Jump to content
Main menu
Main menu
move to sidebar
hide
Navigation
Main page
Recent changes
Random page
Help about MediaWiki
Special pages
ClimateKG
Search
Search
English
Appearance
Create account
Log in
Personal tools
Create account
Log in
Pages for logged out editors
learn more
Contributions
Talk
Editing
IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-5
(section)
IPCC
Discussion
English
Read
Edit source
View history
Tools
Tools
move to sidebar
hide
Actions
Read
Edit source
View history
General
What links here
Related changes
Page information
In other projects
Appearance
move to sidebar
hide
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
== Box 5.5 Market drivers and the consequences of extreme weather in 2010–2011 == <div id="section-5-8-1-food-price-spikes-block-1"></div> The 2010–2011 food price spike was initially triggered by the exceptional heat in summer 2010, with an extent from Europe to the Ukraine and Western Russia (Barriopedro et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1344|1344]]</sup> ; Watanabe et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1345|1345]]</sup> ; Hoag 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1346|1346]]</sup> ). The heatwave in Russia was extreme in both temperature (over 40°C) and duration (from July to mid-August in 2010). This reduced wheat yields by approximately one third (Wegren 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1347|1347]]</sup> ; Marchand et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1348|1348]]</sup> ). Simultaneously, in the Indus Valley in Pakistan, unprecedented rainfall led to flooding, affecting the lives and livelihoods of 20 million people. There is evidence that these effects were both linked and made more likely through climate change (Mann et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1349|1349]]</sup> ). In response to its shortfall in yields, Russia imposed an export ban in order to maintain local food supplies. Other countries responded in a largely uncoordinated ways, each of them driven by internal politics as well as national self-interests (Jones and Hiller 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1350|1350]]</sup> ). Overall, these measures led to rapid price rises on the global markets (Welton 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1351|1351]]</sup> ), partly through panic buying, but also through financial speculation (Spratt 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1352|1352]]</sup> ). Analysis of responses to higher food prices in the developing world showed that lower-income groups responded by taking on more employment, reducing food intake, limiting expenditures, spending savings (if available), and participating in demonstrations. People often identified their problems as stemming from collusion between powerful incumbent interests (e.g., of politicians and big business) and disregard for the poor (Hossain and Green 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1353|1353]]</sup> ). This politicised social response helped spark food-related civil protest, including riots, across a range of countries in 2010–2011 (Natalini et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1354|1354]]</sup> ). In Pakistan, food price rises were exacerbated by the economic impacts of the floods, which further contributed to food-related riots in 2010. Price spikes also impact on food security in the developed world. In the UK, global commodity price inflation influenced local food prices, increasing food-price inflation by about five times at the end of 2010. Comparing household purchases over the five-year period from 2007 to 2011 showed that the amount of food bought declined, on average, by 4.2%, whilst paying 12% more for it. The lowest income decile spent 17% more by 2011 than they did in 2007 (Holding et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1355|1355]]</sup> ; Tadasse et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1356|1356]]</sup> ). Consumers also saved money by trading down for cheaper alternatives. For the poorest, in the extreme situation, food became unaffordable: the Trussell Trust, a charity supplying emergency food handouts for people in crisis, noted a 50% increase in handouts in 2010. <span id="migration-and-conflict"></span> === 5.8.2 Migration and conflict === <div id="section-5-8-2-migration-and-conflict-block-1"></div> Since the IPCC AR5 (Porter et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1357|1357]]</sup> ; Cramer et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1358|1358]]</sup> ), new work has advanced multi-factor methodological issues related to migration and conflict (e.g., Kelley et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1469|1469]]</sup> , 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1470|1470]]</sup> ; Werrell et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1359|1359]]</sup> ; Challinor et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1360|1360]]</sup> ; Pasini et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1361|1361]]</sup> ). These in particular have addressed systemic risks to food security that result from cascading impacts triggered by droughts and floods and how these are related to a broad range of societal influences. Climate variability and extremes have short-, medium – and long-term impacts on livelihoods and livelihood assets – especially of the poor – contributing to greater risk of food insecurity and malnutrition (FAO et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1362|1362]]</sup> ). Drought threatens local food security and nutrition and aggravates humanitarian conditions, which can trigger large-scale human displacement and create a breeding ground for conflict (Maystadt and Ecker 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1363|1363]]</sup> ). There is ''medium agreement'' that existing patterns of conflict could be reinforced under climate change, affecting food security and livelihood opportunities, for example, in already fragile regions with ethnic divides such as North and Central Africa as well as Central Asia (Buhaug 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1364|1364]]</sup> ; Schleussner et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1365|1365]]</sup> ) (Box 5.6). Challinor et al. (2018) have developed a typology for transboundary and transboundary risk transmission that distinguishes the roles of climate and social and economic systems. To understand these complex interactions, they recommend a combination of methods that include expert judgement; interactive scenario building; global systems science and big data; and innovative use of climate and integrated assessment models; and social science techniques (e.g., surveys, interviews, and focus groups). <div id="section-5-8-2-1-migration"></div> <span id="migration"></span> ==== 5.8.2.1 Migration ==== <div id="section-5-8-2-1-migration-block-1"></div> There has been a surge in international migration in recent years, with around five million people migrating permanently in 2016 (OECD 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1366|1366]]</sup> ). Though the initial driver of migration may differ across populations, countries and contexts, migrants tend to seek the same fundamental objective: to provide security and adequate living conditions for their families and themselves. Food insecurity is a critical ‘push’ factor driving international migration, along with conflict, income inequality, and population growth. The act of migration itself causes food insecurity, given the lack of income opportunities and adverse conditions compounded by conflict situations. Warner et al. (2012) <sup>[[#fn:r1367|1367]]</sup> found the interrelationships between changing rainfall patterns, food and livelihood security in eight countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Several studies in Africa have found that persistent droughts and land degradation contributed to both seasonal and permanent migration (Gray 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r1368|1368]]</sup> ; Gray and Mueller 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1369|1369]]</sup> ; Hummel 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1379|1379]]</sup> ; Henry et al. 2004 <sup>[[#fn:r1371|1371]]</sup> ; Folami and Folami 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1372|1372]]</sup> ), worsening the vulnerability of different households (Dasgupta et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1373|1373]]</sup> ). Dependency on rainfed agriculture ranges from 13% in Mexico to more than 30% in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, suggesting a high degree of sensitivity to climate variability and change, and undermined food security (Warner et al. 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r1374|1374]]</sup> ). Studies have demonstrated that Mexican migration (Feng et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1375|1375]]</sup> ; Nawrotzki et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1376|1376]]</sup> ) and Central American migration (WFP 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1377|1377]]</sup> ) fluctuate in response to climate variability. The food system is heavily dependent on maize and bean production and long-term climate change and variability significantly affect the productivity of these crops and the livelihoods of smallholder farmers (WFP 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1378|1378]]</sup> ). In rural Ecuador, adverse environmental conditions prompt out-migration, although households respond to these challenges in diverse ways resulting in complex migratory responses (Gray and Bilsborrow 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1471|1471]]</sup> ). Migration patterns have been linked to heat stress in Pakistan (Mueller et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1380|1380]]</sup> ) and climate variability in the Sundarbans due to decline in food security (Guha and Roy 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1381|1381]]</sup> ). In Bangladesh, the impacts of climate change have been on the rise throughout the last three decades with increasing migration, mostly of men leaving women and children to cope with increasing effects of natural disasters (Rabbani et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1382|1382]]</sup> ). Small islands are very sensitive to climate change impacts ( ''high confidence'' ) (Nurse et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1383|1383]]</sup> ) and impacted by multiple climatic stressors (IPCC 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r1384|1384]]</sup> and SROCC). Food security in the Pacific, especially in Micronesia, has worsened in the past half century and climate change is ''likely'' to further hamper local food production, especially in low-lying atolls (Connell 2016). Migration in small islands (internally and internationally) occurs for multiple reasons and purposes, mostly for better livelihood opportunities ( ''high confidence'' ). Beyond rising sea levels, the effects of increasing frequency and intensity of extreme events such as severe tropical cyclones are likely to affect human migration in the Pacific (Connell 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1385|1385]]</sup> ; Krishnapillai and Gavenda 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1386|1386]]</sup> ; Charan et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1387|1387]]</sup> ; Krishnapillai 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1388|1388]]</sup> ). On Yap Island, extreme weather events are affecting every aspect of atoll communities’ existence, mainly due to the islands’ small size, their low elevation, and extensive coastal areas (Krishnapillai 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1389|1389]]</sup> ). Displaced atoll communities on Yap Island grow a variety of nutritious vegetables and use alternative crop production methods such as small-plot intensive farming, raised bed gardening, as part of a community-based adaptation programme (Krishnapillai and Gavenda 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1390|1390]]</sup> ; Krishnapillai 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1391|1391]]</sup> ). Recurrences of natural disasters and crises threaten food security through impacts on traditional agriculture, causing the forced migration and displacement of coastal communities to highlands in search of better living conditions. Although considerable differences occur in the physical manifestations of severe storms, such climate stressors threaten the life-support systems of many atoll communities (Campbell et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1392|1392]]</sup> ). The failure of these systems resulting from climate disasters propel vulnerable atoll communities into poverty traps, and low adaptive capacity could eventually force these communities to migrate. <div id="section-5-8-2-1-migration-block-2" class="box"></div> <span id="box-5.6-migration-in-the-pacific-region-impacts-of-climate-change-on-food-security"></span>
Summary:
Please note that all contributions to ClimateKG may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here.
You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see
ClimateKG:Copyrights
for details).
Do not submit copyrighted work without permission!
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)
Search
Search
Editing
IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-5
(section)
Add languages
Add topic