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=== 14.3.4 Factors Influencing Perceptions of Climate-Change Risks and Adaptation Action === <div id="h2-7-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Projected climate-change risk, urgency and necessary adaptations are perceived and understood differently by the public, communities, professional groups, climate scientists and public policy makers ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Bolsen--2015|Bolsen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Drews--2016|Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016]] ; [[#Morton--2017|Morton et al., 2017]] ; [[#Treuer--2018|Treuer et al., 2018]] ). People can engage with climate change across three dimensions: cognitive (knowledge), affective (feelings) and behavioural (responses and actions) ( [[#Galway--2019|Galway, 2019]] ; [[#Brosch--2021|Brosch, 2021]] ). Risk assessment can be influenced by values regarding the subject under evaluation ( [[#Allison--2015|Allison and Bassett, 2015]] ; [[#Stevenson--2015|Stevenson et al., 2015]] ) and can interact with other risks and change over time ( [[#Mach--2016|Mach et al., 2016]] ). Communities and practitioners (e.g., farmers, foresters, water managers) are influenced in their willingness to modify current practices and adopt new measures based on how they perceive, understand and experience climate-change uncertainty, risk and urgency as well as political and social norms ( [[#van%20Putten--2015|van Putten et al., 2015]] ; [[#Doll--2017|Doll et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mase--2017|Mase et al., 2017]] ; [[#Morton--2017|Morton et al., 2017]] ; [[#Zanocco--2018|Zanocco et al., 2018]] ) ''.'' Place-based and local-focused assessments allow individuals to more readily assess and adapt to risks as well as identify roles and responsibilities in the face of multiple, interacting and often unequally distributed climate-change impacts ( [[#Khan--2018|Khan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Galway--2019|Galway, 2019]] ). Interest in preserving local archaeological sites threatened by SLR initiated collaboration and co-production of knowledge among disparate US communities: citizens, archaeologists, preservationists, planners, land managers and Indigenous Peoples ( [[#Fatorić--2019|Fatorić and Seekamp, 2019]] ; [[#Dawson--2020|Dawson et al., 2020]] ). Psychological distancing–the perception that the greatest impacts occur sometime in the distant future and to people and places far away–can lead to discounting of risk and the need for adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Leviston--2014|Leviston et al., 2014]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger et al., 2019]] ). Communication directed at local and personal framing of climate-change impact and risk information is one option for addressing low salience ( [[#Bolsen--2019|Bolsen et al., 2019]] ) particularly related to established risks such as SLR, flooding and wildfires in North America ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger et al., 2019]] ). ‘Personalised’ risk communications have had mixed results creating behavioural change and policy support, and even caused resistance ( [[#Schoenefeld--2016|Schoenefeld and McCauley, 2016]] ). Communication focused extensively on risks and dangers of climate change can produce fear or dread, lessen agency and create fatalism that hinders action ( [[#Giddens--2015|Giddens, 2015]] ; [[#Mayer--2019|Mayer and Smith, 2019]] ); it also can be labelled alarmist ( [[#Leiserowitz--2005|Leiserowitz, 2005]] ). Detailed SLR flooding maps for the San Francisco Bay area did not increase climate risk assessment but lessened personal risk perception of those with a strong belief in climate change, although policy preferences and support for adaptation did not change ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger et al., 2019]] ). Defining coherent groups based on variations in beliefs, risk perceptions and policy preferences offers opportunities for effectively engaging with segments of the population instead of using the same approach for everyone ( ''low confidence'' ) ( [[#Maibach--2011|Maibach et al., 2011]] ; [[#Chryst--2018|Chryst et al., 2018]] ). As an example, the US population was segmented into a continuum ranging from the ‘Alarmed’, the dominant group who were ‘Concerned’, then the Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and least prevalent, the Dismissive ( [[#Chryst--2018|Chryst et al., 2018]] ). <div id="14.4" class="h1-container"></div> <span id="indigenous-peoples-and-climate-change"></span>
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