Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-10 (section)

=== 10.4.1 Energy Systems ===

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==== 10.4.1.1 Regional Diversity ====

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Energy consumption of Asia accounts for 36% of the global total at present. China, India and the ASEAN countries have largely contributed to the ever-growing global energy consumption. Asia is predicted to account for 80% of coal, 26% of natural gas and 52% of electricity consumption of the world by 2040 ( [[#IEA--2018|IEA, 2018]] ). The share of Asia in the global primary energy consumption will increase to 48% by 2050. China continues to be the world’s largest energy consumer, and the combined consumption of India and ASEAN will be similar to that of China by that time ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ).

The current energy structure of Asia is dominated by fossil fuels. As the trend indicates, the share of coal in China’s primary energy consumption is forecasted to sharply decline from 60% in 2017 to around 35% in 2040 ( [[#BP--2019|BP, 2019]] ). In contrast, India and ASEAN rely more on coal since coal may meet their soaring energy demand. Accordingly, more than 80% of the global coal will be consumed in Asia by 2050. China will surpass the USA in about 10 years to become the world’s largest oil consumer. India will then replace the USA to be the second largest by the late 2040s ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ).

Around 60% of the incremental electricity demand globally, predicted to double by 2050, will occur in Asia. By that time, the electrification rate will increase to 30%, but 40% of electricity demand will be still covered by coal ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ). Asia accounts for almost half of the growth in global renewable power generation. It is hardly possible for Japan and Republic of Korea to develop additional nuclear power plants as planned, whereas nuclear generation continues to increase quickly in China and the scale will be similar to the entire generation of OECD by 2040 ( [[#BP--2019|BP, 2019]] ). India and Russia’s nuclear power sectors are also growing fast (e.g., the recent launch of the Akademik Lomonosov offshore nuclear power plant in Russia).

The rapid growth of energy demand in Asia reinforces the region’s position as the largest energy importer ( [[#BP--2019|BP, 2019]] ). Around 80% of energy traded globally will be consumed in Asia, and the rate of self-sufficiency will decrease from 72 to 63% by 2050. This tendency is especially remarkable for ASEAN, which will become a net importer in the early 2020s. The self-sufficiency rate of coal will be maintained at a level of 80%, while that of oil and natural gas will decline significantly. The additional oil imports of the emerging Asian economies will be from North America, the Middle East and North Africa. The main players in Asia for the liquefied natural gas imports will extend from Japan and Republic of Korea to China and India. ASEAN has been a net exporter of natural gas but starts to expand its importation due to the increased consumption and resource depletion ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ).

The increase in energy demand at a rapid rate in these countries thus cannot be attributed only to population growth and rising living standards, but also to increasingly extreme temperature variations. The decrease in precipitation influences energy demand as well, as countries are becoming more dependent on energy-intensive methods (e.g., desalination, underground water pumping) to supply water. Similarly, energy systems are influenced by the way the agriculture sector, mainly in Al Mashrek, relies increasingly on energy-intensive methods (e.g., more fertilisers, different irrigation and harvesting patterns) ( [[#Farajalla--2013|Farajalla, 2013]] ).

Climate change has direct and indirect impacts on energy and industrial systems. It has a particularly wide and profound impact on energy systems (energy development, transportation, supply, etc.). With global warming, the energy consumption for heating in winter decreases, while the energy consumption for cooling in summer significantly increases, but the overall energy demand shows an upwards trend ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Sailor--2001|Sailor, 2001]] ; [[#Szabo--2018|Szabo et al., 2018]] ). Such demands in summer seasons will by far exceed any energy savings from the decrease in heating demand due to warmer winters. Higher demand for cooling due to hotter temperatures has become a major challenge in the energy sector in all countries. Furthermore, decreased water levels due to lower precipitation reduces hydroelectric output. This is particularly the case for countries such as Syria and Iraq with large hydroelectric capacity ( [[#Hamid--2009|Hamid and Raouf, 2009]] ). Additionally, the decrease in water levels negatively affects low-carbon energy systems such as concentrated solar power and thermal-generation plants that require regular cooling and cleaning.

Climate change adds extra pressure to current energy infrastructures in most countries where systems failures and blackouts are already common ( [[#Assaf--2009|Assaf, 2009]] ). In the wake of extreme weather events (e.g., heatwaves), energy infrastructures remain inadequate to cope. This is particularly the case for countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine, with poor electricity infrastructures (Jordan, 2015). Extreme weather events could generate grave damage to power plants, most being located only a few metres above sea level, as well as power-transmission towers and lines. In Lebanon, a small country where there are no Indigenous energy resources, the disruption of shipping of fuel supplies due to extreme weather events is a major risk. Other extreme weather events, such as floods and sandstorms, expose energy and industrial systems in the coastal areas due to a rise in sea level. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula are projected to experience significant inland flooding as sea levels rise ( [[#Hamid--2009|Hamid and Raouf, 2009]] ). In East Asia wet snow accretion enhanced by global warming often causes damage to electric power lines ( [[#Sakamoto--2000|Sakamoto, 2000]] ; [[#Ohba--2020|Ohba and Sugimoto, 2020]] ).

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==== 10.4.1.2 Key Drivers to Vulnerability, with Observed and Projected Impacts ====

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Universal energy access is a big challenge for Asia ( [[#IEA--2018|IEA, 2018]] ). About 230 million Indian people lack access to electricity, and around 800 million still use solid fuels for cooking ( [[#Sharma--2019|Sharma, 2019]] ). The average electricity access rate in South Asia was 74%, the equivalent of 417 million people without electricity and accounting for more than a third of the global 1.2 billion lacking the access ( [[#Shukla--2017|Shukla et al., 2017]] ). With a total population of nearly 640 million in ASEAN, an estimated 65 million people remain without electricity and 250 million rely on solid biomass for cooking fuel ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA, 2017]] ). Universal access to electricity is expected to be achieved by 2030, while 1.6 billion people in Asia will still lack clean energy for cooking ( [[#UNESCAP--2018b|UNESCAP, 2018b]] ).

Asia faces an energy security problem even with the rapid growth in production and trade ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ). Among 13 developing countries with large energy consumption in Asia, 11 are exposed to high energy security risk ( [[#WEC--2018|WEC, 2018]] ). This will be a major challenge for the sustainable development of Asia due to the vulnerability to global energy supplies and price volatility ( [[#Nangia--2019|Nangia, 2019]] ). Asia lacks natural energy resources and has the smallest oil reserve but largely relies on fossil fuels. The dependency on fossil fuels was as high as 88.3% in China, 72.3% in India, 89.6% in Japan and 82.8% in Republic of Korea in 2013 (BP, 2014). Many countries in South Asia rely on a single source to supply more than half of the electricity (i.e., 67.9% from coal for India, 99.9% from hydropower for Nepal, 91.5% from natural gas for Bangladesh and 50.2% from oil for Sri Lanka) ( [[#Shukla--2017|Shukla et al., 2017]] ). Additionally, cooperation in Asia to create the integrated energy systems needed for enhancing overall security is still at a very preliminary stage due to countries having different strategic plans and lack of cooperation among them on the common concerns ( [[#Kimura--2013|Kimura and Phoumin, 2013]] ).

Even though energy efficiency is improving, the deployment of low-carbon energy, such as renewables, is not sufficient in Asia. To be consistent with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, the share of renewables in total energy consumption needs to reach 35% in Asia by 2030. Moreover, the financing to deploy renewables presents another considerable challenge ( [[#UNESCAP--2018b|UNESCAP, 2018b]] ).

In order to cope with climate change, renewable energy has become the core of energy development and transformation. Since the 1960s, the total solar radiation on the ground in Asia has shown a downwards trend as a whole, which is consistent with the change in global total solar radiation on the ground, and has experienced a phased change process of ‘first darkening and then brightening’ ( ''high confidence'' ). This conclusion has been further confirmed by ground station observations, satellite remote sensing inversion data and model simulation research ( [[#Wang--2016|Wang and Wild, 2016]] ; [[#Qin--2018|Qin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Yang--2018a|Yang et al., 2018a]] ).

However, wind speed over most Asian regions is obviously decreasing ( ''high confidence'' ). Based on meteorological observation records or reanalysis data, many studies have analysed the variation of near-surface average wind speed in Asia. It is generally found that wind speed has declined since the 1970s, although the declining trend is different in different subregions. ( [[#Yang--2012c|Yang et al., 2012c]] ; [[#Lin--2013|Lin et al., 2013]] ; [[#Liu--2014b|Liu et al., 2014b]] ; [[#Zha--2016|Zha et al., 2016]] ; [[#Guo--2017a|Guo et al., 2017a]] ; [[#Torralba--2017|Torralba et al., 2017]] ; [[#Wu--2017a|Wu et al., 2017a]] ; [[#Ohba--2019|Ohba, 2019]] ). The decline of near-surface wind speed in Asia is consistent with the general decline of global land-surface wind speeds, among which the frequency of strong winds and the decline of wind speed are more prominent ( [[#McVicar--2012|McVicar et al., 2012]] ; [[#Jiang--2013|Jiang et al., 2013]] ; [[#Blunden--2017|Blunden and Arndt, 2017]] ; [[#Wu--2018c|Wu et al., 2018c]] ). Since the early 2010s, the average wind speed in the world and some parts of Asia has shown signs of increasing ( [[#Li--2018d|Li et al., 2018d]] ; [[#Wu--2018c|Wu et al., 2018c]] ; [[#Zeng--2019|Zeng et al., 2019]] ), which seems to be an inter-decadal variability. Whether this means a change in its trend needs the support of longer observation data.

At the same time, with the increase in the proportion of renewable energy in the power system, the power system will be more vulnerable to climate change and extreme weather and climate events, and the vulnerability and risk of the power system will greatly increase ( ''medium confidence'' ).

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==== 10.4.1.3 Adaptation Options ====

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The overall solution would be to develop a resilient energy system and avoid the risk of unsustainable energy growth in developing Asia. This requires that strategic planning be consistent with the long-term climate projection, impact and adaptation ( [[#EUEI-PDF--2017|EUEI-PDF, 2017]] ). Although no single policy package would be applicable for all the countries across the region, several measures could be addressed as the common options, including fortification of energy infrastructure and diversification of the sources by sufficient investment, improvement of energy efficiency for sector flexibility, and promotion of regional cooperation and integration for increasing energy security ( [[#UNESCAP--2018b|UNESCAP, 2018b]] ). Adaptation also includes promoting renewable energy resources, securing local natural gas resources, enhancing water production and adopting green-building technologies. These adaptation measures may help increase readiness for the anticipated impact of climate change.

The improvement of energy efficiency and demand-side management can alleviate supply constraints and thus lower overall required-energy capacity. Energy storage, smart grids for the electricity network as well as other flexible management measures enable this energy demand shifting. Regional integration of energy markets drives productivity increase, cost reduction, new investment, human capability and diversity of energy sources ( [[#WEC--2018|WEC, 2018]] ). For example, better interconnection of natural gas supply networks among the ASEAN countries enhances gas security in the region. The development of the long-planned regional power grid would make large-scale renewable projects more viable and aid the integration of rising shares of wind and solar power ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA, 2017]] ).

Providing enough investment in energy supply is a top priority to extend the connections to those without access to electricity and satisfy the soaring demand ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA, 2017]] ). The investment in non-fossil energies like renewables has been expanding to leverage the economic growth in China, India and Republic of Korea. According to the updated estimate of ADB, 14.7 trillion USD will be needed for the infrastructure development in the power sector of developing Asia over the 15 years from 2016 to 2030 ( [[#ADB--2017a|ADB, 2017a]] ). The cumulative investment needs of ASEAN for energy supply and efficiency up to 2040 is estimated at 2.7 to 2.9 trillion USD ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA, 2017]] ). Mobilising investment to such a scale will require significant participation from the private sector and international financial institutions.

Diversifying energy sources increases energy security and thus the resilience of the whole system. The deployment of renewable energy is widely recognised as a crucial measure for enhancing energy access and diversity. There remains huge potential for renewable sources in Asia (i.e., India has massive solar power potential) ( [[#Shukla--2017|Shukla et al., 2017]] ). Many renewable technologies (i.e., hydro- and wind power as well as solar photovoltaics) are becoming competitive, and their life-cycle costs may fall below those of coal and natural gas in the near term. Great progress has been made in enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), and in the conventional and unconventional fusion power that China is promoting. Conventional and underground pumped hydropower will level out supplies for intermittent renewable energy generation.

Substantial progress may be fulfilled by increasing the share of renewable energy in the overall energy consumption of Asia ( [[#ADB--2017a|ADB, 2017a]] ). Access to energy, particularly in rural areas, can reduce climate vulnerability of developing Asia. Due to the high cost of extending the electricity network to rural regions, an alternative way is to develop the off-grid renewable energy systems in these areas. The distributed, instead of centralised, energy systems can increase energy access and resilience ( [[#EUEI-PDF--2017|EUEI-PDF, 2017]] ).

Some countries in the Arabian Peninsula, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are adopting an array of approaches to enhance the adaptive capacity of the energy infrastructure and diffuse the risk of climate change over a larger area (e.g., energy efficiency, demand management, storm planning for power plants). In Al Mashrek, building institutional capacity in the energy sector is a necessary first step to mainstream climate-change adaptation (CCA). Countries such as Lebanon and Jordan have already made progress in mainstreaming CCA into electricity infrastructure. In the UAE, buildings account for more than 80% of the total electricity consumption. There are currently a set of measures and regulations on building conditions and specifications that are being applied to increase energy efficiency in buildings, but the rehabilitation and upgrading of old buildings still require further efforts ( [[#Environment--2015|Environment, 2015]] ). In Kuwait, one adaptation measure to dust storms is through the reduction of the proportion of open-desert land from 75 to 51%, the increase in protected areas from 8 to 18% and greenbelt projects in desert areas ( [[#Kuwait--2015|Kuwait, 2015]] ). Addressing climate-change impact on energy systems in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Palestine needs to simultaneously consider other interlinked challenges of population growth, rapid urbanisation, refugee influx, conflict and geopolitical location. To address these challenges and provide solutions for CCA, the promotion of multi-stakeholder partnerships is key to breaking the silo approach.

These CCA measures need to be broadened to fit the scope and depth of mitigation efforts by each country. Risk assessments and vulnerability assessments are in their early stages in the energy and industrial sectors, and are not currently based on a comprehensive plan of action. The first step is to undertake comprehensive national assessments of the risks associated with climate change based on existing studies on climate impacts and risks, and by making evidence-based decisions on adaptation actions.

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'''Box 10.2 | Migration and Displacement in Asia'''
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Migration is a key livelihood strategy across Asia and is driven by multiple factors such as socioeconomic changes, increasing climate variability and disaster incidence, and changing aspirations. Displacement denotes a more involuntary movement in reaction to climatic or non-climatic factors. There is ''robust evidence, medium agreement'' that increased climate variability and extreme events are already driving migration ( [[#Gemenne--2015|Gemenne et al., 2015]] ; [[#Rigaud--2018|]] [[#Rigaud--2018|Rigaud et al., 2018]] ; [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] ; [[#Jacobson--2019|Jacobson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Siddiqui--2019|Siddiqui et al., 2019]] ; [[#IDMC--2020|IDMC, 2020]] ; [[#Maharjan--2020|Maharjan et al., 2020]] ) and ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' projecting that longer-term climate change will increase migration flows across Asia ( [[#Abubakar--2018|Abubakar et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rigaud--2018|]] [[#Rigaud--2018|Rigaud et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hauer--2020|Hauer et al., 2020]] ; [[#Bell--2021|Bell et al., 2021]] ).

'''Detection and attribution: Does climate change drive migration?''' Ascertaining the role of climate change in migration is difficult and contested (see Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7|Chapter 7]] and RKR-H in Chapter 16), with observation-based studies either linking extreme event incidence, weather anomalies and environmental change with migration numbers or drivers ( [[#McLeman--2014|McLeman, 2014]] ; [[#Singh--2019a|Singh et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Kaczan--2020|Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020]] ), and projection studies looking at particular risks such as SLR or drought by linking increasing warming (often through representative concentration pathways, RCPs) and population growth. Despite methodological disagreement on detection and attribution of migration due to climate change, there is medium confidence that higher warming and associated changes in frequency and intensity of slow-onset events (such as drought and sea level rise) and rapid-onset events (such as cyclones and flooding) will increase involuntary displacement in the future, especially under SSP3 and SSP4 pathways ( [[#Dasgupta--2014a|Dasgupta et al., 2014a]] ; [[#Davis--2018|Davis et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rigaud--2018|]] [[#Rigaud--2018|Rigaud et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hauer--2020|Hauer et al., 2020]] ). But its role is smaller than non-climatic socio-economic drivers of migration ( [[#Wodon--2014|Wodon et al., 2014]] ; [[#Adger--2021|Adger et al., 2021]] ).

''Current migration and displacement.'' One in three migrants comes from Asia and the highest ratio of outward migrants is seen from hazard-exposed Pacific countries ( [[#Ober--2019|Ober, 2019]] ). In 2019, approximately 1900 disasters triggered 24.9 million new displacements across 140 countries; in particular, Bangladesh, China, India and the Philippines each recorded more than 4 million disaster displacements ( [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] ). Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia see significant disaster-associated displacements: for example, heavy rain-induced flooding in Khatlon (Tajikistan) triggered 5400 new displacements; landslides in the Jalal-Abad (Kyrgyzstan) saw 4700 new displacements; and floods in Altai, Tuva and Khakassia (Russia) displaced 1500 people. Iran reported the highest sub-regional figures with &gt;520,000 new disaster-related displacements in 2019 ( [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] ). In Southeast and East Asia, cyclones, floods and typhoons triggered internal displacement of 9.6 million people in 2019, almost 30% of total global displacements ( [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] ). With most migrants in the region being temporary migrant workers, loss of jobs and wages among them have been particularly severe due to adverse economic climate triggered by COVID-19 ( [[#ESCWA--2020|ESCWA, 2020]] ). It has also resulted in large-scale returns of migrant workers, and remittances have declined drastically ( [[#Khanna--2020|Khanna, 2020]] ; [[#Li--2021|Li et al., 2021]] ). Remittances to Eastern Europe and Central Asia are expected to decline 16.1% from 57 billion USD in 2019 to 48 billion USD in 2020. Remittances in East Asia and the Pacific are estimated to fall 10.5% over the same period, from 147 billion to 131 billion USD ( [[#United%20Nations--2020|United Nations, 2020]] ). The COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on migrants ( [[#Rajan--2020|Rajan, 2020]] ) in the region, and some countries have targeted migrants in economic stimulus packages or income-support programmes; however, access to such support has been heterogeneous.

''Projected migration.'' Regional variation is significant across Asia. By one estimate, in South Asia, internal climate migrants (i.e., those migrating due to climate change and associated impacts such as water scarcity, crop failure, SLR and storm surges) are projected to be 40 million by 2050 (1.8% of regional population) under high warming ( [[#Rigaud--2018|]] [[#Rigaud--2018|Rigaud et al., 2018]] ). While methodological critiques remain on projected migration estimates, what is certain is that some countries will be more affected that others; it is estimated that in southern Bangladesh, SLR could displace 0.9–2.1 million people by direct inundation by 2050 ( [[#Jevrejeva--2016|Jevrejeva et al., 2016]] ; [[#Davis--2018|Davis et al., 2018]] ). In South Asia, migration hotspots include the Gangetic Plain and the Delhi–Lahore corridor, and coastal cities such as Chennai, Chittagong, Dhaka and Mumbai, which will be simultaneously exposed to climate-change impacts, major migration destinations and amplified rural–urban migration ( [[#Ober--2019|Ober, 2019]] ). Importantly, there is ''low agreement'' on projected numbers (see [[#Boas--2019|Boas et al., 2019]] ) with uncertainties around how local policies and individual behaviours will shape migration choices. Even in high-risk places, people might choose to stay or be unable to move, resulting in ‘trapped’ populations ( [[#Zickgraf--2019|Zickgraf, 2019]] ; [[#Ayeb-Karlsson--2020|Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020]] ). There is currently inadequate evidence to ascertain the nature and numbers of trapped populations currently or in the future.

'''Implications of migration for adaptation.''' The evidence on migration and its impacts on adaptive capacity and risk reduction are mixed ( [[#Upadhyay--2014|Upadhyay, 2014]] ; [[#Banerjee--2018|Banerjee et al., 2018]] ; [[#Szabo--2018|Szabo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Maharjan--2020|Maharjan et al., 2020]] ; [[#Singh--2020|Singh and Basu, 2020]] ). Financial remittances help vulnerable households spread risk through better incomes, expanded networks and improved assets such as housing, education and communication technology ( [[#Jha--2018|Jha et al., 2018]] ; [[#Szabo--2018|Szabo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ober--2019|Ober, 2019]] ; [[#Maharjan--2020|Maharjan et al., 2020]] ). Benefits from international remittances across the Asia Pacific region were approximately 276 billion USD in 2017 ( [[#UN--2018|UN, 2018]] ), and in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Nepal remittances were ~25% of the national GDP in 2015. However, migration requires a minimum level of resources, and liquidity constraints impede internal migration by the poorest households often rendering them immobile ( [[#Ayeb-Karlsson--2020|Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020]] ; [[#Maharjan--2020|Maharjan et al., 2020]] ). Furthermore, migration does not necessarily mean that people move out of risk; in fact, often they might be subjected to new risks. Notably, migrants in South and Southeast Asia have been severely affected by the compounding crises of disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic, and there is emerging evidence that inclusion of universal safety-net provisions that embed adaptation planning can reduce vulnerabilities of migrants ( [[#Sengupta--2020|Sengupta and Jha, 2020]] ; [[#Cundill--2021|Cundill et al., 2021]] ; [[#Sultana--2021|Sultana, 2021]] ).

While there is ''robust evidence'' ( ''medium agreement'' ) that migration exacerbates gendered vulnerability and work burdens ( [[#Banerjee--2019|Banerjee et al., 2019]] ; [[#Singh--2019|Singh, 2019]] ; [[#Rao--2020|Rao et al., 2020]] ), it is well established that differential vulnerability of migrants intersects with ethnicity, age and gender; political networks and social capital; and livelihoods in destination areas ( [[#Maharjan--2020|Maharjan et al., 2020]] ; [[#Cundill--2021|Cundill et al., 2021]] ). Across Asia, international and internal migration are changing social norms and household structures, with significant implications for local adaptive capacity ( [[#Singh--2019|Singh, 2019]] ; [[#Evertsen--2020|Evertsen and van der Geest, 2020]] ; [[#Porst--2020|Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2020]] ; [[#Rao--2020|Rao et al., 2020]] ).

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