Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.2.4 Institution Building at the Sub-national Level ===

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Jurisdiction over significant mitigation-related arenas like planning, housing and community development reside at the sub-national level. To address linkages between mitigation and local concerns, sub-national actors engage in institution building within a broader socio-economic and political context, with actors and institutions at a multitude of scales shaping the effectiveness of sub-national-scale interventions ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ). Mitigation policies may demand coordination between sectoral and jurisdictional units that historically have not collaborated; they may require sub-national actors to confront politically sensitive issues such as carbon taxes or increases in utility rates; and they may demand a redistribution of resources to protect endangered ecosystems or vulnerable populations ( [[#Hughes--2014|Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014]] ).

Sub-national actors have built climate institutions by creating new visions and narratives, by setting new entities or committing existing offices, providing them with funds, staff and legal authority, or by experimenting with innovative solutions that could be transferred to other local governments or scaled nationally ( [[#Hoffmann--2011|Hoffmann 2011]] ; [[#Hoornweg--2011|Hoornweg et al. 2011]] ; [[#Aylett--2015|Aylett 2015]] ; [[#Hughes--2014|Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ). These actors have also created task forces, referendums, coordination of financial and human resources, technical assistance, awareness campaigns and funding ( [[#Castán%20Broto--2017|Castán Broto 2017]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ). National governments can play a key role supporting planning for climate change at the regional and national level, for example, through the articulation of climate change action in national urban politics ( [[#Van%20Den%20Berg--2018|Van Den Berg et al. 2018]] ; [[#Cobbinah--2019|Cobbinah et al. 2019]] ).

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==== 13.2.4.1 Significance of Sub-national Networks ====

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Multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral sub-national networks in dozens of countries globally have helped build climate institutions. They have also facilitated social and institutional learning, and addressed gaps in national policy ( [[#Holden--2015|Holden and Larsen 2015]] ; [[#Jordan--2015|Jordan et al. 2015]] ; [[#Setzer--2015|Setzer 2015]] ; [[#Haarstad--2016|Haarstad 2016]] ; [[#Hermwille--2018|Hermwille 2018]] ; [[#Kammerer--2018|Kammerer and Namhata 2018]] ; [[#Rashidi--2018|Rashidi and Patt 2018]] ; [[#Westman--2018|Westman and Castan Broto 2018]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee and Jung 2018]] ; [[#Lee--2019|Lee 2019]] ; [[#Schwartz--2019|Schwartz 2019]] ).

Transnational networks have opened opportunities for sub-national actors to play a crucial mitigation role in political stalemates ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones 2014]] ; [[#Schwartz--2019|Schwartz 2019]] ). The C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, and ICLEI have disseminated information on best practices and promoted knowledge sharing between sub-national governments ( [[#Lee--2013|Lee 2013]] ; [[#Hakelberg--2014|Hakelberg 2014]] ; [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al. 2016]] ; [[#Kona--2016|Kona et al. 2016]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2020|Di Gregorio et al. 2020]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.5.5|Section 14.5.5]] ). Organisations such as the US Carbon Cycle Working Group of the United States Global Change Research Program, the Australian Climate Action Network, and the Mexican Metropolitan Environmental Commission have helped facilitate coordination and learning across multiple jurisdictions and sectors, and connected ambiguous spaces between public, private and civil society actors ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Horne--2019|Horne and Moloney 2019]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ).

Transnational networks have limited influence on climate policies where national governments exert top-down control (e.g., in the city of Rizhao, China) ( [[#Westman--2019|Westman et al. 2019]] ); where sub-national actors face political fragmentation, lack regulations, and financial and human resources; or where vertically-integrated governance exists, as in State of São Paulo, Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Setzer--2017|Setzer 2017]] ).

Public support for sub-national climate institutions increases when climate policies are linked to local issues such as travel congestion alleviation or air pollution control (Puppim de Oliveira 2013; [[#Romero-Lankao--2013|Romero-Lankao et al. 2013]] ; [[#Simon%20Rosenthal--2015|Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ), or when embedded in development priorities that receive support from the national government or citizens (Jörgensen et al. 2015b; [[#Floater--2016|Floater et al. 2016]] ; [[#Dubash--2018|Dubash et al. 2018]] ). For example, Indian cities have engaged in international climate cooperation seeking innovative solutions to address energy, water and infrastructure problems (Beermann et al. 2016).

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==== 13.2.4.2 Factors Influencing Institution Building at the Sub-national Level ====

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Availability of federal funding is a fundamental pillar of city actors’ capacity to develop mitigation policies. Administrative structures, such as the presence of a professional city manager and staff assigned specifically to climate efforts ( [[#Simon%20Rosenthal--2015|Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015]] ). Cooperation between administrative departments, and the creation of knowledge and data on energy use and emissions are also essential for mitigation planning ( [[#Hughes--2014|Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ). For example, the high technical competency of Tokyo’s bureaucracy combined with availability of historical and current data enabled the city’s unique cap-and-trade system on large building facilities ( [[#Roppongi--2017|Roppongi et al. 2017]] ).

Visions and narratives about the future benefits or risks of climate change are often effectively advanced at the sub-national level, drawing on local governmental abilities to bring together actors involved in place-based decarbonisation across sectors ( [[#Hodson--2009|Hodson and Marvin 2009]] ; [[#Bush--2016|Bush et al. 2016]] ; [[#Huang--2018|Huang et al. 2018]] ; [[#Prendeville--2018|Prendeville et al. 2018]] ; [[#Levenda--2019|Levenda et al. 2019]] ). For example, in the plans of 43 C40 Cities, climate action is framed as part of a vision for vibrant, economically prosperous, and socially just cities, that are habitable, secure, resource-efficient, socially and economically inclusive, and competitive internationally ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2019|Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019]] ).

However, institution building is often constrained by a lack of national support, funding, human resources, coalitions, coordination across old and new organisations, and the ability to create new institutional competences ( [[#Valenzuela--2014|Valenzuela 2014]] ; [[#Jörgensen--2015a|Jörgensen et al. 2015a]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ; [[#Dubash--2018|Dubash et al. 2018]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ; [[#Anderton--2018|Anderton and Setzer 2018]] ; [[#Cointe--2019|Cointe 2019]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2019|Di Gregorio et al. 2019]] ; [[#Jaccard--2019|Jaccard et al. 2019]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ). Climate mitigation can also be limited by cultural norms and values of policy actors with varying levels of power, and shifting alliances ( [[#Lachapelle--2012|Lachapelle et al. 2012]] ; [[#Damsø--2016|Damsø et al. 2016]] ; [[#Giampieri--2019|Giampieri et al. 2019]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ).

Institution building is constrained by inequities; resources, legal remit, knowledge, and political clout vary widely within and among sub-national governments globally ( [[#Jörgensen--2015b|Jörgensen et al. 2015b]] ; [[#Genus--2016|Genus and Theobald 2016]] ; [[#Joffe--2016|Joffe and Smith 2016]] ; [[#Klinsky--2018|Klinsky 2018]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Markkanen--2019|Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019]] ). Dominant discourses tend to prioritise scientific and technical expertise and, thus, they focus on infrastructural and economic concerns over the concerns and needs of disadvantaged populations ( [[#Heikkinen--2019|Heikkinen et al. 2019]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2019|Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019]] ).

In addition, expert driven, technical solutions such as infrastructural interventions can undermine the knowledge of lower income countries, communities or indigenous knowledge holders, yet are often used by sub-national governments ( [[#Ford--2016|Ford et al. 2016]] ; [[#Brattland--2018|Brattland and Mustonen 2018]] ; [[#Nagorny-Koring--2019|Nagorny-Koring 2019]] ; [[#Whyte--2017|Whyte 2017]] , 2020). Technical solutions, such as electric vehicles or smart grids rarely address the needs and capabilities of disadvantaged communities that may not be able to afford these technologies ( [[#Mistry--2014|Mistry 2014]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2021|Romero-Lankao and Nobler 2021]] ). However, mitigation strategies in sectors such as transport and buildings have often focused on technical and market outcomes, the benefits of which are limited to some, while others experience negative externalities or face health risks ( [[#Markard--2018|Markard 2018]] ; [[#Williams--2019|Williams and Doyon 2019]] ; [[#Carley--2020|Carley and Konisky 2020]] ). Delivering climate justice requires community-driven approaches to understanding the problem addressing structural inequities and fostering justice, while reducing carbon emissions ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2018b|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018b]] ; [[#Carley--2020|Carley and Konisky 2020]] ; [[#Lewis--2020|Lewis et al. 2020]] ).

To address this situation requires procedural justice that involves all communities, particularly disadvantaged, in climate mitigation decisions and policies (Box 13.4). Also essential is recognition justice, that addresses past inequities through tools such as subsidies, tariffs, rebates, and other policies ( [[#Agyeman--2013|Agyeman 2013]] ; [[#Rydin--2013|Rydin 2013]] ; [[#UN%20Habitat--2016|UN Habitat 2016]] ). Both tenets are key to ensure the fair distribution of benefits or negative impacts from mitigation policies (distributional justice) ( [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ; [[#Lewis--2020|Lewis et al. 2020]] ). However, the benefits of inclusive approaches are often overlooked in favour of growth oriented mitigation and planning ( [[#Rydin--2013|Rydin 2013]] ; [[#Altenburg--2011|Altenburg 2011]] ; [[#Smith--2019|Smith 2019]] ; [[#Lennon--2020|Lennon 2020]] ). Box 13.6 discusses how the city of Durban has internalised climate change with attention to considerations of justice.

Moreover, deep mitigation requires moving beyond existing technological responses ( [[#Mulugetta--2018|Mulugetta and Castán Broto 2018]] ) to policies that correspond to the realities of developing countries ( [[#Bouteligier--2013|Bouteligier 2013]] ).However, best practice approaches tend to be fragmented due to the requirements of different contexts, and often executed as pilot projects that rarely lead to structural change ( [[#Nagorny-Koring--2019|Nagorny-Koring 2019]] ). Instead, context-specific approaches that include consideration of values, cultures and governance better enable successful translation of best practices ( [[#Affolderbach--2016|Affolderbach and Schulz 2016]] ; [[#Urpelainen--2018|Urpelainen 2018]] ).

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