Editing IPCC:AR6/SROCC/Chapter-3 (section)

===== 3.5.3.2.1 Formal arrangements: polar conventions and institutions =====

''The Arctic Council''

International cooperation on issues related to climate change in the Arctic mainly occurs at the Arctic Council (herein ‘the Council’), and consequently in important areas of its mandate: the (marine) environment and scientific research (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2171|2171]]</sup> ; Tesar et al., 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2172|2172]]</sup> ; Wehrmann, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2173|2173]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2174|2174]]</sup> ). The Council is composed of eight Arctic States and six Permanent Participants representing organisations of Arctic Indigenous peoples. Observers status is open to: non-Arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations, global and regional non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Council is an example of cooperation through soft law, a unique institutional body that does not possess a legal personality and is neither an international law nor a completely state-centric institution. However, it is acting state-centric and increasingly operating in a context of the Arctic affected by a changing climate, globalisation and transnationalism (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2175|2175]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2176|2176]]</sup> ; Pincus and Speth, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2177|2177]]</sup> ) ''(medium confidence'' ). In 2013, China, South Korea, Italy, Japan, India and Singapore joined France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK as Observers states to the Arctic Council; Switzerland was granted Observer status in 2017. Non-Arctic States are stimulating the Council towards adopting a new approach for Arctic governance that would leave greater space for their participation.

Despite lacking the role to enact hard law, three binding agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the Council (in its task forces), the latest of which is the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, which is an indication that the Council is preparing a regulatory role to respond to climate change in the Arctic using hard-law instruments (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2178|2178]]</sup> ; Shapovalova, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2179|2179]]</sup> ). Through organising the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (Morgera and Kulovesi, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2180|2180]]</sup> ), the Council has catalysed action on short-lived climate forcers as the task force was followed by the adoption in 2015 of the Arctic Council Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emission Reductions. In this non-legally binding agreement, Arctic States lay out a common vision for national and collective action to accelerate decline in black carbon and methane emissions (Shapovalova, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2181|2181]]</sup> ). The Council thereby moved from merely assessing problems to attempting to solve them (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2182|2182]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2183|2183]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2184|2184]]</sup> ). While mitigation of global emissions from fossil fuels requires global cooperation, progress with anthropogenic emissions of short-term climate forcers (such as black carbon and methane) may be achieved through smaller groups of countries (Aakre et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2185|2185]]</sup> ). However, even though the Council has also embraced the Ecosystem Approach, it does not have a mandate to manage climate-related risks and impacts, or apply a precautionary approach, on fisheries issues.

Several studies have shown that the Council has the potential to enhance internal coherence in the current, fragmented landscape of multi-regulatory governance by providing integrated leadership. However, it is ''about'' ''as likely as not'' that the Council could play a strong role in combatting global climate problems and operating successfully within the climate transnational context unless it goes through restructuring and reconfiguration (Stokke, 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r2186|2186]]</sup> ; Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2187|2187]]</sup> ; Pincus and Speth, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2188|2188]]</sup> ; Cassotta et al., 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2189|2189]]</sup> ; Tesar et al., 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r2190|2190]]</sup> ; Wehrmann, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2191|2191]]</sup> ; Young, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2192|2192]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2193|2193]]</sup> ).

The future of the governance of the changing Arctic Ocean, including the role of the Council will also depend on the implications of the development for a new agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdictions under the UNCLOS (Baker and Yeager, 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r2194|2194]]</sup> ; De Lucia, 2017; Nengye et al., 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2195|2195]]</sup> ; Koivurova and Caddell, 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2196|2196]]</sup> ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

''The Antarctic Treaty System''

The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is the collective term for the Antarctic Treaty and related agreements. The ATS regulates international relations with respect to Antarctica. 54 countries have acceded to the Treaty and 29 of them participate in decision making as Consultative Parties. 27 countries are Party to the CCAMLR, and 40 have ratified the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. The importance of understanding, mitigating and adapting to the impacts of changes to the Southern Ocean and Antarctic cryosphere has been realised by all of the major bodies responsible for governance in the Antarctic region (south of 60°S). The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties agreed that a Climate Change Response Work Programme would address these matters (ATCM, 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r2197|2197]]</sup> ). This led to the establishment of the Subsidiary Group of the Committee for Environmental Protection on Climate Change Response (ATCM, 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r2198|2198]]</sup> ). By contrast, consensus is currently limiting work programme-level responses to climate change by CCAMLR (2017a), while opportunities exist to incorporate climate concerns into mechanisms for implementation and monitoring aimed to conserve ecosystems and the environment (Brooks et al., 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r2199|2199]]</sup> )

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