Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-2 (section)

=== 2.3.3 Decoupling of Emissions from Economic Growth ===

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There has been a long-standing discussion on whether environmental impacts such as carbon emissions and use of natural resources can be decoupled from economic growth. It is controversial whether absolute decoupling can be achieved at a global scale ( [[#Ward--2016|Ward et al. 2016]] ; [[#Hickel--2020|Hickel and Kallis 2020]] ; [[#Haberl--2020|Haberl et al. 2020]] ). However, a number of studies found that it is feasible to achieve decoupling at the national level, and they have explored the reasons for such decoupling ( [[#Schandl--2016|Schandl et al. 2016]] ; [[#Ward--2016|Ward et al. 2016]] ; [[#Deutch--2017|Deutch 2017]] ; [[#Roinioti--2017|Roinioti and Koroneos 2017]] ; [[#Vadén--2020|Vadén et al. 2020]] ; [[#Habimana%20Simbi--2021|Habimana Simbi et al. 2021]] ; [[#Shan--2021b|Shan et al. 2021b]] ).

Table 2.3 shows the extent of decoupling of CBEs and GDP of countries based on CBEs from the Global Carbon Budget ( [[#Friedlingstein--2020|Friedlingstein et al. 2020]] ) and GDP data from the World Bank. Table 2.4 also presents countries’ degree of decoupling of PBEs and GDP. These data allow a comparison of decoupling between GDP and both PBEs and CBEs.

'''Table 2.''' '''4 |''' '''Country groups with different degree of PBE–GDP decoupling from 2015 to 2018.'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
| rowspan="2" colspan="2"| Number of countries

| Absolute decoupling

| Relative decoupling

| No decoupling

| Economic recession

|-
| 32

| 41

| 36

| 6

|-
| rowspan="2"| CBEs (gigatonnes)

| Total

| 6.41

| 23.43

| 2.83

| 0.85

|-
| Global share

| 19.1%

| 69.9%

| 8.4%

| 2.5%

|-
| rowspan="2"| PBEs (gigatonnes)

| Total

| 5.33

| 24.36

| 3.04

| 0.84

|-
| Global share

| 15.9%

| 72.6%

| 9.1%

| 2.5%

|-
| rowspan="2"| Population (million)

| Total

| 857

| 4518

| 1213

| 270

|-
| Global share

| 12.5%

| 65.9%

| 17.7%

| 3.9%

|-
| rowspan="2"| GDP (billion)

| Total

| 27091

| 45255

| 4086

| 2997

|-
| Global share

| 34.1%

| 57.0%

| 5.1%

| 3.8%

|-
| rowspan="4"| Per capita GDP (1000 USD2010)

| Average

| 28.83

| 19.53

| 6.00

| 17.78

|-
| Median

| 26.36

| 12.04

| 3.64

| 13.12

|-
| Max

| 79.23

| 110.70

| 63.93

| 33.11

|-
| Min

| 1.09

| 0.57

| 0.49

| 5.80

|-
| rowspan="4"| Per capita CBEs (tonnes)

| Average

| 7.70

| 6.98

| 3.99

| 12.55

|-
| Median

| 6.78

| 6.00

| 1.95

| 11.33

|-
| Max

| 23.22

| 37.95

| 25.35

| 23.21

|-
| Min

| 0.43

| 0.09

| 0.18

| 2.33

|-
| rowspan="4"| CBEs intensity

(tonnes per 1000 USD2010)

| Average

| 0.41

| 0.50

| 0.77

| 0.66

|-
| Median

| 0.31

| 0.44

| 0.52

| 0.69

|-
| Max

| 2.41

| 1.68

| 4.10

| 1.22

|-
| Min

| 0.12

| 0.10

| 0.20

| 0.21

|-
| rowspan="4"| Per capita PBEs (tonnes)

| Average

| 6.02

| 5.69

| 4.33

| 14.15

|-
| Median

| 5.36

| 4.88

| 1.67

| 13.22

|-
| Max

| 20.13

| 16.65

| 39.27

| 27.24

|-
| Min

| 0.30

| 0.09

| 0.01

| 2.23

|-
| rowspan="4"| PBEs intensity

(tonnes per 1000 USD2010)

| Average

| 0.33

| 0.45

| 0.71

| 0.75

|-
| Median

| 0.20

| 0.31

| 0.44

| 0.68

|-
| Max

| 1.47

| 1.76

| 4.83

| 1.80

|-
| Min

| 0.05

| 0.10

| 0.13

| 0.20

|}

Note: CBEs are obtained from the Global Carbon Budget 2020 ( [[#Friedlingstein--2020|Friedlingstein et al. 2020]] ), GDP and population are from the World Bank. One country (Venezuela) does not have GDP data after 2015, so the degree of decoupling was only calculated for 115 countries. In order to be consistent with the results of CBEs, we calculate the decoupling of PBE until 2018.

Absolute decoupling refers to a decline of emissions in absolute terms or as being stable while GDP grows (i.e., a decoupling index [[#footnote-003|11]] greater than 1); relative decoupling refers to growth of emissions being lower than growth of GDP (a decoupling index between 0 and 1); and no decoupling, which refers to a situation where emissions grow to the same extent or faster than GDP (a decoupling index of less than 0) ( [[#Wu--2018|Wu et al. 2018]] ).

During the most recent three-year period from 2015 to 2018, 23 countries (or 20% of the 116 sample countries) have achieved absolute decoupling of CBEs and GDP, while 32 countries (or 28%) achieved absolute decoupling of PBEs and GDP: 14 of them (e.g., the UK, Japan, and the Netherlands) also decoupled PBEs and GDP. Countries with absolute decoupling of CBEs tend to achieve decoupling at relatively high levels of economic development and high per capita emissions. Most of EU and North American countries are in this group. Decoupling was not only achieved by outsourcing carbon-intensive production, but also improvements in production efficiency and energy mix, leading to a decline of emissions. Structural Decomposition Analysis shows that the main driver for decoupling has been a reduction in carbon intensity (i.e., change in energy mix and energy efficiency) from both domestic production and imports ( [[#Hubacek--2021|Hubacek et al. 2021]] ). Similarly, [[#Wood--2020b|Wood et al. (2020b)]] found that EU countries have reduced their overall consumption-based GHG emissions by 8% between 1995 and 2016, mainly due to the use of more efficient technology. The literature also shows that changes in the structure of economy with a shift to tertiary sectors of production may contribute to such decoupling ( [[#Kanitkar--2015|Kanitkar et al. 2015]] ; Jiang et al. 2021).

A total of 67 (or 58%) countries, including China and India, have relatively decoupled GDP and CBEs between 2015 and 2018, reflecting a slower growth in emissions than GDP. It is worth noting that the USA shows relative decoupling of emissions (both CBEs and PBEs) and GDP over the most recent period, although it strongly decoupled economic growth from emissions between 2005 and 2015. Thus decoupling can be temporary and countries’ emissions may again increase after a period of decoupling.

Another 19 (or 16%) countries, such as South Africa and Nepal, have experienced no decoupling between GDP and CBEs from 2015 to 2018, meaning the growth of their GDP is closely tied with the consumption of emission-intensive goods. As a result, a further increase of GDP in these countries will likely lead to higher emissions, if they follow the historical trend without substantive improvement in efficiency of production and energy use.

It is important to note that a country’s degree of decoupling changes over time. For example, 32countries achieved absolute decoupling from 2010 to 2015 but only 10 of them remained decoupled over the next three years. More importantly, although absolute decoupling has reduced annual emissions, the remaining emissions are still contributing to an increase in atmospheric carbon concentration. Absolute decoupling is not sufficient to avoid consuming the remaining CO 2 emission budget under the global warming limit of 1.5°C or 2°C and to avoid climate breakdown ( [[#Stoknes--2018|Stoknes and Rockström 2018]] ; [[#Hickel--2020|Hickel and Kallis 2020]] ). Even if all countries decouple in absolute terms this might still not be sufficient and thus can only serve as one of the indicators and steps toward fully decarbonising the economy and society.

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