Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-5 (section)

==== 5.8.2.2 Conflict ====

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While climate change will not alone cause conflict, it is often acknowledged as having the potential to exacerbate or catalyse conflict in conjunction with other factors. Increased resource competition can aggravate the potential for migration to lead to conflict. When populations continue to increase, competition for resources will also increase, and resources will become even scarcer due to climate change (Hendrix and Glaser 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r1393|1393]]</sup> ). In agriculture-dependent communities in low-income contexts, droughts have been found to increase the likelihood of violence and prolonged conflict at the local level, which eventually pose a threat to societal stability and peace (FAO et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1394|1394]]</sup> ). In contrast, conflicts can also have diverging effects on agriculture due to land abandonment, resulting in forest growth, or agriculture expansion causing deforestation, for example, in Colombia (Landholm et al. 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r1395|1395]]</sup> ).

Several studies have explored the causal links among climate change, drought, impacts on agricultural production, livelihoods, and civil unrest in Syria from 2007–2010, but without agreement as to the role played by climate in subsequent migration (Kelley et al. 2015, 2017; Challinor et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1396|1396]]</sup> ; Selby et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1397|1397]]</sup> ; Hendrix 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1398|1398]]</sup> ). Contributing factors that have been examined include rainfall deficits, population growth, agricultural policies, and the influx of refugees that had placed burdens on the region’s water resources (Kelley et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1399|1399]]</sup> ). Drought may have played a role as a trigger, as this drought was the longest and the most intense in the last 900 years (Cook et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r1400|1400]]</sup> ; Mathbout et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1401|1401]]</sup> ). Some studies linked the drought to widespread crop failure, but the climate hypothesis has been contested (Selby et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1402|1402]]</sup> ; Hendrix 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r1403|1403]]</sup> ). Recent evidence shows that the severe drought triggered agricultural collapse and displacement of rural farm families, with approximately 300,000 families going to Damascus, Aleppo and other cities (Kelley et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1404|1404]]</sup> ).

Persistent drought in Morocco during the early 1980s resulted in food riots and contributed to an economic collapse (El-Said and Harrigan 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1405|1405]]</sup> ). A drought in Somalia that fuelled conflict through livestock price changes, establishing livestock markets as the primary channel of impact (Maystadt and Ecker 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r1406|1406]]</sup> ). Cattle raiding as a normal means of restocking during drought in the Great Horn of Africa led to conflict (ICPAC and WFP 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r1407|1407]]</sup> ) whereas a region-wide drought in northern Mali in 2012 wiped out thousands of livestock and devastated the livelihoods of pastoralists, in turn swelling the ranks of armed rebel factions and forcing others to steal and loot for survival (Breisinger et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1408|1408]]</sup> ).

On the other hand, inter-annual adjustments in international trade can play an important role in shifting supplies from food surplus regions to regions facing food deficits which emerge as a consequence of extreme weather events, civil strife, and/or other disruptions (Baldos and Hertel 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1409|1409]]</sup> ). A more freely functioning global trading system is tested for its ability to deliver improved long run food security in 2050.

In summary, given increasing extreme events and global and cross-sectoral interconnectedness, the food system is at increasing risk of disruption, for example, via migration and conflict ( ''high confidence'' ). {5.2.3, 5.2.4}

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