Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-5 (section)

== Case Studies of Maladaptation ==

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=== Large-Scale Irrigation Project in Navarre, Spain ===

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Many small-scale producers could not afford the irrigation investment and had to sell or rent their land to those who joined the irrigation project. Many large-scale farmers using irrigation switched to corn and forage and dropped crops with high labour costs. Water costs are now paid to a private company, and small-scale farmers lost access to communal water rights. The project increased inequity and land concentration and lowered crop diversity, with small-scale producers more vulnerable to climate change. Large-scale intensive farmers are more exposed to crop price volatility than to climate vulnerability but have greater access to subsidies and water rights ( [[#Albizua--2019|Albizua et al., 2019]] ).

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<span id="constraining-adaptation-previous-agricultural-development-pathways-in-india"></span>
=== Constraining Adaptation: Previous Agricultural Development Pathways in India ===

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Government policies in colonial and postcolonial India invested in infrastructure, export production and synthetic input use ( [[#Gupta--1998|Gupta, 1998]] ; [[#Davis--2001|Davis, 2001]] ), setting the stage for current development trajectories and closing out other adaptive options. Although such policies increased national food production, they failed to address high levels of malnutrition, worsening regional inequities, degraded natural resources and an agrarian debt crisis ( [[#Singh--2000|Singh, 2000]] ; [[#Gupta--2016|Gupta et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gajjar--2019|Gajjar et al., 2019]] ). Agricultural livelihoods are increasingly considered unviable, with lower adaptive capacity of farmers, high debt levels ( [[#Gupta--2016|Gupta et al., 2016]] ), and Indigenous and local knowledge loss and denigration ( [[#Kumar--2016|Kumar, 2016]] ) alongside lower crop diversification ( [[#Srivastava--2016|Srivastava et al., 2016]] ). Government institutions aimed at infrastructure often lack adaptive capacity needed to address rural livelihoods ( [[#Singh--2017|Singh et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gajjar--2019|Gajjar et al., 2019]] ).

Adaptation options that consider adverse effects for different groups reduce the risk increasing vulnerability, negatively affecting socioeconomic factors to deal with climate impacts, or impeding efforts to implement SDGs ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Juhola--2016|Juhola et al., 2016]] ; [[#Antwi-Agyei--2018|Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018]] ; [[#Paprocki--2018|Paprocki and Huq, 2018]] ; [[#Holsman--2019|Holsman et al., 2019]] ; [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ; [[#Stringer--2020|Stringer et al., 2020]] ). Adaptation methods considering historical roots of current vulnerabilities can identify viable solutions, which are difficult to undertake because of path dependencies ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Ribot--2014|Ribot, 2014]] ; [[#Albizua--2019|Albizua et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gajjar--2019|Gajjar et al., 2019]] ; [[#Paprocki--2019|Paprocki, 2019]] ; [[#Thomas--2020|Thomas, 2020]] ). Planning techniques that model outcomes for different groups from different adaptation options could be put in place to diminish maladaptation risks ( [[#Rodríguez--2019|Rodríguez et al., 2019]] ).

Inclusive planning initiatives such as community-based anticipatory adaptation combined with ‘two-way learning’ that considers future scenarios and different adaptation pathways can prevent maladaptation ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Dovie--2017|Dovie, 2017]] ; [[#Bezner%20Kerr--2019|Bezner Kerr et al., 2019]] ; [[#Neset--2019a|Neset et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey, 2019]] ; [[#Work--2019|Work et al., 2019]] ; [[#Butler--2020|Butler et al., 2020]] ; [[#Nunn--2020|Nunn et al., 2020]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2020|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020]] ; [[#Westoby--2020|Westoby et al., 2020]] ; Table 5.20). Promising policy management tools combine temporal scales and mitigation–adaptation interactions and consider political dynamics, socioeconomic impacts and trade-offs for vulnerable groups, long-term support for policy leaders, efforts to establish livelihood ‘niches’ and ongoing participatory evaluation ( [[#Dovie--2017|Dovie, 2017]] ; [[#Holsman--2019|Holsman et al., 2019]] ; [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey, 2019]] ; [[#Work--2019|Work et al., 2019]] ; [[#Butler--2020|Butler et al., 2020]] ). A focus on the most disadvantaged groups can help small-scale producers at higher risk to prevent maladaptation ( [[#FAO--2018c|FAO, 2018c]] ). Governance mechanisms have emerged that consider food security, socio-cultural factors, and land and water rights, using participatory, inclusive ‘two-way learning’ methods that involve vulnerable people alongside government ( [[#IPCC--2018|IPCC, 2018]] ; [[#Holsman--2019|Holsman et al., 2019]] ; [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ; [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey, 2019]] ; [[#Butler--2020|Butler et al., 2020]] ).

'''Table 5.20 |''' Summary of the emerging literature on potential risks of maladaptation.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Description of''' '''adaptation''' '''strategy'''

! '''Potential negative impacts'''

! '''Maladaptation typology (1 = rebounding vulnerability, 2 = shifting, 3 = eroding SDGs) and confidence level'''

! '''Regions and''' '''countries''' '''affected'''

! '''Groups affected'''

! '''References'''

|-
| Agricultural intensification to increase productivity, in places with heavy rainfall events or rising pest/disease incidence

| Increases GHG emissions, water pollution, possible insect resistance and costs to farmers; possibly increases inequities.

May constrain adaptation policy options for development pathways due to lock-ins and trade-offs which entrench inequities.

| 1, 2, 3

''Robust evidence, medium agreement''

| USA, Africa, Asia (India, China), Europe

| Farmers, pastoralists/nearby communities who rely on water; small-scale farmers who cannot afford inputs; policymakers.

| Gajjar et al. (2019), [[#Guodaar--2019|Guodaar et al. (2019)]] , [[#Houser--2019|Houser and Stuart (2019)]] , [[#Neset--2019b|Neset et al. (2019b)]] , [[#Quan--2019|Quan et al. (2019)]] , Young and Ismail (2019)

|-
| Livelihood diversification into charcoal production

| Increases GHG emissions and deforestation rates

| 1, 3

''medium''

| Africa (Northern Ghana), South America (Peru)

| Small-scale food producers; Indigenous communities

| [[#Antwi-Agyei--2018|Antwi-Agyei et al. (2018)]] , [[#Zavaleta--2018|Zavaleta et al. (2018)]] , Young and Ismail (2019)

|-
| Irrigation projects or programmes that are either large-scale and/or rely on groundwater

| Reduces long-term potential for hydropower and groundwater availability, can increase salinisation and cost of water.

Can increase cost of farming and debt levels of farmers, squeezing out small-scale producers.

Can reduce water availability for aquaculture.

| 1, 2, 3

''high''

| Central China, India, Mediterranean areas, Europe, USA

| Food producers who rely on irrigation; consumers who rely on hydropower or groundwater; small-scale diversified producers who cannot afford irrigation; aquaculture.

| [[#Doody--2015|Doody et al. (2015)]] , [[#Herbert--2015|Herbert et al. (2015)]] , [[#Barik--2016|Barik et al. (2016)]] , [[#Daliakopoulos--2016|Daliakopoulos et al. (2016)]] [[#Fragaszy--2016|Fragaszy and Closas (2016)]] [[#Dalin--2017|Dalin et al. (2017)]] , [[#Foster--2018|Foster et al. (2018)]] [[#Hanaček--2018|Hanaček and Rodríguez-Labajos (2018)]] , Albizua et al. (2019), [[#Flörke--2019|Flörke et al. (2019)]] Gajjar et al. (2019), Zhang et al.(2019a)

|-
| Investment in improved cultivars or shift to different crops

| May displace local varieties; reduces diversity if too much policy/extension emphasis falls on a few varieties; may increase risk of crop loss from pests, disease or drought if reliant on a few varieties; may increase fertilizer use; may lead to loss of Indigenous or local knowledge.

| 1, 3

''medium''

| South America (Bolivia, Pacific Islands, Asia

| Small-scale food producers; Indigenous communities

| [[#Mcleod--2018|Mcleod et al. (2018)]] , [[#Meldrum--2018|Meldrum et al. (2018)]] , [[#Neset--2019b|Neset et al. (2019b)]] [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey (2019)]]

|-
| Migration

| Can increase the workload of people left behind (often women), worsen rural livelihoods and food insecurity; can lead to worsened living conditions, food security and poverty in precarious urban conditions; may increase vulnerability to flooding in urban locations.

May affect mental health by disrupting existing social ties.

| 1, 3

''high''

| Asia, Africa, Central and South America

| Small-scale low-income food producers or rural workers; women

| Bettini et al. (2017), [[#Paprocki--2018|Paprocki (2018)]] , Chen et al. (2019), [[#Jacobson--2019|Jacobson et al. (2019)]] , Michael et al. (2019), Young and Ismail (2019), [[#Singh--2020|Singh and Basu (2020)]] , [[#Torres--2017|Torres and Casey (2017)]]

|-
| Coastal sea walls, embankments, canals, riverbed draining and dikes to reduce flood risk

| Can degrade coastal mangroves, deplete open freshwater fisheries, cause sedimentation of rivers, reduce fish diversity and increase flooding risk for particular vulnerable groups; may divert funds from other more sustainable measures.

| 1, 2, 3

''high''

| Asia, South Pacific Islands, West Africa

| Coastal communities dependent on mangroves and fisheries; low-income rural households with seasonal dependence on inland fisheries

| [[#Dovie--2017|Dovie (2017)]] , [[#Owusu-Daaku--2018|Owusu-Daaku (2018)]] , Freduah et al. (2019), [[#IPCC--2019c|IPCC (2019c)]] , [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey (2019)]] , [[#Nunn--2020|Nunn et al. (2020)]] [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al. (2020)]] , [[#Thomas--2020|Thomas (2020)]]

|-
| River regulation for hydropower

| May have negative impacts on inland fisheries.

| 2, 3

| Global

| Small-scale inland fisheries and low-income rural households with seasonal dependence on inland fisheries

| [[#FAO--2018c|FAO (2018c)]]

|-
| Government policies to manage coastal fisheries which promote overcapitalisation of fisheries, including index insurance

| Government confiscation of fishing nets to prevent rapid decline of fish population can worsen livelihoods for small-scale fishers; subsidies of pre-mixed fuel to allow fishers to stay out longer due to shifting fish populations may increase total number of fishers and total fish catch; insurance payments may benefit larger-scale fishing fleets and push out small-scale fishers.

| 1, 3

''medium''

| West Africa

| Coastal small-scale fishery communities

| [[#FAO--2018b|FAO (2018b)]] , Freduah et al. (2019), [[#Holsman--2019|Holsman et al. (2019)]] , [[#Sainsbury--2019|Sainsbury et al. (2019)]]

|-
| Consultative stakeholder systems in fisheries or flood management

| May encourage inertia in the system due to a few powerful stakeholders participating in the consultative process.

| 2

''low''

| North America, Asia

| Coastal fisheries

| [[#Holsman--2019|Holsman et al. (2019)]] , [[#Rahman--2019|Rahman and Hickey (2019)]]

|-
| Climate services

| May reinforce existing inequities if climate services are attuned to powerful stakeholders in industry, services are privatised, there are limited ways to get input from vulnerable groups and planning budgets that use climate services are constrained.

| 1, 2, 3

''medium''

| North America

| Coastal fisheries, farming

| [[#Furman--2014|Furman et al. (2014)]] , [[#Webber--2017|Webber (2017)]] , [[#Nost--2019|Nost (2019)]]

|-
| Nature-based solutions mitigation and adaptation strategies such as reforestation or afforestation

| Can displace local communities’ access to land for food production and other ecosystem services, have negative impacts on Indigenous rights, reduce biodiversity and may not reduce GHG as much as conserving natural forests and wetlands or agroecological systems such as agroforestry or other means to increase soil C.

| 2, 3

''medium''

| Africa, Asia, and South America, e.g., Indonesia, Amazon, west-central Africa

| Indigenous communities; small-scale producers and forest-dependent communities

| Lunstrum et al. (2016), [[#Work--2019|Work et al. (2019)]] , [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al. (2020)]] , Cross-Working Group Box BIOECONOMY this chapter)

|-
| Social safety nets provide funds which increase consumption of processed, purchased food and erode Indigenous knowledge

| Decline in Indigenous knowledge of and collective approaches to seasonal adaptation strategies in hunting, fishing and food production; shift in dietary patterns to more processed and non-local foods; reduction in farming. Reduced capacity to respond to hazards through dispersed settlement, e.g., hunting, fishing, wild food collection. Increased population density increases deforestation and vulnerability.

| 1, 3

''low''

| South America (Amazonian region of Peru), Africa (South Africa)

| Indigenous communities

| [[#Lemos--2016|Lemos et al. (2016)]] , [[#Zavaleta--2018|Zavaleta et al. (2018)]]

|-
| Community-based adaptation strategies

| Local gender and other social inequities can lead to ‘elite capture’ that reinforces inequity; power dynamics between the funding agency and local participants can make local community involvement tokenistic. There may be inadequate attention to socio-cultural preferences and structural factors which foster maladaptation such as inappropriate crops or animals used.

| 1, 3

''high''

| Pacific Islands, Africa, Asia

| Small-scale food producers; Indigenous communities, other vulnerable groups such as women and low-caste groups

| [[#McNamara--2017|McNamara and Buggy (2017)]] [[#Jamero--2018|Jamero et al. (2018)]] , [[#Singh--2018|Singh (2018)]] [[#Bezner%20Kerr--2019|Bezner Kerr et al. (2019)]] Piggott-McKellar et al. (2020), [[#Westoby--2020|Westoby et al. (2020)]]

|-
| Digital agriculture for increased precision and efficient use of fertilizers, pesticides, water

| Could lead to net job losses, particularly for those with lower levels of education; increased surveillance and employer scrutiny of lower-skilled workers in fields, greenhouses and processing plants and warehouses; separate workers from employees and companies who collect data. Overall increased racial, income inequities and unequal working conditions.

| 2, 3

''low''

| North America, South America, Europe, Asia, parts of Africa

| Farmworkers; small-scale food producers who cannot afford digital technologies; rural communities

| ( [[#Furman--2014|Furman et al. (2014)]] , [[#Rotz--2019|Rotz et al. (2019)]]

|-
| Increased credit access for livelihood diversification

| High interest rates, tight return policies could increase debt loads for low-income households, which could rebound vulnerability. Household may invest in livelihood strategies which are vulnerable to climate change impacts, or which increase GHG.

| 1, 3

''low''

| Asia (Bangladesh)

| Low-income landless people or small-scale producers

| Rahman et al. (2018)

|-
| Aquaculture

| Large-scale coastal aquaculture can increase soil salinisation and reduce land available for other food production and increase migration.

| 2, 3

''low''

| Asia (Bangladesh)

| Small-scale mixed systems including rice production and other rural livelihoods

| [[#Paprocki--2018|Paprocki (2018)]] , [[#Paprocki--2018|Paprocki and Huq (2018)]]

|}

'''Table 5.21 |''' Strategies to avoid maladaptation (adapted from [[#Magnan--2014|Magnan, 2014]] ; [[#Lim-Camacho--2015|Lim-Camacho et al., 2015]] ; [[#Sovacool--2015|Sovacool et al., 2015]] ; [[#FAO--2018b|FAO, 2018b]] ; [[#Paprocki--2018|Paprocki and Huq, 2018]] ; [[#Sainsbury--2019|Sainsbury et al., 2019]] ).

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Type of maladaptation'''

! '''Strategies'''

|-
| Environmental

| # Prevent negative effects on ecosystem services ''in situ'' (e.g., habitat degradation, pollution) that increase exposure to climate hazards.

# Avoid increasing pressure on other socio-ecological systems.

# Ensure ecosystems’ protective role as natural buffer zones is sustained against current and future climate-related hazards, such as storms, floods and sea level rise.

# Provide some duplication and ensure flexibility of adaptation strategies to reduce risk because of uncertainties about climate change impacts and ecosystem response (e.g., agrobiodiversity to reduce pest outbreaks).

|-
| Socio-cultural

| # Consider local social characteristics and cultural values that could affect risks and environmental dynamics.

# Support local skills and knowledge related to climate-related hazards.

# Support capacity-building for new skills needed by local communities.

|-
| Political-economic

| # Consider the political dynamics and power imbalances and create inclusive processes to involve the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in decisions.

# Work to reduce socioeconomic inequities, poverty and food insecurity.

# Support livelihood diversification.

# Focus on the impacts of adaptation on the poorest, structurally disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, and take power imbalances into account.

# Work across the full supply chain to consider linkages and possible ripple effects.

|}

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<span id="climate-change-and-climate-response-impacts-on-indigenous-people"></span>
=== 5.13.5 Climate Change and Climate Response Impacts on Indigenous People ===

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Indigenous people and ethnic minorities, many of them having special cultural associations to local foods, are particularly vulnerable to climate change owing to changes in the availability of wild foods, crop failure and food production losses or increased food prices ( [[#Norton-Smith--2016|Norton-Smith et al., 2016]] ; [[#Otto--2017|Otto et al., 2017]] ).

Changes in sea level rise or coastal erosion can reduce ecosystem services to a point where either subsidies are used to enable human populations to remain in their place of attachment, or ultimately to displace coastal residents, thereby removing connections to places of intrinsic value. For example, the United Houma Nation in Louisiana is experiencing coastal land loss, sea level rise and strong Gulf hurricanes, which leads to the relocation of some tribes causing loss of Houma identity ( [[#Sullivan--2018|Sullivan and Rosenberg, 2018]] ). Another example is the relocation of Alaska Native communities due to climate change ( [[#Hamilton--2016|Hamilton et al., 2016]] )

Expansion of agriculture can bring distress to Indigenous communities because of environmental deterioration and the stress associated with relocation or displacement ( [[#Otto--2017|Otto et al., 2017]] ). A/R programmes can also bring inequities to Indigenous communities ( [[#Godden--2016|Godden and Tehan, 2016]] ) and even violent displacement with tragic results ( [[#Celentano--2017|Celentano et al., 2017]] ). A/R programmes can negatively affect a range of substantial and procedural Indigenous Peoples’ rights entrenched in international human rights law (Table 5.22) and their potential for climate change adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ).

'''Table 5.22 |''' Indigenous rights recognised in international human rights law negatively affected by A/R projects.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Negative impacts of monoculture plantations (and other A/R projects)'''

! '''Indigenous Peoples’ rights affected'''

! '''Degree of certainty'''

! '''References'''

|-
| Local community not informed, not adequately consulted, not provided means for meaningful participation in project design, implementation, and monitoring (with specific attention to women and poor households); disruption or non-recognition of local or traditional institutions; elite capture; no access to third-party grievance mechanisms.

| Right to self-determination; consultation and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC); participation

| ''Medium evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| [[#Aggarwal--2014|Aggarwal (2014)]] , [[#Maraseni--2014|Maraseni et al. (2014)]] , [[#Ravikumar--2015|Ravikumar et al. (2015)]] , [[#Bayrak--2016|Bayrak and Marafa (2016)]] , Loaiza et al. (2016), [[#Vijge--2016|Vijge et al. (2016)]] , Pye et al. (2017), [[#Ryngaert--2017|Ryngaert (2017)]] , Wolde et al. (2016), [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon (2017)]] , [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al. (2020)]]

|-
| Evictions and displacement; dispossession; livelihood precarity; and criminalisation of forest-dwelling people.

| Right not to be forcibly removed

| ''Medium evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| Mingorría (2014), [[#Richards--2016|Richards and Lyons (2016)]] , [[#Witasari--2016|Witasari (2016)]] , Corbera et al. (2017), Pye et al. (2017), [[#Sarmiento%20Barletti--2020|Sarmiento Barletti et al. (2020)]] , [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon (2017)]]

|-
| Loss, transfer or acquisition of land. A/R projects involve changes in land use for medium to long term and often lack consideration for local dynamics including land tenure and competition with agriculture or conservation.

| Rights to land and territory

| ''Limited evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| [[#Aggarwal--2014|Aggarwal (2014)]] , Robinson et al. (2014), [[#Bayrak--2016|Bayrak and Marafa (2016)]] , Pye et al. (2017), [[#Bond--2019|Bond et al. (2019)]]

|-
| A/R projects exacerbate conflicts, accentuate uneven power relations, increase existing inequities within communities, exclude the poor and deepen structural injustices, including racism and stigmatisation.

| Rights to land and territory

| ''Limited evidence'' , ''low agreement''

| [[#Aggarwal--2014|Aggarwal (2014)]]

|-
| Forest expansion intensifies already acute land shortages for growing food and forces villagers to take their animals for grazing to new areas as a result of forests being fenced off.

| Rights to land and territory (with implications for food security)

| ''Limited evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| Lyons et al. (2014), Wolde et al. (2016), [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon (2017)]] , [[#Mousseau--2019|Mousseau and Teare (2019)]]

|-
| Decreased stream flows and water yields; exacerbated water scarcity.

| Right to water

| ''Robust evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| [[#Veldman--2015|Veldman et al. (2015)]] , [[#Aitken--2016|Aitken and Bemmels (2016)]] , [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon (2017)]] , Pye et al. (2017), [[#Bond--2019|Bond et al. (2019)]] , [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al. (2020)]]

|-
| Pollution of lakes with agrochemicals; heavy chemical use, including the spread of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers by aircraft and other means causing runoff into rivers.

| Right to a healthy environment

| ''Medium evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| [[#Richards--2016|Richards and Lyons (2016)]] , Johansson and Isgren (20179, Pye et al. (2017)

|-
| Encroachment on other ecosystems with devastating impacts on biodiversity; pressures on ecologically sensitive ecosystems such as wetlands; reduction in seed-dispersing animals; planted tree species becoming invasive, introducing pests and diseases.

| Right to a healthy environment, right to food

| ''Medium evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| [[#Richards--2016|Richards and Lyons (2016)]] , Holmes et al. (2017), [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al. (2020)]] , Ennos et al. (2019)

|-
| Loss of habitat, degradation of savannas, native grasslands (grassy biomes) or mangroves wrongly characterised as degraded land suitable for afforestation.

| Right to a healthy environment, right to food

| ''Robust evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| Veldman et al: (2015), [[#Cormier-Salem--2016|Cormier-Salem and Panfili (2016)]] , [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon (2017)]] , [[#Bond--2019|Bond et al. (2019)]] , [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al. (2020)]]

|-
| Direct negative health impacts; loss of traditional medicine.

| Right to health

| ''Limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement''

| [[#Dotchamou--2016|Dotchamou et al. (2016)]] , [[#Johansson--2017|Johansson and Isgren (2017)]]

|-
| A/R projects affect burial sites as, for many communities, the forest is also the resting place for deceased ancestors.

| Right to cultural identity and to main and control their traditional knowledge

| ''Limited evidence'' , ''high agreement''

| Lyons et al. (2014), [[#Gabriel--2017|Gabriel and Mangahas (2017)]] , [[#Mousseau--2019|Mousseau and Teare (2019)]]

|-
| Loss of traditional or Indigenous ecological knowledge and forest management practices

| Right to cultural identity and traditional knowledge

| ''Limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement''

| [[#Bayrak--2016|Bayrak and Marafa (2016)]]

|-
| Increased labour burden. Benefit sharing by direct cash transfer or in-kind modalities tends to not compensate lost income opportunities. Some projects bring employment opportunities, but these are short term and limited and rarely viable if the opportunity cost of land and labour is considered. Poor farmers may drop out to regain access to their land for uses that provide cash returns in the shorter term.

| Right to an adequate standard of living; right to decent work; right to benefit sharing

| ''Medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement''

| Boyd et al. (2007), [[#Aggarwal--2014|Aggarwal (2014)]] , [[#Cagalanan--2016|Cagalanan (2016)]] , [[#Witasari--2016|Witasari (2016)]] , Corbera et al. (2017), Pye et al. (2017)

|}

A significant proportion of land targeted for A/R projects is inhabited and used by Indigenous Peoples and local communities ( [[#Cagalanan--2016|Cagalanan, 2016]] ). Indigenous Peoples have rights to and/or manage at least 37.9 million km 2 of land and influence land management across at least 28.1% of the land area ( [[#Garnett--2018|Garnett et al., 2018]] ). At least a quarter of the global land area is traditionally owned, managed, used or occupied by Indigenous Peoples, overlapping with 35–40% of the area that is formally protected ( [[#Garnett--2018|Garnett et al., 2018]] ; [[#Brondizio--2019|Brondizio et al., 2019]] ). In many cases, A/R is implemented in areas where tenure rights are insecure and Indigenous Peoples’ rights are at risk of being disregarded ( [[#Naughton-Treves--2014|Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014]] ; [[#Kohler--2017|Kohler and Brondizio, 2017]] ; [[#Garnett--2018|Garnett et al., 2018]] ) ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Many projects are also found in areas where complex socio-political contexts challenge management ( [[#Jurjonas--2019|Jurjonas and Seekamp, 2019]] ). It is anticipated that A/R projects will create huge pressures on existing land uses and generate further land use conflicts ( [[#Aggarwal--2014|Aggarwal, 2014]] ; [[#Robinson--2014|Robinson et al., 2014]] ; [[#Paul--2016|Paul et al., 2016]] ; [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon, 2017]] ; [[#Pye--2017|Pye et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bond--2019|Bond et al., 2019]] ). In addition, many afforestation projects are conducted in regions that are not bio-climatically suitable, leading to the degradation of ecosystems that are key to local livelihoods ( [[#Veldman--2015|Veldman et al., 2015]] ; [[#Robinson--2016b|Robinson et al., 2016b]] ).

Until 2010, most A/F projects had technical, carbon-related goals and did not consider issues of livelihoods, community involvement or broader ecosystem impacts ( [[#Wolde--2016|Wolde et al., 2016]] ). New strategies such as nature-based solutions ( [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al., 2020]] ) and forest and landscape restoration ( [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon, 2017]] ) integrate a larger set of social and environmental objectives. Indigenous Peoples enjoy a range of co-benefits of A/F initiatives such as improved habitat, fire management or protection from climatic shocks such as drought ( [[#Robinson--2016b|Robinson et al., 2016b]] ; [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al., 2020]] ), provided they are able to manage carbon funds collectively, meet the monitoring and reporting requirements, and protect forests from illicit uses and natural disasters ( [[#Wolde--2016|Wolde et al., 2016]] ).

Policies and safeguards attached to specific A/R initiatives determine their impact ( ''high confidence'' ) (Talor, 2015; [[#West--2016|West, 2016]] ; [[#Brancalion--2017|Brancalion and Chazdon, 2017]] ). In countries where there is a great level of devolution of rights to Indigenous Peoples, there is a risk that the A/R agenda will lead to recentralisation ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Bayrak--2016|Bayrak and Marafa, 2016]] ). Some A/R initiatives specify the need to respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities and protect biodiversity ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Seddon--2020|Seddon et al., 2020]] ).

Local communities’ ability to participate in project design, implementation and monitoring is directly linked to the autonomy and independence of local institutions ( [[#Pye--2017|Pye et al., 2017]] ), their ability to formulate by-laws ( [[#Wolde--2016|Wolde et al., 2016]] ) and handle funds in a transparent way ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Witasari--2016|Witasari, 2016]] ). It is further dependent on cohesion in the community ( [[#Cagalanan--2016|Cagalanan, 2016]] ), the existence of clear rules delineating community membership and the presence of elders and community members with relevant local knowledge ( [[#Robinson--2016b|Robinson et al., 2016b]] ), and gender and out-migration dynamics affecting participation structures ( ''robust evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Cormier-Salem--2016|Cormier-Salem and Panfili, 2016]] ; [[#Witasari--2016|Witasari, 2016]] ; [[#Wolde--2016|Wolde et al., 2016]] ; [[#Jurjonas--2019|Jurjonas and Seekamp, 2019]] ).

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=== 5.13.6 Increased Presence of Financial Actors in the Agrifood System ===

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Financial actors, markets, institutions and incentives have gained importance in agricultural commodities and farmland markets in the past two decades ( [[#Clapp--2018|Clapp and Isakson, 2018]] ; [[#Fairbairn--2020|Fairbairn, 2020]] ). New types of investment vehicles such as commodity index funds that track prices of commodities and farmland have emerged, and the use of older vehicles such as forward and futures markets has increased ( [[#Schmidt--2016|Schmidt and Pearson, 2016]] ; [[#Clapp--2018|Clapp and Isakson, 2018]] ). These trends are connected to climate change as financial investments are influenced by the likelihood that climate change will increase commodity and farmland price variability ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Cotula--2012|Cotula, 2012]] ; [[#Isakson--2014|Isakson, 2014]] ; Tadesse et al.).

Financial investors pool their investments through intermediaries, alongside other dynamic forces in the global economy, making unambiguous assessments of their effect difficult ( [[#Clapp--2014|Clapp, 2014]] ; [[#Clapp--2017|Clapp, 2017]] ). However, assessment of the broader trends at the interface of financial investment, food system dynamics and climate change shows potential connections.

Climate-induced variability in food production has the potential to introduce a new level of uncertainty into food and farmland markets, encouraging financial investment into products to capitalise on price volatility and to hedge risks. The new financial instruments enable investors to speculate more easily on the direction of food and land prices, especially when they are volatile ( [[#Ouma--2014|Ouma, 2014]] ; [[#Baines--2017|Baines, 2017]] ).

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=== 5.13.7 Climate Change Interactions with other Drivers—Food–Water–Health–Energy–Security Nexus ===

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Linkages between food security and nutrition with water and energy as well as other important socio-environmental issues are increasingly being described within a nexus framework (see also Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 7), with food systems frequently located at the centre of nexus concepts ( [[#Caron--2018|Caron et al., 2018]] ).

Climate change will affect the food–energy–water (FEW) nexus, commonly in the form of risk multiplier ( ''high confidence'' ) (e.g., [[#Conway--2015|Conway et al., 2015]] ; [[#Barik--2016|Barik et al., 2016]] ; [[#Keairns--2016|Keairns et al., 2016]] ; [[#Abbott--2017|Abbott et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ebhuoma--2017|Ebhuoma and Simatele, 2017]] ; [[#Caron--2018|Caron et al., 2018]] ; [[#D’Odorico--2018|D’Odorico et al., 2018]] ; [[#de%20Amorim--2018|de Amorim et al., 2018]] ; [[#Mpandeli--2018|Mpandeli et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nhamo--2018|Nhamo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Soto%20Golcher--2018|Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018]] ; [[#Yang--2018|Yang et al., 2018]] ; [[#Amjath-Babu--2019|Amjath-Babu et al., 2019]] ; [[#Froese--2019|Froese and Schilling, 2019]] ; [[#Mercure--2019|Mercure et al., 2019]] ; [[#Momblanch--2019|Momblanch et al., 2019]] ; [[#Pastor--2019|Pastor et al., 2019]] ; [[#Xu--2019|Xu et al., 2019]] ). [[#Xu--2019|Xu et al. (2019)]] modelled the irrigation demand for large-scale maize production in Northeast China and concluded that increasing droughts under future climate change would lead to extreme shortage of irrigation water without adaptive measures. [[#Barik--2016|Barik et al. (2016)]] described how the growing demand for food in India has led to more irrigation with a reduction in groundwater levels in some regions.

Increasing demands for food, energy and water can lead to domestic and international conflict, including political instability and migration, often in the context of drought ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Abbott--2017|Abbott et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bush--2017|Bush and Martiniello, 2017]] ; [[#WEF--2017|WEF, 2017]] ; [[#D’Odorico--2018|D’Odorico et al., 2018]] ; [[#de%20Amorim--2018|de Amorim et al., 2018]] ). [[#de%20Amorim--2018|de Amorim et al. (2018)]] conclude that the FEW nexus is susceptible to many global risks, including extreme weather events and human migrations, and predominantly endangers vulnerable communities of less developed countries. There is emerging evidence that food and water insecurity enhances social conflicts, including protests and violent riots, at least partially, by accelerating existing grievances ( [[#Heslin--2021|Heslin, 2021]] ; [[#Koren--2021|Koren et al., 2021]] ). Closer coordination at global, regional and national levels could be recommended to manage these risks.

Meeting growing demands for food, water and energy under a changing climate requires technical solutions and behavioural change as well as greater coordination across multilateral institutions and governance. Supply-side solutions focus on enhancing production, reducing food waste and loss or lowering water demand through both technological approaches (e.g., breeding, improved irrigation) and agroecological approaches, such as agroforestry, underutilised and more adapted crops, and transition towards a circular economy ( [[#Alexander--2015|Alexander et al., 2015]] ; [[#Obersteiner--2016|Obersteiner et al., 2016]] ; [[#D’Odorico--2018|D’Odorico et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nhamo--2018|Nhamo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Soto%20Golcher--2018|Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018]] ). Demand-side solutions focus primarily on changes in consumer behaviour towards healthier diets with lower carbon footprints, particularly reduction of meat consumption ( [[#Alexander--2015|Alexander et al., 2015]] ; [[#Obersteiner--2016|Obersteiner et al., 2016]] ). Improving the coordination of multilateral organisations could result in improved cross-boundary management of natural resources, particularly related to water ( [[#Conway--2015|Conway et al., 2015]] ; [[#Nhamo--2018|Nhamo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Soto%20Golcher--2018|Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018]] ).

As relationships between individual subsystems are systemic, integrated solutions would result in better outcomes across the FEW nexus ( ''strong agreement'' ). [[#Obersteiner--2016|Obersteiner et al. (2016)]] concluded that single-sector policies can create strong trade-offs with other policy targets and SDGs, whereas strategies that reduce pressure on food production systems diminish trade-offs between FEW nexus components. This suggests that achieving multiple SDGs will require balancing societal demands in the context of finite natural resources ( [[#Jägermeyr--2017|Jägermeyr et al., 2017]] ; [[#Amjath-Babu--2019|Amjath-Babu et al., 2019]] ; [[#Momblanch--2019|Momblanch et al., 2019]] ).

Despite concluding that integrated solutions addressing the systemic connections between the FEW nexus would improve development and environmental outcomes, there are limitations of integrating multiple frameworks, both in terms of describing the complexities and in finding solutions ( [[#Leck--2015|Leck et al., 2015]] ; [[#Weitz--2017|Weitz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Wichelns--2017|Wichelns, 2017]] ; [[#Shannak--2018|Shannak et al., 2018]] ). [[#Leck--2015|Leck et al. (2015)]] and [[#Weitz--2017|Weitz et al. (2017)]] indicate that evidence of successful implementation and improved outcomes based on the application of nexus concepts is rare.

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