Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-14 (section)

==== 14.3.2.2 NDCs, Progression and Ambition ====

<div id="h3-7-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Each Party to the Paris Agreement has a procedural obligation to ‘prepare, communicate and maintain’ successive NDCs ‘that it intends to achieve’. Parties have a further procedural obligation to ‘pursue domestic mitigation measures’ ( [[#UNFCCC--2015a|UNFCCC 2015a]] , Art. 4.2). These procedural obligations are coupled with an obligation of conduct to make best efforts to achieve the objectives of NDCs ( [[#Rajamani--2016a|Rajamani 2016a]] ; [[#Mayer--2018b|Mayer 2018b]] ). Many states have adopted climate policies and laws, discussed in Chapter 13, and captured in databases ( [[#LSE--2020|LSE 2020]] ).

The framing and content of NDCs is thus largely left up to Parties, although certain normative expectations apply. These include developed country leadership through these Parties undertaking economy-wide absolute emissions reduction targets ( [[#UNFCCC--2015a|UNFCCC 2015a]] , Art. 4.4), as well as ‘progression’ and ‘highest possible ambition’ reflecting ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances’ (Art. 4.3). There is ‘a firm expectation’ that for every five-year cycle a Party puts forward a new or updated NDC that is ‘more ambitious than their last’ ( [[#Rajamani--2016a|Rajamani 2016a]] ). While what represents a Party’s highest possible ambition and progression is not prescribed by the Agreement or elaborated in the Paris Rulebook ( [[#Rajamani--2019|Rajamani and Bodansky 2019]] ), these obligations could be read to imply a due diligence standard ( [[#Voigt--2016b|Voigt and Ferreira 2016b]] ).

In communicating their NDCs every five years ( [[#UNFCCC--2015a|UNFCCC 2015a]] , Art. 4.9), all Parties have an obligation to ‘provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding’ ( [[#UNFCCC--2015a|UNFCCC 2015a]] , Art. 4.8). These requirements are further elaborated in the Paris Rulebook ( [[#Doelle--2019|Doelle 2019]] ; [[#UNFCCC--2019b|UNFCCC 2019b]] ). This includes requirements – for Parties’ second and subsequent NDCs – to provide quantifiable information on the reference point, for example base year, reference indicators and target relative to the reference indicator ( [[#UNFCCC--2019b|UNFCCC 2019b]] , Annex I, para. 1). It also requires Parties to provide information on how they consider their contribution ‘fair and ambitious in light of different national circumstances’, and how they address the normative expectations of developed country leadership, progression and highest possible ambition ( [[#UNFCCC--2019b|UNFCCC 2019b]] , Annex I, para. 6). However, Parties are required to provide the enumerated information only ‘as applicable’ to their NDC ( [[#UNFCCC--2019b|UNFCCC 2019b]] , Annex I, para. 7). This allows Parties to determine the informational requirements placed on them through their choice of NDC. In respect of Parties’ first NDCs or NDCs updated by 2020, such quantifiable information ‘may’ be included, ‘as appropriate’, signalling a softer requirement, although Parties are ‘strongly encouraged’ to provide this information ( [[#UNFCCC--2019b|UNFCCC 2019b]] , Annex I, para. 9).

Parties’ first NDCs submitted to the provisional registry maintained by the UNFCCC Secretariat vary in terms of target type, reference year or points, timeframes, and scope and coverage of GHGs. A significant number of NDCs include adaptation, and several NDCs have conditional components, for instance, being conditional on the use of market mechanisms or on the availability of support ( [[#UNFCCC--2016b|UNFCCC 2016b]] ). There are wide variations across NDCs. Uncertainties are generated through interpretative ambiguities in the assumptions underlying NDCs ( [[#Rogelj--2017|Rogelj et al. 2017]] ). According to the assessment in this report, current policies lead to median global GHG emissions of 63 gigatonnes of CO 2 equivalent (GtCO 2 -eq), with a full range of 57–70 by 2030 and unconditional and conditional NDCs to 59 (55–65) and 56 (52–61) GtCO 2 -eq, respectively (Table 4.1). Many omit important mitigation sectors, provide little detail on financing implementation, and are not effective in meeting assessment and review needs ( [[#Pauw--2018|Pauw et al. 2018]] ). Although, it is estimated that the land use sector could contribute as much as 20% of the full mitigation potential of all the intended NDC targets ( [[#Forsell--2016|Forsell et al. 2016]] ), there are variations in how the land use component is included, and the related information provided, leading to large uncertainties on whether and how these will contribute to the achievement of the NDCs ( [[#Forsell--2016|Forsell et al. 2016]] ; [[#Grassi--2017|Grassi et al. 2017]] ; [[#Obergassel--2017a|Obergassel et al. 2017a]] ; [[#Benveniste--2018|Benveniste et al. 2018]] ; [[#Fyson--2019|Fyson and Jeffery 2019]] ). All these variations make it challenging to aggregate the efforts of countries and compare them to each other ( [[#Carraro--2016|Carraro 2016]] ). Although Parties attempted to discipline the variation in NDCs, including whether they could be conditional, through elaborating the ‘features’ of NDCs in the Rulebook, no agreement was possible on this. Thus, Parties continue to enjoy considerable discretion in the formulation of NDCs ( [[#Rajamani--2019|Rajamani and Bodansky 2019]] ; [[#Weikmans--2020|Weikmans et al. 2020]] ).

There are several approaches to evaluating NDCs, incorporating indicators such as CO 2 emissions, GDP, energy intensity of GDP, CO 2 per energy unit, CO 2 intensity of fossil fuels, and share of fossil fuels in total energy use ( [[#Peters--2017|Peters et al. 2017]] ). However, some favour approaches that use metrics beyond emissions such as infrastructure investment, energy demand, or installed power capacity ( [[#Iyer--2017|Iyer et al. 2017]] ; [[#Jeffery--2018|Jeffery et al. 2018]] ). One approach is to combine the comparison of aggregate NDC emissions using Integrated Assessment Model scenarios with modelling of NDC scenarios directly, and carbon budget analyses ( [[#Jeffery--2018|Jeffery et al. 2018]] ). Another approach is to engage in a comprehensive assessment of multiple indicators that reflect the different viewpoints of the Parties to the UNFCCC ( [[#Aldy--2017|Aldy et al. 2017]] ; [[#Höhne--2018|Höhne et al. 2018]] ). These different approaches are described in greater depth in Section 4.2.2.

It is clear, however, that the NDCs communicated by Parties for the 2020–2030 period are insufficient to achieve the temperature goal ( [[#den%20Elzen--2016|den Elzen et al. 2016]] ; Rogelj et al. 2016; [[#Schleussner--2016|Schleussner et al. 2016]] ; [[#Robiou%20du%20Pont--2018|Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen 2018]] ; [[#UNEP--2018a|UNEP 2018a]] ; [[#Alcaraz--2019|Alcaraz et al. 2019]] ; [[#UNEP--2019|UNEP 2019]] , 2020), and the emissions gap is larger than ever ( [[#Christensen--2019|Christensen and Olhoff 2019]] ) (Chapter 4). The IPCC ''Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C'' (SR1.5) notes that pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show up to 40–50% reduction of total GHG emissions from 2010 levels by 2030, and that current pathways reflected in the NDCs are consistent with cost-effective pathways that result in a global warming of about 3°C by 2100 ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC 2018b]] Summary for Policymakers D.1.1). Analysis by the UNFCCC Secretariat of the second round of those NDCs submitted by October 2021 suggests that ‘total global GHG emission level, taking into account full implementation of all the latest NDCs (including their conditional elements), implies possibility of global emissions peaking before 2030’. However, such total global GHG emission level in 2030 is still expected to be 15.9% above the 2010 level. This ‘implies an urgent need for either a significant increase in the level of ambition of NDCs between now and 2030 or a significant overachievement of the latest NDCs, or a combination of both.’ ( [[#UNFCCC--2021a|UNFCCC 2021a]] ).

Many NDCs with conditional elements may not be feasible as the conditions are not clearly defined and existing promises of support are insufficient ( [[#Pauw--2020|Pauw et al. 2020]] ). Moreover, ‘leadership by conditional commitments’ (when some states promise to take stronger commitments if others do so as well), and the system of pledge-and-review, may lead to decreasing rather than deeper contributions over time ( [[#Helland--2017|Helland et al. 2017]] ). Some note, however, that many of the NDCs are conservative and may be overachieved, that NDCs may be strengthened over time as expected under the Paris Agreement, and that there are significant non-state actions that have not been adequately captured in the NDCs ( [[#Höhne--2017|Höhne et al. 2017]] ). Further, if all NDCs with and without conditional elements are implemented, net land use, land use change and forestry emissions will decrease in 2030 compared to 2010 levels, but large uncertainties remain on how Parties estimate, project and account for emissions and removals from this sector ( [[#Forsell--2016|Forsell et al. 2016]] ; [[#Fyson--2019|Fyson and Jeffery 2019]] ). According to the estimates in Table 4.3, communicated unconditional commitments imply about a 7% reduction of world emissions by 2030, in terms of Kyoto GHGs, compared to a scenario where only current policies are in place. If conditional commitments are also included, the reduction in world emissions by 2030 would be about 12%.

In this context, it should be noted that many NDCs have been formulated with conditional elements, and such NDCs require international cooperation on finance, technology and capacity building ( [[#Kissinger--2019|Kissinger et al. 2019]] ), potentially including through Article 6 in the form of bilateral agreements and market mechanisms ( [[#UNFCCC--2016b|UNFCCC 2016b]] ). More broadly, some argue that there is a ‘policy inconsistency’ between the facilitative, ‘bottom up’ architecture of the Paris Agreement, and both the setting of the long-term temperature goal and expectations that it will be delivered ( [[#Geden--2016b|Geden 2016b]] ). As Figure 14.2 shows, there is a large share of additional effort needed to reach a 1.5°C compatible path by 2030 (and even a 2°C compatible path). International coordination and cooperation are crucial in enhancing the ambition of current pledges, as countries will be more willing to increase their ambition if matched by other countries (coordination) and if cost-minimising agreements between developed and developing countries, through Article 6 and other means, are fully developed (cooperation) ( [[#Sælen--2020|Sælen 2020]] ).

<div id="figure-14-2" class="Basic-Text-Frame"></div>

[[File:0a9498e83eecdc130ce80f2eebb33e43 IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Figure_14_2.png]]

'''Figure 14.2 | The role of international cooperationin the reductions in annual emissions by 2030 needed to follow a 1.''' '''5°C (respectively &lt;2°C)''' '''cost-effective''' '''path from 2020 onwards.''' The figure represents the additional contribution of pledges included in the NDCs over current policies at the global level, and the remaining gap in emissions reductions needed to move from current policies to pathways that limit warning to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot, and those to limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%). Median values are used, showing the confidence interval for the total effort. See Figure 1 in Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4, and Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for details. (i) The grey share represents NDCs with abatement efforts pledged without any conditions (called ‘unconditional’ in the literature). They are based mainly on domestic abatement actions, although countries can use international cooperation to meet their targets. (ii) The blue share represents NDCs with conditional components. They require international cooperation, for example bilateral agreements under Article 6, financing or monetary and/or technological transfers. (iii) The remaining gap in emissions reductions – the yellow share – can potentially be achieved through national and international actions. International coordination of more ambitious efforts promotes global ambition and international cooperation provides the cost-saving basis for more ambitious NDCs.

<div id="14.3.2.3" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="ndcs-fairness-and-equity"></span>