Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-9 (section)

== Executive Summary ==

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<div id="Overall" class="h4-container"></div>

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===== Overall Key Messages =====

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'''Africa is one of the lowest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, yet key development sectors have already experienced widespread losses and damages attributable to human-induced climate change, including biodiversity loss, water shortages, reduced food production, loss of lives and reduced economic growth (''' '''''high confidence''''' [[#footnote-002|1]] ''').''' {9.1.1, 9.1.6, 9.2, 9.6.1, 9.8.2, 9.10.2, 9.11.1, Box 9.4}

'''Between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming—assuming localised and incremental adaptation—negative impacts are projected to become widespread and severe with reduced food production, reduced economic growth, increased inequality and poverty, biodiversity loss, increased human morbidity and mortality''' '''(''' '''''high confidence''''' '''). Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is expected to substantially reduce damages to African economies, agriculture, human health, and ecosystems compared to higher levels of global warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.2, 9.6.2, 9.8.2, 9.8.5, 9.10.2, 9.11.2}

'''Exposure and vulnerability to climate change in Africa are multi-dimensional with socioeconomic, political and environmental factors intersecting (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Africans are disproportionately employed in climate-exposed sectors: 55–62% of the sub-Saharan workforce is employed in agriculture and 95% of cropland is rainfed. In rural Africa, poor and female-headed households face greater livelihood risks from climate hazards. In urban areas, growing informal settlements without basic services increase the vulnerability of large populations to climate hazards, especially women, children and the elderly. {9.8.1, 9.9.1, 9.9.3, 9.11.4, Box 9.1}

'''Adaptation in Africa has multiple benefits, and most assessed adaptation options have medium effectiveness at reducing risks for present-day global warming, but their efficacy at future warming levels is largely unknown (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' '''''.''''' {9.3, 9.6.4, 9.8.3, 9.11.4}

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===== Enabling Climate Resilient Development =====

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'''Climate-related research in Africa faces severe data constraints, as well as inequities in funding and research leadership that reduces adaptive capacity (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Many countries lack regularly reporting weather stations, and data access is often limited. From 1990–2019, research on Africa received just 3.8% of climate-related research funding globally: 78% of this funding for Africa went to EU and north American institutions and only 14.5% to African institutions. The number of climate research publications with locally based authors are among the lowest globally and research led by external researchers may focus less on local priorities. Increased funding for African partners, and direct control of research design and resources can provide more actionable insights on climate risks and adaptation options in Africa. {9.1,5 9.4.5, 9.5.2}

'''Adaptation generally is cost-effective, but annual finance flows targeting adaptation for Africa are billions of US dollars less than the lowest adaptation cost estimates for near-term climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Finance has not targeted more vulnerable countries ( ''high confidence'' ). From 2014–2018 more finance commitments were debt than grants and—excluding multilateral development banks—only 46% of commitments were disbursed (compared to 96% for other development projects). {9.4.1}

'''Adaptation costs will rise rapidly with global warming (''' '''''very high confidence''''' '''). Increasing public and private finance flows by billions of dollars per year, increasing direct access to multilateral funds, strengthening project pipeline development and shifting more finance to project implementation would help realise transformative adaptation in Africa (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Concessional finance will be required for adaptation in low-income settings ( ''high confidence'' ). Aligning sovereign debt relief with climate goals could increase finance by redirecting debt-servicing payments to climate resilience. {9.4.1}

'''Governance for climate resilient development includes long-term planning, all-of-government approaches, transboundary cooperation and benefit-sharing, development pathways that increase adaptation and mitigation and reduce inequality, and implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.3.2, 9.4.2, 9.4.3}

'''Cross-sectoral ‘nexus’ approaches provide significant opportunities for large co-benefits and/or avoided damages (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' For example, climate change adaptation benefits pandemic preparedness, ‘One Health’ approaches benefit human and ecosystem health, and ecosystem-based adaptation can deliver adaptation and emissions mitigation ( ''high confidence'' ). {9.4.3, 9.6.4, 9.11.5; Box 9.6}

'''Without cross-sectoral, transboundary and long-term planning, adaptation and mitigation response options in one sector can become response risks, exacerbating impacts in other sectors and causing maladaptation (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' For example, maintaining indigenous forest benefits biodiversity and reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but afforestation—or wrongly targeting ancient grasslands and savannas for reforestation—harms water security and biodiversity, and can increase carbon loss to fire and drought. Planned hydropower projects may increase risk as rainfall changes impact water, energy and food security, exacerbating trade-offs between users, including across countries. {9.4.3, Boxes 9.3, 9.5}

'''Robust legislative frameworks that develop or amend laws to mainstream climate change into their empowerment and planning provisions will facilitate effective design and implementation of climate change response options (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.4.4}

'''Climate information services that are demand driven and context specific (e.g., for agriculture or health) combined with climate change literacy can be the difference between coping and informed adaptation responses (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Across 33 African countries, 23–66% of people are aware of human-caused climate change—with larger variation at sub-national scales (e.g., 5–71% among states in Nigeria). Climate change literacy increases with education level but is undermined by poverty, and literacy rates average 12.8% lower for women than men. Around 71% of Africans that are aware of climate change agree it should be stopped. Production of salient climate information in Africa is hindered by limited availability of and access to weather and climate data. {9.4.5, 9.5.1, 9.8.4, 9.10.3}

'''Ecosystem-based adaptation can reduce climate risk while providing social, economic and environmental benefits (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Direct human dependence on ecosystem services in Africa is high. Ecosystem protection and restoration, conservation agriculture practices, sustainable land management, and integrated catchment management can support climate resilience. Ecosystem-based adaptation can cost less than grey infrastructure in human settlements (e.g., using wetlands and mangroves as coastal protection). {9.6.4, 9.7.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.5, 9.12.3, Box 9.7}

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===== Observed Impacts and Projected Risks =====

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Climate

'''Increasing mean and extreme temperature trends across Africa are attributable to human-caused climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.5.1, 9.5.2}

'''Climate change has increased heat waves (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''') and drought (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''') on land, and doubled the probability of marine heatwaves around most of Africa (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Multi-year droughts have become more frequent in west Africa, and the 2015–2017 Cape Town drought was three times more ''likely'' [[#footnote-001|2]] due to human-caused climate change. {9.5.3–7, 9.5.10}

'''Increases in drought frequency and duration are projected over large parts of southern Africa above 1.5°C global warming (high confidence), with decreased precipitation in North Africa at 2°C global warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' '''), and above 3°C global warming, meteorological drought frequency will increase, and duration will double from approximately 2 months to 4 months in parts of North Africa, the western Sahel and southern Africa (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' {9.5.2, 9.5.3, 9.5.6.}

'''Frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall events will increase at all levels of global warming (except in north and southwestern Africa), increasing exposure to pluvial and riverine flooding (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' '''''.''''' {9.5.3–7, 9.7}

'''Glaciers on the Rwenzoris and Mt Kenya are projected to disappear by 2030, and by 2040 on Kilimanjaro (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' {9.5.8}

'''In east and southern Africa, tropical cyclones making landfall are projected to become less frequent but have more intense rainfall and higher wind speeds at increasing global warming (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' {9.5.7}

'''Heat waves on land, in lakes and in the ocean will increase considerably in magnitude and duration with increasing global warming (''' '''''very high confidence''''' ''').''' Under a 1.5°C-compatible scenario, children born in Africa in 2020 are ''likely'' to be exposed to 4–8 times more heat waves compared to people born in 1960, increasing to 5–10 times for 2.4°C global warming. The annual number of days above potentially lethal heat thresholds reaches 50–150 in west Africa at 1.6°C global warming, 100–150 in central Africa at 2.5°C, and 200–300 over tropical Africa for &gt;4°C. {9.5.2, 9.5.3, 9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.7.2.1}

'''Most African countries will enter unprecedented high temperature climates earlier in this century than generally wealthier, higher latitude countries, emphasising the urgency of adaptation measures in Africa (''' '''''high confidence''''' ). {9.5.1}

Compound risks

'''Multiple African countries are projected to face compounding risks from reduced food production across crops, livestock and fisheries, increased heat-related mortality, heat-related loss of labour productivity and flooding from sea level rise, especially in west Africa (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.8.2, 9.8.5, 9.9.4, 9.10.2, 9.11.2}

Water

'''Recent extreme variability in rainfall and river discharge (around −50% to +50% relative to long-term historical means) across Africa have had largely negative and multi-sector impacts across water-dependent sectors (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.7.2, 9.10.2} Hydrological variability and water scarcity have induced cascading impacts from water supply provision and/or hydroelectric power production to health, economies, tourism, food, disaster risk response capacity and increased inequality of water access. {Box 9.4}

'''Extreme hydrological variability is projected to progressively amplify under all future climate change scenarios relative to the current baseline, depending on region (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Projections of numbers of people exposed to water stress by the 2050s vary widely—decreases/increases by hundreds of millions, with higher numbers for increases—with disagreement among global climate models on the major factor driving these large ranges. Populations in drylands are projected to double by 2050. Projected changes present heightened cross-cutting risks to water-dependent sectors, and require planning under deep uncertainty for the wide range of extremes expected in future. {9.7.1, 9.7.2, 9.9.4}

Economy and livelihoods

'''Climate change has reduced economic growth across Africa, increasing income inequality between African countries and those in temperate northern hemisphere climates (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' One estimate suggests gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for 1991–2010 in Africa was on average 13.6% lower than if climate change had not occurred. Impacts manifest largely through losses in agriculture, as well as tourism, manufacturing and infrastructure. {9.6.3, 9.11.1}

'''Climate variability and change undermine educational attainment (''' '''''high agreement, medium evidence''''' ''').''' High temperatures, low rainfall and flooding, especially in the growing season, may mean children are removed from school to assist income generation. Early life undernutrition associated with low harvests or weather-related food supply interruptions can impair cognitive development. {9.11.1.2}

'''Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is''' '''''very likely''''' '''to positively impact GDP per capita across Africa.''' Increasing economic damage forecasts under high emissions diverge from low emission pathways by 2030. Inequalities between African countries are projected to widen with increased warming. Across nearly all African countries, GDP per capita is projected to be at least 5% higher by 2050 and 10–20% higher by 2100 if global warming is held to 1.5°C compared with 2°C. {9.11.2}

Food systems

'''In Africa, climate change is reducing crop yields and productivity (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Agricultural productivity growth has been reduced by 34% since 1961 due to climate change, more than any other region. Maize and wheat yields decreased on average 5.8% and 2.3%, respectively in sub-Saharan Africa due to climate change in the period 1974–2008. Farmers and pastoralists perceive the climate to have changed and over two-thirds of Africans perceive climate conditions for agricultural production have worsened over the past 10 years. Woody plant encroachment has reduced fodder availability. {9.4.5, 9.6.1, 9.8.2}

'''Future warming will negatively affect food systems in Africa by shortening growing seasons and increasing water stress (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' By 1.5°C global warming, yields are projected to decline for olives (north Africa) and sorghum (west Africa) with a decline in suitable areas for coffee and tea (east Africa). Although yield declines for some crops may be partially compensated by increasing atmospheric CO 2 concentrations, global warming above 2°C will result in yield reductions for staple crops across most of Africa compared to 2005 yields (e.g., 20–40% decline in west African maize yields), even when considering adaptation options and increasing CO 2 ( ''medium confidence'' ). Relative to 1986–2005, global warming of 3°C is projected to reduce labour capacity in agriculture by 30–50% in sub-Saharan Africa. {9.8.2, 9.8.3, 9.11.2}

'''Climate change threatens livestock production across Africa (''' '''''high agreement, low evidence''''' ''').''' Rangeland net primary productivity is projected to decline 42% for west Africa by 2050 at 2°C global warming. Vector-borne livestock diseases and the duration of severe heat stress are both projected to become more prevalent under warming. {9.8.2}

'''Climate change poses a significant threat to African marine and freshwater fisheries (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Fisheries provide the main source of protein for approximately 200 million people in Africa and support the livelihoods of 12.3 million people. At 1.5°C global warming, marine fish catch potential decreases 3–41%, and decreases by 12–69% at 4.3°C by 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 levels, with the highest declines for tropical countries. Under 1.7°C global warming, reduced fish harvests could leave 1.2–70 million people in Africa vulnerable to iron deficiencies, up to 188 million for vitamin A deficiencies, and 285 million for vitamin B 12 and omega-3 fatty acids by mid-century. For inland fisheries, 55–68% of commercially harvested fish species are vulnerable to extinction under 2.5°C global warming by 2071–2100. {9.8.5}

Health

'''Climate variability and change already negatively impacts the health of tens of millions of Africans through exposure to non-optimal temperatures and extreme weather, and increased range and transmission of infectious diseases (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.10.1}

'''Mortality and morbidity will escalate with further global warming, placing additional strain on health and economic systems (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Above 2°C of global warming, distribution and seasonal transmission of vector-borne diseases is expected to increase, exposing tens of millions more people, mostly in west, east and southern Africa ( ''high confidence'' ). Above 1.5°C risk of heat-related deaths rises sharply ( ''medium confidence'' ), with at least 15 additional deaths per 100,000 annually across large parts of Africa, reaching 50–180 additional deaths per 100,000 people annually in regions of North, West, and East Africa for 2.5°C, and increasing to 200–600 per 100,000 people annually for 4.4°C. Above 2°C global warming, thousands to tens of thousands of additional cases of diarrhoeal disease are projected, mainly in west, central and east Africa ( ''medium confidence'' ). These changes risk undermining improvements in health from future socioeconomic development ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ). {9.10.2, Fig. 9.35}

Human settlements

'''Exposure of people, assets and infrastructure to climate hazards is increasing in Africa compounded by rapid urbanisation, infrastructure deficit, and growing population in informal settlements (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').'''

'''High population growth and urbanisation in low-elevation coastal zones will be a major driver of exposure to sea level rise in the next 50 years (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' By 2030, 108–116 million people in Africa will be exposed to sea level rise (compared to 54 million in 2000), increasing to 190–245 million by 2060 ( ''medium confidence'' ). {9.9.1, 9.9.4}

'''Africa’s rapidly growing cities will be hotspots of risks from climate change and climate-induced in-migration, which could amplify pre-existing stresses related to poverty, informality, social and economic exclusion, and governance (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Urban population exposure to extreme heat is projected to increase from 2 billion person-days per year in 1985–2005 to 45 billion person-days by the 2060s (1.7°C global warming with low population growth) and to 95 billion person-days (2.8°C global warming with medium-high population growth), with greatest exposure in west Africa. Under relatively low population growth scenarios, the sensitive populations (people under 5 or over 64 years old) in African cities exposed to heat waves of at least 15 days above 42°C in African cities is projected to increase from around 27 million in 2010 to 360 million by 2100 for 1.8°C global warming (Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 1 (SSP1)) and 440 million (SSP5) for &gt;4°C global warming. Compared to 2000, urbanisation is projected to increase urban land extent exposed to arid conditions by around 700% and exposure to high-frequency flooding by 2600% across west, central and east Africa by 2030. {9.9.1, 9.9.2, 9.9.4, Box 9.8}

Migration

'''Most climate-related migration observed currently is within countries or between neighbouring countries, rather than to distant high-income countries (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Urbanisation has increased when rural livelihoods were negatively impacted by low rainfall. Over 2.6 million and 3.4 million new weather-related displacements occurred in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 and 2019. {Box 9.8}

'''Climate change is projected to increase migration, especially internal and rural to urban migration (''' '''''high agreement, medium evidence''''' ''').''' With 1.7°C global warming by 2050, 17–40 million people could migrate internally in sub-Saharan Africa, increasing to 56–86 million for 2.5°C (&gt;60% in west Africa) due to water stress, reduced crop productivity and sea level rise. This is a lower-bound estimate excluding rapid-onset hazards such as floods and tropical cyclones. {Box 9.8}

Infrastructure

'''Climate-related infrastructure damage and repairs will be a financially significant burden to countries (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Without adaptation, aggregate damages from sea level rise and coastal extremes to 12 major African coastal cities in 2050 under medium and high emissions scenarios will be USD 65 billion and USD 86.5 billion, respectively. Potential costs of up to USD 183.6 billion may be incurred through 2100 to maintain existing road networks damaged from temperature and precipitation changes due to climate change. Increased rainfall variability is expected to affect electricity prices in countries highly dependent on hydropower. {9.9.4, Boxes 9.4, 9.5}

Ecosystems

'''Increasing CO''' 2 '''levels and climate change are destroying marine biodiversity, reducing lake productivity, and changing animal and vegetation distributions (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Impacts include repeated mass coral bleaching events in east Africa, and uphill (birds) or poleward (marine species) shifts in geographic distributions. For vegetation, the overall observed trend is woody plant expansion, particularly into grasslands and savannas, reducing grazing land and water supplies. {9.6.1, 9.6.2, 9.8.2}

'''The outcome of the effect of the interaction of increasing CO''' 2 '''and aridity that operate in opposing directions on future biome distributions is highly uncertain.''' Further increasing CO 2 concentrations could increase woody plant cover, but increasing aridity could counteract this, destabilising forest and peatland carbon stores in central Africa ( ''low confidence'' ). Changes in vegetation cover could occur rapidly if tipping points are crossed {9.6.1, 9.6.2, 9.8.2}

'''African biodiversity loss is projected to be widespread and escalating with every 0.5°C increase above present-day global warming (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Above 1.5°C, half of assessed species are projected to lose over 30% of their population or area of suitable habitat. At 2°C, 36% of freshwater fish species are vulnerable to local extinction, 7–18% of terrestrial species assessed are at risk of extinction, and over 90% of east African coral reefs are projected to be destroyed by bleaching. Above 2°C, risk of sudden and severe biodiversity losses becomes widespread in west, central and east Africa. Climate change is also projected to change patterns of invasive species spread. {9.6.2, Figure 9.19}

Climate security

'''There is increasing evidence linking increased temperatures and drought to conflict risk in Africa''' ( '''''high confidence''''' ) '''.''' Agriculturally dependent and politically excluded groups are especially vulnerable to drought-associated conflict risk. However, climate is one of many interacting risk factors, and may explain a small share of total variation in conflict incidence. Ameliorating ethnic tensions, strengthening political institutions and investing in economic diversification could mitigate future impacts of climate change on conflict. {Box 9.9}

Heritage

'''African cultural heritage is already at risk from climate hazards, including sea level rise and coastal erosion. Most African heritage sites are neither prepared for, nor adapted to, future climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.12}

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===== Adaptation =====

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'''With global warming increasing above present-day levels, the ability of adaptation responses to offset risk is substantially reduced (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Crop yield losses, even after adaptation, are projected to rise rapidly above 2°C global warming. Limits to adaptation are already being reached in coral reef ecosystems. Immigration of species from elsewhere may partly compensate for local extinctions and/or lead to local biodiversity gains in some regions. However, more African regions face net losses than net gains. At 1.5°C global warming, over 46% of localities face net losses in terrestrial vertebrate species richness with net increases projected for under 15% of localities. {9.6.1.4, 9.6.2.2, 9.8.2.1, 9.8.2.2, 9.8.4}

'''Technological, institutional and financing factors are major barriers to climate adaptation feasibility in Africa (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.3, 9.4.1}

'''There is limited evidence for economic growth alone reducing climate damages, but under scenarios of inclusive and sustainable development, millions fewer people in Africa will be pushed into extreme poverty by climate change and negative impacts to health and livelihoods can be reduced by 2030 (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' {9.10.3, 9.11.4}

'''Gender-sensitive and equity-based adaptation approaches reduce vulnerability for marginalised groups across multiple sectors in Africa, including water, health, food systems and livelihoods (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.7.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.5, 9.10.3, 9.11.4, Boxes 9.1, 9.2}

'''Integrating climate adaptation into social protection programmes, such as cash transfers, public works programmes and healthcare access, can increase resilience to climate change (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Nevertheless, social protection programmes may increase resilience to climate-related shocks, even if they do not specifically address climate risks. {9.4.2, 9.10.3, 9.11.4}

'''The diversity of African Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge systems provide a rich foundation for adaptation actions at local scales (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' African Indigenous Knowledge systems are exceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge used for management of climate variability. Integration of Indigenous Knowledge systems within legal frameworks, and promotion of Indigenous land tenure rights can reduce vulnerability. {9.4.4, Boxes 9.1, 9.2}

'''Early warning systems based on targeted climate services can be effective for disaster risk reduction, social protection programmes, and managing risks to health and food systems (e.g., vector-borne disease and crops) (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.4.5, 9.5.1, Box 9.2, 9.8.4, 9.8.5, 9.10.3, 9.11.4}

'''Risk-sensitive infrastructure delivery and equitable provision of basic services can reduce climate risks and provide net financial savings (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' However, there is limited evidence of proactive climate adaptation in African cities. Proactive adaptation policy could reduce road repair and maintenance costs by 74% compared to a reactive policy. Adapting roads for increased temperatures and investment in public transport are assessed as ‘no regret’ options. In contrast, hydropower development carries risk of regrets due to damages when a different climate than was expected materialises. Energy costs for cooling demands are projected to accumulate to USD 51.3 billion by 2035 at 2°C global warming and to USD 486.5 billion by 2076 at 4°C. {9.8.5}

'''Reduced drought and flood risk, and improved water and sanitation access, can be delivered by water sensitive and climate scenario planning, monitored groundwater use, waterless on-site sanitation, rainwater harvesting and water re-use, reducing risk to human settlements, food systems, economies and human health (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' {9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.11}

'''Water sector adaptation measures show medium social and economic feasibility but low feasibility for most African cities due to technical and institutional restrictions, particularly for large supply dams and centralised distribution systems (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' {9.3.1, 9.7.3} Use of integrated water management, water supply augmentation and establishment of decentralised water management systems can reduce risk. Integrated water management measures including sub-national financing, demand management through subsidies, rates and taxes, and sustainable water technologies can reduce water insecurity caused by either drought or floods ( ''medium confidence'' ). {9.7.3, Box 9.4}

'''Agricultural and livelihood diversification, agroecological and conservation agriculture practices, aquaculture, on-farm engineering and agroforestry can increase resilience and sustainability of food systems in Africa under climate change (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' However, smallholder farmers tend to address short-term shocks or stresses by deploying coping responses rather than transformative adaptations. Climate information services, institutional capacity building, secure land tenure, and strategic financial investment can help overcome these barriers to adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ). {9.3.1, 9.4.5, 9.8.3, 9.8.5}

'''African countries and communities are inadequately insured against climate risk, but innovative index-based insurance schemes can help transfer risk and aid recovery, including in food systems (''' '''''medium confidence''''' ''').''' Despite their potential, uptake of climate insurance products remains constrained by lack of affordability, awareness and product diversity. {9.4.5, 9.8.4, 9.11.4.1}

'''Human migration is a potentially effective adaptation strategy across food systems, water, livelihoods and in climate-induced conflict areas, but can also be maladaptive if vulnerability is increased, particularly for health and human settlements (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''')''' . Migration of men from rural areas can aggravate the work burden faced by women. The more agency migrants have (i.e., degree of voluntarity and freedom of movement) the greater the potential benefits for sending and receiving areas ''(high agreement, medium evidence).'' {9.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.1–3, 9.10.2.2.2, Boxes 9.8, 9.9, Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7}

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<span id="introduction"></span>