Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/TS (section)

=== TS.5.8 Demand-side Aspects of Mitigation ===

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The assessment of the social science literature and regional case studies reveals how social norms, culture, and individual choices interact with infrastructure and other structural changes over time. This provides new insight into climate change mitigation strategies, and how economic and social activity might be organised across sectors to support emission reductions. To enhance well-being, people demand services and not primary energy and physical resources per se. Focusing on demand for services and the different social and political roles people play broadens the participation in climate action. (Box TS.11)

'''Demand-side mitigation and new ways of providing services can help''' '''''Avoid''''' '''and''' '''''Shift''''' '''final service demands and''' '''''Improve''''' '''service delivery. Rapid and deep changes in demand make it easier for every sector to reduce GHG emissions in the near and mid-term (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {5.2, 5.3}

'''The indicative potential of demand-side strategies to reduce emissions of direct and indirect CO''' ''2'' '''and non-CO''' ''2'' '''GHG emissions in three end-use sectors (buildings, land transport, and food) is 40–70% globally by 2050 (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Technical mitigation potentials compared to the 2050 emissions projection of two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020 amount to 6.8 GtCO ''2'' for building use and construction, 4.6 GtCO ''2'' for land transport and 8.0 GtCO ''2'' -eq for food demand, and amount to 4.4 GtCO ''2'' for industry. Mitigation strategies can be classified as ''Avoid-Shift-Improve'' (ASI) options, that reflect opportunities for socio-cultural, infrastructural, and technological change. The greatest ''Avoid'' potential comes from reducing long-haul aviation and providing short-distance low-carbon urban infrastructures. The greatest ''Shift'' potential would come from switching to plant-based diets. The greatest ''Improve'' potential comes from within the building sector, and in particular increased use of energy-efficient end-use technologies and passive housing. (Figures TS.20 and TS.21) {5.3.1, 5.3.2, Figures 5.7 and 5.8, Table 5.1 and Table SM.5.2}

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'''Figure TS.2''' '''0 |''' '''Demand-side strategies for mitigation.''' Demand-side mitigation is about more than behavioural change and transformation happens through societal, technological and institutional changes. {Figure 5.10, Figure 5.14}

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'''Figure T''' '''S.21 |''' '''Demand-side mitigation can be achieved through changes in socio-cultural factors, infrastructure design and use, and technology adoption.''' Mitigation response options related to demand for services have been categorised into three domains: ‘socio-cultural factors’, related to social norms, culture, and individual choices and behaviour; ‘infrastructure use’, related to the provision and use of supporting infrastructure that enables individual choices and behaviour; and ‘technology adoption’, which refers to the uptake of technologies by end users. Potentials in 2050 are estimated using the International Energy Agency’s 2020 World Energy Outlook STEPS (Stated Policy Scenarios) as a baseline. This scenario is based on a sector-by-sector assessment of specific policies in place, as well as those that have been announced by countries by mid-2020. This scenario was selected due to the detailed representation of options across sectors and sub-sectors. The heights of the coloured columns represent the potentials on which there is a high level of agreement in the literature, based on a range of case studies. The range shown by the dots connected by dotted lines represents the highest and lowest potentials reported in the literature which have low to medium levels of agreement. The demand-side potential of socio-cultural factors in the food system has two parts. The economic potential of direct emissions (mostly non-CO 2 ) demand reduction through socio-cultural factors alone is 1.9 GtCO 2 -eq without considering land-use change by diversion of agricultural land from food production to carbon sequestration. If further changes in land use enabled by this change in demand are considered, the indicative potential could reach 7 GtCO 2 -eq. The electricity panel presents separately the mitigation potential from changes in electricity demand and changes associated with enhanced electrification in end-use sectors. Electrification increases electricity demand, while it is avoided though demand-side mitigation strategies. Load management refers to demand-side flexibility that can be achieved through incentive design such as time-of-use pricing/monitoring by artificial intelligence, diversification of storage facilities, and so on. NZE (IEA Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario) is used to compute the impact of end-use sector electrification, while the impact of demand-side response options is based on bottom-up assessments. Dark grey columns show the emissions that cannot be avoided through demand-side mitigation options. The table indicates which demand-side mitigation options are included. Options are categorised according to: socio-cultural factors, infrastructure use, and technology adoption. Figure SPM.7 covers potential of demand-side options for the year 2050. Figure SPM.8 covers both supply- and demand-side options and their potentials for the year 2030. {5.3, Figure 5.7, 5.SM.II}

'''Socio-cultural and lifestyle changes can accelerate climate change mitigation (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Among 60 identified actions that could change individual consumption, individual mobility choices have the largest potential to reduce carbon footprints. Prioritising car-free mobility by walking and cycling and adoption of electric mobility could save 2 tCO ''2'' -eq cap ''–1'' yr ''–1'' . Other options with high mitigation potential include reducing air travel, cooling setpoint adjustments, reduced appliance use, shifts to public transit, and shifting consumption towards plant-based diets. {5.3.1, 5.3.1.2, Figure 5.8}

'''Box TS.11''' '''| A New Chapter in AR6 WGIII Focusing on the Social Science of Demand, and Social Aspects of Mitigation'''

The WGIII contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR6) features a distinct chapter on demand, services and social aspects of mitigation {5} . The scope, theories, and evidence for such an assessment are addressed in Sections 5.1 and 5.4 within [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapters/chapter-5 Chapter 5] and a Social Science Primer as an Appendix to Chapter 5.

The literature on social science – from sociology, psychology, gender studies and political science for example – and climate change mitigation is growing rapidly. A bibliometric search of the literature identified 99,065 peer-reviewed academic papers, based on 34 search queries with content relevant to Chapter 5. This literature is expanding by 15% per year, with twice as many publications in the AR6 period (2014–2020) as in all previous years.

The models of stakeholders’ decisions assessed by IPCC have continuously evolved. From AR1 to AR4, rational choice was the implicit assumption: agents with perfect information and unlimited processing capacity maximising self-focused expected utility and differing only in wealth, risk attitude, and time discount rate. The AR5 introduced a broader range of goals (material, social, and psychological) and decision processes (calculation-based, affect-based, and rule-based processes). However, its perspective was still individual- and agency-focused, neglecting structural, cultural, and institutional constraints and the influence of physical and social context.

A social science perspective is important in two ways. By adding new actors and perspectives, it (i) provides more options for climate mitigation; and (ii) helps to identify and address important social and cultural barriers and opportunities to socio-economic, technological, and institutional change. Demand-side mitigation involves five sets of social actors: individuals (e.g., consumption choices, habits), groups and collectives (e.g., social movements, values), corporate actors (e.g., investments, advertising), institutions (e.g., political agency, regulations), and infrastructure actors (e.g., very long-term investments and financing). Actors either contribute to the status-quo of global high-carbon consumption, and a GDP growth-oriented economy, or help generate the desired change to a low-carbon energy-services, well-being, and equity-oriented economy. Each set of actors has novel implications for the design and implementation of both demand- and supply-side mitigation policies. They show important synergies, making energy demand mitigation a dynamic problem where the packaging and/or sequencing of different policies play a role in their effectiveness {5.5, 5.6} . Incremental interventions change social practices, simultaneously affecting emissions and well-being. The transformative change requires coordinated action across all five sets of actors (Table 5.4), using social science insights about intersection of behaviour, culture, institutional and infrastructural changes for policy design and implementation. ''Avoid'' , ''Shift'' , and ''Improve'' choices by individuals, households and communities support mitigation {5.3.1.1, Table 5.1} . They are instigated by role models, changing social norms driven by policies and social movements. They also require appropriate infrastructures designed by urban planners and building and transport professionals, corresponding investments, and a political culture supportive of demand-side mitigation action.

'''Leveraging improvements in end-use service delivery through behavioural and technological innovations, and innovations in market organisation, leads to large reductions in upstream resource use (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Analysis of indicative potentials range from a factor 10- to 20-fold improvement in the case of available energy (exergy) analysis, with the highest improvement potentials at the end-user and service-provisioning levels. Realisable service level efficiency improvements could reduce upstream energy demand by 45% in 2050. (Figure TS.20) {5.3.2, Figure 5.10}

'''''Decent living standards''''' '''(DLS) and''' '''''well-being for all''''' '''(SDG 3) are achievable if high-efficiency low-demand mitigation pathways are followed (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Minimum requirements of energy use consistent with enabling ''well-being for all'' is between 20 and 50 GJ cap –1 yr –1 depending on the context. (Figure TS.22) {5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, Box 5.3}

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'''Figure TS.22''' '''|''' '''Demand-side mitigation options, well-being and SDGs.''' {Figure 5.6}

'''Alternative service provision systems, for example, those enabled through digitalisation, sharing economy initiatives and circular economy initiatives, have to date made a limited contribution to climate change mitigation (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' While digitalisation through specific new products and applications holds potential for improvement in service-level efficiencies, without public policies and regulations, it also has the potential to increase consumption and energy use. Reducing the energy use of data centres, networks, and connected devices is possible in managing low-carbon digitalisation. Claims on the benefits of the circular economy for sustainability and climate change mitigation have limited evidence. (Box TS.12, Box TS.14) {5.3.4, Figures 5.12 and 5.13}

'''Box TS.12 | Circular Economy (CE)'''

In AR6, the circular economy (CE) concept {Annex I} is highlighted as an increasingly important mitigation approach that can help deliver human well-being by minimising waste of energy and resources. While definitions of CE vary, its essence is to shift away from linear ‘make and dispose’ economic models to those that emphasise product longevity, reuse, refurbishment, recycling, and material efficiency, thereby enabling more circular material systems that reduce embodied energy and emissions. {5.3.4, 8.4, 8.5, 9.5, 11.3.3}

Whereas IPCC AR4 {WGIII, Chapter 10} included a separate chapter on waste-sector emissions and waste-management practices, and AR5 {WGIII, Chapter 10} reviewed the importance of ‘reduce, reuse, recycle’ and related policies, AR6 focuses on how CE can reduce waste in materials production and consumption by optimising materials’ end-use service utility. Specific examples of CE implementations, policies, and mitigation potentials are included in Chapters 5, 8, 9, 11 and 12. {5.3, 8.4, 9.5, 11.3, 12.6}

CE is shown to empower new social actors in mitigation actions, given that it relies on the synergistic actions of producers, sellers, and consumers {11.3.3} . As an energy and resource demand-reduction strategy, it is consistent with high levels of human well-being {5.3.4.3} and ensures better environmental quality (Figure TS.22) {5.2.1} . It also creates jobs through increased sharing, reuse, refurbishment, and recycling activities. Therefore, CE contributes to several SDGs, including clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), affordable energy and clean energy (SDG 7), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), responsible production and consumption (SDG 12) and climate action (SDG 13). {11.5.3.2}

Emissions savings derive from reduced primary material production and transport. For example, in buildings, lifetime extension, material efficiency, and reusable components reduce embodied emissions by avoiding demand for structural materials {9.3, 9.5} . At regional scales, urban/industrial symbiosis reduce primary material demand through by-product exchange networks {11.3.3} . CE strategies also exhibit enabling effects, such as material-efficient and circular vehicle designs that also improve fuel economy {10.2.2.2} . There is growing interest in ‘circular bioeconomy’ concepts applied to bio-based materials {Box 12.2} and even a ‘circular carbon economy’, wherein carbon captured via CCU {11.3.6} or CDR {3.4.6} is converted into reusable materials, which is especially relevant for the transitions of economies dependent on fossil fuel revenue. {12.6}

While there are many recycling policies, CE-oriented policies for more efficient material use with higher value retention are comparatively far fewer; these policy gaps have been attributed to institutional failures, lack of coordination, and lack of strong advocates {5.3, 9.5.3.6, Boxes 11.5 and 12.2} . Reviews of mitigation potentials reveal unevenness in the savings of CE applications and potential risks of rebound effects {5.3} . Therefore, CE policies that identify system determinants maximise potential emissions reductions, which vary by material, location, and application.

There are knowledge gaps for assessing CE opportunities within mitigation models due to CE’s many cross-sectoral linkages and data gaps related to its nascent state {3.4.4} . Opportunity exists to bridge knowledge from the industrial ecology field, which has historically studied CE, to the mitigation modelling community for improved analysis of interventions and policies for AR7. For instance, a global CE knowledge-sharing platform is helpful for CE performance measurement, reporting and accounting. {5.3, 9.5, 11.7}

'''Providing better services with less energy and resource input has high technical potential and is consistent with providing well-being for all (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' The assessment of 19 demand-side mitigation options and 18 different constituents of well-being showed that positive impacts on well-being outweigh negative ones by a factor of 11. {5.2, 5.2.3, Figure 5.6}

'''Demand-side mitigation options bring multiple interacting benefits (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Energy services to meet human needs for nutrition, shelter, health, and so on, are met in many different ways with different emissions implications that depend on local contexts, cultures, geography, available technologies, and social preferences. In the near term, many less-developed countries, and poor people everywhere, require better access to safe and low-emissions energy sources to ensure decent living standards and increase energy savings from service improvements by about 20–25%. (Figure TS.22) {5.2, 5.4.5, Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, Boxes 5.2 and 5.3}

'''Granular technologies and decentralised energy end-use, characterised by modularity, small unit sizes and small unit costs, diffuse faster into markets and are associated with faster technological learning benefits, greater efficiency, more opportunities to escape technological lock-in, and greater employment (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Examples include solar PV systems, batteries, and thermal heat pumps. {5.3, 5.5, 5.5.3}

'''Wealthy individuals contribute disproportionately to higher emissions and have a high potential for emissions reductions while maintaining decent living standards and well-being (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Individuals with high socio-economic status are capable of reducing their GHG emissions by becoming role models of low-carbon lifestyles, investing in low-carbon businesses, and advocating for stringent climate policies. {5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, Figure 5.14}

'''Demand-side solutions require both motivation and capacity for change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Motivation by individuals or households worldwide to change energy consumption behaviour is generally low. Individual behavioural change is insufficient for climate change mitigation unless embedded in structural and cultural change. Different factors influence individual motivation and capacity for change in different demographics and geographies. These factors go beyond traditional socio-demographic and economic predictors and include psychological variables such as awareness, perceived risk, subjective and social norms, values, and perceived behavioural control. Behavioural nudges promote easy behaviour change, for example, ‘ ''Improve'' ’ actions such as making investments in energy efficiency, but fail to motivate harder lifestyle changes ( ''high confidence'' ). {5.4}

'''Behavioural interventions, including the way choices are presented to end users (an intervention practice known as choice architecture), work synergistically with price signals, making the combination more effective (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Behavioural interventions through nudges, and alternative ways of redesigning and motivating decisions, alone provide small to medium contributions to reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions. Green defaults, such as automatic enrolment in ‘green energy’ provision, are highly effective. Judicious labelling, framing, and communication of social norms can also increase the effect of mandates, subsidies, or taxes. {5.4, 5.4.1, Table 5.3, 5.3}

'''Cultural change, in combination with new or adapted infrastructure, is necessary to enable and realise many''' '''''Avoid''''' '''and''' '''''Shift''''' '''options (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' By drawing support from diverse actors, narratives of change can enable coalitions to form, providing the basis for social movements to campaign in favour of (or against) societal transformations. People act and contribute to climate change mitigation in their diverse capacities as consumers, citizens, professionals, role models, investors, and policymakers. {5.4, 5.5, 5.6}

'''Collective action as part of social or lifestyle movements underpins system change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Collective action and social organising are crucial to shift the possibility space of public policy on climate change mitigation. For example, climate strikes have given voice to youth in more than 180 countries. In other instances, mitigation policies allow the active participation of all stakeholders, resulting in building social trust, new coalitions, legitimising change, and thus initiate a positive cycle in climate governance capacity and policies. {5.4.2, Figure 5.14}

'''Transition pathways and changes in social norms often start with pilot experiments led by dedicated individuals and niche groups (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Collectively, such initiatives can find entry points to prompt policy, infrastructure, and policy reconfigurations, supporting the further uptake of technological and lifestyle innovations. Individuals’ agency is central as social change agents and narrators of meaning. These bottom-up socio-cultural forces catalyse a supportive policy environment, which enables changes. {5.5.2}

'''The current effects of climate change, as well as some mitigation strategies, are threatening the viability of existing business practices, while some corporate efforts also delay mitigation action (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Policy packages that include job creation programmes can help to preserve social trust, livelihoods, respect, and dignity of all workers and employees involved. Business models that protect rent-extracting behaviour may sometimes delay political action. Corporate advertisement and brand-building strategies may also attempt to deflect corporate responsibility to individuals or aim to appropriate climate-care sentiments in their own brand–building. {5.4.3, 5.6.4}

'''Middle actors – professionals, experts, and regulators – play a crucial, albeit underestimated and underutilised, role in establishing low-carbon standards and practices (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Building managers, landlords, energy-efficiency advisers, technology installers, and car dealers influence patterns of mobility and energy consumption by acting as middle actors or intermediaries in the provision of building or mobility services and need greater capacity and motivation to play this role. (Figure TS.20a) {5.4.3}

'''Social influencers and thought leaders can increase the adoption of low-carbon technologies, behaviours, and lifestyles (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Preferences are malleable and can align with a cultural shift. The modelling of such shifts by salient and respected community members can help bring about changes in different service provisioning systems. Between 10% and 30% of committed individuals are required to set new social norms. {5.2.1, 5.4}

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