Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-14 (section)

=== 14.3.3 Building Consensus on Climate Change ===

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Building consensus for action on climate change is influenced by individual factors (e.g., ideology, world view, trust, partisan identity, religion, education, age) and the broader societal context (e.g., culture, media coverage and content, political climate, economic conditions) ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#McCright--2011|McCright and Dunlap, 2011]] ; [[#Brulle--2012|Brulle et al., 2012]] ; [[#Hornsey--2016|Hornsey et al., 2016]] ; [[#Arbuckle--2017|Arbuckle, 2017]] ; [[#Pearson--2017|Pearson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Shapiro, 2018]] ; [[#Ballew--2020|Ballew et al., 2020]] ; [[#Cologna--2020|Cologna and Siegrist, 2020]] ; [[#Goldberg--2020|Goldberg et al., 2020]] ) ''.'' In a multi-country assessment of acceptance of global warming influenced by ideology (e.g., conspiratorial ideation, individualism, hierarchy, and left–right and liberal–conservative political orientation), the USA uniquely had the strongest link to doubt out of 25 countries for all factors, while Canada’s dominant influence on non-acceptance was conservative political ideology, and for Mexico, there were no ideological effects ( [[#Hornsey--2018|Hornsey et al., 2018]] ).

Political affiliation and partisan group identity contribute to polarisation on the causes and state of climate change, most notably in the USA ( ''medium confidence'' ). Fewer US republicans hold the belief that human activity causes climate change than democrats ( [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ; [[#Druckman--2019|Druckman and McGrath, 2019]] ). Partisanship in the USA with respect to climate change has evolved over the period 1997–2016; initially, it was limited, but since 2008, there has been a widening, more entrenched partisan ‘divide’ ( [[#Dunlap--2016|Dunlap et al., 2016]] ). The millennial generation (born in the 1980s and 1990s), emerging as the largest US population cohort, has a potentially important political influence–reduction in polarisation–as they show relatively higher levels of concern and acceptance of climate-change science than older age groups. Political affiliation does not have as strong an effect on their climate change beliefs ( [[#Corner--2015|Corner et al., 2015]] ; [[#Ross--2019|Ross et al., 2019]] ).

Communicating to educate or enhance knowledge on climate-change science or consensus can, but does not necessarily lead individuals to revise their beliefs ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Bolsen--2015|Bolsen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Druckman--2019|Druckman and McGrath, 2019]] ). People may reject new information that conflicts with their beliefs or not consider it credible, as political ideology and partisan affiliation are strong influences ( [[#Arbuckle--2017|Arbuckle, 2017]] ). The climate-change issue may create resistance from individuals with conservative political ideologies and hierarchical, individualistic world views because it ascribes responsibility to developed, industrialised countries for emissions and brings about more environmental regulation ( [[#Stevenson--2015|Stevenson et al., 2015]] ). Lack of trust in scientific consensus on climate change may actually originate from opposition by US conservatives to the perceived advocacy for different climate-change policy approaches that challenge their world views ( [[#Bolsen--2018|Bolsen and Druckman, 2018]] ).

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