Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-14 (section)

=== 14.3.1 The UN Climate Change Regime ===

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==== 14.3.1.1 Instruments and Milestones ====

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The international climate change regime, in evolution for three decades, comprises the 1992 UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC is a ‘framework’ convention, capturing broad convergence among states on an objective, a set of principles, and general obligations relating to mitigation, adaptation, reporting and support. The UNFCCC categorises Parties into Annex I and Annex II. Annex I Parties, comprising developed country Parties, have a goal to return, individually or jointly, their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Annex II Parties, comprising developed country Parties except for those with economies in transition, have additional obligations relating to the provision of financial and technology support. Parties including developing country Parties, characterised as non-Annex-I Parties, have reporting obligations, as well as obligations to take policies and measures on mitigation and adaptation. The UNFCCC also establishes the institutional building blocks for global climate governance. Both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement are distinct but ‘related legal instruments’ in that only Parties to the UNFCCC can be Parties to these later instruments.

The Kyoto Protocol specifies GHG emissions reduction targets for the 2008–2012 commitment period for countries listed in its Annex B (which broadly corresponds to Annex I to the UNFCCC) ( [[#UNFCCC--1997|UNFCCC 1997]] , Art. 3 and Annex B). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005. Shortly thereafter, states began negotiating a second commitment period under the Protocol for Annex B Parties, as well as initiating a process under the UNFCCC to consider long-term cooperation among all Parties.

At the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13) in Bali in 2007, Parties adopted the Bali Action Plan which launched negotiations aimed at an agreed outcome enhancing the UNFCCC’s ‘full, effective and sustained implementation’. The agreed outcome was to be adopted at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, but negotiations failed to deliver a consensus document. The result instead was the Copenhagen Accord '','' which was taken note of by the COP. While it was a political agreement with no formal legal status under the UNFCCC, it reflected significant progress on several fronts and set in place the building blocks for the Paris Agreement, namely: setting a goal of limiting global temperature increase to below 2°C; calling on all countries to put forward mitigation pledges; establishing broad new terms for the reporting and verification of countries’ actions; setting a goal of mobilising USD100 billion a year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance; and, calling for the establishment of a new Green Climate Fund and Technology Mechanism ( [[#Rajamani--2010|Rajamani 2010]] ; [[#Rogelj--2010|Rogelj et al. 2010]] ; [[#UNFCCC--2010a|UNFCCC 2010a]] ). One hundred and forty states endorsed the Copenhagen Accord, with 85 countries entering pledges to reduce their emissions or constrain their growth by 2020 ( [[#Christensen--2019|Christensen and Olhoff 2019]] ).

At COP16 in Cancun in 2010, Parties adopted a set of decisions termed the Cancun Agreements that effectively formalised the core elements of the Copenhagen Accord, and the pledges states made, under the UNFCCC. The Cancun Agreements were regarded as an interim arrangement through to 2020, and Parties left the door open to further negotiations, in line with negotiations launched in 2005, toward a legally-binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol ( [[#Freestone--2010|Freestone 2010]] ; [[#Liu--2011a|Liu 2011a]] ). Collectively the G20 states are on track to meeting the mid level of their Cancun pledges, although there is uncertainty about some individual pledges. However, there is significant gap between annual emissions expected under full implementation of pledges and the level consistent with the 2°C goal ( [[#Christensen--2019|Christensen and Olhoff 2019]] ).

At the 2011 Durban climate conference, Parties launched negotiations for ‘a Protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force’ with a scheduled end to the negotiations in 2015 ( [[#UNFCCC--2012|UNFCCC 2012]] , Dec. 1, para. 2). At the 2012 Doha climate conference, Parties adopted a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, running from 2013–2020. The Doha Amendment entered into force on 31 December 2020. Given the subsequent adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to continue beyond 2020 ( [[#Bodansky--2017a|Bodansky et al. 2017a]] ). At the end of the compliance assessment period under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B Parties were in full compliance with their targets for the first commitment period; in some cases through the use of the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms ( [[#Shishlov--2016|Shishlov et al. 2016]] ).

Although both the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement are under the UNFCCC, they are generally seen as representing fundamentally different approaches to international cooperation on climate change ( [[#Held--2018|Held and Roger 2018]] ; [[#Falkner--2016b|Falkner 2016b]] ). The Paris Agreement has been characterised as a ‘decisive break’ from the Kyoto Protocol ( [[#Keohane--2016|Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016]] ). Some note that the mitigation efforts under the Kyoto Protocol take the form of targets that, albeit based on national self-selection, were part of the multilateral negotiation process, whereas under the Paris Agreement Parties make Nationally Determined Contributions. The different approaches have been characterised by some as a distinction between a ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approach (Bodansky and Rajamani 2016; [[#Bodansky--2016|Bodansky et al. 2016]] ; [[#Chan--2016|Chan et al. 2016]] ; [[#Doelle--2016|Doelle 2016]] ) but others disagree with such a characterisation, pointing to continuities within the regime, for example, in terms of rules for reporting and review, and crossover and use of common institutional arrangements ( [[#Depledge--2017|Depledge 2017]] ; [[#Allan--2019|Allan 2019]] ). Some note, in any case, that the Kyoto Protocol’s core obligations are substantive obligations of result, while many of the Paris Agreement’s core obligations are procedural obligations, complemented by obligations of conduct ( [[#Rajamani--2016a|Rajamani 2016a]] ; [[#Mayer--2018a|Mayer 2018a]] ).

The differences between and continuities in the three treaties that comprise the UN climate regime are summarised in Table 14.3. The Kyoto targets apply only to Annex I Parties, but the procedural obligations relating to NDCs in the Paris Agreement apply to all Parties, with flexibilities in relation to some obligations for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and developing countries that need them in light of their capacities. The Kyoto targets are housed in its Annex B, therefore requiring a formal process of amendment for revision, whereas the Paris NDCs are located in an online registry that is maintained by the Secretariat, but to which Parties can upload their own NDCs. The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B Parties to use three market-based mechanisms – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation and International Emissions Trading – to fulfil a part of their GHG targets. The Paris Agreement recognises that Parties may choose to cooperate voluntarily on markets, in the form of cooperative approaches under Article 6.2, and a mechanism with international oversight under Article 6.4, subject to guidance and rules that are yet to be adopted. These rules relate to integrity and accounting ( [[#La%20Hoz%20Theuer--2019|La Hoz Theuer et al. 2019]] ). Article 5 also provides explicit endorsement of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and fostering conservation (REDD+). The Kyoto Protocol contains an extensive reporting and review process, backed by a compliance mechanism. This mechanism includes an enforcement branch, to ensure compliance, and sanction non-compliance (through the withdrawal of benefits such as participation in market-based mechanisms), with its national system requirements, and GHG targets. By contrast, the Paris Agreement relies on informational requirements and flows to enhance the clarity of NDCs, and to track progress in the implementation and achievement of NDCs.

'''Table 14.3 | Continuities in and differences between the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol.'''

{| class="wikitable"
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! '''Feature'''

! UNFCCC

! Kyoto Protocol

! Paris Agreement

|-
| '''Objective'''

| To stabilise GHGs in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, in a timeframe to protect food security, enable natural ecosystem adaptability and permit economic development in a sustainable manner

| Primarily mitigation-focused (although in pursuit of the UNFCCC objective)

| Mitigation in line with a long-term temperature goal, adaptation and finance goals, as well as sustainable development and equity (also, in pursuit of the UNFCCC objective)

|-
| '''Architecture'''

| ‘Framework’ agreement with agreement on principles such as ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’), division of countries into Annexes, with different groups of countries with differentiated commitments

| Differentiated targets, based on national offers submitted to the multilateral negotiation process, and multilaterally negotiated common metrics

| Nationally Determined Contributions subject to transparency, multilateral consideration of progress, common metrics in inventories and accounting

|-
| '''Coverage of mitigation-related commitments'''

| Annex I Parties with a GHG stabilisation goal, all Parties to take policies and measures

| UNFCCC Annex I/Kyoto Annex B Parties only

| All Parties

|-
| '''Targets'''

| GHG stabilisation goal for Annex I Parties (‘quasi target’)

| Legally-binding, differentiated mitigation targets inscribed in treaty

| Non-binding (in terms of results) contributions incorporated in Parties’ NDCs, and provisions including those relating to highest possible ambition, progression and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’, in light of different national circumstances

|-
| '''Timetable'''

| Aim to return to 1990 levels of GHGs by 2000

| Two commitment periods (2008–2012; 2013–2020)

| Initial NDCs for timeframes from 2020 running through to 2025 or 2030 with new or updated NDCs every five years, and encouragement to submit long-term low-GHG emission development strategies

|-
| '''Adaptation'''

| Parties to cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change

| Parties to formulate and implement national adaptation measures, share of proceeds from CDM to fund adaptation

| Qualitative global goal on adaptation to enhance adaptative capacity and resilience, and reduce vulnerability, Parties to undertake national adaptation planning and implementation

|-
| '''Loss and Damage'''

| Not covered

| Not covered

| Cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support for loss and damage, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage under the UNFCCC

|-
| '''Transparency'''

| National communications from Parties, with differing content and set to differing timeframes for different categories of Parties

| Reporting and review – Annex B Parties only

| Enhanced transparency framework and five-yearly global stocktake for a collective assessment of progress towards goals – all Parties

|-
| '''Support'''

| Annex II commitments relating to provision of finance, development and transfer of technology to developing countries

| Advances UNFCCC Annex II commitments relating to provision of finance, development and transfer of technology to developing countries

| Enhances reporting in relation to support, expands the base of donors, and tailors support to the needs and capacities of developing countries

|-
| '''Implementation'''

| National implementation, communication on implementation

| Market mechanisms (International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, CDM)

| Voluntary cooperation on mitigation (through market-based and non-market approaches); encouragement of REDD+ (guidance and rules under negotiation)

|-
| '''Compliance'''

| Multilateral consultative process, never adopted

| Compliance committee with facilitative and enforcement branches; sanctions for non-compliance

| Committee to promote compliance and facilitate implementation; no sanctions

|}

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==== 14.3.1.2 Negotiating Context and Dynamics ====

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The 2015 Paris Agreement was negotiated in a starkly different geopolitical context to that of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol ( [[#Streck--2013|Streck and Terhalle 2013]] ; [[#Ciplet--2015|Ciplet et al. 2015]] ). The ‘rupturing binary balance of superpowers’ of the 1980s had given way to a multipolar world with several distinctive trends: emerging economies began challenging US dominance ( [[#Ciplet--2015|Ciplet et al. 2015]] ); industrialised countries’ emissions peaked in the 2010s and started declining, while emissions from emerging economies began to grow ( [[#Falkner--2019|Falkner 2019]] ); the EU stretched eastwards and became increasingly supra-national ( [[#Kinley--2020|Kinley et al. 2020]] ); disparities within the group of developing countries increased ( [[#Ciplet--2015|Ciplet et al. 2015]] ); and the role of non-state actors in mitigation efforts has grown more salient (Bäckstrand et al. 2017; [[#Kuyper--2018b|Kuyper et al. 2018b]] ; [[#Falkner--2019|Falkner 2019]] ). The rise of emerging powers, many of whom now have ‘veto power’, however, some noted, did not detract from the unequal development and inequality at the heart of global environmental politics ( [[#Hurrell--2012|Hurrell and Sengupta 2012]] ).

In this altered context, unlike in the 1990s when the main cleavages were between the EU and the US ( [[#Hurrell--2012|Hurrell and Sengupta 2012]] ), US–China ‘great power politics’ came to be seen as determinative of outcomes in the climate change negotiations ( [[#Terhalle--2013|Terhalle and Depledge 2013]] ). The US–China joint announcement (Whitehouse 2014), for instance, before the 2014 Lima climate conference, brokered the deal on differentiation that came to be embodied in the Paris Agreement ( [[#Rajamani--2016a|Rajamani 2016a]] ; [[#Ciplet--2017|Ciplet and]] [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts 2017]] ). Others have identified, on the basis of economic standing, political influence, and emissions levels, three influential groups – the first comprising the USA with Japan, Canada, and Russia, the second comprising the EU and the third comprising China, India and Brazil ( [[#Brenton--2013|Brenton 2013]] ). The emergence of the Major Economies Fora, among other climate clubs (discussed in [[#14.2.2|Section 14.2.2]] ) reflects this development ( [[#Brenton--2013|Brenton 2013]] ). It also represents a ‘minilateral’ forum, built on a recognition of power asymmetries, in which negotiating compromises are politically tested and fed into multilateral processes ( [[#Falkner--2016a|Falkner 2016a]] ).

Beyond these countries, in the decade leading up to the Paris climate negotiations, increasing differences within the group of developing countries divided the 134-strong developing country alliance of the G77/China into several interest-based coalitions ( [[#Vihma--2011|Vihma et al. 2011]] ; [[#Bodansky--2017b|Bodansky et al. 2017b]] ). A division emerged between the vulnerable least developed and small island states on the one side and rapidly developing economies, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) on the other, as the latter are ‘decidedly not developed but not wholly developing’ ( [[#Hochstetler--2013|Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013]] ). This fissure in part led to the High Ambition Coalition in Paris between vulnerable countries and the more progressive industrialised countries ( [[#Ciplet--2017|Ciplet and]] [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts 2017]] ). A division also emerged between the BASIC countries ( [[#Hurrell--2012|Hurrell and Sengupta 2012]] ), that each have distinctive identities and positions ( [[#Hochstetler--2013|Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013]] ). In the lead up to the Paris negotiations, China and India formed the Like-Minded Developing Countries with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) countries, to resist the erosion of differentiation in the regime. Yet, the ‘complex and competing’ identities of India and China, with differing capacities, challenges and self-images, have also influenced the negotiations ( [[#Ciplet--2017|Ciplet and]] [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts 2017]] ; [[#Rajamani--2017|Rajamani 2017]] ). Other developing countries’ coalitions also played an important role in striking the final deal in Paris. The Alliance of Small Island States, despite their lack of structural power, played a leading role, in particular in relation to the inclusion of the 1.5°C long-term temperature goal in the UN climate regime (Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014; [[#Ourbak--2018|Ourbak and Magnan 2018]] ). The Association of the Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) that emerged in 2012 also played a decisive role in fostering ambition ( [[#Edwards--2017|Edwards et al. 2017]] ; [[#Watts--2018|Watts and Depledge 2018]] ).

Leadership is essential to reaching international agreements and overcoming collective action problems ( [[#Parker--2015|Parker et al. 2015]] ). The Paris negotiations were faced, as a reflection of the multipolarity that had emerged, with a ‘fragmented leadership landscape’ with the USA, EU, and China being perceived as leaders at different points in time and to varying degrees ( [[#Karlsson--2012|Karlsson et al. 2012]] ; [[#Parker--2014|Parker et al. 2014]] ). Small island states are also credited with demonstrating ‘moral leadership’ (Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014), and non-state and sub-national actors are beginning to be recognised as pioneers and leaders ( [[#Wurzel--2019|Wurzel et al. 2019]] ). There is also a burgeoning literature on the emergence of diffused leadership and the salience of followers ( [[#Parker--2014|Parker et al. 2014]] ; [[#Busby--2020|Busby and Urpelainen 2020]] ).

It is in the context of this complex, multipolar and highly differentiated world – with a heterogeneity of interests, constraints and capacities, increased contestations over shares of the carbon and development space, as well as diffused leadership – that the Paris Agreement was negotiated. This context fundamentally influenced the shape of the Paris Agreement, in particular on issues relating to its architecture, ‘legalisation’ ( [[#Karlas--2017|Karlas 2017]] ) and differentiation ( [[#Bodansky--2017b|Bodansky et al. 2017b]] ; [[#Kinley--2020|Kinley et al. 2020]] ), all of which are discussed below.

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