Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-9 (section)

== 9.4 Climate Resilient Development ==

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Climate resilient development (CRD) is a process of implementing GHG mitigation and adaptation measures to support sustainable development for all ( [[#Denton--2014|Denton et al., 2014]] ; [[#Andrijevic--2020|Andrijevic et al., 2020]] ; [[#Owen--2020|Owen, 2020]] ; [[#Cornforth--2021|Cornforth et al., 2021]] ). It emphasises equity as a core element of sustainable development as well as conditions for inclusive and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work for all, taking into account different levels of national development and capacities as encoded in the SDGs ( [[#9.3.2|Section 9.3.2]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-18|Chapter 18]] [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-18#18.1|Section 18.1]] ). This section identifies five key dimensions of CRD for Africa: climate finance, governance, cross-sectoral and transboundary solutions, adaptation law, and climate services and literacy.

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=== 9.4.1 Climate Finance ===

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Access to adequate financial resources is crucial for climate change adaptation (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Since the Copenhagen Accord ( [[#UNFCCC--2009|UNFCCC, 2009]] ), and then extended by the Paris Agreement ( [[#UNFCCC%20Paris%20Agreement--2015|UNFCCC Paris Agreement, 2015]] see Article 4.4, and also 4.8, 4.9), developed countries are expected to scale up climate finance for developing countries toward a collective goal of USD 100 billion per year by 2020, with a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.

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==== 9.4.1.1 How Much Adaptation Finance is Needed? ====

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There is limited research providing quantitative estimates of adaptation costs across Africa. Adaptation costs in Africa have been estimated at USD 7–15 billion per year by 2020 ( [[#Schaeffer--2013|Schaeffer et al., 2013]] ), corresponding to USD 5–11 per capita per year. The African Development Bank estimates costs of near-term adaptation needs identified in the Intended NDCs (INDCs) of African countries as USD 7.4 billion per year from 2020, recognising INDCs describe only a limited subset of adaptation needs ( [[#AfDB--2019|AfDB, 2019]] ). Many African countries, particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs), express a stronger demand for adaptation finance—a study of financial demands in INDCs for 16 African countries suggests a ratio around 2:1 for adaptation to mitigation finance with demand for Eritrea and Uganda approximately 80% for adaptation ( [[#Zhang--2016|Zhang and Pan, 2016]] ).

Adaptation costs in Africa are expected to rise rapidly as global warming increases ( ''high confidence'' ). A meta-analysis of adaptation costs identified in 44 NDCs and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) from developing countries estimated a median adaptation cost around USD 17 per capita per year for 2020–2030 ( [[#Chapagain--2020|Chapagain et al., 2020]] ). Adaptation cost estimates for Africa increase from USD 20–50 billion per year for Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6 in 2050 (around 1.5°C of warming), to USD 18–60 billion per year for just over 2°C, to USD 100–437 billion per year for 4°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels ( [[#Schaeffer--2013|Schaeffer et al., 2013]] ; [[#UNEP--2015|UNEP, 2015]] ; [[#Chapagain--2020|Chapagain et al., 2020]] ). Focusing on individual sectors, the average country-level cost is projected to be USD 0.8 billion per year for adapting to temperature-related mortality under 4°C global warming ( [[#Carleton--2018|Carleton et al., 2018]] ), with cumulative energy costs for cooling demand projected to reach USD 51 billion by 2°C and USD 486 billion by 4°C global warming ( [[#Parkes--2019|Parkes et al., 2019]] ). Transport infrastructure repair costs are also projected to be substantial ( [[#9.8.2|Section 9.8.2]] ) More precise estimates are limited by methodological difficulties and data gaps for costing adaptation, uncertainties about future levels of global warming and associated climate hazards, and ethical choices such as the desired level of protection achieved ( [[#Fankhauser--2010|Fankhauser, 2010]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2018|Hallegatte et al., 2018]] ; [[#UNFCCC--2018|UNFCCC, 2018]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). As such, existing estimates are expected to substantially underestimate eventual costs with adaptation costs possibly 2–3 times higher than current global estimates by 2030, and 4–5 times higher by 2050 ( [[#UNEP--2016a|UNEP, 2016a]] ).

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==== 9.4.1.2 Benefit–Cost Ratios in Adaptation ====

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Although analysts face challenges related to the nature of climate change impacts ( [[#Sussman--2014|Sussman et al., 2014]] ) and data limitations ( [[#Li--2014|Li et al., 2014]] ) when estimating all costs and benefits for adaptation measures in specific contexts, adaptation generally is cost-effective ( ''high confidence'' ). The Global Commission on Adaptation estimated the benefits and costs of five illustrative investments and found benefit–cost ratios ranging from 2:1 to 10:1. However, it also noted that ‘actual returns depend on many factors, such as economic growth and demand, policy context, institutional capacities and condition of assets’ ( [[#The%20Global%20Commission%20on%20Adaptation--2019|The Global Commission on Adaptation, 2019]] ). A review of ''ex-ante'' cost–benefit analyses for 19 adaptation-focused projects in Africa financed by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) shows benefit–cost ratios in a similar range. Using a 10% discount rate, as used by many of GCF’s accredited entities, the benefit–cost ratio for individual projects ranges from 0.9:1 to 7.3:1, the median benefit–cost ratio is 1.8:1 and total ratio across all 19 projects is 2.6:1. When using lower discount rates, as some entities do for climate projects, the benefit–cost ratio is even higher, reflecting the front-loaded costs and back-loaded benefits of many adaptation investments. Using a 5% discount rate, the overall benefit–cost ratio of the GCF projects is 3.5:1, with a range from 1:1 to 11.5:1 and a median ratio of 2.4:1 ( [[#Breitbarth--2020|Breitbarth, 2020]] ). In addition, many proposals have activities for which further benefits were not estimated due to the difficulty of attributing benefits directly to the intervention. The benefits of adaptation measures for infrastructure and others with clear market impacts are often easier to estimate than for policy interventions and where markets may not exist, such as ecosystem services ( [[#Li--2014|Li et al., 2014]] ).

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==== 9.4.1.3 How Much Finance is Being Mobilised? ====

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The amounts of finance being mobilised internationally to support adaptation in African countries are billions of US dollars less than adaptation cost estimates, and finance has targeted mitigation more than adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ( [[#OECD--2020|OECD (2020)]] estimates an average of USD 17.3 billion per year in public finance targeting mitigation and adaptation from developed countries to Africa in 2016–2018, with adaptation expected to be a small share of this amount. Of the global total, only 21% in 2018 targeted adaptation (there is no breakdown provided for Africa). Analysis of OECD data that is reported by the funders, covering bilateral and multilateral funding sources, estimated international public finance (grants and concessional lending) committed to Africa for climate change for 2014–2018 at USD 49.9 billion: 61% (30.6 billion) for mitigation, 33% (16.5 billion) for adaptation and 5% (2.7 billion) for both objectives simultaneously (Figure 9.8a; [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ). This equates to an average of USD 3.8 billion per year targeting adaptation ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ). In per capita terms, only two countries (Djibouti and Gabon) were supported with more than USD 15 per person per year, most were supported with less than USD 5 per person per year ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ).

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[[File:3d55186ccf581e8a76f70db55a80f908 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_008.png]]

'''Figure 9.8 |''' '''Total adaptation-related finance (commitments) to African countries and regions from 2014–2018 (USD millions, constant prices) as reported to OECD.'''

'''(a)''' Flows of committed finance targeting adaptation by source and recipient region;

'''(b)''' trend over time in international development finance commitments targeting adaptation in Africa; and

'''(c)''' country-level shares of total climate finance commitments that targeted adaptation or mitigation or both simultaneously. Source: [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al. (2021)]] .

The multilateral development banks (MDBs) report 43% of their climate-related commitments to sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 targeted adaptation (EBRD et al., 2021). Sources other than international public finance are more difficult to track and there is limited data on Africa (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Considering a wider range of finance types (including private flows and domestic mobilisation), an estimated annual average of roughly USD 19 billion in climate finance for 2017–2018 went to sub-Saharan Africa, of which only 5% was for adaptation ( [[#CPI--2019|CPI, 2019]] ; [[#Adhikari--2021|Adhikari and Safaee Chalkasra, 2021]] ). The mobilisation of private finance by developed country governments, through bilateral and multilateral financial support, is lower in Africa relative to other world regions. Globally, in 2016–2018, Africa made up only 17% of mobilised private finance relevant for climate change ( [[#OECD--2020|OECD, 2020]] ).

Strong differences exist among African sub-regions. Finance commitments targeting adaptation increased from 2014–2018 for east and west Africa but decreased in central Africa ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ) (Figure 9.8b). Climate-related finance was &gt;50% for adaptation in 19 countries, while 26 received &gt;50% for mitigation ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ).

African countries expect grants to play a crucial role in supporting adaptation efforts because loans add to already high debt levels that exacerbate fiscal challenges, especially in light of high sovereign debt levels from the COVID-19 pandemic ( [[#Bulow--2020|Bulow et al., 2020]] ; [[#Estevão--2020|Estevão, 2020]] ). From 2014–2018, more finance commitments targeting adaptation in Africa were debt instruments (57%) than grants (42%) ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ).

For Africa combined, the sectors targeted with most support for adaptation are agriculture and water supply and sanitation, which account for half of total adaptation finance from 2014–2018 (Figure 9.9a). The sectoral distribution has changed little over these years, suggesting adaptation planners and funders are maintaining a relatively narrow view of where support is needed and how to build climate resilience ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ).

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[[File:8ffc3e87e74ba36d65d48da59a19e3e8 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_009.png]]

'''Figure 9.9 |''' '''Adaptation finance for Africa has focused most on agriculture and water, and disbursement ratios for climate-related finance are very low''' 

'''(a)''' The amounts of finance targeting adaptation committed to different sectors across Africa from '''2014''' '''–''' '''2018''' '''in millions of USD as reported to OECD and including multilateral development banks (Savvidou et al.''' , 2021).

'''(b)''' Disbursement ratios (disbursements expressed as percentage of commitments) for finance targeting mitigation and adaptation, and for total development finance; showing disbursement ratios for Africa compared to global average; and

'''(c)''' disbursement ratios for adaptation finance broken down by each African sub-region for 2014–2018 (for all funders reporting to OECD except multilateral development banks). Source: [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al. (2021)]] .

However, to understand actual expenditure on adaptation, it is necessary to look at disbursements (that is, the amounts paid out compared to committed amounts). Low ratios of disbursements to commitments suggest difficulties in project implementation. Disbursement ratios for climate-related finance from all funders other than MDBs (for which data is not published) in Africa are very low (Figure 9.9b; [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ). Only 46% of 2014–2018 commitments targeting adaptation were dispersed ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ). Regions faring worst are north Africa (15%), central Africa (33%) and west Africa (33%) (Figure 9.9c). These disbursement ratios for adaptation and mitigation finance in Africa are lower than the global average ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ), which suggests greater capacity problems in implementing climate-related projects and, in turn, means lost opportunities to build resilience and adaptive capacity and a wider gap in adaptation finance for Africa ( [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ).

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==== 9.4.1.4 What Are the Barriers and Enabling Conditions for Adaptation Finance? ====

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The present situation reflects not only an insufficient level of finance being mobilised to support African adaptation needs ( [[#9.4.1|Section 9.4.1]] ) but also problems in accessing and using funding that is available. The direct-access modality introduced by the Adaptation Fund and GCF, whereby national and regional entities from developing countries can be accredited to access funds directly, is aimed at reducing transaction costs for recipient countries, increasing national ownership and agency for adaptation actions, and enhancing decision-making responsibilities by national actors, thereby contributing to strengthening local capacity for sustained and transformational adaptation ( [[#CDKN--2013|CDKN, 2013]] ; [[#Masullo--2015|Masullo et al., 2015]] ). Indeed, direct-access projects from the Adaptation Fund tend to be more community focused than indirect-access projects ( [[#Manuamorn--2020|Manuamorn and Biesbroek, 2020]] ). Country institutions in Africa, however, are struggling to be accredited for direct access because of the complicated, lengthy and bureaucratic processes of accreditation, which requires, for example, strong institutional and fiduciary standards and capacity to be in place ( [[#Brown--2013|Brown et al., 2013]] ; [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ). As of December 2019, over 80% of all developing countries had no national direct access entities (DAEs) ( [[#Asfaw--2019|Asfaw et al., 2019]] ). Capacity to develop fundable projects in Africa is also inadequate. An analysis of proposals submitted to the GCF up to 2017 revealed that, while African countries were able to submit proposals to the GCF, they had the lowest percentage of approvals (39%) compared to all other regions ( [[#Fonta--2018|Fonta et al., 2018]] ). This suggests the quality of proposals and therefore the capacity to develop fundable proposals remains inadequate in the region.

Even when accredited, some countries experience significant institutional and financial challenges in programming and implementing activities to support concrete adaptation measures ( [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ). Low disbursement ratios suggest inadequate capacity to implement projects once they are approved ( [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ). Systemic barriers have been highlighted in relation to the multilateral climate funds, including funds not providing full-cost adaptation funding, capacity barriers in the design and implementation of adaptation actions (including the development of fundable project proposals) and barriers in recognising and enabling the involvement of sub-national actors in the delivery and implementation of adaptation action ( [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ). As of 2017, most GCF disbursements to Africa (61.9%) were directed to support national stakeholders’ engagement with regards to readiness activities, with only 11% directed to support DAEs in implementation of concrete projects/pipeline development ( [[#Fonta--2018|Fonta et al., 2018]] ). While supporting readiness activities is important for strengthening country ownership and institutional development, research suggests adaptation finance needs to shift towards implementation of concrete projects and more pipeline development if the goal of transformative and sustained adaptation in Africa is to be realised ( [[#Fonta--2018|Fonta et al., 2018]] ; [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ). The source of these problems needs to be better understood so that the prospects for future climate-related investments can be improved and institutional strengthening and targeted project preparation can be supported ( [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ; [[#Doshi--2020|Doshi and Garschagen, 2020]] ; [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ).

Some progress has been made in supporting developing countries to enhance their adaptation actions. The process to formulate and implement NAPs was established by parties under the UNFCCC to support developing countries in identifying their vulnerabilities, and determine their medium- and long-term adaptation needs ( [[#UNFCCC%20Paris%20Agreement--2015|UNFCCC Paris Agreement, 2015]] ). NAPs provide a means of developing and implementing strategies and programmes to address those needs. In 2016, the parties agreed the GCF would fund up to USD 3 million per country for adaptation planning instruments, including NAPs. However, accessing funding through the GCF for NAP formulation is challenging ( [[#Fonta--2018|Fonta et al., 2018]] ) and, as of October 2020, 4 years after the decision to fund NAPs, only six African countries had completed their NAPs (UNFCCC NAP central). The next step is to convert adaptation planning documents into programming pipeline projects that are fundable and implementable, which presents a significant barrier to enhanced adaptation action ( [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ).

Adaptation finance has not been targeted more towards more vulnerable countries ( [[#Barrett--2014|Barrett, 2014]] ; [[#Weiler--2019|Weiler and Sanubi, 2019]] ; [[#Doshi--2020|Doshi and Garschagen, 2020]] ; [[#Savvidou--2021|Savvidou et al., 2021]] ). Reasons for this include fast-growing middle-income countries offering larger gains in emission reductions, so finance has favoured mitigation in these economies, even within sub-Saharan Africa, and as more climate finance uses debt instruments, mitigation projects are further preferred because returns are perceived to be more certain ( [[#Rai--2016|Rai et al., 2016]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee and Hong, 2018]] ; [[#Carty--2020|Carty et al., 2020]] ; [[#Simpson--2021c|Simpson et al., 2021c]] ).

Many adaptation interventions for most vulnerable countries and communities provide no adequate financial return on investments and can therefore only be funded with concessional public finance (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Yet, public funds alone are insufficient to meet rapidly growing adaptation needs. Public mechanisms can help leverage private sector finance for adaptation by reducing regulatory, cost and market barriers through blended finance approaches, public–private partnerships, or innovative financial instruments and structuring in support of private sector requirements for risk and investment returns, such as green bonds (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Sub-national actors can be core agents to conceptualise, drive and deliver adaptation responses, and unlock domestic resources in the implementation of adaptation action ( [[#CoM%20SSA--2019|CoM SSA, 2019]] ; [[#Omari-Motsumi--2019|Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019]] ), provided they are sufficiently resourced and their participation and agency are supported.

Many African countries are at high risk of debt distress, especially due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and will need to decrease their debt levels to have the fiscal space to invest in climate resilience ( [[#Estevão--2020|Estevão, 2020]] ; [[#Dibley--2021|Dibley et al., 2021]] ). As of mid-2021, the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative is providing temporary relief for repayment of bilateral credit, but this has largely not been taken up by private lenders ( [[#Dibley--2021|Dibley et al., 2021]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2021|World Bank, 2021]] ). The total external debt-servicing payments combined for 44 African countries in 2019 were USD 75 billion ( [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank, 2019]] ), far exceeding discussed levels of near-term climate finance. Aligning debt relief with Paris Agreement goals could provide an important channel for increased financing for climate action, for example, by allowing African countries to use their debt-servicing payments to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation ( [[#Fenton--2014|Fenton et al., 2014]] ). Governments can disclose climate risks when taking on sovereign debt, and debt-for-climate resilience swaps could be used to reduce debt burdens for low-income countries while supporting adaptation and mitigation ( [[#Dibley--2021|Dibley et al., 2021]] ).

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=== 9.4.2 Governance ===

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==== 9.4.2.1 Governance Barriers ====

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Overcoming governance barriers is a precondition to ensure successful adaptation and CRD ( [[#Pasquini--2015|Pasquini et al., 2015]] ; [[#Owen--2020|Owen, 2020]] ). Despite the ambitious climate targets across African countries and renewed commitments in recent years ( [[#Zheng--2019|Zheng et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ozor--2020|Ozor and Nyambane, 2020]] ), governance barriers include, among others, slow policy implementation progress ( [[#Shackleton--2015|Shackleton et al., 2015]] ; [[#Taylor--2016|Taylor, 2016]] ), incoherent and fragmented approaches ( [[#Zinngrebe--2020|Zinngrebe et al., 2020]] ; [[#Nemakonde--2021|Nemakonde et al., 2021]] ), inadequate governance systems to manage climate finance ( [[#Granoff--2016|Granoff et al., 2016]] ; [[#Banga--2019|Banga, 2019]] ), poor stakeholder participation ( [[#Sherman--2014|Sherman and Ford, 2014]] ), gender inequalities ( [[#Andrijevic--2020|Andrijevic et al., 2020]] ), unaligned development and climate agendas ( [[#Musah-Surugu--2019|Musah-Surugu et al., 2019]] ; [[#Robinson--2020|Robinson, 2020]] ), elite capture of climate governance systems ( [[#Kita--2019|Kita, 2019]] ), hierarchical and complex state bureaucracy ( [[#Meissner--2016|Meissner and Jacobs, 2016]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek et al., 2018]] ) and weak, non-existent or fragmented sub-national institutions ( [[#Paterson--2017|Paterson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Musah-Surugu--2019|Musah-Surugu et al., 2019]] ). Further, adaptation planning involves cross-cutting themes, multiple actors and institutions with different objectives, jurisdictional authority and levels of power and resources, yet there is often a lack of coordination, clear leadership or governance mandates ( [[#Shackleton--2015|Shackleton et al., 2015]] ; [[#Leck--2018|Leck and Simon, 2018]] ) and unequal power relations between African countries and developed countries can hinder progress on governance of financial markets, budget allocations and technology transfer to address addressing climate technology gaps in Africa ( [[#Rennkamp--2015|Rennkamp and Boyd, 2015]] ; [[#Olawuyi--2018|Olawuyi, 2018]] ).

Policy implementation can be slow due to the absence of support mechanisms and dependency on funding by international partners ( [[#Leck--2015|Leck and Roberts, 2015]] ; [[#Ozor--2020|Ozor and Nyambane, 2020]] ). In many countries, commitment to climate policy objectives is low ( [[#Naess--2015|Naess et al., 2015]] ), particularly in light of competing development imperatives and post-COVID-19 recovery efforts ( [[#Caetano--2020|Caetano et al., 2020]] ), although COVID-19 recovery efforts offer significant opportunities for health, economic and climate resilience co-benefits (Sections 9.4.3; 9.11.5; Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7). Another challenge relates to long-term planning and decision making which is hampered by uncertainty related to future socioeconomic and GHG emissions scenarios ( [[#Coen--2021|Coen, 2021]] ), political cycles and short-term political appointment terms ( [[#Pasquini--2015|Pasquini et al., 2015]] ).

Lack of community agency in climate governance affects the capacity for citizen-led climate interventions in Africa ( [[#Antwi-Agyei--2015|Antwi-Agyei et al., 2015]] ; [[#Mersha--2016|Mersha and Van Laerhoven, 2016]] ). This is attributed partly to low civic education, limited participation power of citizens and tokenism due to perceived lack of immediate benefits ( [[#Odei%20Erdiaw-Kwasie--2020|Odei Erdiaw-Kwasie et al., 2020]] ), as well as low rates of climate change literacy in many regions ( [[#9.4.3|Section 9.4.3]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). Participation in climate policy also extends to the private sector, which has been relatively uninvolved in adaptation discussions to date ( [[#Crick--2018|Crick et al., 2018]] ).

Africa requires substantial resources and support to adapt to the unavoidable consequences of climate change, a pertinent climate justice concern for governments. However, the mechanisms needed to redress current power imbalances, structural and systemic inequality are often absent ( [[#Saraswat--2016|Saraswat and Kumar, 2016]] ; see [[#9.11.4|Section 9.11.4]] ) and policies that underpin environmental justice concerns, including distributive justice, participation, recognition and capability ( [[#Shi--2016|Shi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Chu--2017|Chu et al., 2017]] ) are also needed.

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==== 9.4.2.2 Good Governance ====

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Good governance can contribute to positive climate outcomes and CRD in Africa through long-term planning, development-focused policy environments, the development of robust and transformational policy architecture, inclusive participation and timely implementation of NDCs ( [[#Bataille--2016|Bataille et al., 2016]] ; [[#Werners--2021|Werners et al., 2021]] ; see Table 9.3 for examples).

African governments are developing and revising ambitious adaptation policies that are enforceable and aligned with wider societal development goals, including an enabling environment for finance and investment in the jobs and skills development necessary to support a just transition ( [[#9.4.5|Section 9.4.5]] ; [[#ILO--2019|ILO, 2019]] ). If appropriately designed, such institutions offer the opportunity to foster adaptive governance that is collaborative, multi-level and decentralised, offering integration of policy domains, flexibility and an emphasis on non-coerciveness and adaptation ( [[#Ruhl--2010|Ruhl, 2010]] ).

Coordination across multiple sectors, supported with leadership from the highest levels of government, has shown to improve implementation effectiveness and anticipated scaling up ( [[#Rigaud--2018|Rigaud et al., 2018]] ). This high-level engagement promotes the inclusion of climate resilience and adaptation targets in national planning and budgeting. Financial and capacity support is essential ( [[#Adenle--2017|Adenle et al., 2017]] ; [[#UNEP--2021|UNEP, 2021]] ), as is the tracking of national progress towards development goals (Box 9.6).

In Africa, climate governance occurs in a context of deep inequality and asymmetric power relations—both within countries and between countries—making adequate mechanisms for multi-stakeholder participation essential ( [[#Sapiains--2021|Sapiains et al., 2021]] ). This requires the creation of avenues for the voices of marginalised groups in policy processes and enabling policy environments that can catalyse inclusive action and transformational responses to climate change ( [[#Totin--2018|Totin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Revi--2020|Revi et al., 2020]] ; [[#Ziervogel--2021|Ziervogel et al., 2021]] ), safeguarding protection against the climate harms of the most vulnerable in society, particularly of women and children (see also Box 9.1). Community-based natural resource management in pastoral communities was observed to improve institutional governance outcomes through involving community members in decision making, increasing the capacity of these communities to respond to climate change ( [[#Reid--2014|Reid, 2014]] ).

Specific indicators can be included in the performance metrics and monitoring frameworks for each sector, policy intervention and budget planning cycle ( [[#Wojewska--2021|Wojewska et al., 2021]] ). Many countries in Africa are also revamping their institutional coordination mechanisms to reflect an all-of-government approach and partnership with non-state stakeholders with diverse capabilities and expertise (see examples from Rwanda and Zambia in Table 9.3). This includes Cape Town’s drought response in 2017/2018 where non-state actors actively partnered with the state response around water management/savings practices ( [[#Simpson--2020a|Simpson et al., 2020a]] ; 2020b; [[#Cole--2021b|Cole et al., 2021b]] ).

'''Table 9.3 |''' Characteristics and examples of governance that contribute towards CRD in Africa.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Governance characteristic'''

! '''Example'''

|-
| ''Long-term development planning''

| Countries are mainstreaming adaptation into their long-term development cycles ( [[#UNFCCC%20Adaptation%20Committee--2019|UNFCCC Adaptation Committee, 2019]] ). For example, Burkina Faso’s National Adaptation Plan elaborates its perspective to 2050 and links to its development pathways ( [[#Government%20of%20Burkina%20Faso--2015|Government of Burkina Faso, 2015]] ). Many African countries are also enhancing the adaptation components of their long-term low emissions strategies.

|-
| ''Climate justice and inequality-focused policies''

| Climate policies can be designed to include specific policy mechanisms (e.g., carbon taxes, renewable energy subsidies) to maximise developmental gains while reducing inequality ( [[#Andrijevic--2020|Andrijevic et al., 2020]] ). For example, revenues from a carbon tax can be used to increase social assistance programmes that benefit poor people and reduce their vulnerability to climate change ( [[#Hallegatte--2016|Hallegatte et al., 2016]] ). Climate risk management can be integrated into social protection and assistance programmes, such as public works programmes that increase climate resilience ( [[#9.11|Section 9.11]] ).

|-
| ''Interlinkages between adaptation and development pathways''

| Cross-sectoral and multi-level governance approaches can harness synergies with the SDGs, Paris Agreement and Agenda 2063 aspirations, helping to counter the adaptation deficit, promote sustainable resource use and contribute to poverty reduction ( [[#Niang--2014|Niang et al., 2014]] ; [[#IPBES--2018|IPBES, 2018]] ; [[#Roy--2018b|Roy et al., 2018b]] ). Ghana, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda all link adaptation with disaster risk reduction in their NDCs ( [[#UNFCCC%20Adaptation%20Committee--2019|UNFCCC Adaptation Committee, 2019]] ).

|-
| ''High-level engagement''

| Climate policies, traditionally overseen by environment ministries, are increasingly receiving priority from finance and planning ministries. Zambia’s Climate Change Secretariat is currently led by the Ministry of Finance ( [[#Government%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Zambia--2010|Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2010]] ), while Tanzania’s environmental division sits in the office of the Vice-President ( [[#Governmet%20of%20the%20United%20Republic%20of%20Tanzania--2011|Governmet of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2011]] ).

|-
| ''All-of-government approach''

| In Kenya, the Climate Change Directorate is the secretariat for the National Climate Change Commission, serving as an overarching mechanism to coordinate sectoral and county-level action ( [[#Government%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Kenya--2018|Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2018]] ). In South Africa, the National Committee on Climate Change, the Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change and the Presidential Climate Change Commission have been established to enhance intergovernmental and multi-sectoral coordination on climate action ( [[#Climate%20Action%20Tracker--2021|Climate Action Tracker, 2021]] ).

|-
| ''Participatory engagement''

| Polycentric, bottom-up and locally implemented approaches are more able to include the emergence of new actors (e.g., city networks, multinational companies and sub-state entities), new instruments and levels (soft law instruments or transnational dynamics) and new guiding principles and values (fairness, transparency and co-participation) ( [[#Leal%20Filho--2018|Leal Filho et al., 2018]] ; [[#Sapiains--2021|Sapiains et al., 2021]] ). Case studies include the community-based, participatory scenario planning approach used in Malawi to generate information for farmers from seasonal forecasts, as well as the integration of climate risk into Lusaka’s Strategic Plan through engagement with city planners ( [[#Conway--2021|Conway and Vincent, 2021]] ; [[#Vincent--2021|Vincent and Conway, 2021]] ). Many innovative solutions have been designed to promote participation, such as Pamoja Voices toolkits in pastoralist communities in northern Tanzania ( [[#Greene--2020|Greene et al., 2020]] ).

|-
| ''Inclusive and diverse stakeholders''

| Kenya’s Climate Change Directorate has a designated team to integrate gender into its national climate policies ( [[#Murray--2019|Murray, 2019]] ), while Seychelles’ National Climate Change Council has allocated a seat exclusively for a youth candidate ( [[#Government%20of%20The%20Seychelles--2020|Government of The Seychelles, 2020]] ). Tanzanian Climate-Smart Agriculture Alliance supports the integration of farmers and builds strategic alliances to support climate processes ( [[#Nyasimi--2017|Nyasimi et al., 2017]] ).

|-
| ''Partnerships''

| Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia are developing anticipatory scenarios for low-carbon CRD pathways for the agricultural sector, aimed at informing input into national climate policy ( [[#Balié--2019|Balié et al., 2019]] ). This science to policy to practice interface is bridged through the inclusion of policymakers, practitioners and academics ( [[#Dinesh--2018|Dinesh et al., 2018]] ). In Lusaka, Durban and other African cities, processes of engagement and learning have built the trust and capacities needed to inform city-scale, climate-resilient decisions and associated actions ( [[#Taylor--2021a|Taylor et al., 2021a]] ; [[#Taylor--2021b|Taylor et al., 2021b]] ).

|-
| ''Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) implementation''

| Rwanda has developed an indicator-based monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework for tracking its NDC implementation and associated financial flows ( [[#Government%20of%20Republic%20of%20Rwanda--2020|Government of Republic of Rwanda, 2020]] ). Zambia has also integrated gender indicators into its NDC implementation plan and is incorporating gender considerations into its MRV framework ( [[#Murray--2019|Murray, 2019]] ).

|}

<div id="9.4.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="cross-sectoral-and-transboundary-solutions"></span>
=== 9.4.3 Cross-sectoral and Transboundary Solutions ===

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Climate change does not present its problems and opportunities conveniently aligned with traditional sectors, so mechanisms are needed to facilitate interactions and collaborations between people working in widely different sectors ( [[#Simpson--2021b|Simpson et al., 2021b]] ). Traditional risk assessments typically only consider one climate hazard and one sector at a time, but this can lead to substantial misestimation of risk because multiple climate risks can interact to cause extreme impacts ( [[#Zscheischler--2018|Zscheischler et al., 2018]] ; [[#Simpson--2021b|Simpson et al., 2021b]] ).

Because multiple risks are interlinked and can cascade and amplify risk across sectors, cross-sectoral approaches that consider these interlinkages are essential for CRD, especially for managing trade-offs and co-benefits among SDGs, mitigation and adaptation responses ( [[#Liu--2018a|Liu et al., 2018a]] ).

In Africa, placing cross-sectoral approaches at the core of CRD provides significant opportunities to deliver large benefits and/or avoided damages across multiple sectors including water, health, ecosystems and economies ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Boxes 9.5; 9.6; 9.7). They can also prevent adaptation or mitigation action in one sector exacerbating risks in other sectors and resulting in maladaptation, for example, from large-scale dam construction or large-scale afforestation (e.g., water–energy–food nexus and large-scale tree planting efforts) (Boxes 9.3; 9.5).

Cross-sectoral or ‘nexus’ approaches can improve the ability of decision makers to foresee and prevent major climate impacts. Barriers to developing nexus approaches arise from rigid sectoral planning, regulatory and implementation procedures, entrenched interests, and power structures and established sectoral communication structures. Opportunities for overcoming these barriers include creating a dedicated home for co-development of nexus risk assessment and solutions, promoting co-leadership of projects by multiple sectors, specific budget allocations for nexus projects, facilitating and coordinating services, compiling useful strategies into toolkits, ameliorating inequitable power relations among participants and measuring progress on nexus approaches through metrics ( [[#Palmer--2016|Palmer et al., 2016]] ; [[#Baron--2017|Baron et al., 2017]] ).

Beyond cross-sectoral collaboration, international cooperation is vital to avert dangerous climate change as its impacts reach beyond the jurisdiction of individual states. International good practice and regional agreements, protocols and policies together recognise that regional integration, cooperative governance and benefit-sharing approaches are cornerstones of effective resource security and climate change responses in Africa ( [[#Jensen--2013|Jensen and Lange, 2013]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2017a|World Bank, 2017a]] ; [[#Dombrowsky--2018|Dombrowsky and Hensengerth, 2018]] ). Natural resource development, particularly governance of shared river basins, exemplifies opportunities for governance responses for African nations that can be cooperative, regionally integrated and climate resilient.

In Africa, climate vulnerability crosses geopolitical divides as regional clusters of fragile and high vulnerability countries exist, emphasising the need for transboundary cooperation ( [[#Birkmann--2021|Birkmann et al., 2021]] ; [[#Buhaug--2021|Buhaug and von Uexkull, 2021]] ). Natural resource security is increasingly reliant on transboundary governance, regional integration and cooperation ( [[#Namara--2017|Namara and Giordano, 2017]] ). There are 60 international or shared river basins on the continent, a function of colonial divides and topography, with some basins shared by four or more countries ( [[#UNECA--2016|UNECA, 2016]] ; [[#Popelka--2020|Popelka and Smith, 2020]] ). Climate changes which result in impact and risk pathways across country boundaries and regions (although with different levels of impact) accelerate the urgency for integrated approaches to manage and benefit from shared resources and promote their security for populations and economies ( [[#Namara--2017|Namara and Giordano, 2017]] ; [[#Frame--2018|Frame et al., 2018]] ; [[#Carter--2021|Carter et al., 2021]] ). At the same time, natural resources such as water generate economic benefits shared across boundaries, such as hydroelectric power generation and regional food security ( [[#Dombrowsky--2018|Dombrowsky and Hensengerth, 2018]] ).

Poor governance, particularly at the transboundary level, can undermine water security and climate change is likely to add new challenges to pre-existing dynamics, emphasising the necessity of formal transboundary arrangements ( [[#Jensen--2013|Jensen and Lange, 2013]] ; [[#UNECA--2016|UNECA, 2016]] ). Further, it can constrain access to critical financial resources at a time when it is needed most. This is particularly the case when climate impact pathways manifest at the transboundary level ( [[#Challinor--2018|Challinor et al., 2018]] ; [[#Simpson--2021b|Simpson et al., 2021b]] ), but where the need to protect sovereign interests can block regionally integrated institutional arrangements that are pivotal for accessing the multilateral climate funds for transboundary climate investments that include resilient infrastructure and greater water benefits across Africa’s shared river basins (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG in Chapter 16; [[#Carter--2021|Carter et al., 2021]] ).

In response, the African Development Bank is supporting two of the most climate-vulnerable and larger African river basins to leverage GCF and Global Environment Facility (GEF) funds to finance Programmes for Integrated Development and Adaptation to Climate Change (PIDACC). PIDACC finance is approved at the multinational level in the Niger basin which is shared by nine west and central African States ( [[#AfDB--2018c|AfDB, 2018c]] ; [[#GCF--2018a|GCF, 2018a]] ), while a PIDACC proposal is currently under development for the Zambezi basin ( [[#Zambezi%20Watercourse%20Commission--2021|Zambezi Watercourse Commission, 2021]] ).

Stakeholders across Africa are recognising the scale and severity of transboundary risks to water. Such risks are two-fold in nature, arising both from potential impacts due to climate change and from responses to climate change ( [[#Simpson--2021b|Simpson et al., 2021b]] ). This awareness among stakeholders is leading to increasingly progressive approaches to natural resource development that can also reduce risk across boundaries within regions. For example, river basin organisations in Southern Africa such as the Orange-Senqu and the Okavango River Basin Commissions are revising treaties considered to pre-date the interrelated issues of climate change, growing populations and water scarcity ( [[#OKACOM--2020|OKACOM, 2020]] ). In parts of west Africa, where climate change is characterised by reduction of precipitation ( [[#Barry--2018|Barry et al., 2018]] ), regionally integrated and climate-resilient economic investments for water resource development are enabled by the Senegal River Basin Organisation (OMVS) which emphasises programme and project development, financing and implementation in ensuing work plans ( [[#World%20Bank--2020e|World Bank, 2020e]] ), as does the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in north and east Africa ( [[#Schmeier--2017|Schmeier, 2017]] ; [[#Blumstein--2021|Blumstein and Petersen-Perlman, 2021]] ).

Enhanced transboundary governance arrangements suggest that countries are joining forces to coherently manage and protect natural resources ( [[#Spalding-Fecher--2014|Spalding-Fecher et al., 2014]] ; [[#AfDB--2021|AfDB, 2021]] ). Underlying governance issues and political economy interests block or advance such transitions to regionally integrated resource management and benefit-sharing, the market drivers of water security ( [[#AMCOW--2012|AMCOW, 2012]] ; [[#Soliev--2015|Soliev et al., 2015]] ). Angola, for example, outlines regional adaptation as a priority and one of its unconditional adaptation strategies (which is already funded) is enhancing resilience in the Benguela fisheries system, a project shared with Namibia and South Africa ( [[#GEF%20and%20FAO--2021|GEF and FAO, 2021]] ). Another example is The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel Initiative, which was launched in 2007 with the aim of tackling land degradation in Africa ( [[#UNCCD--2020|UNCCD, 2020]] ). This transboundary project, led by the African Union Commission, is being implemented in more than 20 countries across Africa’s Sahel region, in cooperation with international partners including UNCCD, GEF and the World Bank. Approximately USD 10 billion have been mobilised and/or promised for this initiative ( [[#UNCCD--2020|UNCCD, 2020]] ). Such statements demonstrate the increasing identification of transboundary risks and approaches to manage and adapt to them as areas of ‘common concern’ that require cooperative adaptation actions. Accelerating strengthened transboundary water and climate governance needs to integrate these climate drivers of compromised water security. The role of institutions such as OMVS and the NBI have demonstrated they can influence economic behaviour among riparian countries of shared river basins highlighting that institutions are an integral part of climate governance in evolving economic systems ( [[#Hodgson--2000|Hodgson, 2000]] ).

<div id="9.4.4" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="climate-change-adaptation-law-in-africa"></span>
=== 9.4.4 Climate Change Adaptation Law in Africa ===

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<div id="9.4.4.1" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="the-rise-of-climate-change-adaptation-law"></span>
==== 9.4.4.1 The Rise of Climate Change Adaptation Law ====

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Robust legislative frameworks, both climate change specific and non-specific, can foster adaptive responses to climate change, particularly in LDCs ( [[#Nachmany--2017|Nachmany et al., 2017]] ). As discussed in Chapter 17, there are many reasons for this. The successful implementation of policy objectives across the continent is often contingent upon or at least supported by an underlying legislative framework ( [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova and Matikainen, 2017]] ; [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ). There are also wider systemic and structural reasons for developing climate change legislation, including the promotion of coordination within government, its policy entrenching role, its symbolic value and its potential to support climate finance flows ( [[#Nachmany--2017|Nachmany et al., 2017]] ; [[#Scotford--2019|Scotford and Minas, 2019]] ).

Legal systems, however, also have the potential to be maladaptive. Laws may be brittle, often assuming and reinforcing a static state, and the boundary of the law may not align to the relevant location, scale or impact ( [[#Craig--2010|Craig, 2010]] ; [[#Arnold--2013|Arnold and Gunderson, 2013]] ; [[#Wenta--2019|Wenta et al., 2019]] ). This necessitates the review and revision of existing laws to remove such barriers and foster adaptive management ( [[#Craig--2010|Craig, 2010]] ; [[#Ruhl--2010|Ruhl, 2010]] ; [[#Cosens--2017|Cosens et al., 2017]] ) and, where necessary, the promulgation of new laws.

There has been a rise in framework and sectoral climate change laws across Africa, as illustrated in Figure 9.10. The map illustrates the two framework statutes which have been promulgated in Benin and Kenya, as well as the three framework bills which have been drafted in Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. There are also discussions taking place in Zimbabwe and Ghana regarding the potential development of a draft framework climate change bill. A review of the climate change framework laws indicates evidence of cross-pollination in design across African jurisdictions, creating the potential for a unique and regionally appropriate body of law with a strong focus on adaptation responses ( [[#Rumble--2019|Rumble, 2019]] ). As discussed in Chapter 17, however, there remains the need for in-country expert input on how the domestic legal landscape may influence their operation, and for each jurisdiction to independently interrogate its adaptation needs and objectives ( [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ).

<div id="_idContainer026" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:765fb0cafc8142aed261ee003aeece0a IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_010.png]]

'''Figure 9.10 |''' '''Progress in development of climate change framework law in Africa derived from an analysis of public databases of African laws''' , data drawn from Government of Niger ( '''1998''' ); Government of Liberia ( '''2002''' ); Government of Algeria ( '''2004''' ); Government of Tanzania ( '''2004''' ); Government of Central African Republic ( '''2008''' ); Government of Lesotho ( '''2008''' ); Government of Togo ( '''2008''' ); Government of Guinea Bissau ( '''2011''' ); Government of Ivory Coast ( '''2012''' ); Government of Rwanda ( '''2012''' ); Government of Sierra Leone ( '''2012''' ); Government of Cape Verde ( '''2014''' ); Government of Morocco ( '''2014''' ); Government of Mozambique ( '''2014''' ); Government of Madagascar ( '''2015''' ); Government of the Seychelles ( '''2015''' ); Government of Gabon ( '''2016''' ); Government of Kenya ( '''2016''' ); Government of Mali ( '''2016''' ); Government of Zambia ( '''2016''' ); Government of Malawi ( '''2017''' ); Government of Nigeria ( '''2017''' ); Government of Benin ( '''2018''' ); Government of Ghana ( '''2018''' ); Government of South Africa ( '''2018''' ); Government of Uganda ( '''2018''' ); Government of Zimbabwe ( '''2019''' ) sources quoted as of September '''2019''' .

Numerous African states have also included dedicated climate change-related provisions within various existing statutes that regulate the environment or disaster management. For example, Tanzania’s Environmental Management Act 20 of 2004 contains dedicated provisions to address climate change. Rwanda’s Law on Environment 48/2018 also contains detailed provisions on mainstreaming climate change into development planning processes, education on climate change, vulnerability assessments and the promotion of measures to enhance adaptive capacity. Some countries have also developed laws dedicated to a specific aspect of adaptation. For example, the Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust of Seychelles Act 18 of 2015 establishes a trust fund to finance climate change adaptation responses in Seychelles. Similarly, many countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ghana, Namibia, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa have dedicated disaster management laws. At this stage, it is still too early to determine whether these laws are having any substantive influence in strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability and, as discussed in Chapter 17, this is identified as a knowledge gap requiring further research.

<div id="9.4.4.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="common-themes-in-framework-laws"></span>
==== 9.4.4.2 Common Themes in Framework Laws ====

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Laws are now being developed to formalise and entrench institutional structures, specifying their mandate, function, membership and related procedures. A useful example of such an approach can be found in the Nigerian Climate Change Bill which establishes the National Climate Council on Climate Change headed and chaired by the Vice-President, with a wide membership of ministers, the Chairmen of the Governors’ Forum and Association of Local Governments, as well as the private sector and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives.

Climate change framework laws can play an instrumental role in achieving mainstreaming by directing relevant actors to integrate adaptation considerations into existing mandates, operations and planning instruments ( [[#Rumble--2019|Rumble, 2019]] ). By way of example, the South African Draft Climate Change Bill contains a general duty to ‘coordinate and harmonise the policies, plans, programmes and decisions of the national, provincial and local spheres of government’ to achieve, among other things, the climate change objectives of the Bill and national adaptation objectives.

Another common theme is the requirement to develop national climate change adaptation strategies and plans. Many laws further entrench their longevity by requiring them to be subject to strong community participation and consultation, as demonstrated by the Kenyan Climate Change Act and the Nigerian Climate Change Bill.

<div id="9.4.4.3" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="local-climate-change-laws-and-indigenous-knowledge-systems"></span>
==== 9.4.4.3 Local Climate Change Laws and Indigenous Knowledge Systems ====

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The Paris Agreement acknowledges, in Article 7.5, that adaptation should be based on and guided by, among other things, ‘traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems’. The accumulated knowledge within Indigenous knowledge systems is particularly important as it can assist governments in determining how the climate is changing, how to characterise these impacts and provide lessons for adaptation ( [[#Salick--2009|Salick and Ross, 2009]] ). In this context, Indigenous knowledge systems can play an important role in the effective design of local laws ( [[#Mwanga--2019|Mwanga, 2019]] ), as well as national laws. Doing so can contribute to the success of climate change response strategies, including enhancing local participation and the implementation of community-based and ecosystem-based adaptations ( [[#Chanza--2016|Chanza and de Wit, 2016]] ; [[#Mwanga--2019|Mwanga, 2019]] ). For example, the Makorongo Village Forest Management By-Law in Tanzania codifies local customary practices relating to forest management and sustainable harvesting with associated dual adaptation and mitigation benefits and includes all villagers in the decision-making processes relating to forest management ( [[#Mwanga--2019|Mwanga, 2019]] ). The inclusion of beneficial Indigenous knowledge systems within local by-laws is contingent on the active involvement of members of the Indigenous community and awareness of climate change considerations within the local sphere of government, and a willingness to foster such practices ( [[#Mwanga--2019|Mwanga, 2019]] ).

In addition to the advancement of Indigenous knowledge in adaptive responses, it has been suggested that the protection of the rights of Indigenous Peoples can have adaptive benefits, in particular through the protection of land tenure rights ( [[#Ayanlade--2016|Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016]] ). It has been argued that doing so will protect Indigenous Peoples’ lands and resources from overconsumption, secure the recognition of their cultural stewardship over the environment, provide the financial incentive for land stewardship and promote the application of their unique knowledge on the sustainable development of that land and its preservation ( [[#Jaksa--2006|Jaksa, 2006]] ; [[#Ayanlade--2016|Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016]] ). Not only can a lack of protection of Indigenous legal tenure undermine these objectives, but a number of African laws may actively work against them. For example, a review of Tanzanian and Zambian laws highlighted existing provisions that empowered the state to terminate or criminalise the occupation of vacant, undeveloped or fallow lands, which undermined the occupation by Indigenous peoples of forests and other uncultivated lands ( [[#Ayanlade--2016|Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016]] ).

<div id="9.4.5" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="climate-services-perception-and-literacy"></span>
=== 9.4.5 Climate Services, Perception and Literacy ===

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Policy actors across Africa perceive that human-caused climate change is already impacting their locales through a range of negative socioeconomic and environmental effects ( [[#Pasquini--2020|Pasquini, 2020]] ; Steynor and [[#Pasquini--2020|Pasquini, 2020]] ). They are highly concerned about and motivated to address these impacts ( [[#Hambira--2015|Hambira and Saarinen, 2015]] ; [[#Pasquini--2020|Pasquini, 2020]] ). Transformative responses to the impacts of climate change facilitate CRD and are informed by perceptions of climate variability and change and climate change literacy (Figure 9.11).

<div id="_idContainer028" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:c7db8d5ff343f59f1a5010f09b7083e8 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_011.png]]

'''Figure 9.11 |''' '''Climate services and climate literacy are important for informing transformative responses to climate change (including adaptation and mitigation responses)'''

'''(a)''' The importance of climate services and climate change literacy for more transformative responses to climate change in Africa adapted from Simpson et al. '''(2021a).''' Climate services promote climate resilient development by providing climate information for adaptation decision making ( [[#Street--2016|Street, 2016]] ; [[#Vaughan--2018|Vaughan et al., 2018]] ). Scalable uptake of climate services relies partly on climate risk perception of users, which is largely driven in Africa by experience and perception of local climate changes ( [[#Jacobs--2020|Jacobs and Street, 2020]] ; [[#Steynor--2020b|Steynor et al., 2020b]] ; Steynor and [[#Pasquini--2020|Pasquini, 2020]] ). Perception of climate change can occur without knowledge of its human-induced causes and its effects ( [[#Lee--2015|Lee et al., 2015]] ; [[#Alemayehu--2017|Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017]] ; [[#Andrews--2020|Andrews and Smirnov, 2020]] ). This can lead to coping responses to climate change which fall short of adaptation. Climate change literacy encompasses being aware of climate change and its anthropogenic causes and, together with climate services, can strengthen responses to climate change through better understanding of future risk ( [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ).

'''(b, c)''' Percentage of studies that have recorded that perception of temperature changes and precipitation changes agreed with local meteorological or climate records across 33 African countries (size of bubble indicates number of studies per country for both b and c. In b, agreement with temperature changes is indicated for all studies within a country in red, and articles indicating no agreement in orange; while in c, agreement with precipitation changes is indicated per country in dark blue and articles indicating no agreement in light blue. A total of 144 studies assessed across the 33 countries).

'''(d)''' Country-level rates of climate change literacy for 33 African countries (i.e., percentage of the population that have heard about climate change and think that human activity is wholly or partly the cause of climate change) [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al. (2021a)]] .

<div id="9.4.5.1" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="climate-information-and-services"></span>
==== 9.4.5.1 Climate Information and Services ====

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Climate services (CS) broadly include the generation, tailoring and provision of climate information for use in decision making at all levels of society ( [[#Street--2016|Street, 2016]] ; [[#Vaughan--2018|Vaughan et al., 2018]] ). There is a range of climate service providers in Africa, including primarily National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS) and partner institutions, complemented by NGOs, the private sector and research institutions ( [[#Snow--2016|Snow et al., 2016]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey et al., 2019]] ), which offer the potential for public–private partnerships ( [[#Winrock--2018|Winrock, 2018]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey et al., 2019]] ).

International development funding has progressed the provision of CS and, together with technological advances and capacity-building initiatives, has increased the reliability of CS across Africa ( [[#Vogel--2019|Vogel et al., 2019]] ). Most CS investments have been towards the agricultural sector, with other focal sectors, including pastoralism, health, water, energy and disaster risk reduction, having only small CS initiatives directed towards them ( [[#Nkiaka--2019|Nkiaka et al., 2019]] ; [[#Carr--2020|Carr et al., 2020]] ). Despite this focus and investment, however, there remains a mismatch between the supply and uptake of CS in Africa as information is often inaccessible, unaffordable, not relevant to context or scale, and is poorly communicated ( [[#Singh--2018|Singh et al., 2018]] ; [[#Antwi-Agyei--2021|Antwi-Agyei et al., 2021]] ) (Table 9.4; Sections 9.4.1.5.1 and 9.13.4.1). Observational data required for effective regional CS, including trend analyses, seasonal climate assessment, modelling and model evaluation, is sparse and often of poor quality (Figure 9.11) and usually requires payment which renders it unaffordable ( [[#Winrock--2018|Winrock, 2018]] ).

A number of these challenges can be addressed through the transdisciplinary co-production of CS ( [[#Alexander--2019|Alexander and Dessai, 2019]] ; [[#Vogel--2019|Vogel et al., 2019]] ; [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al., 2020]] ). Co-production of CS involves climate information producers, practitioners and stakeholders, and other knowledge holders participating in equitable partnerships and dialogues to collaboratively identify climate-based risk and develop scale-relevant climate information to address this risk (Table 9.4) ( [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al., 2018]] ; [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al., 2020]] ).

'''Table 9.4 |''' Challenges and opportunities for Climate Services in Africa for the supply and uptake of climate services.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Challenges'''

! '''Opportunities/solutions'''

! '''References'''

! '''Examples of programmes that address these challenges''' a

|-
| colspan="4"| '''Supply of Climate Services'''

|-
| Poor infrastructure (e.g., non-functioning observational networks; limited Internet bandwidth; lack of climate modelling capacity; issues of keeping pace with changing technology)

| * International funding for observation networks, data rescue and data sharing
* Regular NMHS budgets from governments
* Public–private partnerships

| [[#Snow--2016|Snow et al. (2016)]] ; [[#World%20Bank%20Group--2016|World Bank Group (2016)]] ; [[#Winrock--2018|Winrock (2018)]] ; [[#Cullmann--2020|Cullmann et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Meque--2021|Meque et al. (2021)]]

| ''East Africa and the West African Sahel (ENACTS programme)''

Working with NMHS to provide enhanced services by overcoming the challenges of data quality, availability and access.

Creating of reliable climate information suitable for national and local decision-making using station observations and satellite data to provide greater accuracy in smaller space and time scales.

|-
| Fragmented delivery of Climate Services

| * Greater collaboration between the NMHS and sector-specific specialists to create a central database of sector-based climate services

| [[#Winrock--2018|Winrock (2018)]] ; [[#Hansen--2019a|Hansen et al. (2019a)]]

| ''Rwanda (RCSA programme)''

Improving CS and agricultural risk management at local and national government levels in the face of a variable and changing climate.

|-
| Mismatch in time scales: short-term information more desirable (e.g., seasonal predictions as opposed to decadal or end of century projections)

| * Co-production of climate service products

| [[#Jones--2015|Jones et al. (2015)]] ; [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al. (2018)]] ; [[#Hansen--2019a|Hansen et al. (2019a)]] ; [[#Carr--2020|Carr et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Sultan--2020|Sultan et al. (2020)]]

| ''Burkina Faso (BRACED project)''

Strengthening technical and communication capacities of national meteorological services to enable partners to jointly develop forecasts tailored to support agro-pastoralists.

|-
| Development funding interventions operate on time scales that inhibit or restrict effective adaptation and neglect to build in considerations for sustainability post the funded intervention

| * Co-production of climate service products
* Endogenously driven climate services (services that are developed by regional actors, not by remote, usually developed nation actors)

| [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al. (2018)]] ; Vogel et al. (2019) [[#Vincent--2020a|Vincent et al. (2020a)]]

| ''Burkina Faso (BRACED project)''

Actors recognised the need to ensure continuation of CS post-project. Burkina Faso NMHS (ANAM) and National Council for Emergency Assistance and Rehabilitation (CONASUR) budgeted for the continued communication of CS and training of focal weather intermediaries. Local radio stations agreed to continue transmitting CS.

|-
| colspan="4"| '''Use of Climate Services'''

|-
| Insufficient access to usable data, including station data, and information suited to the decision context (including accessibility limitations based on gender and social inequalities)

| * Capacity development initiatives for Climate Services providers, intermediaries (including extension agents, NGO workers and others) and users
* User needs assessments
* Consistent monitoring and evaluation of Climate Services interventions

| [[#Jones--2015|Jones et al. (2015)]] ; [[#Winrock--2018|Winrock (2018)]] ; [[#Hansen--2019a|Hansen et al. (2019a)]] ; [[#Hansen--2019c|Hansen et al. (2019c)]] ; [[#Mercy%20Corps--2019|Mercy Corps (2019)]] ; [[#Nkiaka--2019|Nkiaka et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Carr--2020|Carr et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Cullmann--2020|Cullmann et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Gumucio--2020|Gumucio et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Sultan--2020|Sultan et al. (2020)]]

Figure 9.11

| ''Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger and Malawi (ALP Programme)''

Co-production of relevant information for decision making and planning at seasonal time scales. The methods and media for communication and messages differ between different users. Strong emphasis on participation by women.

|-
| Limited capacity of users to understand or request appropriate Climate Services products

| * Co-production of climate service products
* Capacity development

| [[#Snow--2016|Snow et al. (2016)]] ; [[#Singh--2018|Singh et al. (2018)]] ; [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al. (2018)]] ; [[#Nkiaka--2019|Nkiaka et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Daniels--2020|Daniels et al. (2020)]]

| ''Cities in Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and South Africa (FRACTAL programme)''

Repeated interactions between each represented sector to learn and more completely understand the different contexts of each represented party and build understanding through an ethic of collaboration for solving climate-related problems in each unique city.

|-
| Lack of user trust in the information

| * Co-production of climate service products
* Combine scientific and Indigenous forecasts
* Demonstrate added value of the climate service

| [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al. (2018)]] ; [[#Nkiaka--2019|Nkiaka et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Vaughan--2019|Vaughan et al. (2019)]] ; Vogel et al. (2019); [[#Nyadzi--2021|Nyadzi et al. (2021)]]

| ''Tanzania (ENACTS programme)''

Co-production to inform malaria decisions systematically and change relationships, trust, and demand in a manner that had not been realised through previous singular and siloed approaches.

|-
| Socioeconomic, and institutional barriers (limited professional mandates, financing limitations, institutional cooperation)

| * Regular NMHS budgets from governments
* Public–private partnerships
* Supportive institutions, policy frameworks and individual capacity and agency

| [[#Snow--2016|Snow et al. (2016)]] ; [[#World%20Bank%20Group--2016|World Bank Group (2016)]] ; [[#Winrock--2018|Winrock (2018)]] ; [[#Harvey--2019|Harvey et al. (2019)]] ; [[#Vincent--2020b|Vincent et al. (2020b)]]

|
|}

Notes:

(a) Reproduced from [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al. (2020)]] with permission.

However, the effectiveness of co-production processes are hindered by aspects such as inequitable power relationships between different types of knowledge holders (e.g., scientists and practitioners), inequitable distribution of funding between developed country and African partners that favours developed country partners, an inability to develop sustained trust relationships as a result of short-funding cycles, a lack of flexibility due to product-focused engagements and the scalability of co-production to enable widespread reach across Africa as the process is usually context specific ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al., 2018]] ; [[#Vogel--2019|Vogel et al., 2019]] ; 2020a).

Despite these challenges, the inclusive nature of co-production has had a positive influence on the uptake of CS into decision making where it has been applied (Table 9.4; Figure 9.12; [[#Vincent--2018|Vincent et al., 2018]] ; [[#Vogel--2019|Vogel et al., 2019]] ; [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al., 2020]] ; [[#Chiputwa--2020|Chiputwa et al., 2020]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ), through sustained inter/transdisciplinary relationships and capacity development ( [[#Norström--2020|Norström et al., 2020]] ), strategic financial investment, fostering of ownership of resulting products and the combining of scientific and other knowledge systems ( [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al., 2020]] ; [[#Steynor--2020a|Steynor et al., 2020a]] ). There is ''high confidence'' that together with improved institutional capacity building and strategic financial investment, CS can help African stakeholders adapt to projected climate risks (Figure 9.11).

<div id="_idContainer032" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:758f3feab3aac0a315c4b408a80ef5fa IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_012.png]]

'''Figure 9.12 |''' '''The inclusive nature of co-production has had a positive influence on the uptake of climate services into decision making in Africa.''' Selected examples of the co-production of climate services and the sectors involved. Icons indicate sectors and numbers show the programmes under which the co-production engagements occurred. Programmes listed are (1) AMMA-2050: Combining Scenario Games, Participatory Modelling and Theatre Forums to Co-produce Climate Information for Medium-term Planning, (2,3) BRACED: Sharing Lessons on Promoting Gender Equality through a ‘Writeshop’, (4) RCSA: Bringing Climate Services to People Living in Rwanda’s Rural Areas, (5) ALP: Participatory Scenario Planning for Local Seasonal Climate Forecasts and Advisories, (6) Climate Risk Narratives: Co-producing Stories of the Future, (7) ENACTS: Developing Climate Services for Malaria Surveillance and Control in Tanzania, (8) FATHUM: Forecast for Anticipatory Humanitarian Action, (9) FRACTAL: Learning Labs, Dialogues and Embedded Researchers in Southern African Cities, (10) FONERWA: Climate Risk Screening Tool, (11) MHEWS: Multi-hazard Early Warning System for Coastal Tanzania, (12) Resilient Transport Strategic Assessment for Dar es Salaam, (13) RRA: Climate Attribution for Extreme Weather Events in Ethiopia and Kenya, (14) UMFULA: Co-producing Climate Information for Medium-term Planning in the Water-Energy-Food Nexus, (15) IRRP: Building Resilience in Tanzania’s Energy Sector Planning, (16) PRISE: Co-exploring Relevant Evidence for Policy Change in Kenya, (17) NMA ENACTS: An Example of a Co-produced Climate Service Fit for Purpose, (18) REACH: Improving Water Security for the Poor in Turkana County, Kenya, (19) DARAJA: Co-designing Weather and Climate Information Services for and with Urban Informal Settlements in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, (20) ForPAc: Co-producing Approaches to Forecast-based Early Action for Drought and Floods in Kenya, (21) HIGHWAY: Co-produced Impact-based Early Warnings and Forecasts to Support Fishing Communities on Lake Victoria, (22) HyCRISTAL: Using Video to Initiate Farmer Dialogue with Local Government in Mukono, Uganda, (23) SCIPEA: Co-produced Seasonal Forecasts for More Effective Management of Hydropower Supply in Kenya, (24) Weather Wise: Co-producing Weather and Climate Radio Content for Farmers, Fishermen and Pastoralists in East Africa. See [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al. (2020)]] for details and outcomes of each engagement. Source: [[#Carter--2020|Carter et al. (2020)]] .

<div id="9.4.5.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="community-perceptions-of-climate-variability-and-change"></span>
==== 9.4.5.2 Community Perceptions of Climate Variability and Change ====

<div id="h3-11-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Perceptions of climate variability and change affect whether and how individuals and institutions act, and thus contribute to the success or failure of adaptation policies related to weather and climate ( [[#Silvestri--2012|Silvestri et al., 2012]] ; [[#Arbuckle--2015|Arbuckle et al., 2015]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ).

A recent Afrobarometer study covering 34 African countries found 67% of Africans perceive climate conditions for agricultural production to have worsened over time, and report drought as the main extreme weather event to have worsened in the past decade ( [[#Selormey--2019|Selormey et al., 2019]] ). Of these participants, across all socioeconomic strata, 71% of those who were aware of the concept of climate change agreed that it needs to be stopped, but only 51% expressed confidence about their ability to make a difference. East Africans (63%) were almost twice as likely as north Africans (35%) to report that the weather for growing crops had worsened. Additionally, people engaged in occupations related to agriculture (farming, fishing or forestry) were more likely to report negative weather effects (59%) than those with other livelihoods (45%) ( [[#Selormey--2019|Selormey et al., 2019]] ). Similar perceptions have been reported among a diversity of rural communities in many sub-Saharan African countries ( [[#Mahl--2020|Mahl et al., 2020]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ).

Rural communities, particularly farmers, are the most studied groups for climate change perception. They perceive the climate to be changing, most often reporting changes in rainfall variability, increased dry spells, decreases in rainfall and increased temperatures or temperature extremes. They perceive these changes to bring a range of negative socioeconomic and environmental effects ( [[#Alemayehu--2017|Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017]] ; [[#Liverpool-Tasie--2020|Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2020]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). In some cases, farmers’ perceptions of changes in weather and climate frequently match climate records for decreased precipitation totals, increased drought frequency, shorter rainy season and rainy season delay, and increased temperatures (Figure 9.11; [[#Rurinda--2014|Rurinda et al., 2014]] ; [[#Boansi--2017|Boansi et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ayanlade--2018|Ayanlade et al., 2018]] ), but not in all cases or not for all perceived changes, with common discrepancies in perceived lower rainfall totals ( [[#Alemayehu--2017|Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017]] ; [[#Ayal--2017|Ayal and Leal Filho, 2017]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ).

Farming experience, access to extension services and increasing age are the most frequently cited factors positively influencing the perceptions of climate changes ( [[#Alemayehu--2017|Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017]] ; [[#Oduniyi--2019|Oduniyi and Tekana, 2019]] ). Personal experience of climate-related changes and their impacts appears to be an important factor influencing perceptions through shaping negative associations, for example, experience of flash floods ( [[#Elshirbiny--2020|Elshirbiny and Abrahamse, 2020]] ) or direct effect on economic activity, indicating that perception is not restricted to crop farmers ( [[#Liverpool-Tasie--2020|Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2020]] ). However, perceptions show common misconceptions about the causes of climate change, which has implications for climate action ( [[#Elshirbiny--2020|Elshirbiny and Abrahamse, 2020]] ), highlighting the importance of climate change literacy.

<div id="9.4.5.3" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="climate-change-literacy"></span>
==== 9.4.5.3 Climate Change Literacy ====

<div id="h3-12-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Understanding the human cause of climate change is a strong predictor of climate change risk perception ( [[#Lee--2015|Lee et al., 2015]] ) and a critical knowledge foundation that can affect the difference between coping responses and more informed and transformative adaptation (Figure 9.11; [[#Oladipo--2015|Oladipo, 2015]] ; [[#Mutandwa--2019|Mutandwa et al., 2019]] ). At a minimum, climate change literacy includes both having heard of climate change and understanding it is, at least in part, caused by people ( [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). However, large inequalities in climate change literacy exist between and within countries and communities across Africa.

The average national climate change literacy rate in Africa is only 39% (country rates range from 23–66%) (Figure 9.11). Of 394 sub-national regions surveyed by Afrobarometer, 8% (37 regions in 16 countries) have a climate change literacy rate lower than 20%, while only 2% (8 regions) score higher than 80%, which is common across European countries ( [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). Striking differences exist when comparing sub-national units within countries. Climate change literacy rates in Nigeria range from 71% in Kwara to 5% in Kano, and within Botswana from 69% in Lobatse to only 6% in Kweneng West ( [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). Education is the strongest positive predictor of climate change literacy, particularly tertiary education, but poverty decreases climate change literacy and climate change literacy rates average 12.8% lower for women than men ( [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ).

As the identified factors driving climate change literacy overlap with broader developmental challenges on the continent, policies targeting these factors (e.g., increased education) can potentially yield co-benefits for both climate change adaptation as well as progress towards SDGs, particularly education and gender equality ( [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). Progress towards greater climate change literacy affords a concrete opportunity to mainstream climate change within core national and sub-national developmental agendas in Africa towards more CRD pathways. Synergies with CS can also overcome gendered deficits, for example, although women are generally less climate change aware and more vulnerable to climate change than men in Africa, they are generally more likely to adopt climate-resilient crops when they are climate change aware and have exposure to extension services ( [[#Acevedo--2020|Acevedo et al., 2020]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ).

<div id="box-9.1" class="h2-container box-container"></div>

'''Box 9.1 | Vulnerability Synthesis'''
<div id="h2-50-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Vulnerability in Africa is socially, culturally and geographically differentiated among climatic regions, countries and local communities, with climate change impacting the health, livelihoods and food security of different groups to different extents ( [[#Gan--2016|Gan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Onyango--2016a|Onyango et al., 2016a]] ; [[#Gumucio--2020|Gumucio et al., 2020]] ). This synthesis emphasises intersectionality within vulnerable groups as well as their position within dynamic social and cultural contexts ( [[#Wisner--2016|Wisner, 2016]] ; [[#Kuran--2020|Kuran et al., 2020]] ), and highlights the differential impacts of climate change and restricted adaptation options available to vulnerable groups across African countries (see also Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18).

Vulnerability and exposure to the impacts of climate change are complex and affected by multiple, interacting non-climatic processes, which together influence risk, including socioeconomic processes ( [[#Lwasa--2018|Lwasa et al., 2018]] ; [[#UNCTAD--2020|UNCTAD, 2020]] ), resource access and livelihood changes ( [[#Jayne--2019b|Jayne et al., 2019b]] ) and intersectional vulnerability among social groups (Figure Box 9.1.1; [[#Rao--2020|Rao et al., 2020]] ). Socioeconomic processes encompass broader social, economic and governance trends, such as expanded investment in large energy and transportation infrastructure projects ( [[#Adeniran--2020|Adeniran and Daniell, 2020]] ), rising external debt ( [[#Edo--2020|Edo et al., 2020]] ), changing role of the state in social development ( [[#Wunsch--2014|Wunsch, 2014]] ), environmental management ( [[#Ramutsindela--2019|Ramutsindela and Büscher, 2019]] ) and conflict, as well as those emanating from climate change mitigation and adaptation projects ( [[#Beymer-Farris--2012|Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012]] ; [[#van%20Baalen--2018|van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018]] ; [[#Simpson--2021b|Simpson et al., 2021b]] ). These macro trends shape both urban and rural livelihoods, including the growing diversification of rural livelihoods through engagement in the informal sector and other non-farm activities, and are mediated by complex and intersecting factors like gender, ethnicity, class, age, disability and other dimensions of social status that influence access to resources ( [[#Luo--2019|Luo et al., 2019]] ). Research increasingly highlights the intersectionality of multiple dimensions of social identity and status that are associated with greater susceptibility to loss and damage ( [[#Caparoci%20Nogueira--2018|Caparoci Nogueira et al., 2018]] ; [[#Li--2018|Li et al., 2018]] ).

Arid and semi-arid countries in the Sahelian belt and the greater Horn of Africa are often identified as the most vulnerable regions on the continent ( [[#Closset--2017|Closset et al., 2017]] ; [[#Serdeczny--2017|Serdeczny et al., 2017]] ). Particularly vulnerable groups include pastoralists ( [[#Wangui--2018|Wangui, 2018]] ; [[#Ayanlade--2019|Ayanlade and Ojebisi, 2019]] ), fishing communities ( [[#Belhabib--2016|Belhabib et al., 2016]] ; [[#Muringai--2019a|Muringai et al., 2019a]] ), small-scale farmers ( [[#Ayanlade--2017|Ayanlade et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mogomotsi--2020|Mogomotsi et al., 2020]] ; see [[#9.8.1|Section 9.8.1]] ) and residents of formal and informal urban settlements (see [[#9.9|Section 9.9]] ). Research has identified key macro drivers, as well as multiple dimensions of social status that mediate differential vulnerability in different African contexts. For example, the contemporary vulnerability of small-scale rural producers in semi-arid northern Ghana has been shaped by colonial economic transformations ( [[#Ahmed--2016|Ahmed et al., 2016]] ), more recent neoliberal reforms reducing state support ( [[#Fieldman--2011|Fieldman, 2011]] ) and the disruption of local food systems due to increasing grain imports ( [[#Nyantakyi-Frimpong--2015|Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015]] ). Age interacts with other dimensions of social status, shaping differential vulnerability in several ways. Projected increases in mean temperatures and longer and more intense heat waves (Figure Box 9.1.1) may increase health risks for children and elderly populations by increasing risks associated with heat stress ( [[#Bangira--2015|Bangira et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cairncross--2018|Cairncross et al., 2018]] ). Temperature extremes are associated with increased risk of mortality in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Kenya and South Africa, with greatest increases among children and the elderly ( [[#Bangira--2015|Bangira et al., 2015]] ; [[#Amegah--2016|Amegah et al., 2016]] ; [[#Omonijo--2017|Omonijo, 2017]] ; [[#Wiru--2019|Wiru et al., 2019]] ; see [[#9.10.2.3.1|Section 9.10.2.3.1]] ).

Rural African women are often disadvantaged by traditional, patriarchal decision-making processes and lack of access to land—issues compounded by kinship systems (that, is matrilineal or patrilineal), migrant status, age, type of household, livelihood orientation and disability in determining their adaptive options ( [[#Ahmed--2016|Ahmed et al., 2016]] ; see [[#9.8.1|Section 9.8.1]] ; 9.11.1.2; Box 9.8). Differential agricultural productivity between men and women is about 20–30% or more in dryland regions of Ethiopia and Nigeria ( [[#Ghanem--2011|Ghanem, 2011]] ) and challenges women’s ability to adapt to climate change. Limited access to agricultural resources and limited benefits from agricultural policies, compounded by other social and cultural factors, make women more vulnerable to climatic risks ( [[#Shukla--2021|Shukla et al., 2021]] ). Kinship systems can contribute to their vulnerability and capacity to adapt. Women in matrilineal systems have greater bargaining power and have access to more resources than those in patrilineal systems ( [[#Chigbu--2019|Chigbu, 2019]] ; [[#Robinson--2021|Robinson and Gottlieb, 2021]] ; See section 9.8.1; 9.11.1.2).

[[File:4ddb413fc96ddcab0e88da98e9bff167 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_Box_9_1_1.png]]

'''Figure Box 9.1.1 |''' '''Factors contributing to the progression of vulnerability to climate change in African contexts considering socioeconomic processes, resource access, livelihood changes, and intersectional vulnerability among social groups.''' This figure reflects a synthesis of vulnerability across sections of this chapter and highlights how the interactions of multiple dimensions of vulnerability compound each other to increase overall vulnerability ( [[#Potts--2008|Potts, 2008]] ; [[#Nielsen--2010|Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010]] ; [[#Akresh--2011|Akresh et al., 2011]] ; [[#Eriksen--2011|Eriksen et al., 2011]] ; [[#Beymer-Farris--2012|Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012]] ; Davis et al., 2012; [[#Adom--2014|Adom, 2014]] ; [[#Akello--2014|Akello, 2014]] ; [[#Headey--2014|Headey and Jayne, 2014]] ; [[#Otzelberger--2014|Otzelberger, 2014]] ; [[#Wunsch--2014|Wunsch, 2014]] ; [[#Conteh--2015|Conteh, 2015]] ; [[#Huntjens--2015|Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015]] ; [[#Spencer--2015|Spencer, 2015]] ; [[#Adetula--2016|Adetula et al., 2016]] ; [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Kuper--2016|Kuper et al., 2016]] ; [[#Stark--2016|Stark and Landis, 2016]] ; [[#Allard--2017|Allard, 2017]] ; [[#Anderson--2017|Anderson, 2017]] ; [[#Asfaw--2017|Asfaw et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hufe--2017|Hufe and Heuermann, 2017]] ; [[#Hulme--2017|Hulme, 2017]] ; Paul and wa G ĩ th ĩ nji, 2017; [[#Rao--2017|Rao et al., 2017]] ; [[#Serdeczny--2017|Serdeczny et al., 2017]] ; [[#Tesfamariam--2017|Tesfamariam and Zinyengere, 2017]] ; [[#Tierney--2017|Tierney et al., 2017]] ; [[#Waha--2017|Waha et al., 2017]] ; [[#Chihambakwe--2018|Chihambakwe et al., 2018]] ; [[#Cholo--2018|Cholo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Jenkins--2018|Jenkins et al., 2018]] ; [[#Keahey--2018|Keahey, 2018]] ; [[#Lwasa--2018|Lwasa et al., 2018]] ; [[#Makara--2018|Makara, 2018]] ; [[#Nyasimi--2018|Nyasimi et al., 2018]] ; [[#Petesch--2018|Petesch et al., 2018]] ; [[#Schuman--2018|Schuman et al., 2018]] ; [[#Theis--2018|Theis et al., 2018]] ; [[#van%20Baalen--2018|van Baalen and Mobjörk, 2018]] ; [[#van%20der%20Zwaan--2018|van der Zwaan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Adepoju--2019|Adepoju, 2019]] ; [[#Adzawla--2019b|Adzawla et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Bryceson--2019|Bryceson, 2019]] ; [[#Grasham--2019|Grasham et al., 2019]] ; [[#Jayne--2019a|Jayne et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Lowe--2019|Lowe et al., 2019]] ; [[#Lunga--2019|Lunga et al., 2019]] ; [[#OGAR--2019|OGAR and Bassey, 2019]] ; [[#Onwutuebe--2019|Onwutuebe, 2019]] ; [[#Ramutsindela--2019|Ramutsindela and Büscher, 2019]] ; [[#Sulieman--2019|Sulieman and Young, 2019]] ; [[#Torabi--2019|Torabi and Noori, 2019]] ; [[#Adeniran--2020|Adeniran and Daniell, 2020]] ; [[#Alexander--2020|Alexander, 2020]] ; [[#Clay--2020|Clay and Zimmerer, 2020]] ; [[#Devonald--2020|Devonald et al., 2020]] ; [[#Dolislager--2020|Dolislager et al., 2020]] ; [[#Edo--2020|Edo et al., 2020]] ; [[#Kaczan--2020|Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020]] ; [[#Lammers--2020|Lammers et al., 2020]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2020b|World Bank, 2020b]] ; [[#Asiama--2021|Asiama et al., 2021]] ; [[#Azong--2021|Azong and Kelso, 2021]] ; [[#Birgen--2021|Birgen, 2021]] ; [[#Paalo--2021|Paalo and Issifu, 2021]] ; [[#Simpson--2021b|Simpson et al., 2021b]] ).

Knowledge gaps on Vulnerability in Africa and Uneven Acces to Resources

The differential impacts of climate change and adaptation options available to vulnerable groups in Africa are a critical knowledge gap. More research is needed to examine the intersection of different dimensions of social status on climate change vulnerability in Africa ( [[#Thompson-Hall--2016|Thompson-Hall et al., 2016]] ; [[#Oluwatimilehin--2021|Oluwatimilehin and Ayanlade, 2021]] ). More analysis of vulnerability based on gender and other social and cultural factors is needed to fully understand the impacts of climate change, the interaction of divergent adaptive strategies, as well as the development of targeted adaptation and mitigation strategies, for example, for women in patrilineal kinship systems, people living with disabilities, youth, girls and the elderly. Finally, there is an urgent need to build capacity among those conducting vulnerability assessments, so that they are familiar with this intersectionality lens.

Additional information and capacity development through education and early warning systems could enhance vulnerable groups’ ability to cope and adapt their livelihoods ( [[#Jaka--2018|Jaka and Shava, 2018]] ). However, some groups of people may struggle to translate information into actual changes ( [[#Makate--2019|Makate et al., 2019]] ; [[#McOmber--2019|McOmber et al., 2019]] ). Lack of access to assets and social networks, for example, among older populations, are critical limitations to locally driven or autonomous adaptation and limit potential benefits from planned adaptation actions (e.g., adoption of agricultural technologies or effective use of early warning systems).

There is an urgent need for societal and political change to realise potential benefits for these vulnerable groups in the long term ( [[#Nyasimi--2018|Nyasimi et al., 2018]] ). There is a need for gender-sensitive climate change policies in many African countries and gender-responsive policies, implementation plans and budgets for all local-level initiatives ( [[#Wrigley-Asante--2019|Wrigley-Asante et al., 2019]] ).

<div id="9.5" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="observed-and-projected-climate-change"></span>