Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-14 (section)

==== 14.3.1.2 Negotiating Context and Dynamics ====

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The 2015 Paris Agreement was negotiated in a starkly different geopolitical context to that of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol ( [[#Streck--2013|Streck and Terhalle 2013]] ; [[#Ciplet--2015|Ciplet et al. 2015]] ). The ‘rupturing binary balance of superpowers’ of the 1980s had given way to a multipolar world with several distinctive trends: emerging economies began challenging US dominance ( [[#Ciplet--2015|Ciplet et al. 2015]] ); industrialised countries’ emissions peaked in the 2010s and started declining, while emissions from emerging economies began to grow ( [[#Falkner--2019|Falkner 2019]] ); the EU stretched eastwards and became increasingly supra-national ( [[#Kinley--2020|Kinley et al. 2020]] ); disparities within the group of developing countries increased ( [[#Ciplet--2015|Ciplet et al. 2015]] ); and the role of non-state actors in mitigation efforts has grown more salient (Bäckstrand et al. 2017; [[#Kuyper--2018b|Kuyper et al. 2018b]] ; [[#Falkner--2019|Falkner 2019]] ). The rise of emerging powers, many of whom now have ‘veto power’, however, some noted, did not detract from the unequal development and inequality at the heart of global environmental politics ( [[#Hurrell--2012|Hurrell and Sengupta 2012]] ).

In this altered context, unlike in the 1990s when the main cleavages were between the EU and the US ( [[#Hurrell--2012|Hurrell and Sengupta 2012]] ), US–China ‘great power politics’ came to be seen as determinative of outcomes in the climate change negotiations ( [[#Terhalle--2013|Terhalle and Depledge 2013]] ). The US–China joint announcement (Whitehouse 2014), for instance, before the 2014 Lima climate conference, brokered the deal on differentiation that came to be embodied in the Paris Agreement ( [[#Rajamani--2016a|Rajamani 2016a]] ; [[#Ciplet--2017|Ciplet and]] [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts 2017]] ). Others have identified, on the basis of economic standing, political influence, and emissions levels, three influential groups – the first comprising the USA with Japan, Canada, and Russia, the second comprising the EU and the third comprising China, India and Brazil ( [[#Brenton--2013|Brenton 2013]] ). The emergence of the Major Economies Fora, among other climate clubs (discussed in [[#14.2.2|Section 14.2.2]] ) reflects this development ( [[#Brenton--2013|Brenton 2013]] ). It also represents a ‘minilateral’ forum, built on a recognition of power asymmetries, in which negotiating compromises are politically tested and fed into multilateral processes ( [[#Falkner--2016a|Falkner 2016a]] ).

Beyond these countries, in the decade leading up to the Paris climate negotiations, increasing differences within the group of developing countries divided the 134-strong developing country alliance of the G77/China into several interest-based coalitions ( [[#Vihma--2011|Vihma et al. 2011]] ; [[#Bodansky--2017b|Bodansky et al. 2017b]] ). A division emerged between the vulnerable least developed and small island states on the one side and rapidly developing economies, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) on the other, as the latter are ‘decidedly not developed but not wholly developing’ ( [[#Hochstetler--2013|Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013]] ). This fissure in part led to the High Ambition Coalition in Paris between vulnerable countries and the more progressive industrialised countries ( [[#Ciplet--2017|Ciplet and]] [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts 2017]] ). A division also emerged between the BASIC countries ( [[#Hurrell--2012|Hurrell and Sengupta 2012]] ), that each have distinctive identities and positions ( [[#Hochstetler--2013|Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013]] ). In the lead up to the Paris negotiations, China and India formed the Like-Minded Developing Countries with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) countries, to resist the erosion of differentiation in the regime. Yet, the ‘complex and competing’ identities of India and China, with differing capacities, challenges and self-images, have also influenced the negotiations ( [[#Ciplet--2017|Ciplet and]] [[#Roberts--2017|Roberts 2017]] ; [[#Rajamani--2017|Rajamani 2017]] ). Other developing countries’ coalitions also played an important role in striking the final deal in Paris. The Alliance of Small Island States, despite their lack of structural power, played a leading role, in particular in relation to the inclusion of the 1.5°C long-term temperature goal in the UN climate regime (Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014; [[#Ourbak--2018|Ourbak and Magnan 2018]] ). The Association of the Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) that emerged in 2012 also played a decisive role in fostering ambition ( [[#Edwards--2017|Edwards et al. 2017]] ; [[#Watts--2018|Watts and Depledge 2018]] ).

Leadership is essential to reaching international agreements and overcoming collective action problems ( [[#Parker--2015|Parker et al. 2015]] ). The Paris negotiations were faced, as a reflection of the multipolarity that had emerged, with a ‘fragmented leadership landscape’ with the USA, EU, and China being perceived as leaders at different points in time and to varying degrees ( [[#Karlsson--2012|Karlsson et al. 2012]] ; [[#Parker--2014|Parker et al. 2014]] ). Small island states are also credited with demonstrating ‘moral leadership’ (Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014), and non-state and sub-national actors are beginning to be recognised as pioneers and leaders ( [[#Wurzel--2019|Wurzel et al. 2019]] ). There is also a burgeoning literature on the emergence of diffused leadership and the salience of followers ( [[#Parker--2014|Parker et al. 2014]] ; [[#Busby--2020|Busby and Urpelainen 2020]] ).

It is in the context of this complex, multipolar and highly differentiated world – with a heterogeneity of interests, constraints and capacities, increased contestations over shares of the carbon and development space, as well as diffused leadership – that the Paris Agreement was negotiated. This context fundamentally influenced the shape of the Paris Agreement, in particular on issues relating to its architecture, ‘legalisation’ ( [[#Karlas--2017|Karlas 2017]] ) and differentiation ( [[#Bodansky--2017b|Bodansky et al. 2017b]] ; [[#Kinley--2020|Kinley et al. 2020]] ), all of which are discussed below.

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