Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

==== 8.2.2.2 Observed Impacts and Implications for Structural Inequalities, Gender and Access to Resources ====

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This section examines the mutual reinforcement of climate change impacts and structural inequalities. There is ''robust evidence'' that negative impacts and harm posed by climate change are also a result of social and political processes and existing structural inequalities ( [[#Sealey-Huggins--2018|Sealey-Huggins, 2018]] ). Climate change encompasses unevenly distributed impacts on women, youth, elderly, Indigenous Peoples, communities of colour, urban poor and socially excluded groups, exacerbated by unequal distribution of resources and poor access for some ( [[#Rufat--2015|Rufat et al., 2015]] ; [[#McNeeley--2017|McNeeley, 2017]] ; [[#Sealey-Huggins--2018|Sealey-Huggins, 2018]] ). Structurally disadvantaged people, who are subject to social, economic and political inequalities resulting historically from discrimination, marginality or disenfranchisement because of gender, age, ethnicity, class, language, ability and/or sexual orientation, are disproportionately vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change hazards ( [[#Kaijser--2014|Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014]] ; [[#Otto--2016|Otto et al., 2016]] ). High levels of vulnerability at national scale (see [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ) are often linked to complex histories, including long-term economic dependencies established and reinforced in the context of colonisation.

Links between climate change, structural racism and development are less well established as an element of disproportionate impacts of climate change ( [[#Sealey-Huggins--2018|Sealey-Huggins, 2018]] ). Discrimination is not restricted to structural racism and includes discrimination of all kinds, including that of gender and caste, because of which a considerable population is directly bound to suffer the harsh impacts of the climate change. The climate change and gender literature has come a long way in demonstrating concrete examples of how structural inequalities operate. The political and micro-political aspects and how they interact with structural inequalities are also important to understand vulnerability. [[#Henrique--2020|Henrique and Tschakert (2020)]] shows how the many adaptation efforts benefit powerful actors, while further entrenching the poor and disadvantaged in cycles of dispossession. This critical analysis recommends acknowledging injustices, embracing deliberation and nurturing responsibility for human and more-than-human others. Garcia et al. (2020) describes the socio-political drivers of gendered inequalities that produce discriminatory opportunities for adaptation. They use an intersectional subjectivities lens to examine how entrenched power dynamics and social norms related to gender create barriers to adaptation, such as lack of resources and agency. The analysis shows a pronounced dichotomy as women experience the brunt of these barriers and a persistent power imbalance that positions them as ‘less able’ to adapt than men.

Historical marginality and exclusion are context-specific conditions that shape vulnerability ( [[#Leichenko--2014|Leichenko and Silva, 2014]] ). There is also ''robust evidence'' that gender inequalities contribute to climate vulnerability, and that consideration of gender is a key approach to climate justice (see Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18). There is ''robust evidence'' for the differentiated impacts of climate change and climate-orientated policies on women ( [[#McOmber--2020|McOmber, 2020]] ). For example, Friedman et al. (2019) show that, in Ghana, homogeneous representations of women farmers and a technical focus of climate-orientated policy interventions may threaten to further marginalise the most vulnerable and exacerbate existing inequalities. Climate change impacts can also heighten existing gender inequalities ( [[#Jost--2016|Jost et al., 2016]] ; [[#Glazebrook--2020|Glazebrook et al., 2020]] ). On the one hand, climate change impacts can be gendered as a result of customary roles in society, such as triple workloads for women (i.e., economic labour, household and family labour, and duties of community participation), and occupational hazards from gendered work indoors and outdoors ( [[#Murray--2016|Murray et al., 2016]] ). On the other, climate change hazards interact with changing gender roles in society, such as urban migration of both men and women in ways that break with tradition ( [[#Bhatta--2016|Bhatta et al., 2016]] ).

Gender influences the way that people also experience loss and process psychological and emotional distress of losses, such as mortality of children and other relatives in climate-related disasters ( [[#Chandra--2017|Chandra et al., 2017]] ).Women’s capacities are often constrained due to their roles in their household and society, institutional barriers and social norms. These constraints result in low adaptive capacity of women, which make them more vulnerable to hazards. As more men seek employment opportunities away from home, women are required to acquire new capacities to manage new challenges, including risks from climate change. [[#Banerjee--2019b|Banerjee et al. (2019b)]] finds that capacity-building interventions for women staying behind, which aimed to strengthen autonomous adaptation measures (e.g. precautionary savings and flood preparedness), also positively influenced women to approach formal institutions. Besides, the intervention households were more likely to invest a part of the precautionary savings in flood preparedness measures than control households.

Next to the direct differential impacts of climate change on different social groups, the impacts of climate change can also exacerbate inequality due to the lower access and limited ability to benefit from services provided by ecosystems. Marginalised poor people often significantly depend on the access to surrounding environments, natural resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods, for leisure or cultural practices. Thus shifts in such resources, for example, due to the bleaching of coral reefs or shifts in fish stock, also cause severe challenges and risks to these communities ( [[#Leal%20Filho--2018|Leal Filho, 2018]] ; [[#Le--2019|Le, 2019]] ; [[#UNTTSDCC--2014|UNTTSDCC, 2014]] ).

Overall, the assessed literature highlights that climate change impacts are not emerging in isolation from development context and development pathways. Economic and social ramifications mean that they may exacerbate poverty and marginalisation ( [[#Finkbeiner--2018|Finkbeiner et al., 2018]] ; [[#Dogru--2019|Dogru et al., 2019]] ). Choudhary et al. (2019) and [[#Orimoloye--2019|Orimoloye et al. (2019)]] highlight how the effects of climate change can be even more prejudicial to poor countries, which, in most cases, already suffer from weak governance, high prevalence of informal settlements and lack of resources. Health, livelihood assets and economy are examples of aspects that will worsen as a result of the negative impacts of climate change and failure to provide opportunities for sustainable adaptation ( [[#United%20Nations--2015|United Nations, 2015]] ). These facts highlight the importance of mitigation and adaptation measures especially in these regions characterised by high levels of vulnerability (see also [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ).

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'''Box 8.3 | COVID-19 pandemic'''
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, countries such as India were affected by hydro-meteorological hazards ( [[#Raju--2020|Raju, 2020]] ) making it extremely difficult to handle a public health crisis in the context of compounding risks and cascading hazards ( [[#Phillips--2020|Phillips et al., 2020]] ). The COVID-19 pandemic can increase the adverse consequences of climate change since it has the potential to delay some key adaptation actions. On the other hand, the pandemic also highlights the importance of better preparedness to the impacts of climate change ( [[#Djalante--2020|Djalante et al., 2020]] ). Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the economic situation within many countries and local communities particularly for already marginalised groups ( [[#Gupta--2021|Gupta et al., 2021]] ). The accumulation of crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic alongside climate change impacts, underscore the fact that stressors do not occur in isolation, but are interlinked, with clear implications for structural vulnerability and adaptation options available to the poorest ( [[#Sultana--2021|Sultana, 2021]] ). Responses to COVID-19 have led to significant economic and social distress within and across societies and local communities, especially in poorer countries. The direct health and economic impacts of the lockdowns have further limited the ability of many people across the developing world to pursue income-generating activities, and sustain livelihoods that are already affected by climate hazards. In addition, poor or most vulnerable groups face further marginalisation due to misinformation that these groups transmit the virus to other wealthier groups and areas. The pandemic has intensified inequalities in both developing countries ( [[#FAO--2020|FAO, 2020]] ) and in industrialised nations ( [[#Anderson--2020|Anderson et al., 2020]] ; [[#McCloskey--2020|McCloskey et al., 2020]] ), whereby vulnerable groups are especially affected ( [[#Raju--2021|Raju et al., 2021]] ). Whereas different models and scenarios contain different data and figures, there is ''high agreement'' that it is likely that socioeconomic impacts are particularly severe within selected global regions and areas that are already characterised by a rather high level of human vulnerability (see also [[#8.3|Section 8.3]] ). This also implies that the capacity of people to prepare for present and future climate change impacts will further decrease within these countries and population groups under the direct and indirect consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is not only influencing climate change research ( [[#Leal%20Filho--2021b|Leal Filho et al., 2021b]] ) but is also influencing the capacities of governmental institutions and nations to support planned adaptation and poverty reduction favouring the most vulnerable groups, since the crisis also means among other issues a significant reductions in tax revenues ( [[#Clemens--2020|Clemens and Veuger, 2020]] ). COVID-19 may also force people to seek alternative sources of income that can lead to the further erosion of long-term adaptive capacities. In many settings, the pandemic has had significant impact on businesses and SMEs ( [[#Schmid--2021|Schmid et al., 2021]] ). The important role of governmental support for buffering crises and periods of income loss of individual households (e.g., unemployment) and private businesses (e.g., SMEs) has also been demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries ( [[#OECD--2020b|OECD, 2020b]] ).

Livelihood disruptions and an increasing probability of higher levels of poverty and of structural vulnerability in various countries have already been observed ( [[#Laborde--2020b|Laborde et al., 2020b]] ). These vulnerabilities and the new layers created by the pandemic must be seen with an intersectional lens ( [[#Raju--2019|Raju, 2019]] ; [[#Sultana--2021|Sultana, 2021]] ).

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed the unequal access to vaccine and the importance of national state institutions to buffer negative impacts, for example, of the lock downs or in terms of unemployment. The COVID-19 pandemic recovery also sets some basis for a stronger narrative towards a green recovery approach ( [[#Djalante--2020|Djalante et al., 2020]] ; [[#Forster--2020|Forster et al., 2020]] ).

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'''Box 8.4 | Conflict and governance'''
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Climate change impacts carry the risk of amplifying or aggravating existing tensions within and between communities or countries ( [[#Sakaguchi--2017|Sakaguchi et al., 2017]] ). There is, however, ''limited evidence'' for a universal direct causal linkage between climate change and violent conflicts ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). The triggering of conflicts related to climate impacts is strongly determined by contextual factors, such as the type of government or the level of development ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). A study of 156 countries ( [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ) showed that an increase in periods of drought exacerbate the risk of conflict, especially in democratic countries. This influence was particularly marked during the period 2010–2012 in countries of western Asia and northern Africa that were undergoing political transformations, such as the Arab Spring. Conflict can then represent people’s discontent in governments’ inefficient responses to climate impacts ( [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ). Research has noted conditions under which climate change can increase the risk of armed conflict, which includes ethnic exclusion, agricultural dependence, large populations, insufficient infrastructure, dysfunctional local institutions and low levels of development ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Since the AR5, there is ''robust evidence'' of the socially destabilising measures and high-risk income alternatives that the world’s poorest commonly take to cope with the impacts of climate change on livelihoods ( [[#Blattman--2016|Blattman and Annan, 2016]] ). To avoid impoverishment, households often pursue risky livelihood alternatives, with high potential for return on investment ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool et al., 2018]] ), but which in some cases undermine environmental quality ( [[#Bolognesi--2015|Bolognesi et al., 2015]] ), violate laws ( [[#Ahmed--2019|Ahmed et al., 2019]] ), contradict social norms ( [[#Hagerman--2014|Hagerman and Satterfield, 2014]] ), erode institutions ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool et al., 2018]] ), or affect intra- and inter-community cooperation ( [[#Nadiruzzaman--2015|Nadiruzzaman and Wrathall, 2015]] ). At the same time, a narrowing of livelihood options carries a strong potential for participation and association with violent non-state organisations and movements, either criminal or ideological ( [[#Nett--2016|Nett and Rüttinger, 2016]] ). In order to reduce the risk of instability and violence associated with climate change, a broadening of livelihood options among the most vulnerable people appears to be an effective policy approach ( [[#Miguel--2004|Miguel et al., 2004]] ).

The determinants of violence in the context of climate shocks are primarily poor institutional planning and response to impacts, such as the capacity of a government to respond to and manage environmental risk ( [[#Selby--2017|Selby et al., 2017]] ). In Latin America, for example, evidence on social conflicts related to disputes over access to water in the context of drought and decreasing water availability point to institutional failures, such as poor, inequitable or corrupt water governance ( [[#Poupeau--2017|Poupeau et al., 2017]] ). Such observations are not confined to low-income countries. In industrialised countries, failure of governments to address climate change is ''likely'' to fuel discontent, a condition in which violent outcomes are possible ( [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

In this regard, specific attention ought to be paid to how responses to climate change exacerbate inequalities within societies and create tensions between different groups—typically between those who are able to protect themselves from climate change impacts and those who do not have sufficient resources or are not prioritised in the responses to climate change. Frequently the possibility of migration from climate change is conflated with conflict outcomes from climate change; however, there is ''limited evidence'' and ''low agreement'' that climate change and migration will result in increased conflict ( [[#Okpara--2016b|Okpara et al., 2016b]] ), while there is ''robust evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that climate change can exacerbate existing tensions, which can in turn result in political violence and an increase in asylum-seeking ( [[#Marchiori--2012|Marchiori et al., 2012]] ). In the future, conflict in the context of climate change impacts may increase the number of migrants seeking asylum, although at present there is scant empirical evidence for this ( [[#Schutte--2021|Schutte et al., 2021]] ). Recent evidence also provides support for social conflict around inequitable climate mitigation policy as well (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies and emissions reductions targets) ( [[#Rentschler--2016|Rentschler, 2016]] ).

In recent years, research on the climate–security nexus has developed considerably, and has highlighted risks pertaining to conflicts, geo-political rivalries, critical infrastructure, terrorism or human security ( [[#Gemenne--2014|Gemenne et al., 2014]] ). While different studies have identified strong past correlations between climatic variations (of temperature and rainfall in particular) and the occurrence of violent conflicts ( [[#Hsiang--2013|Hsiang et al., 2013]] ), others have stressed the need for stronger explanatory models or the risk of a selection bias ( [[#Benjaminsen--2012|Benjaminsen et al., 2012]] ; [[#Solow--2013|Solow, 2013]] ; [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ).

While climate change may increase armed conflict risks in certain contexts ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ), responses to climate change will be crucial to mitigate these risks. Poor institutional responses can directly drive violence, and there is ''robust evidence'' that inequitable responses further exacerbate marginalisation, exclusion or disenfranchisement of some populations, which are commonly recognised drivers of violent conflict.

''Robust evidence'' suggests environmental problems (related to climate change) can be dealt with cooperatively, hence leading to more positive and peaceful relations between groups ( [[#Wolf--2003|Wolf et al., 2003]] ; [[#Ide--2019|Ide, 2019]] ). To avert violent outcomes induced by climate change, stronger local and national climate adaptation institutions within vulnerable societies, and stronger cooperative resource governance mechanisms between vulnerable countries (such as transboundary water governance agreements) are needed.

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