Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-5 (section)

== Box 5.6 Migration in the Pacific region: Impacts of climate change on food security ==

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Climate change-induced displacement and migration in the Pacific has received wide attention in the scientific discourse (Fröhlich and Klepp 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1472|1472]]</sup> ). The processes of climate change and their effects in the region have serious implications for Pacific Island nations as they influence the environments that are their ‘life-support systems’ (Campbell 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1473|1473]]</sup> ). Climate variability poses significant threats to both agricultural production and food security. Rising temperatures and reductions in groundwater availability, as well as increasing frequency and severity of disaster events translate into substantial impacts on food security, causing human displacement, a trend that will be aggravated by future climate impacts (ADB 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1474|1474]]</sup> ). Declining soil productivity, groundwater depletion, and non-availability of freshwater threatens agricultural production in many remote atolls.

Many countries in the Pacific devote a large share of available land area to agricultural production. For example, more than 60% of land area is cultivated in the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu and more than 40% in Kiribati and Tonga. With few options to expand agricultural area, the projected impacts of climate change on food production are of particular concern (ADB 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1475|1475]]</sup> , 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1476|1476]]</sup> ). The degradation of available land area for traditional agriculture, adverse disruptions of agricultural productivity and diminishing livelihood opportunities through climate change impacts leads to increasing poverty and food insecurity, incentivising migration to urban agglomerations (ADB 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1477|1477]]</sup> ; FAO et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1478|1478]]</sup> ).

Campbell (2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1479|1479]]</sup> ) describe the trends that lead to migration. First, climate change, including rising sea levels, affects communities’ land security, which is the physical presence on which to live and sustain livelihoods. Second, they impinge on livelihood security (especially food security) of island communities where the productivity of both subsistence and commercial food production systems is reduced. Third, the effects of climate change are especially severe on small-island environments since they result in declining ecological habitat. The effects on island systems are mostly manifested in atolls through erosion and inundation, and on human populations through migration. Population growth and scenarios of climate change are ''likely'' to further induce food stress as impacts unfold in the coming decades (Campbell 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1480|1480]]</sup> ).

While the populations of several islands and island groups in the Pacific (e.g., Tuvalu, Carteret Islands, and Kiribati) have been perceived as the first probable victims of rising seas so that their inhabitants would become, and in some quarters already are seen to be, the first ‘environmental’ or ‘climate change refugees’, migration patterns vary. Especially in small islands, the range and nature of the interactions among economic, social, and/or political drivers are complex. For example, in the Maldives, Stojanov et al. (2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1481|1481]]</sup> ) show that while collective perceptions support climate change impacts as being one of the key factors prompting migration, individual perceptions give more credence to other cultural, religious, economic or social factors.

In the Pacific, Tuvalu has long been a prime candidate to disappear due to rising sea levels, forcing human migration. However, results of a recent study (Kench et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1482|1482]]</sup> ) challenge perceptions of island loss in Tuvalu, reporting that there is a net increase in land area of 73.5 ha. The findings suggest that islands are dynamic features likely to persist as habitation sites over the next century, presenting opportunities for adaptation that embrace the heterogeneity of island types and processes. Farbotko (2010 <sup>[[#fn:r1483|1483]]</sup> ) and Farbotko and Lazrus (2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1484|1484]]</sup> ) present Tuvalu as a site of ‘wishful sinking’, in the climate change discourse. These authors argue that representations of Tuvalu as a laboratory for global climate change migration are visualisations by non-locals.

In Nanumea (Tuvalu), forced displacements and voluntary migrations are complex decisions made by individuals, families and communities in response to discourses on risk, deteriorating infrastructure and other economic and social pressures (Marino and Lazrus 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1485|1485]]</sup> ). In many atoll nations in the Western Pacific, migration has increasingly become a sustainable livelihood strategy, irrespective of climate change (Connell 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1486|1486]]</sup> ).

In Lamen Bay, Vanuatu, migration is both a cause and consequence of local vulnerabilities. While migration provides an opportunity for households to meet their immediate economic needs, it limits the ability of the community to foster longer-term economic development. At the same time, migration adversely affects the ability of the community to maintain food security due to lost labour and changing attitudes towards traditional ways of life among community members (Craven 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1487|1487]]</sup> ).

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==== 5.8.2.2 Conflict ====

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While climate change will not alone cause conflict, it is often acknowledged as having the potential to exacerbate or catalyse conflict in conjunction with other factors. Increased resource competition can aggravate the potential for migration to lead to conflict. When populations continue to increase, competition for resources will also increase, and resources will become even scarcer due to climate change (Hendrix and Glaser 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r1393|1393]]</sup> ). In agriculture-dependent communities in low-income contexts, droughts have been found to increase the likelihood of violence and prolonged conflict at the local level, which eventually pose a threat to societal stability and peace (FAO et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1394|1394]]</sup> ). In contrast, conflicts can also have diverging effects on agriculture due to land abandonment, resulting in forest growth, or agriculture expansion causing deforestation, for example, in Colombia (Landholm et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1395|1395]]</sup> ).

Several studies have explored the causal links among climate change, drought, impacts on agricultural production, livelihoods, and civil unrest in Syria from 2007–2010, but without agreement as to the role played by climate in subsequent migration (Kelley et al. 2015, 2017; Challinor et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1396|1396]]</sup> ; Selby et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1397|1397]]</sup> ; Hendrix 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1398|1398]]</sup> ). Contributing factors that have been examined include rainfall deficits, population growth, agricultural policies, and the influx of refugees that had placed burdens on the region’s water resources (Kelley et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1399|1399]]</sup> ). Drought may have played a role as a trigger, as this drought was the longest and the most intense in the last 900 years (Cook et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1400|1400]]</sup> ; Mathbout et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1401|1401]]</sup> ). Some studies linked the drought to widespread crop failure, but the climate hypothesis has been contested (Selby et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1402|1402]]</sup> ; Hendrix 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1403|1403]]</sup> ). Recent evidence shows that the severe drought triggered agricultural collapse and displacement of rural farm families, with approximately 300,000 families going to Damascus, Aleppo and other cities (Kelley et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1404|1404]]</sup> ).

Persistent drought in Morocco during the early 1980s resulted in food riots and contributed to an economic collapse (El-Said and Harrigan 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1405|1405]]</sup> ). A drought in Somalia that fuelled conflict through livestock price changes, establishing livestock markets as the primary channel of impact (Maystadt and Ecker 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1406|1406]]</sup> ). Cattle raiding as a normal means of restocking during drought in the Great Horn of Africa led to conflict (ICPAC and WFP 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1407|1407]]</sup> ) whereas a region-wide drought in northern Mali in 2012 wiped out thousands of livestock and devastated the livelihoods of pastoralists, in turn swelling the ranks of armed rebel factions and forcing others to steal and loot for survival (Breisinger et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1408|1408]]</sup> ).

On the other hand, inter-annual adjustments in international trade can play an important role in shifting supplies from food surplus regions to regions facing food deficits which emerge as a consequence of extreme weather events, civil strife, and/or other disruptions (Baldos and Hertel 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1409|1409]]</sup> ). A more freely functioning global trading system is tested for its ability to deliver improved long run food security in 2050.

In summary, given increasing extreme events and global and cross-sectoral interconnectedness, the food system is at increasing risk of disruption, for example, via migration and conflict ( ''high confidence'' ). {5.2.3, 5.2.4}

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