Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-9 (section)

== 9.12 Heritage ==

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Africa is a rich reservoir of heritage resources and Indigenous Knowledge, showcased by about 96 sites inscribed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as World Heritage Sites ( [[#UNESCO--2018b|UNESCO, 2018b]] ). These include 53 sites specifically denoted as having great cultural importance and five sites with mixed heritage values. Unfortunately, valuable cultural heritage in forms of tangible evidence of past human endeavour, and the intangible heritage encapsulated by diverse cultural practices of many communities ( [[#Feary--2016|Feary et al., 2016]] ), is under great threat from climate change.

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=== 9.12.1 Observed Impacts on Cultural Heritage. ===

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For more than 10,000 years, Africans recorded over 8000 painted and engraved images on rock shelters and rock outcroppings across 800 known exceptional rock art sites of incalculable value ( [[#Hall--2007|Hall et al., 2007]] ; [[#di%20Lernia--2011|di Lernia and Gallinaro, 2011]] ; [[#di%20Lernia--2017|di Lernia, 2017]] ; [[#Clarke--2018|Clarke and Brooks, 2018]] ; [[#Barnett--2019|Barnett, 2019]] ), but which are exceptionally fragile to the elements. Unfortunately, there has been a poor study of direct climate change impacts on rock art across Africa.

Underwater heritage includes shipwrecks and artefacts lost at sea and extends to prehistoric sites, sunken towns and ancient ports that are now submerged due to climatic or geological changes (Spalding, 2011). Off the shores of Africa, about 111 shipwrecks have been documented, with South Africa having a major share of about 41 sites. The sunken Egyptian city of Thonis-Heracleion and its associated 60+ shipwrecks reflect the richness of Africa’s waters. Unfortunately, increased storm surges and violent weather currently threaten the integrity of shipwrecks by accelerating the destruction of wooden parts and other features ( [[#Harkin--2020|Harkin et al., 2020]] ). However, climate change impacts on underwater cultural heritage sites are poorly studied, as it requires specialist assessment techniques ( [[#Feary--2016|Feary et al., 2016]] ), and marine archaeology studies are not well established in Africa.

Intangible heritage includes instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated with communities, and are almost always held orally ( [[#UNESCO--2003|UNESCO, 2003]] ). Loss of heritage assets may be a direct consequence of climate change/variability ( [[#Markham--2016|Markham et al., 2016]] ), or a consequence of indirect factors resulting from climate change, for example, economic instability and poor decision making in areas of governance. In northern Nigeria, climate change exacerbates the impact of poor land use decisions, reducing the flow of the Yobe River and negatively impacting the Bade fishing festival because the available fish species continue to decline ( [[#Oruonye--2010|Oruonye, 2010]] ). Similarly, Lake Sanké in Mali has been degraded by a combination of urban development and poor rainfall, threatening the Sanké mon collective fishing rite ( [[#UNESCO--2018b|UNESCO, 2018b]] ).

Migration related to climate change and climatic events could offer openings to women and young people to become ''de facto'' family heads ( [[#Kaag--2019|Kaag et al., 2019]] ). However, such societal changes also increase community vulnerability to the loss of cultural knowledge held by village elders. For example, in Mauritius, the Sega tambour Chagos music is at risk, as elders familiar with the landscape pass on ( [[#Boswell--2008|Boswell, 2008]] ).

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==== 9.12.1.1 Case Study: Traditional Earthen ‘Green Energy’ Buildings ====

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Historically, Africa has had a unique and sustainable architecture ( [[#Diop--2018|Diop, 2018]] ) characterised by area-specific, traditional earthen materials and associated Indigenous technology. Key examples include Tiébélé in Burkina Faso, Walata in Mauritania, Akan in Ghana, Ghadames in Libya, Old Towns of Djenné in Mali (World Heritage Site) and other diverse earthen architecture across sub-Saharan Africa. Adegun and Adedeji (2017) indicate that earthen materials provide advantages in thermal conductivity, resistivity and diffusivity, indoor and outdoor temperature, as well as cooling and heating capacities. Moreover, earthen materials are recyclable and environmentally ‘cleaner’ ( [[#Sanya--2012|Sanya, 2012]] ) because of the absence or small quantity of cement in production, thus reducing carbon emissions. Despite these advantages, the expertise and socio-cultural ceremonies that accompany building and renewal of earthen architecture are disappearing fast ( [[#Adegun--2017|Adegun and Adedeji, 2017]] ). Further, earthen construction is being threatened by extreme climatic variability and changing climate that exacerbates decay ( [[#Brimblecombe--2011|Brimblecombe et al., 2011]] ; [[#Bosman--2014|Bosman and Van der Westhuizen, 2014]] ; [[#Brooks--2020|Brooks et al., 2020]] ).

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'''Box 9.9 | Climate Change and Security: Interpersonal Violence and Large-scale Civil Conflict'''
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There is substantial evidence that climate variability influences human security across Africa (see [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7|Chapter 7]] Sections 7.2.7; 7.3.3 7). However, the strength and nature of this link depend on socioeconomic and institutional conditions, and climate is just one of many factors influencing violence and civil conflict ( [[#Schleussner--2016a|Schleussner et al., 2016a]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Projections of security implications of long-run climate change in Africa are uncertain, as they rely on extrapolating observed effects of short-run climate variability ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ). Lack of detection and attribution studies limit assessment of the impacts of observed human-caused climate change on security.

Interpersonal violent crime

Evidence from across the globe finds that interpersonal violence, ranging from use of profanity to violent crime, increases with temperature and sometimes low rainfall ( [[#Hsiang--2013a|Hsiang et al., 2013a]] ; [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gates--2019|Gates et al., 2019]] ). The effect of temperature may be driven by a physiological mechanism ( [[#Morrison--2008|Morrison et al., 2008]] ; [[#Seo--2008|Seo et al., 2008]] ; [[#Ray--2011|Ray et al., 2011]] ), while effects of rainfall may operate through an agricultural yield impacts channel ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ). While few studies link interpersonal violence to climate in Africa, [[#Gates--2019|Gates et al. (2019)]] documents homicide risks increasing under high temperatures in South Africa, and similarity across diverse study settings suggests temperature-induced violent crime ''likely'' generalises to Africa ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ).

Large-scale intergroup conflict

Climatic conditions also change the risk of large-scale conflicts such as riots, ethnic conflicts and civil war ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ). The effects of temperature are particularly well-studied in Africa. Risk of violent conflict rises with temperature in Sudan and South Sudan ( [[#Maystadt--2014|Maystadt and Ecker, 2014]] ; [[#Maystadt--2014|Maystadt et al., 2014]] ; [[#Scheffran--2014|Scheffran et al., 2014]] ), Kenya ( [[#Hsiang--2013b|Hsiang et al., 2013b]] ; [[#Scheffran--2014|Scheffran et al., 2014]] ), the east African region ( [[#O’Loughlin--2012|O’Loughlin et al., 2012]] ) and across sub-Saharan Africa ( [[#Burke--2009|Burke et al., 2009]] ; [[#O’Loughlin--2014|O’Loughlin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ). Estimates indicate that warming trends since 1980 have elevated conflict risk across sub-Saharan Africa by 11% ( [[#Burke--2009|Burke et al., 2009]] ; [[#Carleton--2016|Carleton et al., 2016]] ).

Periods of low rainfall or flooding also contribute to social instability and upheaval across Africa ( [[#Miguel--2004|Miguel et al., 2004]] ; [[#Ralston--2015|Ralston, 2015]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Harari--2018|Harari and Ferrara, 2018]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ). The link between rainfall and conflict appears ''likely'' due to crop losses and declines in economic opportunity. One study found that dry growing seasons increase conflict incidence across 36 African nations, with spillover effects from the location of climate shock to neighbouring communities ( [[#Harari--2018|Harari and Ferrara, 2018]] ). Conflict-inducing impacts of drought have also been uncovered in Somalia ( [[#Maystadt--2014|Maystadt and Ecker, 2014]] ), Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya ( [[#Fjelde--2012|Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012]] ; [[#Hendrix--2012|Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012]] ; [[#Couttenier--2014|Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014]] ; [[#Ralston--2015|Ralston, 2015]] ; [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ), the DRC ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2020|von Uexkull et al., 2020]] ) and in a pooled sample of African and Asian countries ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ). Extremely high rainfall may also incite conflict risk, although results are mixed ( [[#Hendrix--2012|Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012]] ; [[#Raleigh--2012|Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012]] ). This uncertainty, combined with large uncertainties in rainfall projections under climate change, render future impacts of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions on rainfall-induced conflict in Africa highly uncertain.

While conflict–climate links have been repeatedly identified in Africa, climate is one of many interacting conflict risk factors and appears to explain only a small share of total variation in conflict incidence ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ).

Opportunities for adaptation

Adaptive capacity with respect to climate and conflict remains low in Africa ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ). For example, one study found that, relative to each country’s optimal annual temperature, realised temperatures across sub-Saharan Africa increase the annual incidence of war by 29.3% on average ( [[#Carleton--2016|Carleton et al., 2016]] ). Another finds that rising temperatures due to climate change may lead to higher levels of violence in sub-Saharan Africa if political rights do not improve from current conditions ( [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ). Available studies on adaptation in conflict-affected areas tend to have a narrow focus, particularly on agriculture-related adaptation in rural contexts and adaptation by low-income actors, with little known beyond these contexts ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ). Literature on the gender dimension of climate adaptation in conflict-affected countries is also limited ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ).

Migration is a common response ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ) and may be an effective adaptive response to climate-induced conflict. Bosetti et al. (2018) find that countries with high emigration propensity display lower sensitivity of conflict to temperature, with no evidence of detrimental impacts on the destination countries. IK has also been applied to enable adaptation amidst conflict, for example, in Libya, to deal with erratic rainfall ( [[#Biagetti--2017|Biagetti, 2017]] ).

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Box 9.9

Other socioeconomic factors have been identified as adaptive opportunities. Rising incomes may mitigate conflict–climate relationships ( [[#Carleton--2016|Carleton et al., 2016]] ), while weak institutions, lack of political freedom, agricultural dependence and exclusion of ethnic groups increase their strength ( [[#Schleussner--2016a|Schleussner et al., 2016a]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ). In particular, agriculturally dependent and politically excluded groups in Africa are especially vulnerable to the impact of drought on conflict ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ). Household-level resilience to economic shocks has been shown to lower support for violence after drought ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2020|von Uexkull et al., 2020]] ). Local-level institutions have also been shown to support non-violence under adverse climate conditions ( [[#Bogale--2007|Bogale and Korf, 2007]] ).

These findings suggest that ameliorating ethnic tensions, improving political institutions and investing in economic diversification and household resilience could mitigate future impacts of climate change on conflict.

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=== 9.12.2 Projected Risks ===

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Sea level rise (SLR) and its associated hazards will present increasing climate risk to African heritage in the coming decades (Figure 9.38; [[#Marzeion--2014|Marzeion and Levermann, 2014]] ; [[#Reimann--2018|Reimann et al., 2018]] ; [[#Brito--2020|Brito and Naia, 2020]] ). Although no continental assessment has quantified climate risk to African heritage and little is known of near-term exposure to hazards such as SLR and erosion, for a handful of coastal heritage sites included in global or Mediterranean studies, 10 cultural sites are identified to be physically exposed to SLR by 2100 at high emissions scenarios (RCP8.5) ( [[#Marzeion--2014|Marzeion and Levermann, 2014]] ; [[#Reimann--2018|Reimann et al., 2018]] ), of which, seven World Heritage Sites in the Mediterranean are also projected to face medium or high risk of erosion (Figure 9.38; [[#Reimann--2018|Reimann et al., 2018]] ). Further, [[#Brito--2020|Brito and Naia (2020)]] identify natural heritage sites across 27 African countries that will be affected by SLR by 2100 (RCP8.5), of which 15 sites covering eight countries demonstrated a high need for proactive management actions because of high levels of biodiversity, international conservation relevance and exposure to SLR (Figure 9.38). These nascent studies highlight the potential severity of risk and loss and damage from climate change to African heritage, as well as gaps in knowledge of climate risk to African cultural and natural, particularly concerning bio-cultural heritage.

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[[File:29fc4ccffcc6249479acf5f9493f62bf IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_9_038.png]]

'''Figure 9.38 |''' '''Risk to Africa’s cultural and natural coastal heritage sites from see level rise (SLR) and erosion by 2100.'''

'''(a)''' World Heritage Sites projected to be exposed to flooding from SLR under a high emission scenario (RCP8.5) by 2100 ( [[#Marzeion--2014|Marzeion and Levermann, 2014]] ; [[#Reimann--2018|Reimann et al., 2018]] ). For north Africa, multiple sites are already identified to be at medium or high risk from erosion under both current and future SLR conditions ( [[#Reimann--2018|Reimann et al., 2018]] ). At the time of assessment erosion risk had not been assessed for other African regions

'''(b)''' The 15 African natural sites (coastal protected areas) projected to be most exposed to negative impacts from SLR and thus as priority sites for adaptation ( [[#Brito--2020|Brito and Naia, 2020]] ).

Although climate change is a significant risk to heritage sites ( [[#Brito--2020|Brito and Naia, 2020]] ), there is little research on how heritage management is adapting to climate change, and particularly, whether the capacity of current heritage management systems can prepare for and deal with consequences of climate change ( [[#Phillips--2015|Phillips, 2015]] ; see also Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3).

Worsening climate impacts are cumulative and often exacerbate the vulnerability of cultural heritage sites to other existing risks, including conflict, terrorism, poverty, invasive species, competition for natural resources and pollution ( [[#Markham--2016|Markham et al., 2016]] ). These issues may affect a broad range of tourism segments, including beach vacation sites, safari tourism, cultural tourism and visits to historic cities ( [[#UNWTO--2008|UNWTO, 2008]] ). Climate change impacts have the potential to increase tourist safety concerns, especially at sites where increased intensity of extreme weather events or vulnerability to floods and landslides are projected ( [[#Markham--2016|Markham et al., 2016]] ) (see also Cross-Chapter Box EXTREMES in Chapter 2). There may also be circumstances where interventions required to preserve and protect the resource alter its cultural significance ( [[#van%20Wyk--2017|van Wyk, 2017]] ).

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=== 9.12.3 Adaptation ===

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Research highlights potential in integrating Indigenous Knowledge, land use practices, scientific knowledge and heritage values to co-produce tools that refine our understanding of climate change and variability and develop comprehensive heritage adaptation policy (Table 9.13; [[#Ekblom--2019|Ekblom et al., 2019]] ).

'''Table 9.13 |''' Examples of responses to climate change impacts to heritage sites.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Heritage'''

! '''Type'''

! colspan="2"| '''Example'''

! '''Type of climate impact'''

! '''Intervention focus or activity'''

! '''Main intervention activity'''

! '''State of materials'''

! '''Final state of heritage'''

! '''Literature'''

|-
| rowspan="4"| ''Tangible''

| rowspan="2"| Ancient

| Historic buildings

| Ounga Byzantine Fort and associated archaeological remains, Tunisia

| Coastal erosion

| Archaeological conservation of fort

| Building repairs to outer walls of fort but other archaeological areas no intervention

| Mixed. Fort is in good condition, but other parts of the site are under threat of coastal erosion, particularly lesser archaeological remains of other periods.

| Some aspects of site well preserved, other parts damaged.

| [[#Slim--2004|Slim et al. (2004)]]

|-
| Archaeological sites

| Sabratha, Roman City, Libyan coast

| SLR, local flooding and coastal erosion

| Monitoring of condition

| None

| Loss of archaeological remains into the sea.

| Some aspects of site well preserved, other parts damaged.

| [[#Abdalahh--2011|Abdalahh (2011)]]

|-
| rowspan="2"| Living

| Cities/towns

| Lamu Old Town and archipelago, Kenya

| SLR impacting low-lying areas and climate variability impacting protective mangroves

| Lamu Old Town managed by National Museums of Kenya the mangrove forests by Community Forest Associations and Forest Conservation and Management Act of 2016

Changes in biodiversity and cultural resilience to climate shocks

| Draft for National Policy for Disaster Management in Kenya

| Mangrove forests provide protection from storm surges and coastal erosion. Changing biodiversity of mangroves is threatening mangroves which threaten Lamu Old Town.

| Continuing deterioration.

| [[#Wanderi--2019|Wanderi (2019)]]

|-
| Mud buildings

| Tiébélé, Burkina Faso

| Climate variability causing flooding, erosion.

| Local community conservation

| Improvements to drainage and land security, development of conservation and management plans

| Current and ongoing conservation.

| Stable.

| Birabi and Nawangwe (2011)

|-
| ''Bio-cultural''

|
| Rock art

| Golden Gate Highlands, South Africa

| Precipitation and atmospheric changes causing luxuriant lichen growth

| Monitoring of condition

| No known intervention

| Biodeterioration of condition of rock surface.

| Increasing loss of rock surfaces and images on the rock surfaces.

| Viles and Cutler (2012)

|-
| rowspan="7"| ''Intangible (Indigenous)''

|
| rowspan="2"| Language

| !Xun and Khwe Indigenous Youth of South Africa

| Climate variability causing drought and loss of plants

| Groups (youth)

| Documentation

| Non-formal, local.

| Enhancement, promotion.

| [[#Bodunrin--2019|Bodunrin (2019)]]

|-
|
| Indigenous Language Use in Agricultural Radio Programming in Nigeria

| Climate variability increasing frequency of drought

| Farmer groups, communities

| Research, documentation

| Formal, local

| Promotion, transmission.

| [[#Adeyeye--2020|Adeyeye et al. (2020)]]

|-
|
| Rituals

| Enkipaata, Eunoto and Olng’esherr Maasai male rites of passage

| Climate variability causing drought

| Maasai community groups

| Identification, documentation, research

| Formal, non-formal, local, foreign.

| Promotion.

| UNESCO (2018a)

|-
|
| Customs &amp; beliefs

| Sanké mon fishing festival in Mali

| Climate variability reducing rainfall

| Malinkés, Bambara and Buwa communities

| Identification, documentation, preservation

| Formal, non-formal, local.

| Promotion.

| UNESCO (2009)

|-
|
| Indigenous engineering systems

| Water measurers of the Foggara irrigation system in Algeria

| Increased siltation and sandstorms

Climate variability causing flooding

| Touat and Tidikelt communities

| Research, identification, documentation

| Formal, local.

| Transmission.

| [[#Mokadem--2018|Mokadem et al. (2018)]]

|-
|
| Arts and crafts

| rowspan="2"| Traditional crafts made from various parts of the Date Palm in Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and other countries outside Africa

| rowspan="2"| Climate variability causing shift in plant habitats

| rowspan="2"| Residents of oases, groups, communities, agricultural cooperative societies

| rowspan="2"| Research, identification, documentation, preservation, protection

| rowspan="2"| Formal, non-formal, local, foreign.

| rowspan="2"| Transmission, promotion, enhancement, revitalisation.

| [[#UNESCO--2003|UNESCO (2003)]]

|-
|
| Shabani et al. (2012)

|}

Conservation of heritage may require offsetting the impact of loss through partial or total excavation under certain circumstances, like environment instability, or where ''in situ'' heritage preservation is exorbitant in cost ( [[#Maarleveld--2013|Maarleveld and Guérin, 2013]] ).

Although many underwater shipwrecks and ruins of cities are currently preserved better ''in situ'' than similar sites on land ( [[#Feary--2016|Feary et al., 2016]] ), preserving such heritage is often financially prohibitive with many physical and technical challenges. Further, skill capacities of heritage agencies are limited to a few qualified archaeologists in Africa ( [[#Maarleveld--2013|Maarleveld and Guérin, 2013]] ).

For centuries, Africans have drawn on intangible heritage to enhance their resilience to climatic variability and support adaptation practices. For example, pastoralist communities have historically translated their experiences into memories that can be ‘translated’ into diverse adaptive practices ( [[#Oba--2014|Oba, 2014]] ). In coastal Kenya, Mijikenda communities rely on Indigenous Knowledge and practices used in the management of the sacred Kaya Forests to adapt their farming to a changing climate (Wekesa et al., 2015).

Hence, preservation measures for transforming oral information into written records should ensure viability of intangible cultural heritage by giving due consideration to the confidentiality of culturally sensitive information and intellectual property rights ( [[#Feary--2016|Feary et al., 2016]] ).

Inclusion of cultural landscapes and intangible heritage in the landscape approach at the regional scale development planning processes may have significant impacts on protected area management ( [[#Feary--2016|Feary et al., 2016]] ). For example, at the Domboshava rock art site in Zimbabwe, all management decisions are taken in direct consultation with traditional leaders and other stakeholders from surrounding communities ( [[#Chirikure--2010|Chirikure et al., 2010]] ). Such adaptation strategies promote a more open-minded approach to heritage by leveraging local development ( [[#UNESCO--2018b|UNESCO, 2018b]] ).

Lack of expertise and resources, together with legislation that privileges certain typologies of heritage, seem to limit implementation of approved policies ( [[#Ndoro--2015|Ndoro, 2015]] ). Additionally, cultural heritage has least priority in terms of budgetary allocation, capacity building and inclusion into school curricula. Failure to consider the views of people who attach spiritual significance to places is detrimental to the conservation of heritage places ( [[#Bwasiri--2011|Bwasiri, 2011]] ). In particular, documented cases of local people having to pay an entrance fee, like tourists, to access burial grounds and places of pilgrimage negate local participation in cultural site management ( [[#Ndoro--2015|Ndoro, 2015]] ).

In the long term, heritage managers and local authorities could shift from planning primarily for disaster response and recovery to strategies that focus on disaster preparedness, reducing the vulnerability of sites and strengthening resilience of local communities ( [[#UNFCCC--2007|UNFCCC, 2007]] ; [[#Domke--2016|Domke and Pretzsch, 2016]] ). This could evolve into innovative approaches that integrate community, government and the research sector in productive cultural heritage management partnerships.

There is a need for institutions to establish, maintain and update a comprehensive inventory of underwater cultural heritage. This can be done using non-intrusive, detailed mapping of the wreck site and a three-dimensional model from which scientists can reconstruct the site in detail ( [[#Maarleveld--2013|Maarleveld and Guérin, 2013]] ).

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