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IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-18
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==== 18.2.2.2. Complexity of Development and Climate Action ==== <div id="h3-2-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Differing perspectives on development are in part determined by the multiple diverse priorities held by different actors and nations. Another reason is that development is not a linear process with a single goal, and active development planning requires simultaneously taking multiple processes and factors into account. This is well illustrated by growing attention to climate security. The AR5 delivered conflicting messages regarding climate change and security ( [[#Gleditsch--2014|Gleditsch and Nordås, 2014]] ), yet the understanding of climate-related security risks has made substantial progress in recent years ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2021|von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021]] ). Although there remains considerable research gaps in certain regions ( [[#Adams--2018|Adams et al., 2018]] ), a large body of qualitative and quantitative studies from different disciplines provides new insight into the relationship of climate change and security ( [[#Buhaug--2015|Buhaug, 2015]] ; [[#De%20Juan--2015|De Juan, 2015]] ; [[#Brzoska--2016|Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Abrahams--2017|Abrahams and Carr, 2017]] ; [[#Sakaguchi--2017|Sakaguchi et al., 2017]] ; Moran et al, 2018; [[#Scheffran--2020|Scheffran, 2020]] ). Though not the only cause ( [[#Sakaguchi--2017|Sakaguchi et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ), climate change undermines human livelihoods and security, because it increases the populations vulnerabilities, grievances and political tensions through an array of indirect—at times nonlinear—pathways, thereby increasing human insecurity and the risk of violent conflict ( [[#van%20Baalen--2018|van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2021|von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021]] ). Indeed, context, as well as timing and spatial distribution, matter and need to be accounted for ( [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ). In line with this better understanding, climate change and security have been reframed in the political space, to focus more on human security. The solutions to climate-related security risks cannot be military, but are linked to development and people’s vulnerabilities in complex social and politically fragile settings ( [[#Abrahams--2020|Abrahams, 2020]] ). This has resulted in integration of climate-related security risk into institutional and national frameworks ( [[#Dellmuth--2018|Dellmuth et al., 2018]] ; [[#Scott--2018|Scott and Ku, 2018]] ; [[#Aminga--2020|Aminga and Krampe, 2020]] ), including several Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) ( [[#Jernnäs--2019|Jernnäs and Linnér, 2019]] ; [[#Remling--2021|Remling, 2021]] ). One example is the UN Climate Security Mechanism—set up in 2018 between UNDP, UNEP and UN DPPA to help the UN more systematically address climate-related security risks and devise prevention and management strategies. Yet work remains in bridging these concerns with practical responses on the ground ( [[#Busby--2021|Busby, 2021]] ). Especially since emerging research building on the maladaptation literature shows that this practice cannot just mean adding adaptation and mitigation to the mix of development strategies in a given location, as this may have unintended and unanticipated effects and might even backfire completely ( [[#Dabelko--2013|Dabelko et al., 2013]] ; [[#Magnan--2020|Magnan et al., 2020]] ; [[#Mirumachi--2020|Mirumachi et al., 2020]] ; [[#Schipper--2020|Schipper, 2020]] ; [[#Swatuk--2021|Swatuk et al., 2021]] ). In extremely underdeveloped, fragile contexts such as Afghanistan, the local-level side effects of climate adaptation and mitigation projects might result in different development outcomes and question the potential for sustainable peace ( [[#Krampe--2021|Krampe et al., 2021]] ). Given the clearer understanding of the intertwined nature of climate change, security and development—especially in fragile and conflict affected regions—a rethinking of how to transfer this knowledge into policy solutions is necessary for the formulation of CRD. <div id="18.2.3" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="scenarios-as-a-method-for-representing-future-development-trajectories"></span>
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