Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-14 (section)

== 14.3 Perception of Climate-Change Hazards, Risks and Adaptation in North America ==

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=== 14.3.1 Climate Change as a Salient Issue ===

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The majority of the climate science community has reached consensus that mean global temperature has increased and human activity is a major cause ( [[#Oreskes--2004|Oreskes, 2004]] ; [[#Anderegg--2010|Anderegg et al., 2010]] ; [[#Cook--2013|Cook et al., 2013]] ; [[#Cook--2016|Cook et al., 2016]] ; [[#IPCC--2021|IPCC, 2021]] ), setting the context for public policy action. Despite expert scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, there is polarisation and an ongoing debate over the reality of anthropogenic climate change in the public and policy domains, with attendant risks to society ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Doran--2009|Doran and Zimmerman, 2009]] ; [[#Ballew--2019|Ballew et al., 2019]] ; [[#Druckman--2019|Druckman and McGrath, 2019]] ; [[#Hornsey--2020|Hornsey and Fielding, 2020]] ; [[#Wong-Parodi--2020|Wong-Parodi and Feygina, 2020]] ). Public perception of consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change can be an important gateway belief, which establishes a crucial precondition for public policy action ( [[#van%20der%20Linden--2015|van der Linden et al., 2015]] ; [[#van%20der%20Linden--2019|van der Linden et al., 2019]] ) by influencing the assessment of climate-change risks and opportunities, and formulation of appropriate mitigation and adaptation responses ( [[#Ding--2011|Ding et al., 2011]] ; [[#Bolsen--2015|Bolsen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016]] ; [[#Doll--2017|Doll et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mase--2017|Mase et al., 2017]] ; [[#Morton--2017|Morton et al., 2017]] ). Trust in experts, institutions and environmental groups is also important ( [[#Cologna--2020|Cologna and Siegrist, 2020]] ; [[#Termini--2021|Termini and Kalafatis, 2021]] ).

Rhetoric and misinformation on climate change and the deliberate undermining of science have contributed to misperceptions of the scientific consensus, uncertainty, disregarded risk and urgency, and dissent ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Ding--2011|Ding et al., 2011]] ; [[#Oreskes--2011|Oreskes and Conway, 2011]] ; [[#Aklin--2014|Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014]] ; [[#Cook--2017|Cook et al., 2017]] ; [[#van%20der%20Linden--2017|van der Linden et al., 2017]] ). Additionally, strong party affiliation and partisan opinion polarisation contribute to delayed mitigation and adaptation action, most notably in the USA ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#van%20der%20Linden--2015|van der Linden et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cook--2016|Cook and Lewandowsky, 2016]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ; [[#Chinn--2020|Chinn et al., 2020]] ) but with similar patterns in Canada ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Lachapelle--2012|Lachapelle et al., 2012]] ; [[#Kevins--2018|Kevins and Soroka, 2018]] ). Vocal groups can affect public discourse and weaken public support for climate mitigation and adaptation policies ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Aklin--2014|Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014]] ; [[#Lewandowsky--2019|Lewandowsky et al., 2019]] ). Vested economic and political interests have organised and financed misinformation and ‘contrarian’ climate-change communication ( [[#Brulle--2014|Brulle, 2014]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell, 2016a]] ; [[#Farrell--2016b|Farrell, 2016b]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes, 2017]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ; [[#Brulle--2018|Brulle, 2018]] ). Traditional media–print and broadcast–frame and transmit climate-change information and play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions, understanding and willingness to act ( [[#Happer--2013|Happer and Philo, 2013]] ; [[#Schmidt--2013|Schmidt et al., 2013]] ; [[#Hmielowski--2014|Hmielowski et al., 2014]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Shapiro, 2018]] ; [[#King--2019|King et al., 2019]] ; [[#Chinn--2020|Chinn et al., 2020]] ). The journalistic norm of ‘balance’ (giving equal weight to climate scientists and contrarians in climate-change reporting) biases coverage by unevenly amplifying certain messages that are not supported by science, contributing to politicisation of science, spreading of misinformation and reducing public consensus on action ( [[#Boykoff--2004|Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004]] ; [[#Boykoff--2007|Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007]] ; [[#Cook--2017|Cook et al., 2017]] ). Much online social media discussion of climate change takes place in ‘echo chambers’–a social network among like-minded people in communities dominated by a single view that contributes to polarisation ( [[#Williams--2015|Williams et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pearce--2019|Pearce et al., 2019]] ) and the spread of misinformation (Treen et al., 2020).

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=== 14.3.2 Public Perceptions, Opinions and Understanding of Climate Change ===

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In a 2018 survey across 26 nations, people in Canada and Mexico ranked climate change as the top global threat, whereas in the USA climate change ranked third ( [[#Poushter--2019|Poushter and Huang, 2019]] ). The public’s responses to the causes of climate change and risk perceptions in Canada ( [[#Mildenberger--2016|Mildenberger et al., 2016]] ) and the USA ( [[#Howe--2015|Howe et al., 2015]] ) have revealed variations among regions (Figure 14.3) and less acceptance of climate change in rural regions than in urban areas. Canadian regions have higher acceptance of climate change (e.g., recognise it is happening and attributable to human activity) than the most liberal areas in the USA ( [[#Lachapelle--2012|Lachapelle et al., 2012]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2016|Mildenberger et al., 2016]] ). Western Canadian regions with high carbon intensity economies had lower acceptance of climate change than the rest of Canada, whereas in the USA perceptions were more stable across regions ( [[#Lachapelle--2012|Lachapelle et al., 2012]] ). A recent survey in Mexico found that for 73% of respondents climate change represents a major economic, environmental and social threat, and in the most vulnerable states (MX-SE), the perception is that climate-change impacts and extreme events have considerable implications for the way of life in communities ( [[#Zamora%20Saenz--2018|Zamora Saenz, 2018]] ). In a 2017 survey, [[#Azócar--2021|Azócar et al. (2021)]] found that 85% of respondents from Mexico acknowledged anthropogenic climate change. Peoples’ experience with extreme events (e.g., hurricanes, high temperatures), socio-demographic characteristics, level of marginalisation and economic and social exclusion, as well as education levels, were important factors influencing perception of climate change in Mexico ( [[#Corona-Jimenez--2018|Corona-Jimenez, 2018]] ; [[#Alfie--2021|Alfie and Cruz-Bello, 2021]] ; [[#Azócar--2021|Azócar et al., 2021]] ). Drawing upon Indigenous knowledge (see Box 14.1) as well as lived experience of recent changes in ice, weather patterns, and species’ phenology and distribution, Indigenous Peoples recognise that change is occurring in their communities and have effective solutions that are grounded in Indigenous world views ( [[#Harrington--2006|Harrington, 2006]] ; [[#Turner--2009|Turner and Clifton, 2009]] ; [[#Norton-Smith--2016a|Norton-]] [[#Smith--2016a|Smith et al., 2016a]] ; [[#Savo--2016|Savo et al., 2016]] ; [[#Maldonado--2017|Maldonado et al., 2017]] ; Chisholm [[#Hatfield--2018|Hatfield et al., 2018]] ).

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[[File:b46d22a64e1c6649128a4351002ad9ce IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_14_003.png]]

'''Figure 14.3 |''' '''Regional distribution of public perception that ‘the Earth is getting warmer’ as a surrogate for public acceptance that climate change is happening (percent of population).''' Scale is the Canadian federal electoral district or riding level and US congressional district. The three northern territories and Labrador, in Canada, did not meet population thresholds for modelling. The figure updates [[#Mildenberger--2016|Mildenberger et al. (2016)]] and is based on equivalent public surveys in both countries: Canadian ‘Earth is getting warmer’ and US ‘global warming is happening’ undertaken in 2019. Equivalent surveys and modelling for Mexico are not available at the time of writing.

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=== 14.3.3 Building Consensus on Climate Change ===

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Building consensus for action on climate change is influenced by individual factors (e.g., ideology, world view, trust, partisan identity, religion, education, age) and the broader societal context (e.g., culture, media coverage and content, political climate, economic conditions) ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#McCright--2011|McCright and Dunlap, 2011]] ; [[#Brulle--2012|Brulle et al., 2012]] ; [[#Hornsey--2016|Hornsey et al., 2016]] ; [[#Arbuckle--2017|Arbuckle, 2017]] ; [[#Pearson--2017|Pearson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Shapiro, 2018]] ; [[#Ballew--2020|Ballew et al., 2020]] ; [[#Cologna--2020|Cologna and Siegrist, 2020]] ; [[#Goldberg--2020|Goldberg et al., 2020]] ) ''.'' In a multi-country assessment of acceptance of global warming influenced by ideology (e.g., conspiratorial ideation, individualism, hierarchy, and left–right and liberal–conservative political orientation), the USA uniquely had the strongest link to doubt out of 25 countries for all factors, while Canada’s dominant influence on non-acceptance was conservative political ideology, and for Mexico, there were no ideological effects ( [[#Hornsey--2018|Hornsey et al., 2018]] ).

Political affiliation and partisan group identity contribute to polarisation on the causes and state of climate change, most notably in the USA ( ''medium confidence'' ). Fewer US republicans hold the belief that human activity causes climate change than democrats ( [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ; [[#Druckman--2019|Druckman and McGrath, 2019]] ). Partisanship in the USA with respect to climate change has evolved over the period 1997–2016; initially, it was limited, but since 2008, there has been a widening, more entrenched partisan ‘divide’ ( [[#Dunlap--2016|Dunlap et al., 2016]] ). The millennial generation (born in the 1980s and 1990s), emerging as the largest US population cohort, has a potentially important political influence–reduction in polarisation–as they show relatively higher levels of concern and acceptance of climate-change science than older age groups. Political affiliation does not have as strong an effect on their climate change beliefs ( [[#Corner--2015|Corner et al., 2015]] ; [[#Ross--2019|Ross et al., 2019]] ).

Communicating to educate or enhance knowledge on climate-change science or consensus can, but does not necessarily lead individuals to revise their beliefs ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Bolsen--2015|Bolsen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Druckman--2019|Druckman and McGrath, 2019]] ). People may reject new information that conflicts with their beliefs or not consider it credible, as political ideology and partisan affiliation are strong influences ( [[#Arbuckle--2017|Arbuckle, 2017]] ). The climate-change issue may create resistance from individuals with conservative political ideologies and hierarchical, individualistic world views because it ascribes responsibility to developed, industrialised countries for emissions and brings about more environmental regulation ( [[#Stevenson--2015|Stevenson et al., 2015]] ). Lack of trust in scientific consensus on climate change may actually originate from opposition by US conservatives to the perceived advocacy for different climate-change policy approaches that challenge their world views ( [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ).

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=== 14.3.4 Factors Influencing Perceptions of Climate-Change Risks and Adaptation Action ===

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Projected climate-change risk, urgency and necessary adaptations are perceived and understood differently by the public, communities, professional groups, climate scientists and public policy makers ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Bolsen--2015|Bolsen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016]] ; [[#Morton--2017|Morton et al., 2017]] ; [[#Treuer--2018|Treuer et al., 2018]] ). People can engage with climate change across three dimensions: cognitive (knowledge), affective (feelings) and behavioural (responses and actions) ( [[#Galway--2019|Galway, 2019]] ; [[#Brosch--2021|Brosch, 2021]] ). Risk assessment can be influenced by values regarding the subject under evaluation ( [[#Allison--2015|Allison and Bassett, 2015]] ; [[#Stevenson--2015|Stevenson et al., 2015]] ) and can interact with other risks and change over time ( [[#Mach--2016|Mach et al., 2016]] ). Communities and practitioners (e.g., farmers, foresters, water managers) are influenced in their willingness to modify current practices and adopt new measures based on how they perceive, understand and experience climate-change uncertainty, risk and urgency as well as political and social norms ( [[#van%20Putten--2015|van Putten et al., 2015]] ; [[#Doll--2017|Doll et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mase--2017|Mase et al., 2017]] ; [[#Morton--2017|Morton et al., 2017]] ; [[#Zanocco--2018|Zanocco et al., 2018]] ) ''.'' Place-based and local-focused assessments allow individuals to more readily assess and adapt to risks as well as identify roles and responsibilities in the face of multiple, interacting and often unequally distributed climate-change impacts ( [[#Khan--2018|Khan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Galway--2019|Galway, 2019]] ). Interest in preserving local archaeological sites threatened by SLR initiated collaboration and co-production of knowledge among disparate US communities: citizens, archaeologists, preservationists, planners, land managers and Indigenous Peoples ( [[#Fatorić--2019|Fatorić and Seekamp, 2019]] ; [[#Dawson--2020|Dawson et al., 2020]] ).

Psychological distancing–the perception that the greatest impacts occur sometime in the distant future and to people and places far away–can lead to discounting of risk and the need for adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Leviston--2014|Leviston et al., 2014]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger et al., 2019]] ). Communication directed at local and personal framing of climate-change impact and risk information is one option for addressing low salience ( [[#Bolsen--2019|Bolsen et al., 2019]] ) particularly related to established risks such as SLR, flooding and wildfires in North America ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger et al., 2019]] ). ‘Personalised’ risk communications have had mixed results creating behavioural change and policy support, and even caused resistance ( [[#Schoenefeld--2016|Schoenefeld and McCauley, 2016]] ). Communication focused extensively on risks and dangers of climate change can produce fear or dread, lessen agency and create fatalism that hinders action ( [[#Giddens--2015|Giddens, 2015]] ; [[#Mayer--2019|Mayer and Smith, 2019]] ); it also can be labelled alarmist ( [[#Leiserowitz--2005|Leiserowitz, 2005]] ). Detailed SLR flooding maps for the San Francisco Bay area did not increase climate risk assessment but lessened personal risk perception of those with a strong belief in climate change, although policy preferences and support for adaptation did not change ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger et al., 2019]] ). Defining coherent groups based on variations in beliefs, risk perceptions and policy preferences offers opportunities for effectively engaging with segments of the population instead of using the same approach for everyone ( ''low confidence'' ) ( [[#Maibach--2011|Maibach et al., 2011]] ; [[#Chryst--2018|Chryst et al., 2018]] ). As an example, the US population was segmented into a continuum ranging from the ‘Alarmed’, the dominant group who were ‘Concerned’, then the Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and least prevalent, the Dismissive ( [[#Chryst--2018|Chryst et al., 2018]] ).

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