Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-5 (section)

=== 5.2.3 Equity, Trust, and Participation in Demand-side Mitigation ===

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There is ''high evidence'' and ''high agreement'' in literature that socio-economic equity builds not only well-beingfor all, but also trust and effective participatory governance,which in turn strengthen demand-side climate mitigation. Equity, participation, social trust, well-being, governance and mitigation are parts of a continuous interactive and self-reinforcing process (Figure 5.5). [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-5 Chapter 5] Supplementary Material I (Section 5.SM.1) contains more detail on these links, drawing from social science literature.

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'''Figure 5.5 | Well-being, equity, trust, governance and climate mitigation: positive feedbacks.''' Well-being for all, increasingly seen as the main goal of sustainable economies, reinforces emissions reductions through a network of positive feedbacks linking effective governance, social trust, equity, participation and sufficiency. This diagram depicts relationships noted in this chapter text and explained further in the Social Science Primer ( [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-5 Chapter 5] Supplementary Material I). The width of the arrows corresponds to the level of confidence and degree of evidence from recent social sciences literature.

Economic growth in equitable societies is associated with lower emissions than in inequitable societies ( [[#McGee--2018|McGee and Greiner 2018]] ), and income inequality is associated with higher global emissions ( [[#Ravallion--1997|Ravallion et al. 1997]] ; [[#McGee--2018|McGee and Greiner 2018]] ; [[#Rao--2018c|Rao and Min 2018c]] ; [[#Diffenbaugh--2019|Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019]] ; [[#Fremstad--2019|Fremstad and Paul 2019]] ; [[#Liu--2020|Liu and Hao 2020]] ). Relatively slight increases in energy consumption and carbon emissions produce great increases in human development and well-being in less-developed countries, and the amount of energy needed for a high global level of human development is dropping ( [[#Steinberger--2010|Steinberger and Roberts 2010]] ). Equitable and democratic societies which provide high quality public services to their population have high well-being outcomes at lower energy use than those which do not, whereas those which prioritise economic growth beyond moderate incomes and extractive sectors display a reversed effect ( [[#Vogel--2021|Vogel et al. 2021]] ).

Well-designed climate mitigation policies ameliorate constituents of well-being ( [[#Creutzig--2021b|Creutzig et al. 2021b]] ). The study shows that of all demand-side option effects on well-being, 79% are positive, 18% are neutral (or not relevant or specified), and only 3% are negative ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Creutzig--2021b|Creutzig et al. 2021b]] ) (Figure 5.6). Figure 5.6 illustrates that active mobility (cycling and walking), efficient buildings and prosumer choices of renewable technologies have the most encompassing beneficial effects on well-being, with no negative outcomes detected. Urban and industry strategies are highly positive overall for well-being, but they will also reshape supply-side businesses with transient intermediate negative effects. Shared mobility, like all the others, has overall highly beneficial effects on well-being, but also displays a few negative consequences, depending on implementation, such as a minor decrease in personal security for patrons of ride-sourcing.

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'''Figure 5.6 | Two-way link between demand-side climate mitigation strategies and multiple dimensions of human well-being and SDGs.''' All demand-side mitigation strategies improve well-being in sum, though not necessarily in each individual dimension. Incumbent business (in contrast to overall economic performance) may be challenged. Source: [[#Creutzig--2021b|Creutzig et al. (2021b)]] .

Well-being improvements are most notable in health, air, and energy ( ''high confidence'' ). These categories are also most substantiated in the literature, often under the framing of co-benefits. In many cases, co-benefits outweigh the mitigation benefits of specific GHG emission reduction strategies. Food ( ''medium confidence'' ), mobility ( ''high confidence'' ), and water ( ''medium confidence'' ) are further categories where well-being is improved. Mobility has entries with highest well-being rankings for teleworking, compact cities, and urban system approaches. Effects on well-being in water and sanitation mostly come from buildings and urban solutions. Social dimensions, such as personal security, social cohesion, and especially political stability, are less predominantly represented. An exception is economic stability, suggesting that demand-side options generate stable opportunities to participate in economic activities ( ''high confidence'' ). Although the relation between demand-side mitigation strategies and the social aspects of human well-being is important, this has been less reflected in the literature so far, and hence the assessment finds more neutral/unknown interactions (Figure 5.6).

Policies designed to foster higher well-being for all via climate mitigation include reducing emissions through wider participation in climate action, building more effective governance for improved mitigation, and including social trust, greater equity, and informal-sector support as integral parts of climate policies. Public participation facilitates social learning and people’s support of and engagement with climate change priorities; improved governance is closely tied to effective climate policies ( [[#Phuong--2017|Phuong et al. 2017]] ). Better education, health care, valuing of social diversity, and reduced poverty – characteristics of more equal societies – all lead to resilience, innovation, and readiness to adopt progressive and locally-appropriate mitigation policies, whether high-tech or low-tech, centralised or decentralised ( [[#Tanner--2009|Tanner et al. 2009]] ; [[#Lorenz--2013|Lorenz 2013]] ; [[#Chu--2015|Chu 2015]] ; [[#Cloutier--2015|Cloutier et al. 2015]] ; [[#Mitchell--2015|Mitchell 2015]] ; [[#Martin--2016|Martin and Shaheen 2016]] ; [[#Vandeweerdt--2016|Vandeweerdt et al. 2016]] ; [[#Turnheim--2018|Turnheim et al. 2018]] ). Moreover, these factors are the ones identified as enablers of high need satisfaction at lower energy use ( [[#Vogel--2021|Vogel et al. 2021]] ).

There is less policy lock-in in more equitable societies ( [[#Seto--2016|Seto et al. 2016]] ). International communication, networking, and global connections among citizens are more prevalent in more equitable societies, and these help spread promising mitigation approaches ( [[#Scheffran--2012|Scheffran et al. 2012]] ). Climate-related injustices are addressed where equity is prioritised ( [[#Klinsky--2014|Klinsky and Winkler 2014]] ). Thus, there is high confidence in the literature that addressing inequities in income, wealth, and DLS not only raises overall well-being and furthers the SDGs but also improves the effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies. For example, job creation, retraining for new jobs, local production of livelihood necessities, social provisioning, and other positive steps toward climate mitigation and adaptation are all associated with more equitable and resilient societies ( [[#Okvat--2011|Okvat and Zautra 2011]] ; [[#Bentley--2014|Bentley 2014]] ; [[#Klinsky--2016|Klinsky et al. 2016]] ; [[#Roy--2018a|Roy et al. 2018a]] ). At all scales of governance, the popularity and sustainability of climate policies requires attention to the fairness of their health and economic implications for all, and participatory engagement across social groups – a responsible development framing ( [[#Cazorla--2001|Cazorla and Toman 2001]] ; [[#Dulal--2009|Dulal et al. 2009]] ; [[#Chuku--2010|Chuku 2010]] ; [[#Shonkoff--2011|Shonkoff et al. 2011]] ; [[#Navroz--2019|Navroz 2019]] ; [[#Hofstad--2020|Hofstad and Vedeld 2020]] ; [[#Muttitt--2020|Muttitt and Kartha 2020]] ; [[#Roy--2020|Roy and Schaffartzik 2020]] ; [[#Temper--2020|Temper et al. 2020]] ; [[#Waller--2020|Waller et al. 2020]] ). Far from being secondary or even a distraction from climate mitigation priorities, an equity focus is intertwined with mitigation goals ( [[#Klinsky--2016|Klinsky et al. 2016]] ). Demand-side climate mitigation options have pervasive ancillary, equity-enhancing benefits, for example for health, local livelihoods, and community forest resources ( [[#Chhatre--2009|Chhatre and Agrawal 2009]] ; [[#Garg--2011|Garg 2011]] ; [[#Shaw--2014|Shaw et al. 2014]] ; [[#Serrao-Neumann--2015|Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015]] ; [[#Klausbruckner--2016|Klausbruckner et al. 2016]] ; [[#Salas--2019|Salas and Jha 2019]] ) (Figure 5.6). Limiting climate change risks is fundamental to collective well-being ( [[#Max-Neef--1989|Max-Neef et al. 1989]] ; [[#Yamin--2005|Yamin et al. 2005]] ; [[#Nelson--2013|Nelson et al. 2013]] ; [[#Gough--2015|Gough 2015]] ; [[#Gough--2017|Gough 2017]] ; [[#Pecl--2017|Pecl et al. 2017]] ; [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al. 2017]] ). [[#5.6|Section 5.6]] discusses well-designed climate policies more fully, with examples. Rapid changes in social norms which are underway and which underlie socially-acceptable climate policy initiatives are discussed in section 5.4.

The distinction between necessities and luxuries helps to frame a growing stream of social sciences literature with climate policy relevance ( [[#Arrow--2004|Arrow et al. 2004]] ; [[#Ramakrishnan--2021|Ramakrishnan and Creutzig 2021]] ). Given growing public support worldwide for strong sustainability, sufficiency, and sustainable consumption, changing demand patterns and reduced demand are accompanying environmental and social benefits ( [[#Jackson--2008|Jackson 2008]] ; [[#Fedrigo--2010|Fedrigo et al. 2010]] ; [[#Schroeder--2013|Schroeder 2013]] ; [[#Figge--2014|Figge et al. 2014]] ; [[#Spangenberg--2016|Spangenberg and Germany 2016]] ; [[#Spengler--2016|Spengler 2016]] ; [[#Burke--2020|Burke 2020]] ; [[#Mont--2020|Mont et al. 2020]] ). Beyond a threshold, increased material consumption is not closely correlated with improvements in human progress ( [[#Frank--1999|Frank 1999]] ; [[#Kahneman--2010|Kahneman and Deaton 2010]] ; [[#Steinberger--2010|Steinberger and Roberts 2010]] ; [[#Roy--2012|Roy et al. 2012]] ; [[#Oishi--2018|Oishi et al. 2018]] ; [[#Xie--2018|Xie et al. 2018]] ; [[#Vita--2019b|Vita et al. 2019b]] ; [[#Wang--2019|Wang et al. 2019]] ; [[#Vita--2020|Vita et al. 2020]] ). Policies focusing on the ‘super-rich’, also called the ‘polluter elite’, are gaining attention for moral or norms-based as well as emissions-control reasons ( [[#Kenner--2019|Kenner 2019]] ; [[#Otto--2019|Otto et al. 2019]] ; [[#Pascale--2020|Pascale et al. 2020]] ; [[#Stratford--2020|Stratford 2020]] ) ( [[#5.2.2.3|Section 5.2.2.3]] ). Conspicuous consumption by the wealthy is the cause of a large proportion of emissions in all countries, related to expenditures on such things as air travel, tourism, large private vehicles and large homes ( [[#Brand--2008|Brand and Boardman 2008]] ; [[#Roy--2009|Roy and Pal 2009]] ; [[#Roy--2012|Roy et al. 2012]] ; [[#Brand--2010|Brand and Preston 2010]] ; [[#Gore--2015|Gore 2015]] ; [[#Hubacek--2017|Hubacek et al. 2017]] ; [[#Jorgenson--2017|Jorgenson et al. 2017]] ; [[#Sahakian--2018|Sahakian 2018]] ; [[#Gössling--2019|Gössling 2019]] ; [[#Kenner--2019|Kenner 2019]] ; [[#Lynch--2019|Lynch et al. 2019]] ; [[#Osuoka--2019|Osuoka and Haruna 2019]] ).

Since no country now meets its citizens’ basic needs at a level of resource use that is globally sustainable, while high levels of life satisfaction for those just escaping extreme poverty require even more resources, the need for transformative shifts in governance and policies is large ( [[#O’Neill--2018|O’Neill et al. 2018]] ; [[#Vogel--2021|Vogel et al. 2021]] ).

'''Inequitable societies use energy and resources less efficiently.''' Higher income inequality is associated with higher carbon emissions, at least in developed countries ( [[#Grunewald--2011|Grunewald et al. 2011]] ; [[#Golley--2012|Golley and Meng 2012]] ; Chancel et al. 2015; [[#Grunewald--2017|Grunewald et al. 2017]] ; [[#Jorgenson--2017|Jorgenson et al. 2017]] ; [[#Sager--2017|Sager 2017]] ; [[#Klasen--2018|Klasen 2018]] ; [[#Liu--2019|Liu et al. 2019]] ); reducing inequality in high-income countries helps to reduce emissions ( [[#Klasen--2018|Klasen 2018]] ). There is high agreement in the literature that alienation or distrust weakens collective governance and fragments political approaches towards climate action (Smit and Pilifosova 2001; [[#Adger--2003|Adger et al. 2003]] ; [[#Hammar--2007|Hammar and Jagers 2007]] ; [[#Van%20Vossole--2012|Van Vossole 2012]] ; [[#Bulkeley--2015|Bulkeley and Newell 2015]] ; [[#Smith--2015|Smith and Howe 2015]] ; ISSC et al. 2016; [[#Alvaredo--2018|Alvaredo et al. 2018]] ; [[#Smith--2018|Smith and Mayer 2018]] ; [[#Fairbrother--2019|Fairbrother et al. 2019]] ; [[#Hayward--2019|Hayward and Roy 2019]] ; [[#Kulin--2019|Kulin and Johansson Sevä 2019]] ; [[#Liao--2019|Liao et al. 2019]] ).

Populism and politics of fear are less prevalent under conditions of more income equality ( [[#Chevigny--2003|Chevigny 2003]] ; [[#Bryson--2016|Bryson and Rauwolf 2016]] ; [[#O’Connor--2017|O’Connor 2017]] ; [[#Fraune--2018|Fraune and Knodt 2018]] ; [[#Myrick--2019|Myrick and Evans Comfort 2019]] ). Ideology and other social factors also play a role in populist climate scepticism, but many of these also relate to resentment of elites and desire for engagement ( [[#Swyngedouw--2011|Swyngedouw 2011]] ; [[#Lockwood--2018|Lockwood 2018]] ; [[#Huber--2020|Huber et al. 2020]] ). ‘Climate populism’ movements are driven by an impetus for justice ( [[#Beeson--2019|Beeson 2019]] ; [[#Hilson--2019|Hilson 2019]] ). When people feel powerless and/or that climate change is too big a problem to solve because others are not acting, they may take less action themselves ( [[#Williams--2020|Williams and Jaftha 2020]] ). However, systems for benefit-sharing can build trust and address large-scale ‘commons dilemmas’, in the context of strong civil society ( [[#Barnett--2003|Barnett 2003]] ; [[#Mearns--2009|Mearns and Norton 2009]] ; [[#Inderberg--2015|Inderberg et al. 2015]] ; [[#Sovacool--2015|Sovacool et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hunsberger--2017|Hunsberger et al. 2017]] ; [[#Soliev--2020|Soliev and Theesfeld 2020]] ). Leadership is also important in fostering environmentally-responsible group behaviours ( [[#Liu--2020|Liu and Hao 2020]] ).

In some less-developed countries, higher income inequality may in fact be associated with lower per capita emissions, but this is because people who are excluded by poverty from access to fossil fuels must rely on biomass ( [[#Klasen--2018|Klasen 2018]] ). Such energy poverty – the fact that millions of people do not have access to energy sources to help meet human needs – implies the opposite of development ( [[#Guruswamy--2010|Guruswamy 2010]] ; [[#Guruswamy--2020|Guruswamy 2020]] ). In developing countries, livelihood improvements do not necessarily cause increases in emissions ( [[#Peters--2012|Peters et al. 2012]] ; [[#Reusser--2013|Reusser et al. 2013]] ; [[#Creutzig--2015a|Creutzig et al. 2015a]] ; [[#Chhatre--2009|Chhatre and Agrawal 2009]] ; [[#Baltruszewicz--2021|Baltruszewicz et al. 2021]] ) and poverty alleviation causes negligible emissions ( [[#Chakravarty--2009|Chakravarty et al. 2009]] ). Greater equity is an important step towards sustainable service provisioning ( [[#Godfray--2018|Godfray et al. 2018]] ; [[#Dorling--2019|Dorling 2019]] ; [[#Timko--2019|Timko 2019]] ).

As discussed in [[#5.6|Section 5.6]] , policies to assist the low-carbon energy transition can be designed to include additional benefits for income equality, besides contributing to greater energy access for the poor ( [[#Burke--2017|Burke and Stephens 2017]] ; [[#Frank--2017|Frank 2017]] ; [[#Healy--2017|Healy and Barry 2017]] ; [[#Sen--2017|Sen 2017]] ; [[#Chapman--2018|Chapman et al. 2018]] ; [[#La%20Viña--2018|La Viña et al. 2018]] ; [[#Chapman--2019|Chapman and Fraser 2019]] ; [[#Piggot--2019|Piggot et al. 2019]] ; [[#Sunderland--2020|Sunderland et al. 2020]] ). Global and intergenerational climate inequities impact people’s well-being, which affects their consumption patterns and political actions ( [[#Albrecht--2007|Albrecht et al. 2007]] ; [[#Fritze--2008|Fritze et al. 2008]] ; [[#Gori-Maia--2013|Gori-Maia 2013]] ; [[#Clayton--2015|Clayton et al. 2015]] ; [[#Pizzigati--2018|Pizzigati 2018]] ) (Box 5.4).

'''Consumption reductions, both voluntary and policy-induced, can have positive and double-dividend effects on efficiency as well as reductions in energy and materials use ( [[#Mulder--2006|Mulder et al. 2006]] ; [[#Harriss--2010|Harriss and Shui 2010]] ; [[#Figge--2014|Figge et al. 2014]] ; [[#Grinde--2018|Grinde et al. 2018]] ; [[#Spangenberg--2019|Spangenberg and Lorek 2019]] ; [[#Vita--2020|Vita et al. 2020]] ).''' Less waste, better emissions control and more effective carbon policies lead to better governance and stronger democracies. Systems-dynamics models linking strong emissions-reducing policies and strong social equity policies show that a low-carbon transition in conjunction with social sustainability is possible, even without economic growth ( [[#Kallis--2012|Kallis et al. 2012]] ; [[#Jackson--2016|Jackson and Victor 2016]] ; [[#Stuart--2017|Stuart et al. 2017]] ; [[#Chapman--2019|Chapman and Fraser 2019]] ; [[#D’Alessandro--2019|D’Alessandro et al. 2019]] ; [[#Gabriel--2019|Gabriel and Bond 2019]] ; [[#Huang--2019|Huang et al. 2019]] ; [[#Victor--2019|Victor 2019]] ). Such degrowth pathways may be crucial in combining technical feasibility of mitigation with social development goals ( [[#Hickel--2021|Hickel et al. 2021]] ; [[#Keyßer--2021|Keyßer and Lenzen 2021]] ).

Multi-level or polycentric governance can enhance well-being and improve climate governance and social resilience, due to varying adaptive, flexible policy interventions at different times and scales ( [[#Kern--2009|Kern and Bulkeley 2009]] ; [[#Lidskog--2009|Lidskog and Elander 2009]] ; [[#Amundsen--2010|Amundsen et al. 2010]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2010|Keskitalo 2010]] ; [[#Lee--2015|Lee and Koski 2015]] ; [[#Jokinen--2016|Jokinen et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lepeley--2017|Lepeley 2017]] ; [[#Marquardt--2017|Marquardt 2017]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2019|Di Gregorio et al. 2019]] ). Institutional transformation may also result from socio-ecological stresses that accompany climate change, leading to more effective governance structures ( [[#David%20Tàbara--2018|David Tàbara et al. 2018]] ; [[#Patterson--2019|Patterson and Huitema 2019]] ; [[#Barnes--2020|Barnes et al. 2020]] ). An appropriate, context-specific mix of options facilitated by policies can deliver both higher well-being and reduced disparity in access to basic needs for services concurrently with climate mitigation ( [[#Thomas--2005|Thomas and Twyman 2005]] ; [[#Mearns--2009|Mearns and Norton 2009]] ; [[#Klinsky--2014|Klinsky and Winkler 2014]] ; [[#Lamb--2014|Lamb et al. 2014]] ; [[#Lamb--2017|Lamb and Steinberger 2017]] ). Hence, nurturing equitable human well-being through provision of decent living standards for all goes hand in hand with climate change mitigation (ISSC et al. 2016; [[#OECD--2019a|OECD 2019a]] ). There is ''high confidence'' in the literature that addressing inequities in income, wealth, and DLS not only raises overall well-being and furthers the SDGs but also improves the effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies.

'''Participatory governance involves understanding and engagement with policies, including climate policies.''' Greater public participation in climate policy processes and governance, by increasing the diversity of ideas and stakeholders, builds resilience and allows broader societal transformation towards systemic change, even in complex, dynamic and contested contexts ( [[#Dombrowski--2010|Dombrowski 2010]] ; [[#Wise--2014|Wise et al. 2014]] ; [[#Haque--2015|Haque et al. 2015]] ; [[#Jodoin--2015|Jodoin et al. 2015]] ; [[#Mitchell--2015|Mitchell 2015]] ; [[#Kaiser--2020|Kaiser 2020]] ; [[#Alegria--2021|Alegria 2021]] ). This sometimes involves complex policy discussions that can lead to governance innovations, also influencing social norms ( [[#Martinez--2020|Martinez 2020]] ). A specific example are citizen assemblies, deliberating public policy challenges, such as climate change ( [[#Devaney--2020|Devaney et al. 2020]] ). Activist climate movements are changing policies as well as normative values ( [[#5.4|Section 5.4]] and the Social Science Primer, [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-5 Chapter 5] Supplementary Material I). Environmental justice and climate justice activists worldwide have called attention to the links between economic and environmental inequities, collected and publicised data about them, and demanded stronger mitigation ( [[#Goodman--2009|Goodman 2009]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2014|Schlosberg and Collins 2014]] ; [[#Jafry--2019|Jafry 2019]] ; [[#Cheon--2020|Cheon 2020]] ). Youth climate activists, and Indigenous leaders, are also exerting growing political influence towards mitigation ( [[#Helferty--2009|Helferty and Clarke 2009]] ; [[#White--2011|White 2011]] ; [[#Powless--2012|Powless 2012]] ; [[#Petheram--2015|Petheram et al. 2015]] ; [[#UN--2015|UN 2015]] ; [[#Curnow--2016|Curnow and Gross 2016]] ; [[#Grady-Benson--2016|Grady-Benson and Sarathy 2016]] ; [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rowlands--2019|Rowlands and Gomez Peña 2019]] ; [[#Bergmann--2020|Bergmann and Ossewaarde 2020]] ; [[#Han--2020|Han and Ahn 2020]] ; [[#Nkrumah--2021|Nkrumah 2021]] ). Indigenous resurgence (activism fuelled by ongoing colonial social and environmental injustices, land claims, and deep spiritual and cultural commitment to environmental protection) not only strengthens climate leadership in many countries, but also changes broad social norms by raising knowledge of Indigenous governance systems which supported sustainable lifeways over thousands of years ( [[#Wildcat--2014|Wildcat 2014]] ; [[#Chanza--2016|Chanza and De Wit 2016]] ; [[#Whyte--2017|Whyte 2017]] ; [[#Whyte--2018|Whyte 2018]] , [[#Temper--2020|Temper et al. 2020]] ). Related trends include recognition of the value of traditional ecological knowledge, Indigenous governance principles, decentralisation, and appropriate technologies ( [[#Lange--2007|Lange et al. 2007]] ; [[#Goldthau--2014|Goldthau 2014]] ; [[#Whyte--2017|Whyte 2017]] ).

'''Social trust aids policy implementation.''' More equal societies display higher trust, which is a key requirement for successful implementation of climate policies ( [[#Rothstein--2008|Rothstein and Teorell 2008]] ; [[#Carattini--2015|Carattini et al. 2015]] ; [[#Klenert--2018|Klenert et al. 2018]] ; [[#Patterson--2018|Patterson et al. 2018]] ). Inter-personal trust among citizens often promotes pro-environment behaviour by influencing perceptions ( [[#Harring--2013|Harring and Jagers 2013]] ), enhancing cooperation, and reducing free-riding and opportunistic behaviour ( [[#Gür--2020|Gür 2020]] ). Individual support for carbon taxes and energy innovations falls when collective community support is lacking ( [[#Bolsen--2014|Bolsen et al. 2014]] ; [[#Smith--2018|Smith and Mayer 2018]] ; [[#Simon--2020|Simon 2020]] ). Social trust has a positive influence on civic engagement among local communities, NGOs, and self-help groups for local clean cooking fuel installation ( [[#Nayak--2015|Nayak et al. 2015]] ).

[[#5.6|Section 5.6]] includes examples of climate mitigation policies and policy packages which address the interrelationships shown in Figure 5.5. Improving well-being for all through climate mitigation includes emissions-reduction goals in policy packages that ensure equitable outcomes, prioritise social trust-building, support wide public participation in climate action including within the informal sector, and facilitate institutional change for effective multi-level governance, as integral components of climate strategies. This strategic approach, and its feasibility of success, rely on complex contextual factors that may differ widely, especially between the Global North and Global South ( [[#Atteridge--2012|Atteridge et al. 2012]] ; [[#Patterson--2018|Patterson et al. 2018]] ; [[#Jewell--2020|Jewell and Cherp 2020]] ; [[#Singh--2020|Singh et al. 2020]] ; [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al. 2021]] ).

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