Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

== 13.3 Structural Factors that Shape Climate Governance ==

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A growing literature suggests that ambitious climate policy emerges out of strong domestic political support ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Aklin--2020|Aklin and]] [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ; [[#Lamb--2020|Lamb and Minx 2020]] ; [[#Colgan--2021|Colgan et al. 2021]] ). Such support is the outcome of political interest constellations and struggles that vary from country to country. Structural factors (such as economic wealth and natural resources, the character of the national political system, and the dominant ideas, values and beliefs) shape how climate change is governed ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Hochstetler--2020|Hochstetler 2020]] ). This section assesses the ways these structural factors affect political dynamics and decision-making, and ultimately constrain, sustain or enable development of domestic climate governance.

While these structural factors are crucial, they do not determine the outlook of given countries’ climate governance, as civic, corporate and/or political groups or individuals can be mobilised and seek to counteract these structural effects, as indicated in the following [[#13.4|Section 13.4]] that examines the role of various actors and agencies in shaping governance processes. Taken together, Sections 13.3 and 13.4 show that domestic climate governance is not fully constrained by structural factors, but rather that diverse actors can and do achieve substantial changes.

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=== 13.3.1 Material Endowments ===

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Material endowments are natural and economic resources, such as fossil fuels and renewable energy, forests and land, and economic or financial resources, which tend to shape developments of domestic climate governance ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Friedrichs--2013|Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013]] ; [[#Lachapelle--2013|Lachapelle and Paterson 2013]] ; [[#Bang--2015|Bang et al. 2015]] ; [[#Lamb--2020|Lamb and Minx 2020]] ). Most countries’ social and economic systems are largely developed on the basis of their material endowment, and thus they contribute to shape the distribution of political power in that country ( [[#Hall--2001|Hall and Soskice 2001]] ). Material endowments are by no means the only influencing factor, and actors may succeed to either circumvent or exploit material endowments to impact climate governance ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Green--2017|Green and Hale 2017]] ; [[#Aklin--2020|Aklin and]] [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ).

Since countries are not bound by their material endowment, countries with similar material endowments may differ in climate governance, whereas those with notable differences in material endowments may have similar policies. For instance, countries with rich fossil fuel endowments are found either adopting rather ambitious emission reduction targets and measures, or remaining weak in developing domestic climate policies ( [[#Eckersley--2013|Eckersley 2013]] ; [[#Farstad--2019|Farstad 2019]] ). Further, countries with radically different electricity systems and energy resource potentials are found developing rather similar renewables support schemes such as feed-in-tariff subsidies and competitive tendering programmes ( [[#Dobrotkova--2018|Dobrotkova et al. 2018]] ; [[#Vanegas%20Cantarero--2020|Vanegas Cantarero 2020]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). Some policy instruments are widely applied in both developed and developing countries with similar or different material endowment. For example, renewable energy auctions have been experimented by over 100 countries by the end of 2018 ( [[#IRENA--2019|IRENA 2019]] ).

Rich carbon-intensive resources and well developed infrastructure can make low-carbon activities relatively less economically profitable, and negatively influence some perceptions of climate mitigation potential ( [[#Bertram--2015a|Bertram et al. 2015a]] ; Erickson et al. 2015). If effective climate policies are introduced despite this, they can alter the importance of country’s material endowments in a way that underpin more forceful climate governance over time. For instance, policy interventions to limit fossil fuel exploitation or support renewable energy deployment may change the value of these energy resources over time ( [[#Schmitz--2015|Schmitz et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ürge-Vorsatz--2018|Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2018]] ; [[#Chailleux--2020|Chailleux 2020]] ; [[#Colgan--2021|Colgan et al. 2021]] ).

Developing countries face additional material constraints in climate governance due to challenges associated with underdevelopment and scarce economic or natural resources ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Hence, many developing countries design domestic climate mitigation policies in combination with policy goals that address various developmental challenges ( [[#von%20Stechow--2016|von Stechow et al. 2016]] ; [[#Deng--2017|Deng et al. 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ; [[#Campagnolo--2019|Campagnolo and Davide 2019]] ), such as air quality, urban transportation, energy access, and poverty alleviation ( [[#Klausbruckner--2016|Klausbruckner et al. 2016]] ; [[#Li--2016|Li et al. 2016]] ; [[#Melamed--2016|Melamed et al. 2016]] ; [[#Slovic--2016|Slovic et al. 2016]] ; [[#Khreis--2017|Khreis et al. 2017]] ; [[#Geall--2018|Geall et al. 2018]] ; [[#Xie--2018|Xie et al. 2018]] ). Combining climate and developmental policies for beneficial synergies should not overlook potential trade-offs and challenges ( [[#Dagnachew--2018|Dagnachew et al. 2018]] ; [[#Ellis--2019|Ellis and Tschakert 2019]] ; [[#Peñasco--2021|Peñasco et al. 2021]] ) ( [[#13.7.2|Section 13.7.2]] for wider discussion).

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=== 13.3.2 Political Systems ===

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The effectiveness of domestic climate governance will significantly rely on how well it fits with the features of the countries’ specific political systems ( ''limited evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Schmitz--2017|Schmitz 2017]] ; [[#Lamb--2020|Lamb and Minx 2020]] ). Political systems have developed over generations and constitute a set of formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, bureaucratic structures, political executives, legislative assemblies and political parties ( [[#Egeberg--1999|Egeberg 1999]] ; [[#Pierson--2004|Pierson 2004]] ). Different political systems create differing conditions for climate governance to emerge and evolve, but because political systems are so politically and historically entrenched they are not likely to change quickly even though this could facilitate domestic climate mitigation efforts ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Duit--2008|Duit and Galaz 2008]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). In addition, variations in governance capacities also affect climate policy making and implementation ( [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling and Nahm 2018]] ).

Broader public participation and more open contestation spaces tend to nurture more encompassing climate policies, facilitate stronger commitments to international agreements ( [[#Bättig--2009|Bättig and Bernauer 2009]] ; [[#Böhmelt--2016|Böhmelt et al. 2016]] ), achieve more success in decoupling economic growth from CO 2 emissions ( [[#Lægreid--2018|Lægreid and Povitkina 2018]] ), reduce more CO 2 emissions ( [[#Clulow--2019|Clulow 2019]] ; [[#von%20Stein--2020|von Stein 2020]] ), and maintain lower deforestation rates ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Buitenzorgy--2011|Buitenzorgy and Mol 2011]] ). States with less public participation and contestation space can also develop ambitious climate emission reduction targets and institutions ( [[#Zimmer--2015|Zimmer et al. 2015]] ; [[#Eckersley--2016|Eckersley 2016]] ; [[#Han--2017|Han 2017]] ; [[#Engels--2018|Engels 2018]] ), but the drivers and effects of climate policies within less open and liberal political contexts has not yet been sufficiently investigated.

Election systems based on proportional representation tend to have lower emissions, higher energy efficiency, higher renewable energy deployment, and more climate friendly investment than systems where leadership candidates have to secure a majority of the votes to be elected ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Fredriksson--2004|Fredriksson and Millimet 2004]] ; [[#Lachapelle--2013|Lachapelle and Paterson 2013]] ; [[#Finnegan--2019|Finnegan 2019]] ). Such systems better enable voters supporting ambitious climate positions to influence policymaking ( [[#Harrison--2010|Harrison and Sundstrom 2010]] ; [[#Willis--2018|Willis 2018]] ), place less political risks on legislators from additional costs incurred from climate actions on voters ( [[#Finnegan--2018|Finnegan 2018]] , 2019), and strengthen credible commitments to climate policy ( [[#Lockwood--2021b|Lockwood 2021b]] ). Similarly, rules that govern the relationship between governments and civic societies in decision-making have also been shown to matter in climate governance. Corporatist societies, where economic groups are formally involved in public policy making, have better climate-related outcomes (lower CO 2 emissions and higher low-carbon investments) than liberal-pluralist countries, where a larger array of non-governmental organisations compete for informal influence, often through lobbying ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Liefferink--2009|Liefferink et al. 2009]] ; [[#Jahn--2016|Jahn 2016]] ; [[#Finnegan--2018|Finnegan 2018]] ).

Political parties with similar ideological roots in different countries (for instance social democratic or conservative parties) may have different positions on climate governance across countries ( [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). Nevertheless, on average, a higher share of green parties in a parliament is associated with lower greenhouse gas emissions ( [[#Neumayer--2003|Neumayer 2003]] ; [[#Jensen--2011|Jensen and Spoon 2011]] ; [[#Mourao--2019|Mourao 2019]] ), and left-wing parties tend to adopt more pro-climate policy positions ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Carter--2013|Carter 2013]] ; [[#Tobin--2017|Tobin 2017]] ; [[#Farstad--2018|Farstad 2018]] ; [[#Ladrech--2019|Ladrech and Little 2019]] ). There is also evidence, however, that conservative parties in some countries support climate measures ( [[#Båtstrand--2015|Båtstrand 2015]] ) and consensus can be achieved on climate actions across the political spectrum ( [[#Thonig--2021|Thonig et al. 2021]] ). At the same time, it seems harder to get support for new climate governance initiatives in systems where many political groups can block decision due to many veto points, for instance in systems with bicameralism (the legislature is divided into two separate assemblies) and/or in federalist governments (where regions have national political representation, e.g. USA and Brazil) ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Madden--2014|Madden 2014]] ; [[#von%20Stein--2020|von Stein 2020]] ) although federal systems hold out the possibility of sub-national action when federal agreement is limited ( [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] ). There remains a limited literature on the role of green parties and veto points in developing countries ( [[#Haynes--1999|Haynes 1999]] ; [[#Kernecker--2019|Kernecker and Wagner 2019]] ).

In any political system, climate policy adoption and implementation may be obstructed by corrupt practices ( [[#Rafaty--2018|Rafaty 2018]] ; [[#Fredriksson--2016|Fredriksson and Neumayer 2016]] ) that entail an abuse of entrusted power for private gain ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Treisman--2000|Treisman 2000]] ). Evidence shows that CO 2 emissions levels can be affected by corruption, either through the direct negative effect of corruption on law enforcement, including in the forestry sector ( [[#Sundström--2016|Sundström 2016]] ), or through the negative effect of corruption on countries’ income ( [[#Welsch--2004|Welsch 2004]] ).These early findings are reinforced by studies of a global sample of countries ( [[#Cole--2007|Cole 2007]] ) and from across the developing world (Sahli and Rejeb 2015; [[#Bae--2017|Bae et al. 2017]] ; [[#Wang--2018b|Wang et al. 2018b]] ; [[#Ridzuan--2019|Ridzuan et al. 2019]] ; [[#Habib--2020|Habib et al. 2020]] ). Corruption also disrupts public support of climate policies by affecting the levels of trust ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Harring--2013|Harring 2013]] ; [[#Fairbrother--2019|Fairbrother et al. 2019]] ; [[#Davidovic--2020|Davidovic and Harring 2020]] ), which then impact on the compliance of climate policies. More research is required to further understand the causal mechanisms between corrupt practices and emissions.

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=== 13.3.3 Ideas, Values and Belief Systems ===

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Ideas, values and beliefs affect climate governance by shaping people’s perceptions, attitude, and preferences on specific policy and governance issues ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#McCright--2016b|McCright et al. 2016b]] ; [[#Schifeling--2019|Schifeling and Hoffman 2019]] ; [[#Leipold--2019|Leipold et al. 2019]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). While these are often entrenched, they can also change, for instance when facing growing exposures to climate risks, stronger scientific evidence, and dominant public or political discourse ( [[#Mayer--2017|Mayer et al. 2017]] ; [[#Diehl--2021|Diehl et al. 2021]] ). While change tend to be incremental, the pace of change may vary substantially across countries and specific climate issue areas.

However, new norms sometimes only influence political discussion and not actual governance. For instance, more ambitious climate emission reduction targets may not lead to more effective mitigation actions or policy instruments. Put another way, words do not replace actions ( [[#Geden--2016|Geden 2016]] ).

Different sets of beliefs can shape climate-related policies, targets, and instruments ( [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). First, beliefs link climate governance with social justice concerns; policies, targets and instruments may therefore reflect justice issues ( [[#Fuller--2016|Fuller and McCauley 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al. 2017]] ; [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ; [[#Routledge--2018|Routledge et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bäckstrand--2006|Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006]] , 2019). Second, climate mitigation may be seen as primarily a market correction issue and mitigation compatible with economic growth, as exemplified by ecological modernisation ( [[#Mol--2009|Mol et al. 2009]] ; [[#Bäckstrand--2006|Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006]] , 2019), climate capitalism ( [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ), market logics ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ) or a global commons approach ( [[#Bernstein--2019|Bernstein and Hoffmann 2019]] ). Third, climate governance may be understood relative to policies on technological innovation and progress, often conceptualised as social-technical transformations ( [[#Geels--2017a|Geels et al. 2017a]] ).

Significant variation in ideas, values and beliefs related to climate governance are detected across and within regions, countries, societies, organisations, and individuals ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Shwom--2015|Shwom et al. 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ; [[#Knox-Hayes--2016|Knox-Hayes 2016]] ; [[#Wettestad--2018|Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2018]] ). These factors provide the context for climate policymaking and include differences in countries’ histories ( [[#Aamodt--2018|Aamodt 2018]] ; [[#Aamodt--2020|Aamodt and Boasson 2020]] ); the political culture and regulatory traditions in governing environmental and energy issues ( [[#Tosun--2018|Tosun 2018]] ; [[#Aamodt--2018|Aamodt 2018]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ); and even bureaucrats’ educational background ( [[#Rickards--2014|Rickards et al. 2014]] ). Structural factors in a country, such as deeply held value systems, are not changed rapidly, just as political systems or natural endowments, are not changed rapidly. Consequently, climate policy and governance is more effective if it takes into account these deep-rooted values and beliefs.

Differences in dominant individual preferences may also be important. The factors that shape individual ideas, values and beliefs about climate governance include trust in politicians, the state and other people in general ( [[#Drews--2016|Drews and van den Bergh 2016]] ; [[#Harring--2019|Harring et al. 2019]] ; [[#Huber--2020|Huber et al. 2020]] ), fairness beliefs, variation in political orientation (left leaning more concerned), and class ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Schmitz--2018|Schmitz et al. 2018]] ; [[#Inglehart--2017|Inglehart and Norris 2017]] ).

Levels of climate change concern on the individual level have increased in most countries ( [[#Shwom--2015|Shwom et al. 2015]] ), and vary with gender (females are more concerned), and place of residence (urban residents are more concerned) ( [[#Shwom--2015|Shwom et al. 2015]] ; [[#McCright--2016a|McCright et al. 2016a]] ; [[#Ziegler--2017|Ziegler 2017]] ). The higher educated in developing countries tend to be more concerned ( [[#Lee--2015|Lee et al. 2015]] ) while individuals working in polluting industries tend to oppose forceful climate governance ( [[#Bechtel--2019|Bechtel et al. 2019]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ).

Shifts in mainstream ideas, values and beliefs can underpin changes in climate policy choices and policy outcomes ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Schleich--2018|Schleich et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ). For example, emission trading schemes are welcomed as a new regulatory instrument in China in the context of its market-oriented reforms and ideological shift in the past decades ( [[#Lo--2013|Lo 2013]] ). Based on the study of 167 nation-states and 95 sub-national jurisdictions with carbon pricing, researchers find that that high public belief in climate science underpin adoption of systems that produce a rather high carbon price ( [[#Levi--2020|Levi et al. 2020]] ). These public opinions need to be identified and leveraged in supporting specific policy choices or changes ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ). Policy support tends to be greater if people believe effective measures are being taken by other actors, including other households ( [[#Bostrom--2018|Bostrom et al. 2018]] ; [[#Marlon--2019|Marlon et al. 2019]] ), and other countries and at the international level ( [[#Schleich--2018|Schleich et al. 2018]] ).

On the other hand, anti-climate ideas or beliefs may arise due to the introduction of more constraining or ambitious climate policies, for example protests in reaction to toll roads in Norway, which increase the cost of driving, or protests in France against increasing carbon taxes ( [[#Grossman--2019|Grossman 2019]] ; [[#Wanvik--2021|Wanvik and Haarstad 2021]] ). The policy implication is that vulnerable or effected groups should be considered when introducing policy change, and that participation, transparency, and good communication all helps to reduce climate-related discontent.

Survey-based studies of public perceptions on hypothetical policy instruments or activities, such as carbon taxes or energy infrastructure, suggest that linking climate policy to other economic and social reforms can increase public support for climate governance ( [[#Carattini--2019|Carattini et al. 2019]] ; [[#Bergquist--2020|Bergquist et al. 2020]] ). People and politicians tend to underestimate other peoples’ and politicians’ willingness to support mitigation policies ( [[#Hurlstone--2014|Hurlstone et al. 2014]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ), but if actors are informed about other actors actual perceptions and behaviours this may reduce the tendency to underestimate climate governance support ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ).

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