Editing IPCC:AR6/SROCC/Chapter-3 (section)

==== 3.5.3.2 International Climate Governance and Law: Implications for International Cooperation ====

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The way states and institutions manage international cooperation on environmental governance is changing in response to climate change in the polar regions. Rather than treating regional impacts of climate change and their governance in isolation (i.e., purely with a regional lens), the need to cooperate in a global multi-regulatory fashion across several levels of governance is increasingly realised (Stokke, 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2141|2141]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2142|2142]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

In both polar regions, cooperative approaches to regional governance have been developed to allow for the participation of non-state actors. In some cases, regimes allow for a substantial level of participation by specific groups of the civil society (Jabour, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2143|2143]]</sup> ; Keil and Knecht, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2144|2144]]</sup> ) . For example, in the Antarctic Treaty System, the Antarctic Treaty Parties included the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research into their Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. In the Arctic, the status of Permanent Participants has enabled the effective participation of Indigenous Peoples in the work of the Council (Pincus and Ali, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2145|2145]]</sup> ). Climate change has contributed to modifying the balance between the interests of state and non-state actors, leading to changing forms of cooperation (Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2146|2146]]</sup> ). While such changes and modifications occur in both the Arctic and Antarctic, the role of states has remained present in all the regimes and sectors of human responses (Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2147|2147]]</sup> ; Jabour, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2148|2148]]</sup> ).

Addressing the risks of climate change impacts in polar regions also requires linking levels of governance and sector governance across local to global scales, considering impacts and human adaptation (Stokke, 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2149|2149]]</sup> ; Berkman and Vylegzhanin, 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2150|2150]]</sup> ; Tuori, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2151|2151]]</sup> ; Young, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2152|2152]]</sup> ; Koivurova, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2153|2153]]</sup> ; Prior, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2154|2154]]</sup> ; Shibata, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2155|2155]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2156|2156]]</sup> ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Despite established cooperation in international polar region governance, several authors have come to the conclusion that the current international legal framework is inadequate when applying a precautionary approach at the regional level ( ''medium confidence'' ). For example, several studies have shown that the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, which applies only to the North East Atlantic, and that provides a framework for implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), are insufficient to deal with risks when applying a precautionary approach (Jakobsen, 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r2157|2157]]</sup> ; Hossain, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2158|2158]]</sup> ).

In the Arctic, responses to climate change do not only lead to international governance cooperation but also to competition in access to natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. With ice retreating and thinning, and improved access to natural resources, coastal states are increasingly recurring to the option to invoke Article 76 of the UNCLOS (Art. 76 UNCLOS; Verschuuren, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2159|2159]]</sup> ) and seek to demonstrate with scientific data, submitted to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf, and within a set timeline, that their continental shelf is extended. In that case they can enjoy sovereign rights beyond the EEZ. It is ''very unlikely'' that this new trend from states to refer to Article 76 will lead to future (military) conflicts (Berkman and Vylegzhanin, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2160|2160]]</sup> ; Kullerud et al., 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2161|2161]]</sup> ; Stokke, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2162|2162]]</sup> ; Verschuuren, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2163|2163]]</sup> ), although the issue cannot be totally dismissed (Kraska, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2164|2164]]</sup> ; Åtland, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2165|2165]]</sup> ; Huebert, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2166|2166]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2167|2167]]</sup> ; Barret, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2168|2168]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2169|2169]]</sup> ).

In the Antarctic, cooperation in general does occur via UNCLOS, the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Polar Code. Global environmental and climate regimes that are implemented and managed through regional regimes (such as the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement) are also relevant for the Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol on Environmental Protection, which requires, amongst other issues, a minimisation of adverse environmental impacts. Cooperation in the Antarctic also occurs through the the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources . Climate change and its consequences for the marine environment are a central issue for this Convention because it challenges ways to regulate and manage fisheries and designate and manage Marine Protected Areas. Nevertheless, CCAMLR has not agreed to any climate change program and at its most recent meeting, there was again no agreement to do so (Brooks et al. (2018) <sup>[[#fn:r2170|2170]]</sup> , CCAMLR Report on the 37th Meeting of the Commission, CCAMLR (2018)).

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===== 3.5.3.2.1 Formal arrangements: polar conventions and institutions =====

''The Arctic Council''

International cooperation on issues related to climate change in the Arctic mainly occurs at the Arctic Council (herein ‘the Council’), and consequently in important areas of its mandate: the (marine) environment and scientific research (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2171|2171]]</sup> ; Tesar et al., 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2172|2172]]</sup> ; Wehrmann, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2173|2173]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2174|2174]]</sup> ). The Council is composed of eight Arctic States and six Permanent Participants representing organisations of Arctic Indigenous peoples. Observers status is open to: non-Arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations, global and regional non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Council is an example of cooperation through soft law, a unique institutional body that does not possess a legal personality and is neither an international law nor a completely state-centric institution. However, it is acting state-centric and increasingly operating in a context of the Arctic affected by a changing climate, globalisation and transnationalism (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2175|2175]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2176|2176]]</sup> ; Pincus and Speth, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2177|2177]]</sup> ) ''(medium confidence'' ). In 2013, China, South Korea, Italy, Japan, India and Singapore joined France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK as Observers states to the Arctic Council; Switzerland was granted Observer status in 2017. Non-Arctic States are stimulating the Council towards adopting a new approach for Arctic governance that would leave greater space for their participation.

Despite lacking the role to enact hard law, three binding agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the Council (in its task forces), the latest of which is the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, which is an indication that the Council is preparing a regulatory role to respond to climate change in the Arctic using hard-law instruments (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2178|2178]]</sup> ; Shapovalova, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2179|2179]]</sup> ). Through organising the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2180|2180]]</sup> ), the Council has catalysed action on short-lived climate forcers as the task force was followed by the adoption in 2015 of the Arctic Council Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions. In this non-legally binding agreement, Arctic States lay out a common vision for national and collective action to accelerate decline in black carbon and methane emissions (Shapovalova, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2181|2181]]</sup> ). The Council thereby moved from merely assessing problems to attempting to solve them (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2182|2182]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2183|2183]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2184|2184]]</sup> ). While mitigation of global emissions from fossil fuels requires global cooperation, progress with anthropogenic emissions of short-term climate forcers (such as black carbon and methane) may be achieved through smaller groups of countries (Aakre et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2185|2185]]</sup> ). However, even though the Council has also embraced the Ecosystem Approach, it does not have a mandate to manage climate-related risks and impacts, or apply a precautionary approach, on fisheries issues.

Several studies have shown that the Council has the potential to enhance internal coherence in the current, fragmented landscape of multi-regulatory governance by providing integrated leadership. However, it is ''about'' ''as likely as not'' that the Council could play a strong role in combatting global climate problems and operating successfully within the climate transnational context unless it goes through restructuring and reconfiguration (Stokke, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2186|2186]]</sup> ; Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2187|2187]]</sup> ; Pincus and Speth, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2188|2188]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2189|2189]]</sup> ; Tesar et al., 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2190|2190]]</sup> ; Wehrmann, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2191|2191]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2192|2192]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2193|2193]]</sup> ).

The future of the governance of the changing Arctic Ocean, including the role of the Council will also depend on the implications of the development for a new agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdictions under the UNCLOS (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2194|2194]]</sup> ; De Lucia, 2017; Nengye et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2195|2195]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2196|2196]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

''The Antarctic Treaty System''

The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is the collective term for the Antarctic Treaty and related agreements. The ATS regulates international relations with respect to Antarctica. 54 countries have acceded to the Treaty and 29 of them participate in decision making as Consultative Parties. 27 countries are Party to the CCAMLR, and 40 have ratified the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. The importance of understanding, mitigating and adapting to the impacts of changes to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic cryosphere has been realised by all of the major bodies responsible for governance in the Antarctic region (south of 60°S). The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties agreed that a Climate Change Response Work Programme would address these matters (ATCM, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2197|2197]]</sup> ). This led to the establishment of the Subsidiary Group of the Committee for Environmental Protection on Climate Change Response (ATCM, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2198|2198]]</sup> ). By contrast, consensus is currently limiting work programme-level responses to climate change by CCAMLR (2017a), while opportunities exist to incorporate climate concerns into mechanisms for implementation and monitoring aimed to conserve ecosystems and the environment (Brooks et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2199|2199]]</sup> )

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===== 3.5.3.2.2 Informal arrangements =====

The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, through the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) and its Subsidiary Group of the Committee for Environmental Protection on Climate Change Response, continue to work closely with the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs, the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators and other NGOs to understand, mitigate and adapt to impacts associated with changes to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic cryosphere. Understanding, mitigating and adapting to climate change are among the key priorities identified for research in the region (Kennicutt et al., 2014a <sup>[[#fn:r2200|2200]]</sup> ; Kennicutt et al., 2014b <sup>[[#fn:r2201|2201]]</sup> ) and nationally funded bilateral and multilateral projects are underway.

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===== 3.5.3.2.3 Role of informal actors =====

Several studies show that informal actors of the Arctic can influence decision making process of the Council and shift the Council towards more cooperation with different actors to enhance the co-production of knowledge (Duyck, 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r2202|2202]]</sup> ; Makki, 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2203|2203]]</sup> ; Keil and Knecht, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2204|2204]]</sup> ). Recently, non-state observers at the Council, such as the World Wide Fund for Nature  and the Circumpolar Conservation Union have played a role in raising awareness on climate change responses and contributing to the work of the Council’s Working Groups and Expert Groups (Keil and Knecht, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2205|2205]]</sup> ).

Within the Antarctic Treaty System, several non-state actors play a major role in providing advice and influencing the governance of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Among the most prominent actors are formal observers such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, and invited experts such as the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition. At meetings of CCAMLR, the Scientific Committee’s 2009 report on Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment (Turner et al., 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r2206|2206]]</sup> ) precipitated an Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Climate Change in 2010 (Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts, 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r2209|2209]]</sup> ). The outcomes of the meeting led the Antarctic Treaty’s Committee for Environmental Protection to develop a Climate Change Response Work Programme (ATCM, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2210|2210]]</sup> )

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'''Table 3.5'''
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Summary of the assessment of practices, tools and strategies that can contribute to climate resilient pathways. Practices are shown with the potential extent of their contribution to resilience building, considering also seven general strategies (Biggs et al., 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r2207|2207]]</sup> ; Quinlan et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2208|2208]]</sup> ; Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 1). Also shown is the current level of their application in polar regions and key conditions facilitating implementation.
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[[File:0c22ef5cf12e0b1df3b86e48bbbb56fb table3.5.png]]

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