Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-9 (section)

=== 9.12.1 Observed Impacts on Cultural Heritage. ===

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For more than 10,000 years, Africans recorded over 8000 painted and engraved images on rock shelters and rock outcroppings across 800 known exceptional rock art sites of incalculable value ( [[#Hall--2007|Hall et al., 2007]] ; [[#di%20Lernia--2011|di Lernia and Gallinaro, 2011]] ; [[#di%20Lernia--2017|di Lernia, 2017]] ; [[#Clarke--2018|Clarke and Brooks, 2018]] ; [[#Barnett--2019|Barnett, 2019]] ), but which are exceptionally fragile to the elements. Unfortunately, there has been a poor study of direct climate change impacts on rock art across Africa.

Underwater heritage includes shipwrecks and artefacts lost at sea and extends to prehistoric sites, sunken towns and ancient ports that are now submerged due to climatic or geological changes (Spalding, 2011). Off the shores of Africa, about 111 shipwrecks have been documented, with South Africa having a major share of about 41 sites. The sunken Egyptian city of Thonis-Heracleion and its associated 60+ shipwrecks reflect the richness of Africa’s waters. Unfortunately, increased storm surges and violent weather currently threaten the integrity of shipwrecks by accelerating the destruction of wooden parts and other features ( [[#Harkin--2020|Harkin et al., 2020]] ). However, climate change impacts on underwater cultural heritage sites are poorly studied, as it requires specialist assessment techniques ( [[#Feary--2016|Feary et al., 2016]] ), and marine archaeology studies are not well established in Africa.

Intangible heritage includes instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated with communities, and are almost always held orally ( [[#UNESCO--2003|UNESCO, 2003]] ). Loss of heritage assets may be a direct consequence of climate change/variability ( [[#Markham--2016|Markham et al., 2016]] ), or a consequence of indirect factors resulting from climate change, for example, economic instability and poor decision making in areas of governance. In northern Nigeria, climate change exacerbates the impact of poor land use decisions, reducing the flow of the Yobe River and negatively impacting the Bade fishing festival because the available fish species continue to decline ( [[#Oruonye--2010|Oruonye, 2010]] ). Similarly, Lake Sanké in Mali has been degraded by a combination of urban development and poor rainfall, threatening the Sanké mon collective fishing rite ( [[#UNESCO--2018b|UNESCO, 2018b]] ).

Migration related to climate change and climatic events could offer openings to women and young people to become ''de facto'' family heads ( [[#Kaag--2019|Kaag et al., 2019]] ). However, such societal changes also increase community vulnerability to the loss of cultural knowledge held by village elders. For example, in Mauritius, the Sega tambour Chagos music is at risk, as elders familiar with the landscape pass on ( [[#Boswell--2008|Boswell, 2008]] ).

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==== 9.12.1.1 Case Study: Traditional Earthen ‘Green Energy’ Buildings ====

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Historically, Africa has had a unique and sustainable architecture ( [[#Diop--2018|Diop, 2018]] ) characterised by area-specific, traditional earthen materials and associated Indigenous technology. Key examples include Tiébélé in Burkina Faso, Walata in Mauritania, Akan in Ghana, Ghadames in Libya, Old Towns of Djenné in Mali (World Heritage Site) and other diverse earthen architecture across sub-Saharan Africa. Adegun and Adedeji (2017) indicate that earthen materials provide advantages in thermal conductivity, resistivity and diffusivity, indoor and outdoor temperature, as well as cooling and heating capacities. Moreover, earthen materials are recyclable and environmentally ‘cleaner’ ( [[#Sanya--2012|Sanya, 2012]] ) because of the absence or small quantity of cement in production, thus reducing carbon emissions. Despite these advantages, the expertise and socio-cultural ceremonies that accompany building and renewal of earthen architecture are disappearing fast ( [[#Adegun--2017|Adegun and Adedeji, 2017]] ). Further, earthen construction is being threatened by extreme climatic variability and changing climate that exacerbates decay ( [[#Brimblecombe--2011|Brimblecombe et al., 2011]] ; [[#Bosman--2014|Bosman and Van der Westhuizen, 2014]] ; [[#Brooks--2020|Brooks et al., 2020]] ).

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'''Box 9.9 | Climate Change and Security: Interpersonal Violence and Large-scale Civil Conflict'''
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There is substantial evidence that climate variability influences human security across Africa (see [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7|Chapter 7]] Sections 7.2.7; 7.3.3 7). However, the strength and nature of this link depend on socioeconomic and institutional conditions, and climate is just one of many factors influencing violence and civil conflict ( [[#Schleussner--2016a|Schleussner et al., 2016a]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Projections of security implications of long-run climate change in Africa are uncertain, as they rely on extrapolating observed effects of short-run climate variability ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ). Lack of detection and attribution studies limit assessment of the impacts of observed human-caused climate change on security.

Interpersonal violent crime

Evidence from across the globe finds that interpersonal violence, ranging from use of profanity to violent crime, increases with temperature and sometimes low rainfall ( [[#Hsiang--2013a|Hsiang et al., 2013a]] ; [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gates--2019|Gates et al., 2019]] ). The effect of temperature may be driven by a physiological mechanism ( [[#Morrison--2008|Morrison et al., 2008]] ; [[#Seo--2008|Seo et al., 2008]] ; [[#Ray--2011|Ray et al., 2011]] ), while effects of rainfall may operate through an agricultural yield impacts channel ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ). While few studies link interpersonal violence to climate in Africa, [[#Gates--2019|Gates et al. (2019)]] documents homicide risks increasing under high temperatures in South Africa, and similarity across diverse study settings suggests temperature-induced violent crime ''likely'' generalises to Africa ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ).

Large-scale intergroup conflict

Climatic conditions also change the risk of large-scale conflicts such as riots, ethnic conflicts and civil war ( [[#Burke--2014|Burke et al., 2014]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ). The effects of temperature are particularly well-studied in Africa. Risk of violent conflict rises with temperature in Sudan and South Sudan ( [[#Maystadt--2014|Maystadt and Ecker, 2014]] ; [[#Maystadt--2014|Maystadt et al., 2014]] ; [[#Scheffran--2014|Scheffran et al., 2014]] ), Kenya ( [[#Hsiang--2013b|Hsiang et al., 2013b]] ; [[#Scheffran--2014|Scheffran et al., 2014]] ), the east African region ( [[#O’Loughlin--2012|O’Loughlin et al., 2012]] ) and across sub-Saharan Africa ( [[#Burke--2009|Burke et al., 2009]] ; [[#O’Loughlin--2014|O’Loughlin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ). Estimates indicate that warming trends since 1980 have elevated conflict risk across sub-Saharan Africa by 11% ( [[#Burke--2009|Burke et al., 2009]] ; [[#Carleton--2016|Carleton et al., 2016]] ).

Periods of low rainfall or flooding also contribute to social instability and upheaval across Africa ( [[#Miguel--2004|Miguel et al., 2004]] ; [[#Ralston--2015|Ralston, 2015]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Harari--2018|Harari and Ferrara, 2018]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ). The link between rainfall and conflict appears ''likely'' due to crop losses and declines in economic opportunity. One study found that dry growing seasons increase conflict incidence across 36 African nations, with spillover effects from the location of climate shock to neighbouring communities ( [[#Harari--2018|Harari and Ferrara, 2018]] ). Conflict-inducing impacts of drought have also been uncovered in Somalia ( [[#Maystadt--2014|Maystadt and Ecker, 2014]] ), Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya ( [[#Fjelde--2012|Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012]] ; [[#Hendrix--2012|Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012]] ; [[#Couttenier--2014|Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014]] ; [[#Ralston--2015|Ralston, 2015]] ; [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ), the DRC ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2020|von Uexkull et al., 2020]] ) and in a pooled sample of African and Asian countries ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ). Extremely high rainfall may also incite conflict risk, although results are mixed ( [[#Hendrix--2012|Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012]] ; [[#Raleigh--2012|Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012]] ). This uncertainty, combined with large uncertainties in rainfall projections under climate change, render future impacts of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions on rainfall-induced conflict in Africa highly uncertain.

While conflict–climate links have been repeatedly identified in Africa, climate is one of many interacting conflict risk factors and appears to explain only a small share of total variation in conflict incidence ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ; [[#van%20Weezel--2019|van Weezel, 2019]] ).

Opportunities for adaptation

Adaptive capacity with respect to climate and conflict remains low in Africa ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ). For example, one study found that, relative to each country’s optimal annual temperature, realised temperatures across sub-Saharan Africa increase the annual incidence of war by 29.3% on average ( [[#Carleton--2016|Carleton et al., 2016]] ). Another finds that rising temperatures due to climate change may lead to higher levels of violence in sub-Saharan Africa if political rights do not improve from current conditions ( [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ). Available studies on adaptation in conflict-affected areas tend to have a narrow focus, particularly on agriculture-related adaptation in rural contexts and adaptation by low-income actors, with little known beyond these contexts ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ). Literature on the gender dimension of climate adaptation in conflict-affected countries is also limited ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ).

Migration is a common response ( [[#Sitati--2021|Sitati et al., 2021]] ) and may be an effective adaptive response to climate-induced conflict. Bosetti et al. (2018) find that countries with high emigration propensity display lower sensitivity of conflict to temperature, with no evidence of detrimental impacts on the destination countries. IK has also been applied to enable adaptation amidst conflict, for example, in Libya, to deal with erratic rainfall ( [[#Biagetti--2017|Biagetti, 2017]] ).

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Box 9.9

Other socioeconomic factors have been identified as adaptive opportunities. Rising incomes may mitigate conflict–climate relationships ( [[#Carleton--2016|Carleton et al., 2016]] ), while weak institutions, lack of political freedom, agricultural dependence and exclusion of ethnic groups increase their strength ( [[#Schleussner--2016a|Schleussner et al., 2016a]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Witmer--2017|Witmer et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ). In particular, agriculturally dependent and politically excluded groups in Africa are especially vulnerable to the impact of drought on conflict ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ). Household-level resilience to economic shocks has been shown to lower support for violence after drought ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2020|von Uexkull et al., 2020]] ). Local-level institutions have also been shown to support non-violence under adverse climate conditions ( [[#Bogale--2007|Bogale and Korf, 2007]] ).

These findings suggest that ameliorating ethnic tensions, improving political institutions and investing in economic diversification and household resilience could mitigate future impacts of climate change on conflict.

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