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==== 10.4.1.1 Regional Diversity ==== <div id="h3-3-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Energy consumption of Asia accounts for 36% of the global total at present. China, India and the ASEAN countries have largely contributed to the ever-growing global energy consumption. Asia is predicted to account for 80% of coal, 26% of natural gas and 52% of electricity consumption of the world by 2040 ( [[#IEA--2018|IEA, 2018]] ). The share of Asia in the global primary energy consumption will increase to 48% by 2050. China continues to be the world’s largest energy consumer, and the combined consumption of India and ASEAN will be similar to that of China by that time ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ). The current energy structure of Asia is dominated by fossil fuels. As the trend indicates, the share of coal in China’s primary energy consumption is forecasted to sharply decline from 60% in 2017 to around 35% in 2040 ( [[#BP--2019|BP, 2019]] ). In contrast, India and ASEAN rely more on coal since coal may meet their soaring energy demand. Accordingly, more than 80% of the global coal will be consumed in Asia by 2050. China will surpass the USA in about 10 years to become the world’s largest oil consumer. India will then replace the USA to be the second largest by the late 2040s ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ). Around 60% of the incremental electricity demand globally, predicted to double by 2050, will occur in Asia. By that time, the electrification rate will increase to 30%, but 40% of electricity demand will be still covered by coal ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ). Asia accounts for almost half of the growth in global renewable power generation. It is hardly possible for Japan and Republic of Korea to develop additional nuclear power plants as planned, whereas nuclear generation continues to increase quickly in China and the scale will be similar to the entire generation of OECD by 2040 ( [[#BP--2019|BP, 2019]] ). India and Russia’s nuclear power sectors are also growing fast (e.g., the recent launch of the Akademik Lomonosov offshore nuclear power plant in Russia). The rapid growth of energy demand in Asia reinforces the region’s position as the largest energy importer ( [[#BP--2019|BP, 2019]] ). Around 80% of energy traded globally will be consumed in Asia, and the rate of self-sufficiency will decrease from 72 to 63% by 2050. This tendency is especially remarkable for ASEAN, which will become a net importer in the early 2020s. The self-sufficiency rate of coal will be maintained at a level of 80%, while that of oil and natural gas will decline significantly. The additional oil imports of the emerging Asian economies will be from North America, the Middle East and North Africa. The main players in Asia for the liquefied natural gas imports will extend from Japan and Republic of Korea to China and India. ASEAN has been a net exporter of natural gas but starts to expand its importation due to the increased consumption and resource depletion ( [[#IEEJ--2018|IEEJ, 2018]] ). The increase in energy demand at a rapid rate in these countries thus cannot be attributed only to population growth and rising living standards, but also to increasingly extreme temperature variations. The decrease in precipitation influences energy demand as well, as countries are becoming more dependent on energy-intensive methods (e.g., desalination, underground water pumping) to supply water. Similarly, energy systems are influenced by the way the agriculture sector, mainly in Al Mashrek, relies increasingly on energy-intensive methods (e.g., more fertilisers, different irrigation and harvesting patterns) ( [[#Farajalla--2013|Farajalla, 2013]] ). Climate change has direct and indirect impacts on energy and industrial systems. It has a particularly wide and profound impact on energy systems (energy development, transportation, supply, etc.). With global warming, the energy consumption for heating in winter decreases, while the energy consumption for cooling in summer significantly increases, but the overall energy demand shows an upwards trend ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Sailor--2001|Sailor, 2001]] ; [[#Szabo--2018|Szabo et al., 2018]] ). Such demands in summer seasons will by far exceed any energy savings from the decrease in heating demand due to warmer winters. Higher demand for cooling due to hotter temperatures has become a major challenge in the energy sector in all countries. Furthermore, decreased water levels due to lower precipitation reduces hydroelectric output. This is particularly the case for countries such as Syria and Iraq with large hydroelectric capacity ( [[#Hamid--2009|Hamid and Raouf, 2009]] ). Additionally, the decrease in water levels negatively affects low-carbon energy systems such as concentrated solar power and thermal-generation plants that require regular cooling and cleaning. Climate change adds extra pressure to current energy infrastructures in most countries where systems failures and blackouts are already common ( [[#Assaf--2009|Assaf, 2009]] ). In the wake of extreme weather events (e.g., heatwaves), energy infrastructures remain inadequate to cope. This is particularly the case for countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine, with poor electricity infrastructures (Jordan, 2015). Extreme weather events could generate grave damage to power plants, most being located only a few metres above sea level, as well as power-transmission towers and lines. In Lebanon, a small country where there are no Indigenous energy resources, the disruption of shipping of fuel supplies due to extreme weather events is a major risk. Other extreme weather events, such as floods and sandstorms, expose energy and industrial systems in the coastal areas due to a rise in sea level. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula are projected to experience significant inland flooding as sea levels rise ( [[#Hamid--2009|Hamid and Raouf, 2009]] ). In East Asia wet snow accretion enhanced by global warming often causes damage to electric power lines ( [[#Sakamoto--2000|Sakamoto, 2000]] ; [[#Ohba--2020|Ohba and Sugimoto, 2020]] ). <div id="10.4.1.2" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="key-drivers-to-vulnerability-with-observed-and-projected-impacts"></span>
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