018]] ) and notably river management ( [[#Tàbara--2018|Tàbara et al., 2018]] ). The individual perception of climate risks is also a component of vulnerability ( [[#Nguyen--2016|Nguyen et al., 2016]] ). Understanding the gap between perceptions and scientific evidence, and increasing risk perception and awareness, will be crucial to promote adaptive responses both at the individual and the collective level throughout the Mediterranean Basin ( [[#Macias--2015|Macias et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bodoque--2016|Bodoque et al., 2016]] ; [[#Cramer--2018|Cramer et al., 2018]] ).

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