Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-5 (section)

==== 5.2.2.3 Variations in Consumption-based Emissions ====

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The carbon footprint of a nation is equal to the direct emissions occurring due to households’ transport, heating and cooking, as well as the impact embodied in the production of all consumed goods and services ( [[#Wiedmann--2008|Wiedmann and Minx 2008]] ; [[#Davis--2010|Davis and Caldeira 2010]] ; [[#Hübler--2017|Hübler 2017]] ; [[#Vita--2019a|Vita et al. 2019a]] ). There are large differences in carbon footprints between the poor and the rich. As a result of energy use inequality, the lowest global emitters (the poorest 10% in developing countries) in 2013 emitted about 0.1 tCO 2 cap –1 yr –1 , whereas the highest global emitters (the top 1% in the richest countries) emitted about 200–300 tCO 2 cap –1 yr –1 ( [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank 2019]] ). The poorest 50% of the world’s population are responsible for only about 10% of total lifetime consumption emissions, in contrast about 50% of the world’s GHG emissions can be attributed to consumption by the world’s richest 10%, with the average carbon footprint of the richest being 175 times higher than that of the poorest 10% ( [[#Chancel--2015|Chancel and Piketty 2015]] ). This richest 10% consumed the global carbon budget by nearly 30% during the period 1990–2015 ( [[#Kartha--2020|Kartha et al. 2020]] ; [[#Gore--2020|Gore 2020]] ). While mitigation efforts often focus on the poorest, the lifestyle and consumption patterns of the affluent often influence the growing middle class ( [[#Otto--2019|Otto et al. 2019]] ). Across EU countries, only 5% of households are living within 1.5°C climate limits and the top 1% emit more than 22 times the target on average, with land and air transport being particular characteristics of the highest-emitting countries ( [[#Ivanova--2020|Ivanova and Wood 2020]] ).

In low-income nations – which can exhibit per-capita carbon footprints 30 times lower than wealthy nations ( [[#Hertwich--2009|Hertwich and Peters 2009]] ) – emissions are predominantly domestic and driven by provision of essential services (shelter, low-meat diets, clothing). Per capita carbon footprints average 1.6 tonnes per year for the lowest income category, then quickly increase to 4.9 and 9.8 tonnes for the two middle-income categories and finally to an average of 17.9 tonnes for the highest income category. Global CO 2 emissions remain concentrated: the top 10% of emitters contribute about 35–45% of the total, while the bottom 50% contribute just 13–15% of global emissions ( [[#Chancel--2015|Chancel and Piketty 2015]] ; [[#Hubacek--2017|Hubacek et al. 2017]] ). In wealthy nations, services such as private road transport, frequent air travel, private jet ownership, meat-intensive diets, entertainment and leisure add significant emissions, while a considerable fraction of the carbon footprint is imported from abroad, embedded in goods and services ( [[#Hubacek--2017|Hubacek et al. 2017]] ).

High-income households consume and demand energy at an order of magnitude greater than what is necessary for DLS ( [[#Oswald--2020|Oswald et al. 2020]] ). Energy-intensive goods, such as package holidays, have a higher income elasticity of demand than less energy-intensive goods like food, water supply and housing maintenance, which results in high-income individuals having much higher energy footprints ( [[#Oswald--2020|Oswald et al. 2020]] ). Evidence highlights highly unequal GHG emissions in aviation: only 2–4% of the global population flew internationally in 2018, with 1% of the world population emitting 50% of CO 2 from commercial aviation ( [[#Gössling--2020|Gössling and Humpe 2020]] ). Some individuals may add more than 1600 tCO 2 yr –1 individually by air travel ( [[#Gössling--2019|Gössling 2019]] ).

The food sector dominates in all income groups, comprising 28% of households’ carbon footprint, with cattle and rice the major contributors ( [[#Scherer--2018|Scherer et al. 2018]] ); food also accounts for 48% and 70% of household impacts on land and water resources respectively, and consumption of meat, dairy, and processed food rise fast asincomes increase ( [[#Ivanova--2016|Ivanova et al. 2016]] ). Roughly 20–40% of food produced worldwide is lost to waste before it reaches the market, or is wasted by households, the energy embodied in wasted food was estimated at around 36 EJ yr –1 , and during the period 2010–2016 global food loss and waste equalled 8–10% of total GHG emissions ( [[#Godfray--2014|Godfray and Garnett 2014]] ; [[#Springmann--2018|Springmann et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mbow--2019|Mbow et al. 2019]] ). Global agri-food supply chains are crucial in the variation of per capita food consumption-related-GHG footprints, mainly in the case of red meat and dairy ( [[#Kim--2020|Kim et al. 2020]] ) since the highest per capita food-consumption-related GHG emissions do not correlate perfectly with the income status of countries. Thus, it is also crucial to focus on high-emitting individuals and groups within countries, rather than only those who live in high-emitting countries, since the top 10% of emitters live on all continents and one-third of them are from the developing world ( [[#Chakravarty--2009|Chakravarty et al. 2009]] ; [[#Pan--2019|Pan et al. 2019]] ).

The environmental impact of increasing equity across income groups can be either positive or negative ( [[#Hubacek--2017|Hubacek et al. 2017]] ; [[#Rao--2018a|Rao and Min 2018a]] ; [[#Scherer--2018|Scherer et al. 2018]] ; [[#Millward-Hopkins--2020|Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020]] ). Projections for achieving equitable levels of service provision globally predict large increases in global GHG emissions and demand for key resources ( [[#Blomsma--2017|Blomsma and Brennan 2017]] ), especially in passenger transport, which is predicted to increase nearly three-fold between 2015 and 2050, from 44 trillion to 122 trillion passenger-kilometres ( [[#OECD--2019a|OECD 2019a]] ), and associated infrastructure needs, increasing freight ( [[#Murray--2017|Murray et al. 2017]] ), increasing demand for cooling ( [[#IEA--2018|IEA 2018]] ), and shifts to carbon-intensive high-meat diets ( [[#OECD/FAO--2018|OECD/FAO 2018]] ).

Increasing incomes for all to attain DLS raises emissions and energy footprints, but only slightly ( [[#Chakravarty--2009|Chakravarty et al. 2009]] ; [[#Jorgenson--2016|Jorgenson et al. 2016]] ; [[#Scherer--2018|Scherer et al. 2018]] ; [[#Millward-Hopkins--2020|Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020]] ; [[#Oswald--2020|Oswald et al. 2020]] ; [[#Oswald--2021|Oswald et al. 2021]] ). The amount of energy needed for a high global level of human development is dropping ( [[#Steinberger--2010|Steinberger and Roberts 2010]] ) and could by 2050 be reduced to 1950 levels ( [[#Millward-Hopkins--2020|Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020]] ) requiring a massive deployment of technologies across the different sectors as well as demand-side reduction consumption. The consumption share of the bottom half of the world’s population represents less than 20% of all energy footprints, which is less than what the top 5% of people consume ( [[#Oswald--2020|Oswald et al. 2020]] ).

Income inequality itself also raises carbon emissions ( [[#Hao--2016|Hao et al. 2016]] ; [[#Sinha--2016|Sinha 2016]] ; [[#Uzar--2019|Uzar and Eyuboglu 2019]] ; [[#Baloch--2020|Baloch et al. 2020]] ; [[#Oswald--2020|Oswald et al. 2020]] ; [[#Wiedmann--2020|Wiedmann et al. 2020]] ; [[#Vogel--2021|Vogel et al. 2021]] ). Wide inequality can increase status-based consumption patterns, where individuals spend more to emulate the standards of the high-income group (the Veblen effect); inequality also diminishes environmental efforts by reducing social cohesion and cooperation ( [[#Jorgenson--2017|Jorgenson et al. 2017]] ) and finally, inequality also operates by inducing an increase in working hours that leads to higher economic growth and, consequently, higher emissions and ecological footprint, so working time reduction is key for policy to both reduce emissions and protect employment ( [[#Fitzgerald--2015|Fitzgerald et al. 2015]] ; [[#Fitzgerald--2018|Fitzgerald et al. 2018]] ).

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