Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

=== 8.2.2 Poverty–Environment Traps and Observed Responses to Climate Change with Implications for Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable Development ===

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Across all geographical regions, there is evidence that anthropogenic climate change is hindering poverty alleviation and thereby constraining responses to climate change in five main ways:

* By worsening living conditions ( [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hsiang--2017|Hsiang et al., 2017]] )
* By threatening food and nutrition security due to undernutrition and reduced opportunities for income generation ( [[#Burke--2015|Burke et al., 2015]] )
* By disrupting access to basic ecosystems services such as rainwater, soil moisture (reducing the productivity of agricultural land) or via the depletion of habitats (e.g., mangroves, fishing grounds) that particularly vulnerable and poor people are depending on ( [[#Malhi--2020|Malhi et al., 2020]] )
* By creating favourable conditions for the spread of vector-transmitted diseases ( [[#Liang--2017|Liang and Gong, 2017]] )
* By threatening underlying gender inequalities exacerbated by climate impacts, such as access and control to productive inputs and reinforcing social-cultural norms that discriminate against gender, age groups, social classes and race ( [[#Singh--2019b|Singh et al., 2019b]] ).

Responses to observed impacts such as glacier melt, sea level rise and increases in the frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts, hurricanes and floods need to take into account how they influence other policy issues and sectors, including poverty alleviation, human health and well-being ( [[#Orimoloye--2019|Orimoloye et al., 2019]] ), water/energy and the built environment ( [[#Andrić--2018|Andrić et al., 2018]] ), transportation and mobility (Markolf et al., 2019), agriculture ( [[#Hertel--2014|Hertel and Lobell, 2014]] ) and biodiversity/ecosystems (Nogués-Bravo et al., 2019), only to mention a few. Recent literature provides evidence that impacts of climate change together with non-climatic drivers can create poverty–environment traps that may increase the probability of long-term and chronic poverty (Figure 8.4; [[#Hallegatte--2015|Hallegatte et al., 2015]] ; [[#Djalante--2020|Djalante et al., 2020]] ; [[#Malhi--2020|Malhi et al., 2020]] ; [[#McCloskey--2020|McCloskey et al., 2020]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ).

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[[File:d9d347887402890d44633f97eeadea00 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_8_004.png]]

'''Figure 8.4 |''' '''Schematic representation of a poverty–environment trap that can increase chronic poverty.'''

In addition, observed climate change responses, including autonomous and planned adaptation, can exacerbate poverty and vulnerability ( [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ). There is ''robust evidence'' that planned responses to climate change, such as large-scale adaptation projects, in some context can also increase vulnerability due to the reinforcement of inequalities and the effects of further marginalisation ( [[#Fritzell--2015|Fritzell et al., 2015]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ). There is increasing evidence that the responses to indirect impacts of climate change, such as to shifts in marine or terrestrial ecosystems due to climate change ( [[#Seddon--2016|Seddon et al., 2016]] ) also affect different groups differently and impact poverty and livelihood security. Apart from influences on agriculture trends ( [[#Reichstein--2014|Reichstein et al., 2014]] ) and changes in yields ( [[#Reyes-Fox--2014|Reyes-Fox et al., 2014]] ; [[#Craparo--2015|Craparo et al., 2015]] ), climate change has significant (direct and indirect) impacts on livelihood assets and resources such as forests, livestock production and fisheries, which may undermine the livelihoods security in the medium and long run.

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==== 8.2.2.1 Characteristics of Responses ====

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Many of the observed responses to climate change aim to reduce exposure of people to climate-related hazards, such as flood defences, sea walls and embankments ( [[#Gralepois--2016|Gralepois et al., 2016]] ), rather than aiming specifically to address structural vulnerability to climate change, which means the root causes of vulnerability (e.g., [[#Mikulewicz--2020|Mikulewicz, 2020]] ; [[#McNamara--2021a|McNamara et al., 2021a]] ). Evidence suggests that responses to the impacts of climate change should consider the physical climate event, and also historical and institutional root causes that make people or systems vulnerable. However, addressing structural vulnerability must be balanced with the political context and the range of options available to people, communities or countries (see [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ). Political frameworks need to consider both types of responses, to revive democratic debate and citizenship ( [[#Pepermans--2016|Pepermans et al., 2016]] ). In addition to reducing poverty and vulnerability, planned climate change responses must also be intersectoral, in order to increase their effectiveness. This requires higher levels of vertical and horizontal coordination and integration ( [[#GIZ--2019|GIZ, 2019]] ). Horizontal coordination encompasses, for example, the integrated coordination of responses to climate change across different sectors, which requires suitable governance structures and processes that allow for such a coordination ( [[#Di%20Gregorio--2017|Di Gregorio et al., 2017]] ; [[#Burch--2019|Burch et al., 2019]] ). Vertical integration is needed in order to ensure that effective responses also include different levels of governance and benefit from knowledge at different scales. The inclusion of local knowledge within national or provincial adaptation strategies requires such linkages and vertical coordination. Overall, there is an increasing body of literature that highlights the importance of improved integration and coordination also in order to promote a higher effectiveness of strategies and an improved consideration of social justice and climate justice when designing and implementing responses ( [[#Levy--2015|Levy and Patz, 2015]] ).

However, evaluating the effectiveness, social impacts and social justice of climate change responses is not uniform across locations, nations and regions for three principal reasons:

* Temporal dimensions of responses: effective and appropriate climate change responses require that strategies and responses are tested in a specific context and that ongoing learning and adaptive management is a necessary to avoid maladaptation or other unintended consequences ( [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ),
* Goal of responses: responses may have distinct and locally specific goals, such as reducing vulnerability ( [[#Sarker--2019|Sarker et al., 2019]] ), which is distinct from increasing resilience ( [[#Alam--2018|Alam et al., 2018]] ). Vulnerability reduction and the increase of resilience (i.e., raising the ability to cope) are two different goals and often involve different processes.
* Level of responses: there is a need to ascertain the relevant level at which the responses are needed or expected (e.g., the individual level, community level, regional level). This analysis, however, also needs to consider the differential capacities of people, for example, the limited capacities of poor people or constrained capacities of most vulnerable countries (see also [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ).

Effective responses to climate change impacts for one group could impose higher costs and negative consequences for other groups, in terms of shifts in exposure and vulnerability. This category of response is known as maladaptation. Maladaptation actions defined in the IPCC SR1.5°C ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ) and in the Land Report ( [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ) are the ones that usually have unintended consequences, and can lead to increased negative risk to poor population mostly in the Global South to climate hazards by either increasing GHG emissions or by increasing the vulnerabilities to climate change with diminished welfare, now and in the near future ( [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ). For example, migration to urban centres can represent a significant adaptation opportunity for the migrants themselves, but can also increase the vulnerability of their community of origin or destination (e.g., through a depletion of the workforce or an addition pressure on environmental resources and infrastructure respectively) ( [[#Gemenne--2017|Gemenne and Blocher, 2017]] ). Some types of observed responses to climate change may not yield long-term benefits. For example, food imports during droughts or adverse climate conditions are not a fully adequate response, since they may alleviate a problem on the one hand (i.e., an imminent food shortage due to crop failure) but, on the other, lead to no long-lasting improvements in physical conditions and create new dependencies that can increase vulnerability in the long run ( [[#Zimmermann--2018|Zimmermann et al., 2018]] ).

In the AR5, the maladaptation outcomes emerge when climate change impacts and risks are disproportionately born by the poorest populations ( [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ). Since then, most maladaptation evidence emerges as a consequence of failure to address root causes of vulnerabilities that emerge under high and multiple forms of inequalities. In fact, the literature shows that adaptation practices can indeed redistribute vulnerabilities and increase risks to already poor and marginalised people with risk to maladaptation outcomes mainly in the Global South countries ( [[#Atteridge--2018|Atteridge and Remling, 2018]] ).

The maladaptation outcomes also emerge when responses are not equitable at the policy level, and exacerbate the precarity of vulnerable populations by excluding them from benefits and support, while attending to the needs of people of the most enfranchised segments of society ( [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas and Warner, 2019]] ; Asplund and Hjerpe 2020). In Tanzania, the political marginalisation of pastoralist access to critical riparian wetlands and increasing expansion of agriculture may result in adaptation pathways that heighten risk for these groups, while reducing risk for others ( [[#Smucker--2015|Smucker et al., 2015]] ). Salim et al. (2019) found that adaptation to flooding in Jakarta privileges political economic elites, while poor infrastructure in poorest neighbourhoods exacerbates loss of assets, housing and displacements ( [[#Salim--2019|Salim et al., 2019]] ). In Bangladesh, intense and consecutive flooding led to national and regional adaptation plans, that resulted in maladaptive trajectories as local poverty context and precarities of properties were not carefully considered and disconnected from local autonomous practice ( [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey, 2019]] ).

Overall, the assessment shows that understanding impacts of climate change should not be limited to the analysis of direct impacts or physical changes under different climatic conditions, but needs also account for the distributional effects that responses to climate change may imply. For example, responses implemented in order to benefit one sector or social group (e.g., farmers), should not undermine the well-being of others (e.g., pastoralists). Documented cases of maladaptation (see [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ) hint that responses to climate change can exacerbate existing inequality in some cases and may discourage other types of responses (see also Sections 8.5; 8.6). Furthermore, responses to similar climate change impacts and hazards may be extremely differentiated according to various social contexts (see [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ). In some cases, responses to climate change (e.g., relocation programmes) can even trigger social tipping points when climate change responses lead to major social transformations, such as forced displacement (see [[#8.4|Section 8.4]] ).

Also the influence of new global phenomena, such as urbanisation, issues of urban health (Schmid and [[#Raju--2020|Raju, 2020]] ) and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic need to be considered when assessing actual and potential consequences of different responses to climate change. For example, inequalities, vulnerabilities and poverty pockets are expected to change and increase, particularly in urban areas in countries with rapid urbanisation processes and high levels of poverty ( [[#Djalante--2020|Djalante et al., 2020]] ), hence urban and urbanisation trends need more attention. Urbanisation processes add another level of complexity ( [[#Raju--2021|Raju et al., 2021]] ). This is particularly the case in rapidly growing medium-sized cities in Africa that at present do not have sufficient resources to cope and adapt, and to implement climate-sensitive land use planning ( [[#Birkmann--2016|Birkmann et al., 2016]] ).

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present a summary of a set of common climate change responses observed, classified according to their main approach. All these responses demand a certain level of commitment, the support of adequate policies and enough budget for their implementation ( [[#Archie--2018|Archie et al., 2018]] ). The observed climate change adaptation responses—differentiated along urban and rural settings—underscore the very different nature of various responses and the need for cross-sectoral approaches.

While Table 8.1 shows selected adaptation responses, Table 8.2 shows selected mitigation responses that highlight that some mitigation responses (e.g., increasing energy efficiency) also have a potential benefit for the poor or more vulnerable groups, for example, through the reduction of costs for electricity. Both tables underscore that climate change mitigation and adaptation responses are strongly interlinked with broader development issues (industrial production, land use planning, education, etc.) at different scales.

'''Table 8.1 |''' Selected observed climate change adaptation responses in urban and rural areas commonly associated with positive implications for poverty, livelihoods and sustainable development.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Modality of response

! Impacts to urban communities

! Impacts to rural communities (e.g., farmers, pastoralists)

|-
| Integrated natural resource management

(e.g., [[#van%20Noordwijk--2019|van Noordwijk, 2019]] )

| Better conservation of green areas and reduced exposure to floods

| Conservation of natural resources (e.g., water, soil, pasture, forest, wildlife, biodiversity, aquatic life)

|-
| Disaster risk management

(e.g., [[#Mall--2019|Mall et al., 2019]] )

| Pre-disaster risk management and post-disaster risk management measures reduce loss of life and damage to property

| Disaster risk management may play an important role in avoiding or limiting the impacts of floods, droughts and other extreme events

|-
| Physical/structural improvements

(e.g., [[#Vallejo--2017|Vallejo and Mullan, 2017]] )

| Improving physical/structural measures to prevent property damage and foster ecosystems integrity

| Flood defences may help to prevent property losses, planting of trees may stabilise slopes, reduce soil erosion and siltation, rainwater harvesting increases water availability, protection of biotopes supports biodiversity

|-
| Relocation of vulnerable communities

(e.g., [[#McNamara--2015|McNamara and Des Combes, 2015]] )

| Moving vulnerable communities before and during climate-induced hazards may reduce loss of life

| Reduces the exposure of vulnerable communities to climate change and extremes hazards (e.g., floods and droughts), lessens their vulnerability, improves access to better resources and builds their capacity to adjust to a new context

|-
| Education and communication

(e.g., [[#Monroe--2017|Monroe et al., 2017]] )

| Public education and awareness, improved communication may reduce the damages and losses from adverse impacts of climate change and from extreme events

| Fosters awareness creation, reducing the degree of vulnerability to certain climate-induced hazards and help build the capacity to adapt

|}

'''Table 8.2 |''' Selected climate change mitigation responses.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Modality of response

! Impacts on urban communities

! Impacts on rural communities (e.g., farmers, pastoralists)

|-
| Land use planning

(e.g., [[#Frose--2019|Frose and Schiling, 2019]] )

| Helps to reduce GHG emissions and support environmental conservation, preventing urban heat islands

| Helps to reduce pressure on the natural resources (deforestation, land filling, damaging wetland) and promotes carbon sequestration

|-
| Improving industrial processes

(e.g., [[#van%20Vuuren--2018|van Vuuren et al., 2018]] )

| Unlocks many opportunities for improvement, including the optimised use of energy, reuse of waste in production, reducing GHG emissions, use of biomass and more efficient equipment

| In rural settings, industrialisation and technological innovation may directly assist vulnerable communities through provision of inputs (e.g., water storage, drip irrigation, forecast information), or reuse of biowaste in agriculture or energy production, hence reducing costs and pollution levels

|-
| Renewable energy

(e.g., [[#Cronin--2018|Cronin et al., 2018]] )

| Reduction of GHG emissions and reduction of the cost of electricity

| Some options (e.g., solar, wind) may help to reduce deforestation, reduce GHG emissions and promote healthier air within households

|-
| Energy efficiency

(e.g., [[#Abrahamse--2018|Abrahamse and Shwom, 2018]] )

| Efficient end-users’ energy utilisation reduces energy wastage, reduces costs and lowers carbon emissions

| Efficient end-users’ energy utilisation leads to natural resource conservation and a reduction of GHG emissions

|-
| Local/individual actions

(e.g., [[#Shaffril--2018|Shaffril et al., 2018]] ; [[#Tvinnereim--2018|Tvinnereim et al., 2018]] )

| Can contribute to reduce carbon footprints

| Fosters personal and community motivation to manage individually and communally owned resources, helps to reduce GHG emissions and foster resources conservation

|}

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==== 8.2.2.2 Observed Impacts and Implications for Structural Inequalities, Gender and Access to Resources ====

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This section examines the mutual reinforcement of climate change impacts and structural inequalities. There is ''robust evidence'' that negative impacts and harm posed by climate change are also a result of social and political processes and existing structural inequalities ( [[#Sealey-Huggins--2018|Sealey-Huggins, 2018]] ). Climate change encompasses unevenly distributed impacts on women, youth, elderly, Indigenous Peoples, communities of colour, urban poor and socially excluded groups, exacerbated by unequal distribution of resources and poor access for some ( [[#Rufat--2015|Rufat et al., 2015]] ; [[#McNeeley--2017|McNeeley, 2017]] ; [[#Sealey-Huggins--2018|Sealey-Huggins, 2018]] ). Structurally disadvantaged people, who are subject to social, economic and political inequalities resulting historically from discrimination, marginality or disenfranchisement because of gender, age, ethnicity, class, language, ability and/or sexual orientation, are disproportionately vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change hazards ( [[#Kaijser--2014|Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014]] ; [[#Otto--2016|Otto et al., 2016]] ). High levels of vulnerability at national scale (see [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ) are often linked to complex histories, including long-term economic dependencies established and reinforced in the context of colonisation.

Links between climate change, structural racism and development are less well established as an element of disproportionate impacts of climate change ( [[#Sealey-Huggins--2018|Sealey-Huggins, 2018]] ). Discrimination is not restricted to structural racism and includes discrimination of all kinds, including that of gender and caste, because of which a considerable population is directly bound to suffer the harsh impacts of the climate change. The climate change and gender literature has come a long way in demonstrating concrete examples of how structural inequalities operate. The political and micro-political aspects and how they interact with structural inequalities are also important to understand vulnerability. [[#Henrique--2020|Henrique and Tschakert (2020)]] shows how the many adaptation efforts benefit powerful actors, while further entrenching the poor and disadvantaged in cycles of dispossession. This critical analysis recommends acknowledging injustices, embracing deliberation and nurturing responsibility for human and more-than-human others. Garcia et al. (2020) describes the socio-political drivers of gendered inequalities that produce discriminatory opportunities for adaptation. They use an intersectional subjectivities lens to examine how entrenched power dynamics and social norms related to gender create barriers to adaptation, such as lack of resources and agency. The analysis shows a pronounced dichotomy as women experience the brunt of these barriers and a persistent power imbalance that positions them as ‘less able’ to adapt than men.

Historical marginality and exclusion are context-specific conditions that shape vulnerability ( [[#Leichenko--2014|Leichenko and Silva, 2014]] ). There is also ''robust evidence'' that gender inequalities contribute to climate vulnerability, and that consideration of gender is a key approach to climate justice (see Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18). There is ''robust evidence'' for the differentiated impacts of climate change and climate-orientated policies on women ( [[#McOmber--2020|McOmber, 2020]] ). For example, Friedman et al. (2019) show that, in Ghana, homogeneous representations of women farmers and a technical focus of climate-orientated policy interventions may threaten to further marginalise the most vulnerable and exacerbate existing inequalities. Climate change impacts can also heighten existing gender inequalities ( [[#Jost--2016|Jost et al., 2016]] ; [[#Glazebrook--2020|Glazebrook et al., 2020]] ). On the one hand, climate change impacts can be gendered as a result of customary roles in society, such as triple workloads for women (i.e., economic labour, household and family labour, and duties of community participation), and occupational hazards from gendered work indoors and outdoors ( [[#Murray--2016|Murray et al., 2016]] ). On the other, climate change hazards interact with changing gender roles in society, such as urban migration of both men and women in ways that break with tradition ( [[#Bhatta--2016|Bhatta et al., 2016]] ).

Gender influences the way that people also experience loss and process psychological and emotional distress of losses, such as mortality of children and other relatives in climate-related disasters ( [[#Chandra--2017|Chandra et al., 2017]] ).Women’s capacities are often constrained due to their roles in their household and society, institutional barriers and social norms. These constraints result in low adaptive capacity of women, which make them more vulnerable to hazards. As more men seek employment opportunities away from home, women are required to acquire new capacities to manage new challenges, including risks from climate change. [[#Banerjee--2019b|Banerjee et al. (2019b)]] finds that capacity-building interventions for women staying behind, which aimed to strengthen autonomous adaptation measures (e.g. precautionary savings and flood preparedness), also positively influenced women to approach formal institutions. Besides, the intervention households were more likely to invest a part of the precautionary savings in flood preparedness measures than control households.

Next to the direct differential impacts of climate change on different social groups, the impacts of climate change can also exacerbate inequality due to the lower access and limited ability to benefit from services provided by ecosystems. Marginalised poor people often significantly depend on the access to surrounding environments, natural resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods, for leisure or cultural practices. Thus shifts in such resources, for example, due to the bleaching of coral reefs or shifts in fish stock, also cause severe challenges and risks to these communities ( [[#Leal%20Filho--2018|Leal Filho, 2018]] ; [[#Le--2019|Le, 2019]] ; [[#UNTTSDCC--2014|UNTTSDCC, 2014]] ).

Overall, the assessed literature highlights that climate change impacts are not emerging in isolation from development context and development pathways. Economic and social ramifications mean that they may exacerbate poverty and marginalisation ( [[#Finkbeiner--2018|Finkbeiner et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dogru--2019|Dogru et al., 2019]] ). Choudhary et al. (2019) and [[#Orimoloye--2019|Orimoloye et al. (2019)]] highlight how the effects of climate change can be even more prejudicial to poor countries, which, in most cases, already suffer from weak governance, high prevalence of informal settlements and lack of resources. Health, livelihood assets and economy are examples of aspects that will worsen as a result of the negative impacts of climate change and failure to provide opportunities for sustainable adaptation ( [[#United%20Nations--2015|United Nations, 2015]] ). These facts highlight the importance of mitigation and adaptation measures especially in these regions characterised by high levels of vulnerability (see also [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ).

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'''Box 8.3 | COVID-19 pandemic'''
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, countries such as India were affected by hydro-meteorological hazards ( [[#Raju--2020|Raju, 2020]] ) making it extremely difficult to handle a public health crisis in the context of compounding risks and cascading hazards ( [[#Phillips--2020|Phillips et al., 2020]] ). The COVID-19 pandemic can increase the adverse consequences of climate change since it has the potential to delay some key adaptation actions. On the other hand, the pandemic also highlights the importance of better preparedness to the impacts of climate change ( [[#Djalante--2020|Djalante et al., 2020]] ). Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the economic situation within many countries and local communities particularly for already marginalised groups ( [[#Gupta--2021|Gupta et al., 2021]] ). The accumulation of crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic alongside climate change impacts, underscore the fact that stressors do not occur in isolation, but are interlinked, with clear implications for structural vulnerability and adaptation options available to the poorest ( [[#Sultana--2021|Sultana, 2021]] ). Responses to COVID-19 have led to significant economic and social distress within and across societies and local communities, especially in poorer countries. The direct health and economic impacts of the lockdowns have further limited the ability of many people across the developing world to pursue income-generating activities, and sustain livelihoods that are already affected by climate hazards. In addition, poor or most vulnerable groups face further marginalisation due to misinformation that these groups transmit the virus to other wealthier groups and areas. The pandemic has intensified inequalities in both developing countries ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ) and in industrialised nations ( [[#Anderson--2020|Anderson et al., 2020]] ; [[#McCloskey--2020|McCloskey et al., 2020]] ), whereby vulnerable groups are especially affected ( [[#Raju--2021|Raju et al., 2021]] ). Whereas different models and scenarios contain different data and figures, there is ''high agreement'' that it is likely that socioeconomic impacts are particularly severe within selected global regions and areas that are already characterised by a rather high level of human vulnerability (see also [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ). This also implies that the capacity of people to prepare for present and future climate change impacts will further decrease within these countries and population groups under the direct and indirect consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is not only influencing climate change research ( [[#Leal%20Filho--2021b|Leal Filho et al., 2021b]] ) but is also influencing the capacities of governmental institutions and nations to support planned adaptation and poverty reduction favouring the most vulnerable groups, since the crisis also means among other issues a significant reductions in tax revenues ( [[#Clemens--2020|Clemens and Veuger, 2020]] ). COVID-19 may also force people to seek alternative sources of income that can lead to the further erosion of long-term adaptive capacities. In many settings, the pandemic has had significant impact on businesses and SMEs ( [[#Schmid--2021|Schmid et al., 2021]] ). The important role of governmental support for buffering crises and periods of income loss of individual households (e.g., unemployment) and private businesses (e.g., SMEs) has also been demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries ( [[#OECD--2020b|OECD, 2020b]] ).

Livelihood disruptions and an increasing probability of higher levels of poverty and of structural vulnerability in various countries have already been observed ( [[#Laborde--2020b|Laborde et al., 2020b]] ). These vulnerabilities and the new layers created by the pandemic must be seen with an intersectional lens ( [[#Raju--2019|Raju, 2019]] ; [[#Sultana--2021|Sultana, 2021]] ).

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed the unequal access to vaccine and the importance of national state institutions to buffer negative impacts, for example, of the lock downs or in terms of unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic recovery also sets some basis for a stronger narrative towards a green recovery approach ( [[#Djalante--2020|Djalante et al., 2020]] ; [[#Forster--2020|Forster et al., 2020]] ).

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'''Box 8.4 | Conflict and governance'''
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Climate change impacts carry the risk of amplifying or aggravating existing tensions within and between communities or countries ( [[#Sakaguchi--2017|Sakaguchi et al., 2017]] ). There is, however, ''limited evidence'' for a universal direct causal linkage between climate change and violent conflicts ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). The triggering of conflicts related to climate impacts is strongly determined by contextual factors, such as the type of government or the level of development ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). A study of 156 countries ( [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ) showed that an increase in periods of drought exacerbate the risk of conflict, especially in democratic countries. This influence was particularly marked during the period 2010–2012 in countries of western Asia and northern Africa that were undergoing political transformations, such as the Arab Spring. Conflict can then represent people’s discontent in governments’ inefficient responses to climate impacts ( [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ). Research has noted conditions under which climate change can increase the risk of armed conflict, which includes ethnic exclusion, agricultural dependence, large populations, insufficient infrastructure, dysfunctional local institutions and low levels of development ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Since the AR5, there is ''robust evidence'' of the socially destabilising measures and high-risk income alternatives that the world’s poorest commonly take to cope with the impacts of climate change on livelihoods ( [[#Blattman--2016|Blattman and Annan, 2016]] ). To avoid impoverishment, households often pursue risky livelihood alternatives, with high potential for return on investment ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool et al., 2018]] ), but which in some cases undermine environmental quality ( [[#Bolognesi--2015|Bolognesi et al., 2015]] ), violate laws ( [[#Ahmed--2019|Ahmed et al., 2019]] ), contradict social norms ( [[#Hagerman--2014|Hagerman and Satterfield, 2014]] ), erode institutions ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool et al., 2018]] ), or affect intra- and inter-community cooperation ( [[#Nadiruzzaman--2015|Nadiruzzaman and Wrathall, 2015]] ). At the same time, a narrowing of livelihood options carries a strong potential for participation and association with violent non-state organisations and movements, either criminal or ideological ( [[#Nett--2016|Nett and Rüttinger, 2016]] ). In order to reduce the risk of instability and violence associated with climate change, a broadening of livelihood options among the most vulnerable people appears to be an effective policy approach ( [[#Miguel--2004|Miguel et al., 2004]] ).

The determinants of violence in the context of climate shocks are primarily poor institutional planning and response to impacts, such as the capacity of a government to respond to and manage environmental risk ( [[#Selby--2017|Selby et al., 2017]] ). In Latin America, for example, evidence on social conflicts related to disputes over access to water in the context of drought and decreasing water availability point to institutional failures, such as poor, inequitable or corrupt water governance ( [[#Poupeau--2017|Poupeau et al., 2017]] ). Such observations are not confined to low-income countries. In industrialised countries, failure of governments to address climate change is ''likely'' to fuel discontent, a condition in which violent outcomes are possible ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

In this regard, specific attention ought to be paid to how responses to climate change exacerbate inequalities within societies and create tensions between different groups—typically between those who are able to protect themselves from climate change impacts and those who do not have sufficient resources or are not prioritised in the responses to climate change. Frequently the possibility of migration from climate change is conflated with conflict outcomes from climate change; however, there is ''limited evidence'' and ''low agreement'' that climate change and migration will result in increased conflict ( [[#Okpara--2016b|Okpara et al., 2016b]] ), while there is ''robust evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that climate change can exacerbate existing tensions, which can in turn result in political violence and an increase in asylum-seeking ( [[#Marchiori--2012|Marchiori et al., 2012]] ). In the future, conflict in the context of climate change impacts may increase the number of migrants seeking asylum, although at present there is scant empirical evidence for this ( [[#Schutte--2021|Schutte et al., 2021]] ). Recent evidence also provides support for social conflict around inequitable climate mitigation policy as well (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies and emissions reductions targets) ( [[#Rentschler--2016|Rentschler, 2016]] ).

In recent years, research on the climate–security nexus has developed considerably, and has highlighted risks pertaining to conflicts, geo-political rivalries, critical infrastructure, terrorism or human security ( [[#Gemenne--2014|Gemenne et al., 2014]] ). While different studies have identified strong past correlations between climatic variations (of temperature and rainfall in particular) and the occurrence of violent conflicts ( [[#Hsiang--2013|Hsiang et al., 2013]] ), others have stressed the need for stronger explanatory models or the risk of a selection bias ( [[#Benjaminsen--2012|Benjaminsen et al., 2012]] ; [[#Solow--2013|Solow, 2013]] ; [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ).

While climate change may increase armed conflict risks in certain contexts ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ), responses to climate change will be crucial to mitigate these risks. Poor institutional responses can directly drive violence, and there is ''robust evidence'' that inequitable responses further exacerbate marginalisation, exclusion or disenfranchisement of some populations, which are commonly recognised drivers of violent conflict.

''Robust evidence'' suggests environmental problems (related to climate change) can be dealt with cooperatively, hence leading to more positive and peaceful relations between groups ( [[#Wolf--2003|Wolf et al., 2003]] ; [[#Ide--2019|Ide, 2019]] ). To avert violent outcomes induced by climate change, stronger local and national climate adaptation institutions within vulnerable societies, and stronger cooperative resource governance mechanisms between vulnerable countries (such as transboundary water governance agreements) are needed.

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