Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

==== 13.2.4.1 Significance of Sub-national Networks ====

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Multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral sub-national networks in dozens of countries globally have helped build climate institutions. They have also facilitated social and institutional learning, and addressed gaps in national policy ( [[#Holden--2015|Holden and Larsen 2015]] ; [[#Jordan--2015|Jordan et al. 2015]] ; [[#Setzer--2015|Setzer 2015]] ; [[#Haarstad--2016|Haarstad 2016]] ; [[#Hermwille--2018|Hermwille 2018]] ; [[#Kammerer--2018|Kammerer and Namhata 2018]] ; [[#Rashidi--2018|Rashidi and Patt 2018]] ; [[#Westman--2018|Westman and Castan Broto 2018]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee and Jung 2018]] ; [[#Lee--2019|Lee 2019]] ; [[#Schwartz--2019|Schwartz 2019]] ).

Transnational networks have opened opportunities for sub-national actors to play a crucial mitigation role in political stalemates ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones 2014]] ; [[#Schwartz--2019|Schwartz 2019]] ). The C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, and ICLEI have disseminated information on best practices and promoted knowledge sharing between sub-national governments ( [[#Lee--2013|Lee 2013]] ; [[#Hakelberg--2014|Hakelberg 2014]] ; [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al. 2016]] ; [[#Kona--2016|Kona et al. 2016]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2020|Di Gregorio et al. 2020]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.5.5|Section 14.5.5]] ). Organisations such as the US Carbon Cycle Working Group of the United States Global Change Research Program, the Australian Climate Action Network, and the Mexican Metropolitan Environmental Commission have helped facilitate coordination and learning across multiple jurisdictions and sectors, and connected ambiguous spaces between public, private and civil society actors ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Horne--2019|Horne and Moloney 2019]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ).

Transnational networks have limited influence on climate policies where national governments exert top-down control (e.g., in the city of Rizhao, China) ( [[#Westman--2019|Westman et al. 2019]] ); where sub-national actors face political fragmentation, lack regulations, and financial and human resources; or where vertically-integrated governance exists, as in State of São Paulo, Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Setzer--2017|Setzer 2017]] ).

Public support for sub-national climate institutions increases when climate policies are linked to local issues such as travel congestion alleviation or air pollution control (Puppim de Oliveira 2013; [[#Romero-Lankao--2013|Romero-Lankao et al. 2013]] ; [[#Simon%20Rosenthal--2015|Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ), or when embedded in development priorities that receive support from the national government or citizens (Jörgensen et al. 2015b; [[#Floater--2016|Floater et al. 2016]] ; [[#Dubash--2018|Dubash et al. 2018]] ). For example, Indian cities have engaged in international climate cooperation seeking innovative solutions to address energy, water and infrastructure problems (Beermann et al. 2016).

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