Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/TS (section)

== TS.C Projected Impacts and Risks ==

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This section identifies future impacts and risks under different degrees of climate change. As a result, 127 key risks have been found across regions and sectors. These are integrated as eight overarching risks (called Representative Key Risks, RKRs) which relate to low-lying coastal systems; terrestrial and ocean ecosystems; critical physical infrastructure, networks and services; living standards and equity; human health; food security; water security; and peace and migration. Risks are projected to become severe with increased warming and under ecological or societal conditions of high exposure and vulnerability. The intertwined issues of biodiversity loss and climatic change together with human demographic changes, particularly rapid growth in low-income countries, an ageing population in high-income countries and rapid urbanisation are seen as core issues in understanding risk distribution at all scales. { 16.5.2, Table 16.A.4, SMTS.2 }

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=== Ecosystems and biodiversity ===

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'''TS.C.1 Without urgent and ambitious emissions reductions, more terrestrial, marine and freshwater species and ecosystems will face conditions that approach or exceed the limits of their historical experience (''' '''''very high confidence''''' '''). Threats to species and ecosystems in oceans, coastal regions and on land, particularly in biodiversity hotspots, present a global risk that will increase with every additional tenth of a degree of warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). The transformation of terrestrial and ocean/coastal ecosystems and loss of biodiversity, exacerbated by pollution, habitat fragmentation and land use changes, will threaten livelihoods and food security (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' (Figure TS.5 ECOSYSTEMS) { 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8, 2.5.4, Figure 2.11, Table 2.5, 3.2.4, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 4.5.5, 9.6.2, 12.4, 13.10.2, 14.5.1, 14.5.2, 15.3.3, 16.4.2, 16.4.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.4 CCP1.2.4] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.2.7 CCP5.2.7] , CCP 7.3.5 }

'''TS.C.1.1 Near-term warming will continue to cause plants and animals to alter their timing of seasonal events (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''') and to move their geographic ranges (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Risks escalate with additional near-term warming in all regions and domains ( ''high confidence'' ). Without urgent and deep emissions reductions, some species and ecosystems, especially those in polar and already-warm areas, will face temperatures beyond their historical experience in coming decades (e.g., &gt;20% of species on some tropical landscapes and coastlines at 1.5°C global warming). Unique and threatened ecosystems are expected to be at high risk in the very near term at 1.2°C global warming levels ( ''very high confidence'' ) due to mass tree mortality, coral reef bleaching, large declines in sea-ice-dependent species and mass mortality events from heatwaves. Even for less vulnerable species and systems, projected climate change risks surpass hard limits to natural adaptation, increasing species at high risk of population declines ( ''medium confidence'' ) and loss of critical habitats ( ''medium to high confidence'' ) and compromising ecosystem structure, functioning and resilience ( ''medium confidence'' ). At a global warming of 2°C with associated changes in precipitation global land area burned by wildfire is projected to increase by 35% ( ''medium confidence'' ). (Figure TS.5 ECOSYSTEMS) { 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.6.1, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.11, Table 2.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.5, 4.5.5, 9.6.2, 11.3.1, 11.3.2, 12.3, 13.10.2, 14.5.1, 14.5.2, 15.3.3, 16.4.2, 16.4.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.1 CCP1.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.4 CCP1.2.4] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.3 CCP7.3] , CCB DEEP, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.1.2 Risks to ecosystem integrity, functioning and resilience are projected to escalate with every tenth of a degree increase in global warming (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Beginning at 1.5°C warming, natural adaptation faces hard limits, driving high risks of biodiversity decline, mortality, species extinction and loss of related livelihoods ( ''high confidence'' ). At 1.6°C (median estimate), &gt;10% of species are projected to become endangered, increasing to &gt;20% at 2.1°C, representing severe biodiversity risk ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' These risks escalate with warming, most rapidly and severely in areas at both extremes of temperature and precipitation ( ''high confidence'' ). With warming of 3°C, &gt;80% of marine species across large parts of the tropical Indian and Pacific Ocean will experience potentially dangerous climate conditions ( ''medium confidence'' ). Beyond 4°C warming, projected impacts expand, including extirpation of approx. 50% of tropical marine species ( ''medium confidence'' ) and biome shifts (changes in the major vegetation form of an ecosystem) across 35% of global land area ( ''medium confidence'' ). These will lead to a shift of much of the Amazon rainforest to drier and lower-biomass vegetation ( ''medium confidence'' ), poleward shifts of boreal forest into treeless tundra across the Arctic and upslope shifts of montane forests into alpine grassland ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.5 ECOSYSTEMS) { 2.3.2, 2.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 9.6.2, 11.3.1, 11.3.2, 12.3, 13.3.1, 13.4.1, 13.10.2, 16.4.3, 16.5.2, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8, Figure 2.11, Figure 3.18, Table 2.6.7, Box 3.2, 9.6.2, Box 11.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.1 CCP1.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.2 CCP1.2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.1 CCP5.3.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2.3 CCP5.3.2.3] , CC6P4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.3 CCP7.3] , CCB EXTREMES }

'''TS.C.1.3 Damage and degradation of ecosystems exacerbate the projected impacts of climate change on biodiversity (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Space for nature is shrinking as large areas of forest are lost to deforestation (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), peat draining and agricultural expansion, land reclamation and protection structures in urban and coastal settlements (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Currently less than 15% of the land and 8% of the ocean are under some form of protection, and enforcement of protection is often weak ( ''high confidence'' ). Future ecosystem vulnerability will strongly depend on developments in society, including demographic and economic change ( ''high confidence'' ). Deforestation is projected to increase the threat to terrestrial ecosystems, as is increasing the use of hard coastal protection of cities and settlements by the sea for coastal ecosystems. Coordinated and well-monitored habitat restoration, protection and management, combined with consumer pressure and incentives, can reduce non-climatic impacts and increase resilience ( ''high confidence'' ). Adaptation and mitigation options, such as afforestation, dam construction and coastal infrastructure placements, can increase vulnerability, compete for land and water and generate risks for the integrity and functioning of ecosystems ( ''high confidence'' ). { 2.2, 2.3, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.4.3, 2.5.4, 2.6.2, 2.6.3, 2.6.4, 2.6.5, 2.6.6, 2.6.7, Figure 2.1, 3.4.2, 3.5, 3.6.3, 4.5.5, 9.6.2, 9.6.3, 9.6.4, 9.7.2, 11.3.1, 12.3.3, 12.3.4, 13.3.2, 13.4.2, 13.10.2, 13.11.3, 14.5.2, 14.5.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.2.1 CCP5.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.2.5 CCP5.2.5] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.4.1 CCP5.4.1] , CCB NATURAL, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.1.4 Changes induced by climate change in the physiology, biomass, structure and extent of ecosystems will determine their future carbon storage capacity (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' In terrestrial ecosystems, the fertilisation effects of high atmospheric CO 2 concentrations on carbon uptake will be increasingly saturated and limited by warming and drought ( ''medium confidence'' ). Increases in wildfires, tree mortality, insect pest outbreaks, peatland drying and permafrost thaw ( ''high confidence'' ) all exacerbate self-reinforcing feedbacks between emissions from high-carbon ecosystems and warming with the potential to turn many ecosystems that are currently net carbon sinks into sources ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' In coastal areas beyond 1.5°C warming, blue carbon storage by mangroves, marshes and seagrass habitats are increasingly threatened by rising sea levels and the intensity, duration and extent of marine heatwaves, as well as adaptation options (including coastal development) ( ''high confidence'' ). Changes in ocean stratification are projected to reduce nutrient supply and alter the magnitude and efficiency of the biological carbon pump ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.11, 3.2.2, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, Box 3.4, 9.5.10, 9.6.2, 10.4.2, 10.4.3, 11.3.1, 11.3.4, Box 11.5, 12.3.3, 12.3.4, 12.3.5, 12.3.6, Table 12.6, 13.3.1, 14.5.1, 15.3.3, CCB SLR, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.4 CCP1.2.4] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.3 CCP1.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.3 CCP7.3] , WGI AR6 5.4 }

'''TS.C.1.5 Extinction risk increases disproportionately from global warming of 1.5°C to 3°C and is especially high for endemic species and species rendered less resilient by human-induced non-climate stressors (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' The median values for percentage of species at very high risk of extinction are 9% at 1.5°C, 10% at 2°C, 12% at 3°C, 13% at 4°C and 15% at 5°C ( ''high confidence'' ), with the likely range of estimates having a maximum of 14% at 1.5°C and rising to a maximum of 48% at 5°C. Extinction risks are higher for species in biodiversity hotspots ( ''medium confidence'' ), reaching 24% of species at very high extinction risk above 1.5°C, with yet higher proportions for endemic species of 84% in mountains ( ''medium confidence'' ) and 100% on islands ( ''medium confidence'' ). Thousands of individual populations are projected to be locally lost, which will reduce species diversity in some areas where there are no species moving in to replace them, for example, in tropical systems ( ''high confidence'' ). Novel species interactions at the cold edge of species’ distribution may also lead to extirpations and extinctions of newly encountered species ( ''low confidence'' ). Palaeo records indicate that at extreme warming levels (&gt;5°C), mass extinctions of species occur ( ''medium confidence'' ). Among the thousands of species at risk, many are species of ecological, cultural and economic importance. { 2.3.1, 2.3.3, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8, Figure 2.11, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 4.5.5, 9.6.2, 13.3.1, 13.4.1, 13.10.1, 13.10.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.1 CCP1.2.1] ¸ [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.4 CCP1.2.4] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.1 CCP5.3.1] , CCB PALEO }

'''TS.C.2 Cumulative stressors and extreme events are projected''' '''to increase in magnitude and frequency (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''') and will accelerate projected climate-driven shifts in ecosystems and loss of the services they provide to people (''' '''''high co''''' '''''nfidence''''' '''). These processes will exacerbate both stress o''' '''n systems already at risk from climate impacts and non-climate impacts like habitat fragmentation and pollution (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). The increasing frequency and severity of extreme events will decrease the recovery time available for ecosystems (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Irreversible changes will occur from the interaction of stressors and the occurrence of extreme events (''' '''''very high confidence''''' '''), such as the expansion of arid systems or total loss of stony coral and sea ice communities.''' { 2.3, 2.3.1, 3.2.2, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 13.3.1, 13.4.1, 13.10.2, 14.5.2, 14.5.5, 14.5.9, Box 14.2, Box 14.4 }

'''TS.C.2.1. Ecosystem integrity is threatened by the positive feedback between direct human impacts (land use change, pollution, overexploitation, fragmentation and destruction) and climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' In the case of the Amazon forest, this could lead to large-scale ecological transformations and shifts from a closed, wet forest into a drier and lower-biomass vegetation ( ''medium confidence'' ). If these pressures are not successfully addressed, the combined and interactive effects between climate change, deforestation and forest degradation, and forest fires are projected to lead to a reduction of over 60% of the area covered by forest in response to 2.5°C global warming level ( ''medium confidence'' ). Some habitat-forming coastal ecosystems, including many coral reefs, kelp forests and seagrass meadows, will undergo irreversible phase shifts due to marine heatwaves with global warming levels &gt;1.5°C and are at high risk this century even in &lt;1.5°C scenarios that include periods of temperature overshoot beyond 1.5°C ( ''high confidence'' ). Under SSP1–2.6, coral reefs are at risk of widespread decline, loss of structural integrity and transitioning to net erosion by mid-century due to the increasing intensity and frequency of marine heatwaves ( ''very high confidence'' ). Due to these impacts, the rate of sea level rise is ''very likely'' to exceed that of reef growth by 2050, absent adaptation. In response to heatwaves, bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef is projected to occur annually if warming increases above 2.0°C, resulting in widespread decline and loss of structural integrity ( ''very high confidence'' ). Global warming of 3.0°C–3.5°C increases the likelihood of extreme and lethal heat events in western and northern Africa ( ''medium confidence'' ) and across Asia. Drought risks are projected to increase in many regions over the 21st century ( ''very high confidence'' ). { 2.5.2, 2.5.4, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 9.5.3, 9.10, 10.2.1, 10.3.7, 11.3.1, 11.3.2, Box 11.2, Table 11.14, 13.3.1, 13.4.1, 14.5.3, Box 14.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.3.6 CCP7.3.6] }

'''TS.C.2.2 Pests, weeds and disease occurrence and distribution are projected to increase with global warming, amplified by climate change induced extreme events (e.g., droughts, floods, heatwaves and wildfires), with negative consequences for ecosystem health, food security, human health and livelihoods (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Invasive plant species are predicted to expand both in latitude and altitude ( ''high confidence'' ). Climatically disrupted ecosystems will make organisms more susceptible to disease via reduced immunity and biodiversity losses, which can increase disease transmission. Risks of climate-driven emerging zoonoses will increase. Depending on location and human–wildlife interactions, climate-driven shifts in distributions of wild animals increase the risk of emergence of novel human infectious diseases, as has occurred with SARS, MERS and SARS-CoV-2 ( ''medium confidence'' ). Changes in the rates of reproduction and distribution of weeds, insect pests, pathogens and disease vectors will increase biotic stress on crops, forests and livestock ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Pest and disease outbreaks will require greater use of control measures, increasing the cost of production, food safety impacts and the risk of biodiversity loss and ecosystem impacts. These control measures will become costlier under climate change ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 2.4.2, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 3.5.5, 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.5.2, 5.9.4, 5.12, 11.3.1, 13.5.1, 14.5.4, 14.5.6, CCB ILLNESS, CCB MOVING PLATE, CCB COVID }

'''TS.C.2.3 The ability of natural ecosystems to provide carbon storage and sequestration is increasingly impacted by heat, wildfire, droughts, loss and degradation of vegetation from land use and other impacts (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' '''''.''''' Limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, could reduce projected permafrost CO 2 losses by 2100 by 24.2 GtC ( ''low confidence'' ). A temperature rise of 4°C by 2100 is projected to increase global burned area 50–70% and fire frequency by approx. 30%, potentially releasing 11–200 GtC from the Arctic alone ( ''medium confidence'' ). Changes in plankton community structure and productivity are projected to reduce carbon sequestration at depth ( ''low'' to ''medium confidence'' ). { 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, Figure 2.11, Table 2.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.2, 4.2.4, 13.3.1, 13.4.1, Box 14.7, Box 3.4 }

'''TS.C.2.4 Climate change impacts on marine ecosystems are projected to lead to profound changes and irreversible losses in many regions, with negative consequences for human ways of life, economy and cultural identity (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' For example, by 2100, 18.8% ± 19.0% to 38.9% ± 9.4% of the ocean will ''very likely'' undergo a change of more than 20 days (advances and delays) in the start of the phytoplankton growth period under SSP1-2.6 and SSP5-8.5 respectively ( ''low confidence'' ). This altered timing increases the risk of temporal mismatches between plankton blooms and fish spawning seasons ( ''medium'' to ''high confidence'' ) and increases the risk of fish recruitment failure for species with restricted spawning locations, especially in mid- to high latitudes of the northern hemisphere ( ''low confidence'' ) but provide short-term opportunities to countries benefiting from shifting fish stocks ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.6, 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 11.3.1, 13.4.1, 13.5.1, 14.5.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.3 CCP6.3] , CCB MOVING SPECIES }

'''TS.C.2.5 Warming pathways that temporarily increase global mean temperature over 1.5°C above pre-industrial for multi-decadal time spans imply severe risks and irreversible impacts in many ecosystems (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Major risks include loss of coastal ecosystems such as wetlands and marshlands from committed sea level rise associated with overshoot warming ( ''medium confidence'' ), coral reefs and kelps from heat-related mortality and associated ecosystem transitions ( ''high confidence'' ), disruption of water flows in high-elevation ecosystems from glacier loss and shrinking snow cover, and local extinctions of terrestrial species. { 2.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.4, 4.7.4, 9.6.2, 12.3, 13.10.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.1 CCP5.3.1] }

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=== Food systems and food security ===

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'''TS.C.3 Climate change will increasingly add pressure on food production systems, undermining food security (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). With every increment of warming, exposure to climate hazards will grow substantially (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), and adverse impacts on all food sectors will become prevalent, further stressing food security (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Regional disparity in risks to food security will grow with warming levels, increasing poverty traps, particularly in regions characterised by a high level of human vulnerability (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' (Figure TS.4) { 4.5.1, 4.6.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.5.3, 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.12.4, 7.3.1, 9.8.2, 9.8.5, 13.5.1, 14.5.4, 16.5.2, 16.6.3, CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.3.1 Climate change will increasingly add pressure on terrestrial food production systems with every increment of warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Some current global crop and livestock areas will become climatically unsuitable depending on the emissions scenario ( ''high confidence'' ; 10% globally by 2050, by 2100 over 30% under SSP-8.5 versus below 8% under SSP1-2.6). Compared to 1.5°C global warming level, 2°C global warming level will even further negatively impact food production where current temperatures are already high as in lower latitudes ( ''high confidence'' ). Increased and potentially concurrent climate extremes will increase simultaneous losses in major food-producing regions ( ''medium confidence'' ). The adverse effects of climate change on food production will become more severe when global temperatures rise by more than 2°C ( ''high confidence'' ). At 3°C or higher global warming levels, exposure to climate hazards will grow substantially ( ''high confidence'' ), further stressing food production, notably in sub-Saharan Africa and South and South East Asia ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.4) { 4.5.1, 4.6.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.5.3, 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.12.4, 9.8.2, 9.8.5, 11.3.4, 13.5.1, 14.5.4, 16.5.2, 16.6.3, CCB MOVING PLATE }

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[[File:0d7a088013fc7886dbb2d00b4ef261de IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_004a.png]] [[File:aa2978174dc25988f1f40b39fc2ed841 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_004b.png]]

'''Figure TS.4 |''' '''Synthetic diagrams of global and sectoral assessments and examples of regional key risks.''' Diagrams show the change in the levels of impacts and risks assessed for global warming of 0–5°C global surface temperature change relative to pre-industrial period (1850–1900) over the range.

'''(a)''' Global surface temperature changes in °C relative to 1850–1900. These changes were obtained by combining CMIP6 model simulations with observational constraints based on past simulated warming, as well as an updated assessment of equilibrium climate sensitivity (Box TS.2). Changes relative to 1850–1900 based on 20-year averaging periods are calculated by adding 0.85°C (the observed global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 1995–2014) to simulated changes relative to 1995–2014. ''Very likely'' ranges are shown for SSP1-2.6 and SSP3-7.0 (WGI AR6 Figure SPM.8). Assessments were carried out at the global scale for (b), (c), (d) and (e).

'''(b)''' The Reasons for Concern (RFC) framework communicates scientific understanding about accrual of risk for five broad categories. Diagrams are shown for each RFC, assuming low to no adaptation (i.e., adaptation is fragmented, localized and comprises incremental adjustments to existing practices). However, the transition to a very high risk level has an emphasis on irreversibility and adaptation limits. Undetectable risk level (white) indicates no associated impacts are detectable and attributable to climate change; moderate risk (yellow) indicates associated impacts are both detectable and attributable to climate change with at least ''medium confidence'' , also accounting for the other specific criteria for key risks; high risk (red) indicates severe and widespread impacts that are judged to be high on one or more criteria for assessing key risks; and very high risk level (purple) indicates very high risk of severe impacts and the presence of significant irreversibility or the persistence of climate-related hazards, combined with limited ability to adapt due to the nature of the hazard or impacts/risks. The horizontal line denotes the present global warming of 1.09°C which is used to separate the observed, past impacts below the line from the future projected risks above it. RFC1: Unique and threatened systems: ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by climate-related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive properties. Examples include coral reefs, the Arctic and its Indigenous Peoples, mountain glaciers and biodiversity hotspots. RFC2: Extreme weather events: risks/impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets and ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heatwaves, heavy rain, drought and associated wildfires, and coastal flooding. RFC3: Distribution of impacts: risks/impacts that disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate change hazards, exposure or vulnerability. RFC4: Global aggregate impacts: impacts to socio-ecological systems that can be aggregated globally into a single metric, such as monetary damages, lives affected, species lost or ecosystem degradation at a global scale. RFC5: Large-scale singular events: relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems caused by global warming, such as ice sheet disintegration or thermohaline circulation slowing. Assessment methods are described in SM16.6 and are identical to AR5, but are enhanced by a structured approach to improve robustness and facilitate comparison between AR5 and AR6. Risks for (c) terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems and (d) ocean ecosystems.

For '''(c)''' and '''(d)''' , diagrams shown for each risk assume low to no adaptation. The transition to a very high risk level has an emphasis on irreversibility and adaptation limits.

'''(e)''' Climate-sensitive human health outcomes under three scenarios of adaptation effectiveness. The assessed projections were based on a range of scenarios, including SRES, CMIP5, and ISIMIP, and, in some cases, demographic trends. The diagrams are truncated at the nearest whole °C within the range of temperature change in 2100 under three SSP scenarios in panel (a).

'''(f)''' Examples of regional key risks. Risks identified are of at least ''medium confidence'' level. Key risks are identified based on the magnitude of adverse consequences (pervasiveness of the consequences, degree of change, irreversibility of consequences, potential for impact thresholds or tipping points, potential for cascading effects beyond system boundaries); likelihood of adverse consequences; temporal characteristics of the risk; and ability to respond to the risk, e.g., by adaptation. The full set of 127 assessed global and regional key risks is given in SMTS.4 and SM16.7. Diagrams are provided for some risks. The development of synthetic diagrams for Small Islands, Asia and Central and South America were limited by the availability of adequately downscaled climate projections, with uncertainty in the direction of change, the diversity of climatologies and socio-economic contexts across countries within a region, and the resulting low number of impact and risk projections for different warming levels. Absence of risks diagrams does not imply absence of risks within a region. (Box TS.2) { Figure 2.11, Figure SM3.1, Figure 7.9, Figure 9.6, Figure 11.6, Figure 13.28, 16.5, 16.6, Figure 16.15, SM16.3, SM16.4, SM16.5, SM16.6 (methodologies), SM16.7, Figure CCP4.8, Figure [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.1 CCP4.1] 0, Figure [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.5 CCP6.5] , WGI AR6 2, WGI AR6 SPM A.1.2, WGI AR6 Figure SPM.8 }

'''TS.C.3.2 Climate change will significantly alter aquatic food provisioning services, with direct impacts on food-insecure people (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Global ocean animal biomass will decrease by 5.7% ± 4.1% and 15.5% ± 8.5% under SSP1-2.6 and SSP5-8.5 respectively by 2080–2099 relative to 1995–2014 ( ''medium confidence'' ), affecting food provisioning, revenue value and distribution. Catch composition will change regionally, and the vulnerability of fishers will partially depend on their ability to move, diversify and leverage technology ( ''medium confidence'' ). Global marine aquaculture will decline under increasing temperature and acidification conditions by 2100, with potential short-term gains for finfish aquaculture in some temperate regions and overall negative impacts on bivalve aquaculture due to habitat reduction ( ''medium confidence'' ). Changes in precipitation, sea level rise, temperature and extreme events will negatively affect food provisioning from inland aquatic systems ( ''medium confidence'' ), which provide a significant source of livelihoods and food for direct human consumption, particularly in Asia and Africa. { 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.3, 3.6.2, 3.6.3, 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.13, 9.8.5, 13.5.1, 14.5.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.3 CCP6.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.4 CCP6.2.4] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.5 CCP6.2.5] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.6 CCP6.2.6] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2.8] , CCB MOVING PLATE, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.3.3 Climate change will increasingly add significant pressure and regionally different impacts on all components of food systems, undermining all dimensions of food security (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Extreme weather events will increase risks of food insecurity via spikes in food prices, reduced food diversity and reduced income for agricultural and fishery livelihoods ( ''high confidence'' ), preventing achievement of the UN SDG 2 (‘Zero Hunger’) by 2030 in regions with limited adaptive capacities, including Africa, small island states and South Asia ( ''high confidence'' ). With about 2°C warming, climate-related changes in food availability and diet quality are estimated to increase nutrition-related diseases and the number of undernourished people by 2050, affecting tens (under low vulnerability and low warming) to hundreds of millions of people (under high vulnerability and high warming, i.e., SSP-3-RCP6.0), particularly among low-income households in low- and middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America ( ''high confidence'' ), for example, between 8 million under SSP1-6.0 to up to 80 million people under SSP3-6.0. At 3°C or higher global warming levels, adverse impacts on all food sectors will become prevalent, further stressing food availability ( ''high confidence'' ), agricultural labour productivity and food access ( ''medium confidence'' ). Regional disparity in risks to food security will grow at these higher warming levels, increasing poverty traps, particularly in regions characterised by a high level of human vulnerability ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.5.1, 4.6.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.5.3, 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.12.4, 7.3.1, 9.8.2, 9.8.5, 13.5.1, 14.5.4, 16.5.2, 16.6.3, CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.3.4 Climate change is projected to increase malnutrition through reduced nutritional quality, access to balanced food and inequality (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Increased CO 2 concentrations promote crop growth and yield but reduce the density of important nutrients in some crops ( ''high confidence'' ) with projected increases in undernutrition and micronutrient deficiency, particularly in countries that currently have high levels of nutrient deficiency ( ''high confidence'' ) and regions with low access to diverse foods ( ''medium confidence'' ). Marine-dependent communities, including Indigenous Peoples and local peoples, will be at increased risk of malnutrition due to losses of seafood-sourced nutrients ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 3.5.3, 5.2.2, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.5.2, 5.12.1, 5.12.4, 7.3.1, 9.8.5, 16.5.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.3 CCP6.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.4 CCP6.2.4] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.5 CCP6.2.5] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.6 CCP6.2.6] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2.8] , CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.3.5 Climate change will further increase pressures on those terrestrial ecosystem services which support global food production systems (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Climate change will reduce the effectiveness of pollination as species are lost from certain areas, or the coordination of pollinator activity and flower receptiveness will be disrupted in some regions ( ''high confidence'' ). Greenhouse gas emissions will negatively impact air, soil and water quality, exacerbating direct climatic impacts on yields ( ''high confidence'' ). { 5.4.3, 5.5.3, 5.7.1, 5.7.4, 5.9.4, 5.10.3, Box 5.3, Box 5.4, 13.10.2, 14.5.4, CCB MOVING PLATE, SRCCL }

'''TS.C.3.6 Climate change will compromise food safety through multiple pathways (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Higher temperatures and humidity will expand the risk of aflatoxin contamination into higher-latitude regions ( ''high confidence'' ). More frequent and intense flood events and increased melting of snow and ice will increase food contamination ( ''high confidence'' ). Aquatic food safety will decrease through increased detrimental impacts from harmful algal blooms ( ''high confidence'' ) and human exposure to elevated bioaccumulation of persistent organic pollutants and methylmercury ( ''low to medium confidence'' ). These negative food safety impacts will be greater without adaptation and fall disproportionately on low-income countries and communities with high consumption of seafood, including coastal Indigenous communities ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 3.6.3, 5.4.3, 5.8.1, 5.8.3, 5.11.1, 5.12.4, Box 5.10, 7.3.1, 14.5.6, CCB ILLNESS }

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=== Water systems and water security ===

<div id="h3-11-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.4 Water-related risks are projected to increase at all warming levels, with risks being proportionally lower at 1.5°C than at higher degrees of warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' '''''.''''' '''Regions and populations with higher exposure and vulnerability are projected to face greater risks than others (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''')''' '''''.''''' '''Projected changes in the water cycle, water quality, cryosphere changes, drought and flood will negatively impact natural and human systems (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' { 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.6.3, 3.5.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.4.6, 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.5.6, 4.5.8, 4.6.1, Box 4.1, Box 4.3, 5.4.3, 5.5.2, 5.8.1, 5.8.2, 5.8.3, 5.9.1, 5.9.3, 5.11.1, 5.11.3, 5.12.3, 5.13, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.3.1, 8.3, 8.4.4, 9.5.8, 9.5.3, 9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7, 9.7.1, 9.7.2, 10.4.6, 10.4.7, Box 10.2, Box 10.5, 11.2.2, 11.3.3, 11.3.4, Box 11.3, Box 11.4, 12.3, 13.2.1, 13.2.2, 13.6.2, 13.10.2, 13.10.3, Box 13.1, 14.5.3, 14.5.5, 14.5.9, 16.5.2, 16.6.1, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.1 CCP1.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.3.2 CCP1.2.3.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.2 CCP4.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.3 CCP4.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] }

'''TS.C.4.1 Water-related risks are projected to increase with every increment in warming level, and the impacts will be felt disproportionately by vulnerable people in regions with high exposure and vulnerability (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' About 800 million to 3 billion people at 2°C and about 4 billion at 4°C warming are projected to experience different levels of water scarcity ( ''medium confidence'' ), leading to increased water insecurity. At 4°C global warming by the end of the century, approximately 10% of the global land area is projected to face simultaneously increasing high extreme streamflow and decreasing low extreme streamflow, affecting over 2.1 billion people ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Globally, the greatest risks to attaining global sustainability goals come from risks to water security ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.4, 4.6.1, Box 4.2, 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.13, 8.3, 8.4.4., 9.7.2, 12.3, Table 12.3, 13.2.1, 13.2.2, 13.6.1, 13.10.2, 15.3.3, 16.6.1, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.4.2 Projected cryosphere changes will negatively impact water security and livelihoods, with higher severity of risks at higher levels of global warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Glacier mass loss, permafrost thaw and decline in snow cover are projected to continue beyond the 21st century ( ''high confidence'' ). Many low-elevation and small glaciers around the world will lose most of their total mass at 1.5°C warming ( ''high confidence'' ). Glaciers are likely to disappear by nearly 50% in High Mountain Asia and about 70% in Central and Western Asia by the end of the 21st century under the medium warming scenario. Glacier lake outburst flood will threaten the security of local and downstream communities in High Mountain Asia ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2100, annual runoff in one-third of the 56 large-scale glacierised catchments are projected to decline by over 10%, with the most significant reductions in Central Asia and the Andes ( ''medium confidence'' ). Cryosphere related changes in floods, landslides and water availability have the potential to lead to severe consequences for people, infrastructure and the economy in most mountain regions ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.5.8, 9.5.8, 10.4.4, Box 10.5, 11.2.2, Box 11.6, 14.2, 16.5.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.3 CCP1.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.1 CCP5.3.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] , SROCC }

'''TS.C.4.3 Projected changes in the water cycle will impact various ecosystem services (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' By 2050, environmentally critical streamflow is projected to be affected in 42% to 79% of the world’s watersheds, causing negative impacts on freshwater ecosystems ( ''medium confidence'' ). Increased wildfire, combined with soil erosion due to deforestation, could degrade water supplies ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Projected climate-driven water cycle changes, including increases in evapotranspiration, altered spatial patterns and amount of precipitation, and associated changes in groundwater recharge, runoff and streamflow, will impact terrestrial, freshwater, estuarine and coastal ecosystems and the transport of materials through the biogeochemical cycles, impacting humans and societal well-being ( ''medium confidence'' ). In Africa, 55–68% of commercially harvested inland fish species are vulnerable to extinction under 2.5°C global warming by 2071–2100. In Central and South America, disruption in water flows will significantly degrade ecosystems such as high-elevation wetlands ( ''high confidence'' ). { 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.6.3, 3.5.5, 3.5.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.5 '','' 4.4.6, 4.5.4, 5.4.3, 9.8.5, 11.3.1, 12.3, 14.2.2, 14.5.3, 15.3.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.1 CCP1.2.1] }

'''TS.C.4.4''' '''Drought risks and related societal damage are projected to increase with every degree of warming (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Under RCP6.0 and SSP2, the population that is projected to be exposed to extreme to exceptional low total water storage will reach up to 7% over the 21st century ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Under RCP8.5, aridity zones could expand by one-quarter of the 1990 area by 2100. In southern Europe, more than a third of the population will be exposed to water scarcity at 2°C, and the risk doubles at 3°C, with significant economic losses ( ''medium confidence'' ). Over large areas of northern South America, the Mediterranean, western China and high latitudes in North America and Eurasia, the frequency of extreme agricultural droughts is projected to be 150% to 200% more likely at 2°C and over 200% more likely at 4°C ( ''medium confidence'' ). Above 2°C, the frequency and duration of meteorological drought are projected to double over North Africa, the western Sahel and southern Africa ( ''medium confidence'' ). More droughts and extreme fire weather are projected in southern and eastern Australia ( ''high confidence'' ) and over most of New Zealand ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 4.5.1, 4.6.1, Box 4.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.1.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.1, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.6.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 7.3.1, 9.5.2, 9.5.3, 9.5.6, 9.9.4, 10.4.6; 11.2.2, Box 11.6, 14.5.3, 14.5.5, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP3.3.1 CCP3.3.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP3.3.2 CCP3.3.2] , CWGB URBAN }

'''TS.C.4.5 Flood risks and societal damages are projected to increase with every increment of global warming (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' The projected increase in precipitation intensity ( ''high confidence'' ) will increase rain-generated local flooding ( ''medium confidence'' ). Direct flood damage is projected to increase by four to five times at 4°C compared to 1.5°C ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' A higher sea level with storm surge further inland may create more severe coastal flooding ( ''high confidence'' ). Projected intensifications of the hydrological cycle pose increasing risks, including potential doubling of flood risk and 1.2- to 1.8-fold increase in GDP loss due to flooding between 1.5°C and 3°C ( ''medium confidence'' ). Projected increase in heavy rainfall events at all levels of warming in many regions in Africa will cause increasing exposure to pluvial and riverine flooding ( ''high confidence'' ), with expected human displacement increasing 200% for 1.6°C and 600% for 2.6°C. A 1.5°C increase would result in an increase of 100–200% in the population affected by floods in Colombia, Brazil and Argentina, 300% in Ecuador and 400% in Peru ( ''medium confidence'' ). In Europe, above 3°C global warming level, the costs of damage and people affected by precipitation and river flooding may double. { 4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 6.2.2, 7.3.1, Box 4.1, Box 4.3, 9.5.3, 9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7, 9.7.2, 9.9.4, 10.4.6, Box 10.2, Box 11.4, 12.3, 13.2.1, 13.2.2, 13.6.2, 13.10.2, Box 13.1, 14.2.2, 14.5.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , CWGB URBAN }

'''TS.C.4.6 Projected water cycle changes will impact agriculture, energy production and urban water uses (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Agricultural water use will increase globally as a consequence of population increase and dietary changes, as well as increased water requirements due to climate change ( ''high confidence'' ). Groundwater recharge in some semiarid regions are projected to increase, but worldwide depletion of non-renewable groundwater storage will continue due to increased groundwater demand ( ''medium'' to ''high confidence'' ). Increased floods and droughts, together with heat stress, will have an adverse impact on food availability and prices, resulting in increased undernourishment in South and Southeast Asia ( ''high confidence'' ). In the Mediterranean and parts of Europe, potential reductions of hydropower of up to 40% are projected under 3°C warming, while declines below 10% and 5% are projected under 2°C and 1.5°C warming levels respectively. An additional 350 and 410 million people living in urban areas will be exposed to water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5°C and 2°C respectively. { 2.5.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.5.6, 4.6.1, 5.4.3, 6.2.2, 6.2.4, Box 6.2, 6.3.5, 6.4, 9.7.2, 10.4.7, 12.3, 13.10.3, 4.5.2, 4.6.1, 11.3.3, 11.3.4, Box 11.3, 12.3, 14.5.3, 14.5.5, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.2 CCP4.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.3 CCP4.3] , CWGB URBAN }

<div id="Risks" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="risks-from-sea-level-rise"></span>
=== Risks from sea level rise ===

<div id="h3-12-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.5 Coastal risks will increase by at least one order of magnitude over the 21st century due to committed sea level rise impacting ecosystems, people, livelihoods, infrastructure, food security, cultural and natural heritage and climate mitigation at the coast. Concentrated in cities and settlements by the sea, these risks are already being faced and will accelerate beyond 2050 and continue to escalate beyond 2100, even if warming stops. Historically rare extreme sea level events will occur annually by 2100, compounding these risks (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' { 3.4.2, 3.5.5, 3.6.3, 9.9.4, Box 11.6, 13.2, Box 13.1, 14.5.2, Box 14.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.5.1 Under all emissions scenarios, coastal wetlands will''' '''''likely''''' '''face high risk from sea level rise in the mid-term (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''), with substantial losses before 2100. These risks will be compounded where coastal development prevents upshore migration of habitats or where terrestrial sediment inputs are limited and tidal ranges are small (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Loss of these habitats disrupts associated ecosystem services, including wave-energy attenuation, habitat provision for biodiversity, climate mitigation and food and fuel resources ( ''high confidence'' ). Near- to mid-term sea level rise will also exacerbate coastal erosion and submersion and the salinisation of coastal groundwater, expanding the loss of many different coastal habitats, ecosystems and ecosystem services ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 3.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.5, 3.6.3, 9.6.2, 11.3.1, 13.4.1, 13.4.2, 14.5.2, CCB NATURAL, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.5.2 The exposure of many coastal populations and associated development to sea level rise is high, increasing risks, and is concentrated in and around coastal cities and settlements (''' '''''virtually certain''''' ''').''' High population growth and urbanisation in low-lying coastal zones will be the major driver of increasing exposure to sea level rise in the coming decades ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2030, 108–116 million people will be exposed to sea level rise in Africa (compared to 54 million in 2000), increasing to 190–245 million by 2060 ( ''medium confidence'' ). By 2050, more than a billion people located in low-lying cities and settlements will be at risk from coast-specific climate hazards, influenced by coastal geomorphology, geographical location and adaptation action ( ''high confidence'' ). { 9.9.1, 9.9.4, Box 11.6, 14.5.2, Box 14.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.5.3 Under all climate and socioeconomic scenarios, low-lying cities and settlements, small islands, Arctic communities, remote Indigenous communities and deltaic communities will face severe disruption by 2100, and as early as 2050 in many cases (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Large numbers of people are at risk in Asia, Africa and Europe, while a large relative increase in risk occurs in small island states and in parts of North and South America and Australasia. Risks to water security will occur as early as 2030 or earlier for the small island states and Torres Strait Islands in Australia and remote Maori communities in New Zealand. By 2100, compound and cascading risks will result in the submergence of some low-lying island states and damage to coastal heritage, livelihoods and infrastructure ( ''very high confidence'' ). Sea level rise, combined with altered rainfall patterns, will increase coastal inundation and water-use allocation issues between water-dependent sectors, such as agriculture, direct human consumption, sanitation and hydropower ( ''medium confidence'' ). { Box 4.2, 5.13, 9.12, 9.9.1, 9.9.4, 11.4.1, 11.4.2, Box 11.6, 14.5.2, Box 14.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.5.4 Risks to coastal cities and settlements are projected to increase by at least one order of magnitude by 2100 without significant adaptation and mitigation action (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' The population at risk in coastal cities and settlements from a 100-year coastal flood increases by approx. 20% if the global mean sea level rises by 0.15 m relative to current levels, doubles at 0.75 m and triples at 1.4 m, assuming present-day population and protection height ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, in Europe, coastal flood damage is projected to increase at least 10-fold by the end of the 21st century, and even more or earlier with current adaptation and mitigation ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2100, 158–510 million people and USD7,919–12,739 billion in assets are projected to be exposed to the 1-in-100-year coastal floodplain under RCP4.5, and 176–880 million people and USD8,813–14,178 billion assets under RCP8.5 ( ''high confidence'' ). Projected impacts reach far beyond coastal cities and settlements, with damage to ports potentially severely compromising global supply chains and maritime trade, with local to global geopolitical and economic ramifications ( ''medium confidence'' ). Compounded and cascading climate risks, such as tropical cyclone storm surge damage to coastal infrastructure and supply chain networks, are expected to increase ( ''medium confidence'' ). (Figure TS.9 URBAN) { 3.5.5, 3.6.2, 6.2.5, 6.2.7, 9.9.4, 9.12.2, 11.4, Box 11.4, Box 11.6, Table 11.14, 13.2.1, 13.2.2, 13.6.2, 13.10.2, Box 13.1, 14.5.5, Box 14.4, Box 14.5, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.3 CCP6.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2.7] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2.8] , BoxCCP6.1, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.5.5 Particularly exposed and vulnerable coastal communities, especially those relying on coastal ecosystems for protection or livelihoods, may face adaptation limits well before the end of this century, even at low warming levels (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Changes in wave climate superimposed on sea level rise will significantly increase coastal flooding ( ''high confidence'' ) and erosion of low-lying coastal and reef islands ( ''limited evidence, medium agreement'' ). The frequency, extent and duration of coastal flooding will significantly increase from 2050 ( ''high confidence'' ), unless coastal and marine ecosystems are able to naturally adapt to sea level rise through vertical growth and landward migration ( ''low confidence'' ). Permafrost thaw, sea level rise, and reduced sea ice protection is projected to damage or cause loss to many cultural heritage sites, settlements and livelihoods across the Arctic ( ''very high confidence'' ). Deltaic cities and settlements characterised by high inequality and informal settlements are especially vulnerable ( ''high confidence'' ). Although risks are distributed across cities and settlements at all levels of economic development, wealthier and more urbanised coastal cities and settlements are more likely to be able to limit impacts and risk in the near- to mid-term through infrastructure resilience and coastal protection interventions, with highly uncertain prospects in many of these locations beyond 2100 ( ''high confidence'' ). Prospects for enabling and contributing to climate resilient development thus vary markedly within and between coastal cities and settlements ( ''high confidence'' ). { 9.9.4, 11.3.5, Table Box 11.6.1, 12.3, 12.4, Figure 12.7, Figure 12.9, Table 12.1, Table SM12.5, 13.2, 15.3.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.5] , Table SMCCP2.1 }

<span id="health-and-well-being-1"></span>
=== Health and well-being ===

<div id="h3-13-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.6 Climate change will increase the number of deaths and the global burden of non-communicable and infectious diseases (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Over nine million climate-related deaths per year are projected by the end of the century, under a high emissions scenario and accounting for population growth, economic development and adaptation. Health risks will be differentiated by gender, age, income, social status and region (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' { 3.5.5, 3.6.2, 4.5.3, 5.12.4, Box 5.10, 6.2.2, 7.3.1, 8.4.5, 9.10.2, Figure 9.32, Figure 9.35, 10.4.7, Figure 10.11, 11.3.6, Table 11.14,12.3.2, 12.3.4, 12.3.5, 12.3.6, 12.3.8, Figure 12.5, Figure 12.6, 13.7.1, Figure 13.23, Figure 13.24, 14.5.4, 14.5.6, 15.3.4, 16.5.2, CCP Box 6.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.6 CCP6.2.6] , CCB COVID, CCB ILLNESS, CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.6.1 Future global burdens of climate-sensitive diseases and conditions will depend on emissions and adaptation pathways and the efficacy of public health systems, interventions and sanitation (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Projections under mid-range emissions scenarios show an additional 250,000 deaths per year by 2050 (compared to 1961–1990) due to malaria, heat, childhood undernutrition and diarrhoea ( ''high confidence'' ). Overall, more than half of this excess mortality is projected for Africa. Mortality and morbidity will continue to escalate as exposures become more frequent and intense, putting additional strain on health and economic systems ( ''high confidence'' ), reducing capacity to respond, particularly in resource-poor regions. Vulnerable groups include young children (&lt;5 years old), the elderly (&gt;65 years old), pregnant women, Indigenous Peoples, those with pre-existing diseases, physical labourers and those in low socioeconomic conditions ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.5.3, 7.3.1, 9.10.2, 12.3.5, 16.5.2, CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.6.2 Climate change is expected to have adverse impacts on well-being and to further threaten mental health (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Children and adolescents, particularly girls, as well as people with existing mental, physical and medical challenges, are particularly at risk ( ''high confidence'' ). Mental health impacts are expected to arise from exposure to extreme weather events, displacement, migration, famine, malnutrition, degradation or destruction of health and social care systems, climate-related economic and social losses and anxiety and distress associated with worry about climate change ( ''very high confidence'' ). { 7.3.1, 11.3.6, 14.5.6, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.6 CCP6.2.6] , Box [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2] , CCB COVID }

'''TS.C.6.3 Increased heat-related mortality and morbidity are projected globally (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Globally, temperature-related mortality is projected to increase under RCP4.5 to RCP8.5, even with adaptation ( ''very high confidence'' ). Tens of thousands of additional deaths are projected under moderate and high global warming scenarios, particularly in north, west and central Africa, with up to year-round exceedance of deadly heat thresholds by 2100 (RCP8.5) ( ''high agreement, robust evidence'' ). In Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, urban heat-related excess deaths are projected to increase by about 300 yr -1 (low emission pathway) to 600 yr -1 (high emission pathway) during 2031–2080 relative to 142 yr -1 during 1971–2020 ( ''high confidence'' ). In Europe the number of people at high risk of mortality will triple at 3°C compared to 1.5°C warming, in particular in central and southern Europe and urban areas ( ''high confidence'' ). { 6.2.2, 7.3.1, 8.4.5, 9.10.2, Figure 9.32, Figure 9.35, 10.4.7, Figure 10.11, 11.3.6, 11.3.6, Table 11.14, 12.3.4, 12.3.8, Figure 12.6, 13.7.1, Figure 13.23, 14.5.6, 15.3.4, 16.5.2 }

'''TS.C.6.4 Climate impacts on food systems are projected to increase undernutrition and diet-related mortality and risks globally (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Reduced marine and freshwater fisheries catch potential is projected to increase malnutrition in East, West and Central Africa ( ''medium to high confidence'' ) and in subsistence-dependent communities across North America ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2050, disability-adjusted life years due to undernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are projected to increase by 10% under RCP8.5 ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). These projected changes will increase diet-related risk factors and related non-communicable diseases globally and increase undernutrition, stunting and related childhood mortality, particularly in Africa and Asia ( ''high confidence'' ). Near-term projections (2030) of undernutrition are the highest for children ( ''confidence'' ), which can have lifelong adverse consequences for physiological and neurological development as well as for earnings capacity. Climate change is projected to put 8 million (SSP1-6.0) to 80 million people (SSP3-6.0) at risk of hunger in mid-century, concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America ( ''high confidence'' ). These climate change impacts on nutrition could undermine progress towards the eradication of child undernutrition ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.5.3, 5.2.2, 5.12.4, Box 5.10, 7.3.1, 9.8.5, 9.10.2, 10.4.7, Figure 10.11, 13.7.1, 14.5.6, 15.3.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2] , CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.6.5 Vector-borne disease transmission is projected to expand to higher latitudes and altitudes, and the duration of seasonal transmission risk is projected to increase (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), with the greatest risk under high emissions scenarios.''' Dengue vector ranges will increase in North America, Asia, Europe and sub-Saharan Africa under RCP6 and RCP8.5, potentially putting another 2.25 billion people at risk ( ''high confidence'' ). Higher incidence rates of Lyme disease are projected for the Northern Hemisphere ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' Climate change is projected to increase malaria’s geographic distribution in endemic areas of sub-Saharan and southern Africa, Asia and South America ( ''high confidence'' ), exposing tens of millions more people to malaria, predominately in east and southern Africa, and up to hundreds of millions more exposed under RCP8.5 ( ''high confidence'' ). { 7.3.1, 9.10.2, Figure 9.32, 10.4.7, Figure 10.11, 11.3.6, 12.3.2, 12.3.5, 12.3.6, Figure 12.5, 13.7.1, Figure 13.24, 14.5.6, 15.3.4, CCB ILLNESS }

'''TS.C.6.6 Higher temperatures and heavy rainfall events are projected to increase rates of water-borne and food-borne diseases in many regions (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' At 2.1°C, thousands to tens of thousands of additional cases of diarrhoeal disease are projected, mainly in central and east Africa ( ''medium confidence'' ). Morbidity from cholera will increase in central and east Africa ( ''medium confidence'' ), and increased schistosomiasis risk is projected for eastern Africa ( ''high confidence'' ). In Asia and Africa, 1°C warming can cause a 7% increase in diarrhoea, an 8% increase in ''E. coli'' and a 3% to 11% increase in deaths ( ''medium confidence'' ). Warming increases the risk of food-borne disease outbreaks, including ''Salmonella'' and ''Campylobacter'' infections ( ''medium confidence'' ). Warming supports the growth and geographical expansion of toxigenic fungi in crops ( ''medium confidence'' ) and potentially toxic marine and freshwater algae ( ''medium confidence'' ). Food safety risks in fisheries and aquaculture are projected through harmful algal blooms ( ''high confidence'' ), pathogens (e.g., ''Vibrio'' ) ( ''high confidence'' ), and human exposure to elevated bioaccumulation of persistent organic pollutants and mercury ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 3.5.5, 3.6.2, 4.5.3, 5.12.4, Box 5.10, 7.3.1, 9.10.2, Figure 9.32, 10.4.7, Figure 10.11, 11.3.6, 13.7.1, Figure 13.24, 14.5.4, 14.5.6, 15.3.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.6 CCP6.2.6] , CCB MOVING PLATE }

'''TS.C.6.7 The burden of several non-communicable diseases is projected to increase under climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Cardiovascular disease mortality could increase by 18.4%, 47.8% and 69.0% in the 2020s, 2050s and 2080s respectively under RCP4.5, and by 16.6%, 73.8% and 134% under RCP8.5 compared to the 1980s ( ''high confidence'' ). Future risks of respiratory disease associated with aeroallergens and ozone exposure are expected to increase ( ''high confidence'' ). { 7.3.1, 10.4.7, 11.3.6, 12.3.4, 13.7.1 }

<span id="migration-and-displacement-1"></span>
=== Migration and displacement ===

<div id="h3-14-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.7 Migration patterns due to climate change are difficult to project as they depend on patterns of population growth, adaptive capacity of exposed populations and socioeconomic development and migration policies (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). In many regions, the frequency and/or severity of floods, extreme storms and droughts is projected to increase in coming decades, especially under high emissions scenarios, raising future risk of displacement in the most exposed areas (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Under all global warming levels, some regions that are presently densely populated will become unsafe or uninhabitable, with movement from these regions occurring autonomously or through planned relocation (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' { 4.5.7, 7.3.2, Box 9.8, 15.3.4, CCB MIGRATE }

'''TS.C.7.1 Future climate-related migration is expected to vary by region and over time, according to future climatic drivers, patterns of population growth, adaptive capacity of exposed populations and international development and migration policies (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' . Future migration and displacement patterns in a changing climate will depend not only on the physical impacts of climate change, but also on future policies and planning at all scales of governance ( ''high confidence'' ). Projecting the number of people migrating due to slow onset events is difficult due to the multi-causal nature of migration and the dominant role that socioeconomic factors have in determining migration responses ( ''high confidence'' ). Increased frequency of extreme heat events and long-term increases in average temperatures pose future risks to the habitability of settlements in low latitudes; this, combined with the urban heat island effect, may in the long term affect migration patterns in exposed areas, especially under high emissions scenarios, but more evidence is needed ''.'' High emissions/low development scenarios raise the potential for both increased rates of migration and displacement and larger involuntary immobile populations that are highly exposed to climatic risks but lack the means of moving to other locations ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 4.5.7, 7.2.6, 7.3.2, 15.3.4, 4.6.9, 5.14.1, 5.14.2, 7.3.2, 7.4.5, 8.2.1, Box 8.1, Box 9.8, CCP 6.3.2, CCB MIGRATE }

'''TS.C.7.2 Estimates of displacement from rapid-onset extreme events exist; however, the range of estimates is large as they largely depend on assumptions made about future emissions and socioeconomic development trajectories (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' . Uncertainties about socioeconomic development are reflected in the wide range of projected population displacements by 2050 in Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia due to climate change, ranging from 31 million to 143 million people ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' Projections of the number of people at risk of future displacement by sea level rise range from tens of millions to hundreds of millions by the end of this century, depending on the level of warmings and assumptions about exposure ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.9 URBAN) { 4.5.7, 7.3.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.2, 9.9.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.2] , CCB MIGRATE, CCB SLR, Figure AI.42 }

'''TS.C.7.3 As climate risk intensifies, the need for planned relocations will increase to support those who are unable to move voluntarily (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Planned relocation will be increasingly required as climate change undermines livelihoods, safety and overall habitability, especially for coastal areas and small islands ( ''medium confidence'' ). This will have implications for traditional livelihood practices, social cohesion and knowledge systems that have inherent value as intangible culture as well as introduce new risks for communities by amplifying existing and generating new vulnerabilities ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.6.8, 15.3.4, 14.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.3.5 CCP2.3.5] , CCB FEASIB, CCB MIGRATE }

<span id="human-vulnerability-1"></span>
=== Human vulnerability ===

<div id="h3-15-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.8 Under an inequality scenario (SSP4) by 2030, the number of people living in extreme poverty will increase by 122 million from currently around 700 million (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''). Future climate change may increase involuntary displacement, but severe impacts also undermine the capacity of households to use mobility as a coping strategy, causing high exposure to climate risks, with consequences for basic survival, health and well-being (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). The COVID-19 pandemic is expected to increase the adverse consequences of climate change since the financial consequences have led to a shift in priorities and constrain vulnerability reduction (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' { 7.3.2, 8.1.1, 8.3.2, 8.4.4, 8.4.5, 9.11.4, Box 9.8, 16, Table 16.9, CCB COVID, CCB ILLNESS, CCB MOVING SPECIES }

'''TS.C.8.1''' '''Even with current, moderate climate change, vulnerable people will experience a further erosion of livelihood security that can interact with humanitarian crises, such as displacement and involuntary migration (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''') and violence and armed conflict, and lead to social tipping points (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Under higher emissions scenarios and increasing climate hazards, the potential for societal risks also increases ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' Lessons from COVID-19 risk management have implications for managing urban climate change risk ( ''limited evidence, high agreement'' ). { 4.5.1, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.7, 4.5.8, 6.1.1, 6.3, 6.4, 8.2.1, 8.3, 8.4.4, 9.11.4 }

'''TS.C.8.2 Indigenous Peoples and local communities will experience changes in cultural opportunities (''' '''''low''''' '''to''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Cultural heritage is already being impacted by climate change and variability, for example in Africa, Small Island Developing States and the Arctic, where heritage sites are exposed to future climate change risk ( ''high confidence'' ). Coastal erosion and sea level rise are projected to affect natural and cultural coastal heritage sites spread across 36 African countries and all Arctic nations. Frequent drought episodes will lower groundwater tables and gradually expose highly valued archaeological sites to salt weathering and degradation. Coastal inundation and ocean acidification will intensify impacts on sacred sites, including burial grounds, and the corrosion of shipwrecks and underwater ruins. { 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, 3.5.6, 4.5.8, 9.12., 2.1.2, 11.4.1, 11.4.2, 13.8.1.3, 13.8.2, Box 13.2, 14.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2.7] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] }

'''TS.C.8.3 Climate change increases risks of violent conflict, primarily intrastate conflicts, by strengthening climate-sensitive drivers (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Climate change may produce severe risks to peace within this century through climate variability and extremes, especially in contexts marked by low economic development, high economic dependence on climate-sensitive activities, high or increasing social marginalisation and fragile governance ( ''medium confidence'' ). The largest impacts are expected in weather-sensitive communities with low resilience to climate extremes and high prevalence of underlying risk factors ( ''medium confidence'' ). Trajectories that prioritise economic growth, political rights and sustainability are associated with lower conflict risk ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 4.5.6, 7.3.3, 16.5.2 }

<span id="cities-settlements-and-infrastructure-1"></span>
=== Cities, settlements and infrastructure ===

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'''TS.C.9 Climate change increases risks for a larger number of growing cities and settlements across wider areas, especially in coastal and mountain regions, affecting an additional 2.5 billion people residing in cities mainly in Africa and Asia by 2050 (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). In all cities and urban areas, projected risks faced by people from climate-driven impacts has increased (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Many risks will not be felt evenly across cities and settlements or within cities. Communities in informal settlements will have higher exposure and lower capacity to adapt (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Most at risk are women and children who make up the majority populations of these settlements (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Risks to critical physical infrastructure in cities can be severe and pervasive under higher warming levels, potentially resulting in compound and cascading risks, and can disrupt livelihoods both within and across cities (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). In coastal cities and settlements, risks to people and infrastructure will get progressively worse in a changing climate, sea level rise and with ongoing coastal development (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' { 2.6.5, 6.1, 6.1.4, 6.2, 9.9.4, 16.5, 14.5.5, Box 14.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] }

'''TS.C.9.1 An additional 2.5 billion people are projected to live in urban areas by 2050, with up to 90% of this increase concentrated in the regions of Asia and Africa (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' By 2050, 64% and 60% of Asia’s and Africa’s population respectively will be urban. Growth is most pronounced in smaller and medium-sized urban settlements of up to one million people ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.5.4, 6.1, 6.1.4, 6.2, 9.9.1, 10.4.6 }

'''TS.C.9.2 Asian and African urban areas are considered high-risk locations from projected climate, extreme events, unplanned urbanisation and rapid land use change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' These could amplify pre-existing stresses related to poverty, informality, exclusion and governance, such as in African cities ( ''high confidence'' ). Climate change increases heat stress risks in cities ( ''high confidence'' ) and amplifies the urban heat island across Asian cities at 1.5°C and 2°C warming levels, both substantially larger than under present climates ( ''medium confidence'' ). Urban population exposure to extreme heat in Africa is projected to increase from 2 billion person-days per year in 1985–2005 to 45 billion person-days by the 2060s (1.7°C global warming with low population growth) and to 95 billion person-days (2.8°C global warming with medium-high population growth) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Risks driven by flooding and droughts will also increase in cities ( ''high confidence'' ). Urban populations exposed to severe droughts in West Africa will increase (65.3±34.1 million) at 1.5°C warming and increase further at 2°C ( ''medium confidence'' ). Urban land in flood zones and drylands exposed to high-frequency floods is expected to increase by as much as 2600% and 627% respectively across East, West and Central Africa by 2030. Higher risks from temperature and precipitation extremes are projected for almost all Asian cities under RCP8.5 ( ''medium confidence'' ), impacting on freshwater availability, regional food security, human health and industrial outputs. { 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.5.4, 6.1, 6.2, Table 6.3, Table 6.4, 9.9.4, 10.3.7, 10.4.6, 15.3.3, 15.3.4, 15.4.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2.7] , CWGB URBAN }

'''TS.C.9.3 Globally, urban key infrastructure systems are increasingly sites of risk creation that potentially drive compounding and cascading risks (''' '''''high confidence''''' ). Unplanned rapid urbanisation is a major driver of risk, particularly where increasing climate-driven risks affect key infrastructure and potentially result in compounding and cascading risks as cities expand into coastal and mountain regions prone to flooding or landslides that disrupt transportation networks, or where water and energy resources are inadequate to meet the needs of growing settlements ( ''high confidence'' ). These infrastructure risks expand beyond city boundaries; climate-related transport and energy infrastructure damage is projected to be a significant financial burden for African countries, reaching tens to hundreds of billions of US dollars under moderate and high emissions scenarios ( ''high confidence'' ). Projected changes in both the hydrological cycle and the cryosphere will threaten urban water infrastructure and resource management in most regions ( ''very high confidence'' ). South and Southeast Asian coastal cities can experience significant increases in average annual economic losses between 2005 and 2050 due to flooding, with very high losses in east Asian cities under RCP8.5 ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2050, permafrost thaw in the pan-Arctic is projected to impact 69% of infrastructure, more than 1200 settlements, 36,000 buildings, and 4 million people in Europe under RCP4.5. In small islands, degraded terrestrial ecosystems decrease resource provision (e.g., potable water) and amplify the vulnerability of island inhabitants ( ''high confidence'' ). Projections suggest that 350 million (± 158.8 million) more people in urban areas will be exposed to water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5°C warming and 410.7 million (± 213.5) at 2°C warming ( ''low confidence'' ). { 6.2.2, 9.9.4, 10.4.6, 13.6.1, 13.6.2, 13.11.3, 14.5.5, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , SMCCP2.1 }

'''TS.C.9.4 The characteristics of coastal cities and settlements means that climate-driven risks to people and infrastructure in many of them are already high and will get progressively worse over the 21st century and beyond''' ( '''''high confidence''''' ). These risks are driven by disproportionately high exposure of multiple assets, economic activities and large coastal populations concentrated in narrow coastal zones. Climate change risks, including sea level rise, interact in intricate ways with non-climatic drivers of coastal change, such as land subsidence, continued infrastructure development in coastal floodplains, the rise of asset values and landward development adversely impacting coastal ecosystems, to shape future risk in coastal settlements ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.9 URBAN) { 3.4.2, 6.2, 6.3, 7.4, 9.9.4, 10, 11.3.5, Box 11.4, 13.6.1, 14.5.5, Box 14.4, 15.3.4, 15.3.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.1 CCP7.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.3 CCP2.3] , CCB SLR }

<span id="economic-sectors-1"></span>
=== Economic sectors ===

<div id="h3-17-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.10 Across sectors and regions, market and non-market damage and adaptation costs will be lower at 1.5°C compared to 3°C or higher global warming levels (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Some recent estimates of projected global economic damage from climate impacts are higher than previous estimates and generally increase with global average temperature (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). However, the spread in the estimates of the magnitude of this damage is substantial and does not allow for robust range to be established (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Non-market, non-economic damage and adverse impacts on livelihoods will be concentrated in regions and populations that are already more vulnerable (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Socioeconomic drivers and more inclusive development will largely determine the extent of this damage (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' { 4.4.4, 4.7.5, 9.11.2, 10.4.6, 11.5.2, 13.10.2, 13.10.3, 14.5.8, Box 14.6, 16.5.2, 16.5.3 }

'''TS.C.10.1 Without limiting warming to 1.5°C global warming level, many key risks are projected to intensify rapidly in almost all regions of the world, causing damage to assets and infrastructure and losses to economic sectors and entailing high recovery and adaptation costs (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Severe risks are more likely in developing regions that are already hotter and in regions and communities with a large portion of the workforce employed in highly exposed industries (e.g., agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism, outdoor labour). In addition to market damage and disaster management costs, substantial costs of climate inaction are projected for human health ( ''high confidence'' ). At higher levels of warming, climate impacts will pose risks to financial and insurance markets, especially if climate risks are incompletely internalised ( ''medium confidence'' ), with adverse implications for the stability of markets ( ''low confidence'' ). While the overall economic consequences are clearly negative, opportunities may arise for a few economic sectors and regions, such as from longer growing seasons or reduced sea ice, primarily in northern latitudes ( ''medium'' to ''high confidence'' ). { 4.4.4, 4.7.5, 9.11.2, 10.4.6, 11.6, 13.9.2, 13.10.3, 14.5.4, 14.5.5, 14.5.7, 14.5.8, 14.5.9, Box 14.5, Box 14.6, 16.5.2, 16.5.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.2 CCP4.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2] , CCB INTEREG }

'''TS.C.10.2 Estimates of global economic damage generally increase non-linearity with warming and some are larger than previous estimates (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Some recent estimates have increased relative to the range reported in AR5, though there is low agreement and significant spread within and across methodology types (e.g., statistical, structural, meta-analysis), resulting in an inability to identify a best estimate or robust range ( ''high confidence'' ). Under high warming (&gt;4°C) and limited adaptation, the magnitude of decline in annual global GDP in 2100 relative to a non-global-warming scenario could exceed economic losses during the Great Recession in 2008–2009 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Much smaller effects are estimated for less warming, lower vulnerability and more adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ). Regional estimates of GDP damage vary ( ''high confidence'' ). Severe risks are more likely in (typically hotter) developing countries ( ''medium confidence'' ). For Africa, GDP damage is projected to be negative across models and approaches ( ''high confidence'' ). { 4.4.4, 4.7.5, 9.11.2, 10.4.6, 13.10.2, 13.10.3, 14.5.8, Box 14.6, 16.5.2, 16.6.3, CWGB ECONOMIC }

'''TS.C.10.3 Even at low levels of warming, climate change will disrupt the livelihoods of tens to hundreds of millions of additional people in regions with high exposure and vulnerability and low adaptation in climate-sensitive regions, ecosystems and economic sectors (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' If future climate change under high emissions scenarios continues and increases risks, without strong adaptation measures, losses and damage will likely be concentrated among the poorest vulnerable populations ( ''high confidence'' ). { 8.4.5, 9.11.4, Box 15.2, 16.5.3 }

'''TS.C.10.4 Potential socioeconomic futures, in terms of population, economic development and orientation towards growth, vary widely and these drivers have a large influence on the economic costs of climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Higher growth scenarios along higher warming levels increase exposure to hazards and assets at risk, such as sea level rise for coastal regions, which will have large implications for economic activities, including shipping and ports ( ''high confidence'' ). The high sensitivity of developing economies to climate impacts will pose increasing challenges to economic growth and performance, although projections depend as much or more on future socioeconomic development pathways and mitigation policies as on warming levels ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 9.11.2, 11.4, 13.2.1, 16.5.3, CCB SLR, CWGB ECONOMIC }

'''TS.C.10.5 Large non-market and non-economic losses are projected, especially at higher warming levels (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' This wide range of effects underscore the impact of climate change on welfare and the adverse effects on vulnerable populations ( ''medium confidence'' ). Including as many of these impacts in decision-making as possible, and as part of the social cost of carbon, will improve evaluation of the overall and distributional effects of climate mitigation and adaptation actions as well as in more comprehensively internalising climate impacts. { 1.5.1, 4.5.8, 4.7.5, 8.4.1, 8.4.5, Map 8.8, 16.5.2, Box 14.6, CWGB ECONOMIC }

<div id="Compound," class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="compound-cascading-and-transboundary-risks"></span>
=== Compound, cascading and transboundary risks ===

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'''TS.C.11 Compound, cascading risks and transboundary risks give rise to new and unexpected types of risks (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). They exacerbate existing stressors and constrain adaptation options (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''). They are projected to become major threats for many areas, such as coastal cities (''' '''''medium''''' '''to''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Some compound and cascading impacts occur locally, some spread across sectors and socioeconomic and natural systems, while others can be driven by events in other regions, for instance through trade and flows of commodities and goods through supply chain linkages (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 1.3.1, 2.3, 2.5.5, 6.2, 4.4, 4.5.1, 11.5.1, Box 11.1, 13.10.3, Figure 14.10, 14.5.4, 11.5.1, 11.6, Box 11.7, Figure Box 11.1.2, Table 11.14, Box 14.5, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2.5] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.3 CCP6.2.3] , CCB EXTREMES, CCB INTEREG }

'''TS.C.11.1 Escalating impacts of climate change on terrestrial, freshwater and marine life will further alter the biomass of animals (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''), the timing of seasonal ecological events (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''') and the geographic ranges of terrestrial, coastal and ocean taxa (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), disrupting life cycles (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''), food webs (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''') and ecological connectivity throughout the water column (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' For example, cascading effects on food webs have been reported in the Baltic due to detrimental oxygen levels ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.5 ECOSYSTEMS, Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.5.4, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 13.3.1, 13.4.1, 14.5.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] , WGI AR6 2.3.4 }

'''TS.C.11.2 Climate hazards cause multiple impacts, interacting to compound risks to food security, nutrition and human health (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Compound risks to health and food systems (especially in tropical regions) are projected from simultaneous reductions in food production across crops, livestock and fisheries ( ''high confidence'' ), heat-related loss of labour productivity in agriculture ( ''high confidence'' ), increased heat-related mortality ( ''high confidence'' ), contamination of seafood ( ''high confidence'' ), malnutrition ( ''high confidence'' ) and flooding from sea level rise ( ''high confidence'' ). Malnourished populations will increase through direct impacts on food production with cascading impacts on food prices and household incomes, reducing access to safe and nutritious food ( ''high confidence'' ). Food safety will be undermined from increased food contamination for seafood with marine toxins from harmful algal blooms and chemical contaminants, worsening health risks ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 4.5.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.3, 5.8.1, 5.8.3, 5.11.1, 5.12, Figure 5.2, 5.12.4, Box 5.10, 7.3.1, 9.10.2, 9.8.2, 9.8.3, 14.5.6, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.2.3 CCP5.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.3 CCP6.2.3] , CCB ILLNESS }

'''TS.C.11.3 Compound hazards increasing with global warming include increased frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), dangerous fire weather (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''') and floods (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''), resulting in increased and more complex risks to agriculture, water resources, human health, mortality, livelihoods, settlements and infrastructure.''' Extreme weather events result in cascading and compounding risks that affect health and are expected to increase with warming ( ''very high confidence'' ). Compound climate hazards can overwhelm adaptive capacity and substantially increase damage ( ''high confidence'' ); for example, heat and drought are projected to substantially reduce agricultural production, and although irrigation can reduce this risk, its feasibility is limited by drought. (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 4.2.5, 6.2.5, 7.1.3, 7.1.4,7.2.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, 7.4.1, 7.4.5, 11.5.1, 11.8.1, Box 11.1, 12.4, 13.3.1, 13.10.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.4 CCP5.4.6] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.4.3 CCP5.4.3] , CCP 6, CCB COVID, CCB EXTREMES, CCB HEALTH, WGI AR6 11.8 }

'''TS.C.11.4 Interacting climatic and non-climatic drivers when coupled with coastal development and urbanisation are projected to lead to losses for coastal ecosystems and their services under all scenarios in the near to mid-term (''' '''''medium to high confidence''''' ''').''' The compound impacts of warming, acidification and sea level rise are projected to lead to losses for coastal ecosystems ( ''medium to high confidence'' ). Fewer habitats, less biodiversity, lower coastal protection ( ''medium confidence'' ) and decreased food and water security will result ( ''medium confidence'' ), reducing the habitability of some small islands ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 2.3, 2.5.5, 3.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.5.5, 3.5.6, 3.6.3, 4.5.1, 5.13.6, 6.2, 6.2.6, 6.4.3, 11.3.2, 11.5.1, Box 11.6, 12.4, 12.5.2, 13.5.2, 13.10.2, Table 13.12, 15.3.3, 15.3.4, Box 15.5, 16.5.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.1 CCP1.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.4 CCP1.2.4] , Box [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.1 CCP1.1] , Table [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.1 CCP1.1] , Figure [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.1 CCP1.1] , Figure [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2 CCP1.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.2 CCP2.2] , CCP 2.2.5, CCB EXTREMES, CCB SLR }

'''TS.C.11.5 Observed human and economic losses have increased since AR5 for urban areas and human settlements arising from compound, cascading and systemic events (''' '''''medium evidence, high agreement''''' ''').''' Urban areas and their infrastructure are susceptible to both compounding and cascading risks arising from interactions between severe weather from climate change and increasing urbanisation ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Compound risks to key infrastructure in cities have increased from extreme weather ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Losses become systemic when they affect entire systems and can even jump from one system to another (e.g., drought impacting rural food production contributing to urban food insecurity) ( ''medium confidence'' ). (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 6.2.6, 6.2.7, 6.4.3, Figure 6.2, 11.5.1, Box 11.1, 13.9.2, 13.5.2, 13.10.2, 13.10.3, 14.6.3, CCP2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] , CWGB URBAN }

'''TS.C.11.6 Interconnectedness and globalisation establish pathways for the transmission of climate-related risks across sectors and borders, through trade, finance, food and ecosystems (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Flows of commodities and goods, as well as people, finance and innovation, can be driven or disrupted by distant climate change impacts on rural populations, transport networks and commodity speculation ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, Europe faces climate risks from outside the area due to global supply chain positioning and shared resources ( ''high confidence'' ). Climate risks in Europe also impact finance, food production and marine resources beyond Europe ( ''medium confidence'' ). (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 1.3.1, 5.13.3, 5.13.5, 6.2.4, 9.9, 13.9.2, 13.5.2, 13.9.2, 13.9.3, Box 14.5, CCB INTEREG, Figure CCB INTEREG.1 }

'''TS.C.11.7 Arctic communities and Indigenous Peoples face risks to economic activities (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''')''' '''as direct and cascading impacts of climate change continue to occur at a magnitude and pace unprecedented in recent history and much faster than projected for other regions (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Impacts and risks include reduced access to and productivity of future fisheries, regional and global food and nutritional security ( ''high confidence'' ), local livelihoods, health and well-being ( ''high confidence'' ) and loss to sociocultural assets, including heritage sites in all Arctic regions ( ''very high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { Box 7.1, 13.8.1, Box 13.2, Figure 13.14, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.1 CCP6.2.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.2 CCP6.2.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.3 CCP6.2.3] , CCP.6.2.4, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2.5 CCP6.2.5] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.3.1 CCP6.3.1] , Table [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.1 CCP6.1] , Table [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.2 CCP6.2] , Table CCP6.6 }

'''TS.C.11.8 Indigenous Peoples, traditional communities, smallholder farmers, urban poor, children and elderly in Amazonia are burdened by cascading impacts and risks from the compound effects of climate and land use change on forest fires in the region (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Deforestation, fires and urbanisation have increased the exposure of Indigenous Peoples to respiratory problems, air pollution and diseases ( ''high confidence'' ). Amazonian forest fires are transboundary and increase systemic losses of wild crops, infrastructure and livelihoods, requiring a landscape governance approach ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). (Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK) { 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 8.2.1, 8.4.5, Box 8.6, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.2.3 CCP7.2.3] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.3 CCP7.3] }

'''TS.C.11.9 Population groups in most vulnerable and exposed regions to compound and cascading risks have the most urgent need for improved adaptive capacity (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Regions characterised by compound challenges of high levels of poverty, a significant number of people without access to basic services, such as water and sanitation and wealth and gender inequalities, and governance challenges are among the most vulnerable regions and are particularly located in East, Central and West Africa, South Asia, Micronesia and Melanesia and in Central America ( ''high confidence'' ). { 8.3, 8.4, Box 8.6, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.3.2 CCP5.3.2] }

'''TS.C.11.10 Emergent risks arise from responses to climate change, including maladaptation and unintended side effects of mitigation, including in the case of afforestation and hydropower (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Solar radiation modification (SRM) approaches attempt to offset warming and ameliorate some climate risks but introduce a range of new risks to people and ecosystems, which are not well understood ( ''high confidence'' ). { 1.3.1, 3.6.3, 5.13.6, CWGB SRM }

<div id="Reasons" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="reasons-for-concern-rfc"></span>
=== Reasons for concern (RFC) ===

<div id="h3-19-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.12 More evidence now supports the five major RFCs about climate change, describing risks associated with unique and threatened systems (RFC1), extreme weather events (RFC2), distribution of impacts (RFC3), global aggregate impacts (RFC4) and large-scale singular events (RFC5) (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). (''' Figure TS.4, Table TS.1) { 16.6.3, Figure 16.15 }

'''TS.C.12.1 Compared to AR5 and SR15, risks increase to high and very high levels at lower global warming levels for all five RFCs (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), and transition ranges are assigned with greater confidence.''' Transitions from high to very high risk emerge in all five RFCs, compared to just two RFCs in AR5 ( ''high confidence'' ). As in previous assessments, levels of concern at a given level of warming remain higher for RFC1 than for other RFCs. (Table TS.1, TS.AII) { 16.6.3, Figure 16.15 }

'''TS.C.12.2 Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would ensure risk levels remain moderate for RFC3, RFC4 and RFC5 (''' '''''medium confidence''''' '''), but risk for RFC2 would have transitioned to a high risk at 1.5°C and RFC1 would be well into the transition to very high risk (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Remaining below 2°C warming (but above 1.5°C) would imply that risk for RFC3 through RFC5 would be transitioning to high, and risk for RFC1 and RFC2 would be transitioning to very high ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2.5°C warming, RFC1 will be at very high risk ( ''high confidence'' ), and all other RFCs will have begun their transitions to very high risk, with ''medium confidence'' for RFC2, RFC3 and RFC4, and ''low confidence'' for RFC5. (Table TS.1) { 16.6.3, Figure 16.15 }

'''TS.C.12.3 While the RFCs represent global risk levels for aggregated concerns about ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’, they represent a great diversity of risks, and in reality, there is not one single dangerous climate threshold across sectors and regions.''' RFC1, RFC2 and RFC5 include risks that are irreversible, such as species extinction, coral reef degradation, loss of cultural heritage or loss of a small island due to sea level rise. Once such risks materialise, the impacts would persist even if global temperatures subsequently declined to levels associated with lower levels of risk in an ‘overshooting’ scenario, for example where temperatures increase over ‘well below 2°C above pre-industrial’ for multi-decadal time spans before decreasing ( ''high confidence'' ). (Figure TS.4, see also TS.C.13) { 16.6.3, Figure 16.15 }

'''Table TS.1 |''' Updated assessment of risk level transitions for the five reasons for concern (RFC) { 16.6.3 }

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''RFC'''

! '''Example of impacts (not comprehensive)'''

! '''Updated risk level based on observed and modelled impacts'''

! '''Warming level'''

|-
| rowspan="2"| '''RFC1 Unique and threatened systems''' : ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by climate-related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive properties. Examples include coral reefs, the Arctic and its Indigenous Peoples, mountain glaciers and biodiversity hotspots.

| Coral bleaching, mass tree and animal mortalities, species extinction; decline in sea-ice dependent species, range shifts in multiple ecosystems

| In transition from moderate to high

| 1.1°C ( ''ve'' ''ry high confiden'' ''ce'' )

|-
| Further decline of coral reef (by 70–90% at 1.5°C) and Arctic sea-ice dependent ecosystems; insects projected to lose &gt;50% climatically determined geographic range 2°C; reduced habitability of small islands; increased endemic species extinction in biodiversity hotspots

| Projected to transition from high to very high risk

| 1.2°C–2.0°C ( ''high confidenc'' ''e'' )

|-
| rowspan="2"| '''RFC2 Extreme weather events''' : risks/impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets and ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heatwaves, heavy rain, drought and associated wildfires and coastal flooding.

| Increased heat-related human mortality, wildfires, agricultural and ecological droughts, water scarcity; short-term food shortages; impacts on food security and safety, price spikes; marine heatwaves estimated to double in frequency.

| In transition to high risk at present

| 1.0°C–1.5°C ( ''h'' ''igh confid'' ''ence'' )

|-
| Significant projected increases in fluvial flood frequency and resultant risks associated with higher populations; at least 1 d yr -1 with a heat index above 40.6°C for about 65% of megacities at 2.7°C and close to 80% at 4°C; soil moisture droughts 2–3 times longer; agricultural and ecological droughts more widespread; simultaneous crop failure across worldwide breadbasket regions; malnutrition and increasing risk of disease.

| Projected to transition to very high risk (new in AR6)

| 1.8°C–2.5°C ( ''me'' ''dium confidence'' )

|-
| rowspan="3"| '''RFC3 Distribution of impacts''' : risks/impacts that disproportionately affect particular groups, such as vulnerable societies and socio-ecological systems, including disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development, due to uneven distribution of physical climate change hazards, exposure or vulnerability.

| Increasing undernutrition, stunting and related childhood mortality, particularly in Africa and Asia and disproportionately affecting children and pregnant women; distributional impacts on crop production and water resources

| Current risk level is moderate

| 1.1°C ( ''h'' ''igh confidence'' )

|-
| Risk of simultaneous crop failure in maize estimated to increase from 6% to 40%; increasing flood risk in Asia, Africa, China, India and Bangladesh; high risks of mortality and morbidity due to heat extremes and infectious disease with regional disparities

| Projected to transition to high risk

| 1.5°C–2.0°C ( ''m'' ''edium confidence'' )

|-
| Much more negative impacts on food security in low to mid-latitudes; substantial regional disparity in risks to food production; food-related health projected to be negatively impacted by 2°C–3°C warming; heat-related morbidity and mortality, ozone-related mortality, malaria, dengue, Lyme disease and West Nile fever projected to increase regionally and globally

| Projected to transition to very high risk

| 2.0°C–3.5°C ( ''m'' ''edium confidence'' )

|-
| rowspan="3"| '''RFC4 Global aggregate impacts''' : impacts to socio-ecological systems that can be aggregated globally into a single metric, such as monetary damages, lives affected, species lost or ecosystem degradation at a global scale.

| Aggregate impacts on biodiversity with damages of global significance (e.g., drought, pine bark beetles, coral reef ecosystems); climate-sensitive livelihoods like agriculture, fisheries and forestry would be severely impacted

| In transition to moderate risk

| 1.1°C ( ''medium confidence'' )

|-
| Estimated 10% relative decrease in effective labour at 2°C; global exposure to multi-sector risks approximately doubles between 1.5°C and 2°C; global population exposed to flooding projected to rise by 24% at 1.5°C and by 30% at 2°C warning; reduced marine food provisioning, fishery distribution and revenue value with projected approximate 13% decline in ocean animal biomass.

| Projected to transition to high risk

| 1.5°C–2.5°C ( ''me'' ''dium confidence'' )

|-
| Widespread death of trees, damage to ecosystems and reduced provision of ecosystem services over temperature range 2.5°C–4.5°C; projected global annual damages associated with sea level rise of USD31,000 billion yr -1 in 2100 for 4°C warming scenario.

| Projected to transition to very high risk (new in AR6)

| 2.5°C–4.5°C ( ''lo'' ''w confidence'' )

|-
| rowspan="3"| '''RFC5 Large-scale singular events''' : relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems caused by global warming, such as ice sheet disintegration or thermohaline circulation slowing, sometimes called tipping points or critical thresholds.

| Mass loss from both Antarctic (whether associated with marine ice sheet instability or not) and Greenland ice sheets is more than seven times higher over the period 2010–2016 than over the period 1992–1999 for Greenland and four times higher for the same time intervals for Antarctica; in Amazon forest, increases in tree mortality and a decline in carbon sink are reported

| Current risk level is moderate

| 1.1°C ( ''high confidence'' )

|-
| Implications for 2000-year commitments to sea level rise from sustained mass loss from both ice sheets as projected by various ice sheet models, reaching 2.3–3.1 m at 1.5°C peak warming and 2–6 m at 2°C peak warming; risk of savannisation for Amazon alone was assessed to lie between 1.5°C and 3°C, with a median value at 2°C

| Projected to transition to high risk

| 1.5°C–2.5°C ( ''me'' ''dium confidence'' )

|-
| Uncertainties in projections of sea level rise at higher levels of warming, long-term equilibrium sea level rise of 5–25 m at mid-Pliocene temperatures of 2.5°C; potential for Amazon forest dieback between 4°C and 5°C; risk of ecosystem carbon loss from tipping points in tropical forest and loss of Arctic permafrost.

| Projected to transition to very high risk (new in AR6)

| 2.5°C–4°C ( ''l'' ''ow confidence'' )

|}

<div id="Temporary" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="temporary-overshoot"></span>
=== Temporary overshoot ===

<div id="h3-20-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

'''TS.C.13 Warming pathways that imply a temporary temperature increase over ‘well below 2°C above pre-industrial’ for multi-decadal time spans imply severe risks and irreversible impacts in many natural and human systems (e.g., glacier melt, loss of coral reefs, loss of human lives due to heat) even if the temperature goals are reached later (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' { 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 4.6.1 }

'''TS.C.13.1 Projected warming pathways may entail exceeding 1.5°C or 2°C around mid-century.''' Even if the Paris temperature goal is still reached by 2100, this ‘overshoot’ entails severe risks and irreversible impacts on many natural and human systems (e.g., glacier melt, loss of coral reefs, loss of human life due to heat) ( ''high confidence'' ). { 2.5, 3.4, 16.6, WGI AR6 SPM }

'''TS.C.13.2 Overshoot substantially increases risk of carbon stored in the biosphere being released into the atmosphere due to increases in processes such as wildfires, tree mortality, insect pest outbreaks, peatland drying and permafrost thaw (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' These phenomena exacerbate self-reinforcing feedbacks between emissions from high-carbon ecosystems (which currently store around 3030–4090 GtC) and increasing global temperatures. Complex interactions of climate change, land use change, carbon dioxide fluxes and vegetation changes, combined with insect outbreaks and other disturbances, will regulate the future carbon balance of the biosphere, processes incompletely represented in current Earth system models. The exact timing and magnitude of climate–biosphere feedbacks and potential tipping points of carbon loss are characterised by large uncertainty, but studies of feedbacks indicate increased ecosystem carbon losses can cause large future temperature increases ( ''medium confidence'' ). { 2.5.2, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, Table 2.4, Table 2.5, Table 2.S. 2, Table 2.S. 4, Table 5.4, Figure 5.29, WGI AR6 5.4 }

'''TS.C.13.3 Extinction of species is an irreversible impact of climate change whose risk increases sharply with rises in global temperature (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Even the lowest estimates of species extinctions (9% lost) are 1000 times the natural background rates ( ''medium confidence'' ). Projected species extinctions at future global warming levels are consistent with projections from AR4, but assessed on many more species with much greater geographic coverage and a broader range of climate models, giving higher confidence. (see also TS.C.1) { 2.5.1, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8, CCP1, CCB DEEP }

'''TS.C.13.4 Solar radiation modification (SRM) approaches have the potential to offset warming and ameliorate other climate hazards, but their potential to reduce risk or introduce novel risks to people and ecosystems is not well understood (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' SRM effects on climate hazards are highly dependent on deployment scenarios, and substantial residual climate change or overcompensating change would occur at regional scales and seasonal time scales ( ''high confidence'' ). Due in part to limited research, there is low confidence in projected benefits or risks to crop yields, economies, human health or ecosystems. Large negative impacts are projected from rapid warming for a sudden and sustained termination of SRM in a high-CO 2 scenario. SRM would not stop CO 2 from increasing in the atmosphere or reduce resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic emissions ( ''high confidence'' ). There is high agreement in the literature that for addressing climate change risks SRM is, at best, a supplement to achieving sustained net zero or net negative CO 2 emission levels globally. Co-evolution of SRM governance and research provides a chance for responsibly developing SRM technologies with broader public participation and political legitimacy, guarding against potential risks and harms relevant across a full range of scenarios. { CWGB SRM }

<div id="_idContainer017" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:a5d50f642fefd602ac6503c1e264c1d1 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_005a.png]] [[File:9dc20ff049fe9de8a43baa51b52eb6dd IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_005b.png]]

'''Figure TS.5 ECOSYSTEMS |''' '''(a)''' '''Left:''' '''Observed global and regional impacts on ecosystems and human systems attributed to climate change.''' C onfidence levels reflect uncertainty in attribution of the observed impact to climate change. For more details and line of sight to chapters and cross-chapter papers see Figure TS.3a, SMTS.1 and Table SMTS.1. '''Right:''' Observed species richness across latitude for three historical periods. { 3.4.3, Figure 3.18 } .

'''(b)''' '''Left:''' Global warming levels (GMST) modelled across the ranges of more than 30,000 marine and terrestrial species. '''Middle:''' Global warming levels (GSAT); change indicated by the proportion of species (modelled n=119,813 species globally) for which the climate is projected to become unsuitable across their current distributions. '''Right:''' Modelled 12,796 marine species globally. { 2.5.1, Figure 2.6, 3.4.3, Figure 3.18, Figure 3.20a, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.2.4 CCP1.2.4] , Figures AI.6, AI.15, AI.16 } .

'''(c)''' { 2.6.2, Table 2.6, 3.6.2, Figure 3.24 } .

'''(d)''' Some actions facilitate sustainable use but also increase space for nature. { 2.4 2, 2.6.2, 2.6.3, 2.6.5, 2.6.7, 2.6.8, 3.6.2, 3.6.5, Table 3.30, 5.6.3, Box 5.11, 9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.6.3, 9.6.4, 9.12 .3, 10.4.2, 10.4.3, 11.3.1, 11 .3.2, 11 .7.3, 12.5. 1, 12. 5.2, 12.5.9, 12.6.1, 13.3.2, 13.4.2, 13.5 .2, 13.10.2, 14.5.1, 14.5.2, Box 14.2, Box 14.7, 15.5.4, 15.3.3, Table 15 .6, 16.5.2, 16.6.3, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP1.3 CCP1.3] , CCP3. 2.2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP4.4.1 CCP4.4.1] , CCP5 .2.5, [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP5.4.1 CCP5.4.1] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP6.3.2 CCP6.3.2] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP7.5 CCP7.5] , CCP7 .5. 1, CCPBox7.1, Table CCP7 .3, CCB EXTREMES, CCB NATURAL }

<div id="_idContainer020" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:b6a58b97538b1a87dca8ee7995023be9 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_006a.png]] [[File:fcc87f3a1b35c55eb3c8c25d172b3ad9 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_006b.png]]

'''Figure TS.6 FOOD-WATER |''' '''(a)''' '''5''' '''.''' 4.1.1, Box 5.1, FAQ 5.1, SM5.1, Figure Al.20.

'''(b)''' Projected increase in the global share of area and population impacted from droughts. Changes are calculated based on the RCP6.0 concentration pathway for Terrestrial Water Storage (TWS) droughts, which can be considered to be a combination of agricultural, ecological and hydrological droughts. TWS is the sum of continental water stored in canopies, snow and ice, rivers, lakes and reservoirs, wetlands, soil and groundwater. { Figure 4.19; 4.4.5 } .

'''(c)''' Projected impacts are for RCP4.5 mid 21st century, taking into account adaptation and CO 2 fertilisation for the crop yield productivity { 4.3.1, 4.2.7, 4.5.1, Figure 4.2, 5.5.3, 5.4.1, Figure 5.3, Figure 9.22, 15.3.3, 15.3.4 } .

'''(d)''' Projections used five CMIP5 climate models, three global hydrological models from ISIMIP, and three Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). { Box 4.1, Figure Box 4.1.1, Figure AI.48 } . '''(e)''' { 4.6.2, Figure 4.29, Figure 4.28, SM4.7, SM4.8, 5.5.4, 5.6.3 } .

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[[File:59580c19cd3f16fd4ba421266b6d65e1 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_TS_007a.png]]

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'''Figure TS.7 VULNERABILITY |''' '''(a)''' '''The global map of vulnerability is based on two comprehensive global indicator systems, namely INFORM Risk Index and WorldRiskIndex (2019).''' Climate change hazards and exposure levels are not included in this figure. The relative level of average national vulnerability is shown by the colours. Vulnerability values are based on the average of the two indices, classified into 5 classes using the quantile method. A hexagon binning method was used to simplify the global map and enlarge small states. The map combines information about the level of vulnerability (independent of the population size) with two classes of population density (high density ≥ 20 people/km2 and low density &lt; 20 people/km 2 ). The selected examples of local vulnerable populations underscore that there are also highly vulnerable populations in countries with overall low relative vulnerability { 8.3.2, Figure 8.6 }

'''(b)''' This figure shows regional averages for selected aspects of human vulnerability. The indicators are a selection of the indicator systems used within the global vulnerability map (panel a). The colours represent the average value of the respective indicator for the regional level; classified into three classes using natural breaks. This regional information reveals that within all regions challenges exist in terms of different aspects of vulnerability, however, in some regions these challenges are more severe and accumulate in multiple-dimensions. For example, the indicator “dependency ratio” measures the ratio of the number of children (0–14 years old) and older persons (65 years or over) to the working-age population (15–64 years old). { 8.3.2, Figure 8.7 }

'''(c)''' The pie charts show the number of deaths (mortality) per hazard (storm, flood, drought, heatwaves and wildfires) event per continental region based on Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2020). The size of the pie chart represents the average mortality per hazard event while slices of each pie chart show the absolute number of deaths from each hazard. This reveals that significantly more fatalities per hazard (storms, floods, droughts, heatwaves and wildfires) did occur in the past decade in more vulnerable regions, e.g. Africa and Asia. { Figure 8.6 }

'''(d)''' The figure shows constraints that make it harder to plan and implement human adaptation. Across regions and sectors, the most significant challenges to human adaptation are financial, governance, institutional and policy constraints. The ability of actors to overcome these socio-economic constraints largely influences whether additional adaptation is able to be implemented and prevent limits to adaptation from being reached. Low: &lt;20% of assessed literature identifies this constraint; Medium: 20–40% of assessed literature identifies this constraint; High: &gt;40% of assessed literature identifies this constraint. { 9.3, 16.4.3, Figure 16.8 }

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'''Figure TS.8 HEALTH |''' '''Multiple socio-economic and environmental factors interact with climate risks to shape human health and well-being.''' Achieving climate resilient development requires leveraging opportunities in the solution space within health systems and across other sectors. { 7.1.4, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 7.2.5, 7.2.6, 7.2.7, 7.3.1, 7.3.3, 7.4.1, 7.4.2, 7.4.3, 7.4.6, 7.4.7, Box 7.1, Box 7.2, Figure 7.6, Figure 7.7, Figure 7.16, Table 7.1,Table 7.3, Table 7.6, Table 7.7, Table 7.8, Table 7.10, Table 7.11, CCB COVID, CCB HEALTH, CCB MIGRATE }

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'''Figure TS.9 URBAN |''' '''(a)''' The regions shown are reflecting the original dataset from UN Habitat and vary from IPCC regions. (6.1.4, 9.9.3, 10.4.6, 12.5.5)

'''(b)''' Heat is a growing health risk due to increasing urbanization and rising temperature extremes. Within cities the urban heat island effect elevates temperatures further, with some populations in cities being disproportionately at risk including low income communities in informal settlements, children, the elderly, disabled, people who work outdoors and ethnic minorities. The data does not consider heatwaves which are also projected to increase and can cause thousands of deaths in higher latitudes. { 6.1.4, 7.2.4, 7.3.1, 10.4.6, 13.6.1, Annex I: Global to Regional Atlas }

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'''(c)''' The size of the circle represents the number of people at risk per IPCC region and the colours show the timing of risk based on projected population change and sea level rise under SSP2-4.5. Darker colours indicate earlier in setting risks. The left side of the circles shows absolute projected population at risk and the right side the share of the population in percentage. (Figure 13.6, Figure 15.3, Figure [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapter/ts#CCP2.4 CCP2.4] , Annex I: Global to Regional Atlas).

'''(d)''' The figure is based on Table 6.6 which is an assessment of 21 urban adaptation mechanisms. Supplementary Material 6.3 provides a detailed analysis including definitions for each component of climate resilient development and the evidences. { 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, Table 6.6, SM6.3 }

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'''Figure TS.10 COMPLEX RISK |''' '''Compound, cascading and transboundary impacts for humans and ecosystems result from exposure to the complex interactions of (1) multiple climatic hazards, including with non-climatic stressors (as seen in panels a, b, c, d), (2) multiple vulnerabilities compounding the effect of risks (as seen in panel a, b, c), and (3) multiple impacts/risks that compound and cascade to spread across sectors and boundaries (panels b, c, d, e, f)'''

'''(a)''' Climate and land use change result in cumulative impacts on traditional, semi-nomadic Sámi reindeer herding. Impacts cascade due to a lack of access to key ecosystems, lakes and rivers, thereby increasing costs and threatening traditional livelihoods, food security, cultural heritage, and mental health. { Box 7.1, Figure Box 9.7.1, 13.8.1.2, Box 13.2, Figure 13.14. Table SM13.7, Figure 16.2, Figure CCP6.7 }

'''(b)''' Risks compound from deforestation, wildfires, urbanization, and climate change in Amazonia impacts biodiversity, livelihoods, medicinal, spiritual, and cultural sites; increasing migration patterns, loss of place-based attachments, and culture, causing health problems and mental and emotional distress of vulnerable traditional communities and Indigenous People dependent on the forest ecosystem. { Box 8.7, Figure Box 9.7.1, 12.4, Figure 12.11, Table 12.6, Figure 16.2 }

'''(c)''' Complex pathways from climate hazards to malnutrition in subsistence farming households. The factors involved in and the probable impacts of weather variables on food yields and of production on malnutrition. { Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.12.3, 5.12.4, Box 5.10, Figure 5.2, 7.2.2, 7.3.1, Figure Box 9.7.1, 13.5.1, 13.5.2, 13.10.2, 16.5.2, 16.5.3, Figure 16.2 }

'''(d)''' Risk compounds and amplifies through cascading effects due to interconnectedness of island systems. Loss of marine, coastal, terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services can cause submergence of reef islands, increase water insecurity, destroy settlements and infrastructure, degrade health and well-being, reduce economy and livelihoods, and result in loss of cultural resources and heritage. { 15.3.4.9, Figure Box 15.1, Figure 15.5, Figure 16.2 }

'''(e)''' Climate impacts can cascade through interconnected infrastructure in cities and settlements impacting on social well-being and economic activities, spreading loss and risk through lost economic productivity disrupting the distribution of goods and provision of basic services, spreading widely, into rural places and across international borders as supply chains, financial investment and remittance flows are disrupted. { 6.1.3, 6.2.2, 6.2.4, Figure 6.2, Figure 16.2, Figure CCB INTEREG.1 }

'''(f)''' Cascading, compounding and transboundary impacts on people’s mortality and physical and mental health, economic activity, built assets, ecosystems and mass species mortality and with smoke and ash transported to New Zealand affecting air quality and glaciers, arising from the “Black Summer” fires of 2019–2020 which burned over a five-month period in eastern and southern Australia. Fire weather is projected to worsen across Australasia. { Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4, 11.3.1.3, Box 11.1, Figure Box 11.1.2, Figure 16.2, WGI AR6 Figure SPM.9 }

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