Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-14 (section)

=== 14.3.1 Climate Change as a Salient Issue ===

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The majority of the climate science community has reached consensus that mean global temperature has increased and human activity is a major cause ( [[#Oreskes--2004|Oreskes, 2004]] ; [[#Anderegg--2010|Anderegg et al., 2010]] ; [[#Cook--2013|Cook et al., 2013]] ; [[#Cook--2016|Cook et al., 2016]] ; [[#IPCC--2021|IPCC, 2021]] ), setting the context for public policy action. Despite expert scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, there is polarisation and an ongoing debate over the reality of anthropogenic climate change in the public and policy domains, with attendant risks to society ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Doran--2009|Doran and Zimmerman, 2009]] ; [[#Ballew--2019|Ballew et al., 2019]] ; [[#Druckman--2019|Druckman and McGrath, 2019]] ; [[#Hornsey--2020|Hornsey and Fielding, 2020]] ; [[#Wong-Parodi--2020|Wong-Parodi and Feygina, 2020]] ). Public perception of consensus regarding anthropogenic climate change can be an important gateway belief, which establishes a crucial precondition for public policy action ( [[#van%20der%20Linden--2015|van der Linden et al., 2015]] ; [[#van%20der%20Linden--2019|van der Linden et al., 2019]] ) by influencing the assessment of climate-change risks and opportunities, and formulation of appropriate mitigation and adaptation responses ( [[#Ding--2011|Ding et al., 2011]] ; [[#Bolsen--2015|Bolsen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016]] ; [[#Doll--2017|Doll et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mase--2017|Mase et al., 2017]] ; [[#Morton--2017|Morton et al., 2017]] ). Trust in experts, institutions and environmental groups is also important ( [[#Cologna--2020|Cologna and Siegrist, 2020]] ; [[#Termini--2021|Termini and Kalafatis, 2021]] ).

Rhetoric and misinformation on climate change and the deliberate undermining of science have contributed to misperceptions of the scientific consensus, uncertainty, disregarded risk and urgency, and dissent ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Ding--2011|Ding et al., 2011]] ; [[#Oreskes--2011|Oreskes and Conway, 2011]] ; [[#Aklin--2014|Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014]] ; [[#Cook--2017|Cook et al., 2017]] ; [[#van%20der%20Linden--2017|van der Linden et al., 2017]] ). Additionally, strong party affiliation and partisan opinion polarisation contribute to delayed mitigation and adaptation action, most notably in the USA ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#van%20der%20Linden--2015|van der Linden et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cook--2016|Cook and Lewandowsky, 2016]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ; [[#Chinn--2020|Chinn et al., 2020]] ) but with similar patterns in Canada ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Lachapelle--2012|Lachapelle et al., 2012]] ; [[#Kevins--2018|Kevins and Soroka, 2018]] ). Vocal groups can affect public discourse and weaken public support for climate mitigation and adaptation policies ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Aklin--2014|Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014]] ; [[#Lewandowsky--2019|Lewandowsky et al., 2019]] ). Vested economic and political interests have organised and financed misinformation and ‘contrarian’ climate-change communication ( [[#Brulle--2014|Brulle, 2014]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell, 2016a]] ; [[#Farrell--2016b|Farrell, 2016b]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes, 2017]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ; [[#Brulle--2018|Brulle, 2018]] ). Traditional media–print and broadcast–frame and transmit climate-change information and play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions, understanding and willingness to act ( [[#Happer--2013|Happer and Philo, 2013]] ; [[#Schmidt--2013|Schmidt et al., 2013]] ; [[#Hmielowski--2014|Hmielowski et al., 2014]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Shapiro, 2018]] ; [[#King--2019|King et al., 2019]] ; [[#Chinn--2020|Chinn et al., 2020]] ). The journalistic norm of ‘balance’ (giving equal weight to climate scientists and contrarians in climate-change reporting) biases coverage by unevenly amplifying certain messages that are not supported by science, contributing to politicisation of science, spreading of misinformation and reducing public consensus on action ( [[#Boykoff--2004|Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004]] ; [[#Boykoff--2007|Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007]] ; [[#Cook--2017|Cook et al., 2017]] ). Much online social media discussion of climate change takes place in ‘echo chambers’–a social network among like-minded people in communities dominated by a single view that contributes to polarisation ( [[#Williams--2015|Williams et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pearce--2019|Pearce et al., 2019]] ) and the spread of misinformation (Treen et al., 2020).

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