Jump to content
Main menu
Main menu
move to sidebar
hide
Navigation
Main page
Recent changes
Random page
Help about MediaWiki
Special pages
ClimateKG
Search
Search
English
Appearance
Create account
Log in
Personal tools
Create account
Log in
Pages for logged out editors
learn more
Contributions
Talk
Editing
IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-2
(section)
IPCC
Discussion
English
Read
Edit source
View history
Tools
Tools
move to sidebar
hide
Actions
Read
Edit source
View history
General
What links here
Related changes
Page information
In other projects
Appearance
move to sidebar
hide
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
=== CCP2.4.3 Governance === <div id="h2-11-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> An array of climatic and non-climatic perils ( [[#Le%20Cozannet--2017|Le Cozannet et al., 2017]] ) present coastal communities and their governing authorities with immense governance and institutional challenges that will become progressively more difficult as sea level rises ( ''high confidence'' ; [[#Wallace--2017|Wallace, 2017]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2018|Leal Filho et al., 2018]] ; [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ). Yet a study of public provisions for coastal adaptation in 136 of the largest coastal port–urban agglomerations across 68 countries found no policy implementation in 50% of the cases; in 85% of cases, adaptation actions are not framed by current impacts or future risks, and formal efforts are recent and concentrated in more developed settings ( [[#Olazabal--2019|Olazabal et al., 2019]] ; [[#Olazabal--2021|Olazabal and Ruiz De Gopegui, 2021]] ), thus underscoring a persistent coastal adaptation gap. Translating these challenges into enabling governance conditions is difficult, but instructive lessons are being learned and are summarised (from Table SMCCP2.4) for archetypal C&S in Tables CCP2.1 and 2.2. We start with a synopsis of governance settings within which coastal adaptation and CRD choices are made, and spotlight factors hindering and enabling translation of adaptation into practice. Then, building upon and extending the SROCC analysis of enablers and lessons learned in responding to SLR ( [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ), we assess key governance challenges, related enablers and lessons learned (Tables CCP2.1, Section CCP2.2). Governance arrangements and practices are embedded in the sociopolitical and institutional fabric of coastal C&S ''.'' Consequently, barriers and enablers for adapting to climate change at the coast and charting pathways for CRD reflect more general constraints and opportunities ( ''high confidence'' ; [[#Meerow--2017|Meerow, 2017]] ; [[#Rocle--2018|Rocle and Salles, 2018]] ; [[#Rosendo--2018|Rosendo et al., 2018]] ; [[#Di%20Giulio--2019|Di Giulio et al., 2019]] ; [[#Hölscher--2019|Hölscher et al., 2019]] ; [[#Van%20Assche--2020|Van Assche et al., 2020]] ; [[#Williams--2020|Williams et al., 2020]] ). Local-level action is often constrained: 231 cities in the USA report weak leadership, lack of funding and staffing, and low political will ( [[#Fu--2020|Fu, 2020]] ). A meta-analysis of coastal municipal planning documents in Australia shows that few localities have moved beyond risk assessment ( [[#Bradley--2015|Bradley et al., 2015]] ). Coastal C&S tend to prefer strategies that protect and accommodate existing coastline assets in the sense of a ‘fix and forget’ approach ( [[#Gibbs--2015|Gibbs, 2015]] ), rather than enduring proactive adaptation ( [[#Cooper--2014|Cooper and Pile, 2014]] ). Many C&S, especially in the Global South, already face high exposure to coastal risks and development constraints associated with poverty and socioeconomic inequality, lack of transparent resource allocation mechanisms and low political will ( ''high confidence'' ; [[#Di%20Giulio--2019|Di Giulio et al., 2019]] ; [[#Nagy--2019|Nagy et al., 2019]] ; [[#Pasquini--2020|Pasquini, 2020]] ; [[#Lehmann--2021|Lehmann et al., 2021]] ) ''.'' Research from across South America notes inadequate regulatory frameworks, missing data and information, widespread coastal ecosystem degradation and complex interactions between natural disasters and civil conflict ( [[#Villamizar--2017|Villamizar et al., 2017]] ; [[#Nagy--2019|Nagy et al., 2019]] ). Coastal climate risks in the Global South are often compounded by ongoing land-use management conflicts and other pressures including informal land uses, unregulated and/or inadequate infrastructure/building development, public health priorities such as combating Dengue fever, inadequate income diversification, low education levels and political marginalization of communities historically not represented in the urban development process ( [[#Barbi--2014|Barbi and Ferreira, 2014]] ; [[#Salik--2015|Salik et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cabral--2017|Cabral et al., 2017]] ; [[#Goh--2019|Goh, 2019]] ). There are also entrenched socioeconomic inequalities leading to the maldistribution of adaptation actions and benefits in the Global North ( [[#Gould--2018|Gould and Lewis, 2018]] ; [[#Keenan--2018|Keenan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ranganathan--2019|Ranganathan and Bratman, 2019]] ; [[#Yumagulova--2020|Yumagulova, 2020]] ; [[#Long--2021|Long et al., 2021]] ). To address the myriad governance challenges attributed to low awareness, low skills, scalar mismatches, and high socioeconomic inequality and coastal vulnerability, post-AR5 research highlights enablers of more innovative approaches to bridge capacity, policy and financial deficits ( [[#Reiblich--2019|Reiblich et al., 2019]] ), and facilitate more proactive implementation of coastal adaptation actions (Table SMCCP2.2; [[#Fu--2020|Fu, 2020]] ). A survey of NGOs, state and local government across Alaska, Florida and Maryland in the USA found that perceived risk, uncertainty and trust in support for climate adaptation varied across two stages of adaptation, that is between support for the development of plans and willingness to allocate human and financial resources to implement plans ( [[#Kettle--2016|Kettle and Dow, 2016]] ). To bridge this gap, [[#Cinner--2018|Cinner et al. (2018)]] suggest the need to build capacity across five domains: the assets that people can draw upon in times of need; the flexibility to change strategies and interventions; the ability to organise and act collectively; learning to recognise and respond to change (especially as important thresholds are approached); and the agency to determine whether to change or not, and to then take prudent action. Effective and accountable local leadership can help to mobilise capacities, resources and climate awareness within coastal C&S. Strong leadership is associated with agenda-setting authorities and the ability to navigate complex institutional interests towards more strategic planning efforts ( ''high confidence'' ; [[#Ferguson--2013|Ferguson et al., 2013]] ; [[#Anguelovski--2014|Anguelovski et al., 2014]] ; [[#Chu--2017|Chu et al., 2017]] ; [[#Valdivieso--2018|Valdivieso and Andersson, 2018]] ; [[#Fink--2019|Fink, 2019]] ; [[#Ndebele-Murisa--2020|Ndebele-Murisa et al., 2020]] ). Policy leadership can positively influence the motivation and initiative of municipal officers ( [[#Lassa--2014|Lassa and Nugraha, 2014]] ; [[#Wijaya--2020|Wijaya et al., 2020]] ), whilst local leadership is needed integrate coastal management, disaster management and climate adaptation mandates ( [[#Rosendo--2018|Rosendo et al., 2018]] ). Inclusive decision-making arrangements can enable participation, local ownership, and further equity in crafting coastal adaptation plans and policies ( [[#Chu--2016|Chu et al., 2016]] ). Inclusion of diverse stakeholders can help improve awareness of adaptation needs; help to bridge existing social inequalities in decision-making about adaption needs, options and outcomes; close the gap between formal and informal institutions and engage indigenous forms of decision-making, which often associate climate risks with livelihood, housing and employment stressors ( [[#Ziervogel--2016|Ziervogel et al., 2016]] ; [[#Fayombo--2020|Fayombo, 2020]] ). For example, research from Pacific island states ( [[#Nunn--2017|Nunn et al., 2017]] ) and coastal Arctic zones ( [[#Romero%20Manrique--2018|Romero Manrique et al., 2018]] ) highlights the need to engage with indigenous environmental knowledge. Case studies from Indonesia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste show that Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge and customary laws can support environmental awareness, strengthen social cohesion and help communities to better respond to climate impacts ( [[#Hiwasaki--2015|Hiwasaki et al., 2015]] ). Research from coastal Cambodia shows that inclusive governance arrangements can target empowerment of the most vulnerable groups to facilitate better adaptation behaviour and mainstream adaption knowledge through both formal and informal education at the community level ( [[#Ung--2016|Ung et al., 2016]] ). The law is key to governing climate risks in C&S, including regulating exposure to coastal hazards; facilitating accountable decision-making; funding arrangements, liabilities and resolving disputes; and also for securing human rights ( ''high confidence'' ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala, 2019]] ; [[#Averill--2020|Averill, 2020]] ). However, it has limits and can be both an adaptation enabler and barrier ( [[#Green--2015|Green et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cosens--2017|Cosens et al., 2017]] ; [[#Craig--2017|Craig et al., 2017]] ; [[#DeCaro--2017|DeCaro et al., 2017]] ). Contemporary legal practice has not enabled effective adaptation in part because SLR affects compensable property rights that are secured by the law, and which generally trump concerns about public safety, resilience and sustainability ( [[#Reiblich--2019|Reiblich et al., 2019]] ). Private property rights can be used as both a sword and a shield to privilege dominant interests by undermining land use policies, plans and implementation efforts intended to promote integrated coastal management and risk reduction ( [[#O’Donnell--2019|O’Donnell et al., 2019]] ; [[#Reiblich--2019|Reiblich et al., 2019]] ). Climate change litigation has proliferated over the past decade ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala, 2019]] ), addressing, among other things, failures to prepare for or adapt to climate change, and to secure human rights ( [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky, 2018]] ). Reflexive and adaptive law that accounts for the distinctive features of coastal hazard risk and associated governance imperatives builds coastal C&S adaptive capacity and resilience ( ''high confidence'' ; [[#Garmestani--2013|Garmestani and Benson, 2013]] ; [[#Cosens--2017|Cosens et al., 2017]] ; [[#DeCaro--2017|DeCaro et al., 2017]] ). Procedural justice, due process and use of substantive standards instead of rules provide legal stability and enable adaptation ( [[#Craig--2017|Craig et al., 2017]] ). Coastal adaptation efforts are ultimately implemented through C&S actions that are enabled or constrained by prevailing legislative, executive and judicial provisions and practices, which differ significantly across jurisdictions ( [[#He--2018|He, 2018]] ). In practice, the ‘coastal lawscape’ is made up of interconnected cultural normative, political and legal systems that need to be understood holistically to enable coastal adaptation in C&S ( [[#O’Donnell--2021|O’Donnell, 2021]] ). Tables CCP2.1 and CCP2.2 summarise key insights about key governance challenges facing archetypal coastal C&S around the world as well as associated critical enablers and lessons learned to address climate change-compounded coastal hazard risk (based on synthesis of Table SMCCP2.3). In sum, prospects for addressing climate risk in archetypal coastal C&S around the world depend on the extent to which societal choices—and associated governance processes and practices—address the drivers and root causes of exposure and social vulnerability ( ''very high confidence'' ) ''.'' Coastal C&S are more able to address these challenges when authorities work with local communities and vulnerable groups in particular, and with stakeholders from the local to national levels and beyond, to chart adaptation pathways that enable sustained reduction in the exposure and vulnerability of those most at risk ''(very high confidence'' ; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; [[#Magnan--2019|Magnan et al., 2019]] ; [[#Oppenheimer--2019|Oppenheimer et al., 2019]] ). Unlocking potential enablers for locally appropriate and effective adaptation is difficult because many drivers and root causes of coastal risk are historically and institutionally embedded ''(high confidence'' ; [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas et al., 2019]] ). Charting credible, salient and legitimate adaptation pathways is consequently a struggle in reconciling divergent worldviews, values and interests ( [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool, 2018]] ; [[#Mendenhall--2020|Mendenhall et al., 2020]] ; [[#Bowden--2021a|Bowden et al., 2021a]] ; [[#Bowden--2021b|Bowden et al., 2021b]] ). Unlocking the productive potential of conflict is foundational for transitioning towards pathways that foster CRD ''(high confidence'' ; [[#Abrahams--2017|Abrahams and Carr, 2017]] ; [[#Harris--2018|Harris et al., 2018]] ; [[#Sharifi--2020|Sharifi, 2020]] ). But this can be especially challenging for low-lying coastal C&S characterised by degraded coastal ecosystems susceptible to climate change impacts as well as pronounced inequity and governance constraints ''(high confidence'' ; [[#Esteban--2017|Esteban et al., 2017]] ; [[#Jones--2020|Jones et al., 2020]] ). '''Table CCP2.1 |''' Governance challenges and critical enablers for addressing coastal hazard risk in C&S {| class="wikitable" |- ! '''Key governance challenges''' ! '''Critical enablers for C&S to address coastal hazard risk''' |- | rowspan="2"| '''Complexity:''' climate change compounds non-climatic hazard risks facing coastal C&S in interconnected, dynamic and emergent ways for which there are no simple solutions. | Draw on '''multiple knowledge systems''' to co-design and co-produce more acceptable, effective and enduring responses. |- | Build '''governance capacity''' to tackle complex problems. |- | rowspan="2"| '''Time horizon and uncertainty:''' The future is uncertain, but climate change will continue for generations and cannot be addressed by short-term (e.g., 1–10 years) responses alone. | Adopt a '''long-term view''' but take action now. '''Keep options open''' to adjust responses as climate risk escalates and circumstances change. |- | '''Avoid''' new development commitments in exposed locations. Enable managed retreat in most at-risk locations by '''anticipatory actions''' , e.g., secure funds, legal provisions for buy-outs, resettlement, etc. |- | rowspan="2"| '''Cross-scale and cross-domain coordination:''' Decisions bound by jurisdictional and sectoral boundaries fail to address linkages within and between coastal ecosystems and C&S facing interconnected climate change-compounded impacts and risk. | Develop networks and linkages within and between different governance scales and levels and across policy domains and sectors, to improve '''coordination''' , build trust and legitimise decisions. |- | Build '''shared understanding''' and enable locally appropriate responses through experimentation, innovation and social learning. |- | rowspan="2"| '''Equity and social vulnerability:''' Climate change compounds everyday inequity and vulnerability in coastal C&S, making it difficult to disentangle and address social drivers and root causes of risk. | Recognise political realities and '''prioritise vulnerability''' , justice and equity concerns to enable just, impactful and enduring outcomes. |- | Strengthen '''community capabilities''' to respond to coastal hazard risk, using external assistance and government support if necessary. |- | rowspan="2"| '''Social conflict:''' Coastal C&S will be the focal point of contending views about appropriate climate responses, and face the challenge of avoiding destructive conflict and realising its productive potential. | Design and facilitate '''tailor-made participation processes''' , involving stakeholders early and consistently from negotiating responses to implementation. |- | Create '''safe arenas of engagement''' for inclusive, informed and meaningful deliberation and collaborative problem-solving. |} '''Table CCP2.2 |''' Lessons learned from efforts to address coastal hazard risk {| class="wikitable" |- ! '''Lessons to address governance challenges and unlock enablers''' ! '''Archetypal C&S initiatives, constraints aside''' |- | '''Complexity: multiple knowledge systems''' * Reveal dynamic complexity drawing on multiple sources of locally relevant evidence. * Use and integrate local, Indigenous and scientific knowledge. * Include marginalised voices and knowledge of vulnerable groups, women, young people, etc. * Build shared understanding through storytelling. * Bridge gaps between science, policy and practice by experimenting with novel approaches and working across organisational, sectoral and institutional boundaries. | '''Seychelles (0.1 million; open coast):''' Science–policy–local knowledge partnerships to co-produce usable information for decision-making. '''Dhaka, Bangladesh (21 million; delta):''' Climate change is national priority. Partnering with the Netherlands to develop long-term data plans. '''Jakarta, Indonesia (10.8 million; delta):''' Community-based efforts to foster mutual assistance and self-organisation. '''Utqiagvik (formerly Barrow) Alaska, USA (0.04 million; Arctic, open coast):''' Using local knowledge and historical precedent of transformative change to integrate local and scientific knowledge. |- | '''Complexity: governance capacity''' * Joined-up visionary leadership is key, e.g., cabinet- and C&S-level commitments to long-term implementation. * Translate political will into substantial dedicated budgets to build government capacity to tackle complex problems. * Use flexible approaches to build resilience, e.g., independent agency alongside traditional administrative bodies. * Counter deadlocks due to short-term priorities and vested interests with long-term perspectives, considering plausible scenarios and incentivising novel solutions. * Translate national requirements into local action with enabling provisions for tailored local policy and practice. * Tackle emergent problems by setting up enduring monitoring and lesson-learning processes. * Governance arrangements reconcile competing interests in an inclusive, timely and legitimate manner. * Make visible and reflect on underlying reasons for policy actions/inaction, including values, attitudes and taken-for-granted habits influencing problem-solving capability. | '''Singapore (5.6 million; open coast):''' Integrated approach across ministries committing to long-term adaptation (and mitigation goals) by 2030. '''Rotterdam, the Netherlands (0.65 million; delta):''' Delta Programme, supported by law, administrative arrangements and a €1 bill. pa budget to 2029. '''Florianopolis, Santa Catarina Island, Brazil (1.2 million; mixed):''' Building knowledge hub via public–private–civil society partnerships. '''Nassau, Bahamas (0.275 million; open coast, small island):''' Identifying responsibilities, accessing funding and preparing adaptation plans drawing on evidence-based studies. '''Shanghai (27 million; estuary), China:''' Contain risk by combining long-term planning, political will, national and municipal provisions, and technical capability. '''Can Tho City, Vietnam (0.4 million; delta):''' Engage international donors and research community. |- | '''Time horizon and uncertainty: long-term view''' * Establish national policies and guidance with a long-term view (e.g., 100 years) that enable action now. * Develop shared medium- (10–50 years) to long-term vision (100+ years). * Use an adaptation-pathways approach to make short-term decisions consistent with long-term goals. * Meaningfully involve stakeholders, e.g., involve representatives in decision-making. * Address power imbalances and human development needs, e.g., in goal setting and process design. * Reconcile divergent perspectives through tailored responses. | '''Napier (0.07 million), Hawkes Bay (0.18 million; open coast), New Zealand:''' National law compels local authorities to take a 100-year perspective; 2100 Strategy accounts for dynamic complexity and uncertain future through adaptation pathways. '''Shanghai, China (27 million; estuary):''' Plans up to 2100, strong national and municipal focus on climate change, and access to technical expertise. '''Dhaka, Bangladesh (21 million; delta):''' Long-term adaptation plans through to 2100. |- | '''Time horizon and uncertainty: avoidance and anticipatory action''' * Avoid development in exposed localities using spatial plans. * Use window of opportunity created by extreme events. * Prepare pre-event plans and tailor risk reduction and resilience building post disaster. * Reveal political pressures and opposition that hamper efforts to address intolerable risk and unacceptable impacts. | '''Rotterdam, the Netherlands (0.65 million; delta):''' Delta Programme promotes ‘living with water’, allowing and managing urban flooding. '''Napier (0.07 million), Hawkes Bay, New Zealand (0.18 million, open coast):''' Regulatory provisions discourage new development in high-risk locations; strategy sequences adaptation interventions. '''Florianopolis, Santa Catarina Island, Brazil (1.2 million; mixed):''' Research reveals unregulated ad hoc development in at-risk locations preventing effective adaptation. |- | '''Cross-scale and cross-domain coordination: coordination''' * Collaborative projects involve state and non-state actors. * Multi-lateral agreements, e.g., between neighbouring countries, coastal regions and C&S. * Connect people, organisations and communities through boundary-spanning organizations. * Leadership by central actors with capable teams is key. * Mobilise the capabilities of communities and non-state actors. * Address policy inconsistencies and clarify roles and responsibilities. * Secure national and regional resources to support local efforts. * Use measures to promote interaction, deliberation and coordination to manage spill-over effects. * Strengthen linkages between formal (e.g., regulatory) and informal (e.g., traditions and rituals) institutions, e.g., through information sharing. * Use spatial coordination mechanisms, e.g., land-use planning, to translate national and regional provisions into local competencies. | '''Seychelles (0.1 million; open coast, small island):''' Cross-sectoral and institutional collaboration to improve use of limited financial resources; community-based and ecosystem-based adaptation to bridge adaptation and mitigation and improve coordination. '''Florianopolis, Santa Catarina Island, Brazil (1.2 million; mixed):''' Effective local climate action hampered by governance constraints and weak federal leadership. '''Cape Town, South Africa (4.6 million; mixed):''' Multi-level climate governance advanced at local-provincial level, but political turf battles hamper national–provincial–local progress. |- | '''Cross-scale and cross-domain coordination: shared understanding''' * Prioritise social learning and shared understanding, e.g., information accessible to all, irrespective of education, language, etc. * Account for local history, culture and politics through engagement, experimentation and innovation. * Generate socioeconomic, livelihood and climate development co-benefits. * Leverage national and trans-national community and local authority networks. | '''Cape Town, South Africa (4.6 million; mixed):''' Capable local leaders collaborate with researchers in municipality-initiated community-based adaptation. Translating plans into action challenging given ‘everyday’ vulnerability exacerbated by climate change impacts. '''New York City, USA (23.5 million; mixed):''' State and city government work with communities to build adaptive capacity and resilience; drawing on technical capabilities but many challenges. |- | '''Equity and social vulnerability: address vulnerability''' * Expose drivers and root causes of injustice, structural inequity and vulnerability. * Link human development concerns, risk reduction, resilience and adaptation. * Raise awareness and public support for actions that are just and equitable. * Understand discriminatory drivers (e.g., on racial grounds) of coastal land-use patterns and risk. * Address barriers facing marginalised groups. * Use inclusive planning, decision-making and implementation processes that give voice to vulnerable people. | '''Cape Town, South Africa (4.6 million; mixed):''' Adaptation framed by apartheid legacy; focus on reducing vulnerability, public safety and securing critical infrastructure and community assets. '''Maputo-Matola, Mozambique (3 million; mixed):''' Livelihood opportunities compromised by ecological degradation compelling community DIY coping in face of severe poverty and vulnerability, weak governance and institutional capacity, and reliance on donors. '''New York City, USA (23.5 million; estuary):''' Hurricane Sandy (2012) focused attention on climate risk and the plight of exposed and vulnerable people, and sparked adaptation action. |- | '''Equity and social vulnerability: community capabilities''' * Raise vulnerability and risk awareness and understanding; build community capability and leverage external support by working with professionals, academics, local NGOs, journalists and activists. * Secure rights of vulnerable groups through court action where necessary. * Integrate traditional community responses with local government efforts. * Ensure gender equity, e.g., representation on planning and decision-making bodies. | '''Monkey River Village, Belize (200 people; estuary):''' Remote indigenous community; capacity to tackle erosion enabled by interventions by researchers, journalists and local NGOs to secure media and political attention after hurricane damage. '''Accra, Ghana (2.5 million; delta):''' Household adaptation mediated by local government flood-mitigation efforts; need better early warning and maintenance of local stormwater to prevent flooding. '''Lagos, Nigeria (14 million; open coast):''' Building adaptive capacity to overcome ‘everyday’ vulnerability and poverty severely challenging. |- | '''Social conflict: tailor-made participation''' * Create opportunities for integrative and inclusive solutions. * Use conflict-resolution mechanisms. * Appoint independent facilitators/mediators and involve officials as ‘bureaucratic activists’ to improve inclusivity and iterative and reflexive engagement. * Align informal participatory processes with statutory processes and government practices. * Sustain engagement by securing resources for local use and aligning activities with political and bureaucratic cycles. * Involve historically disadvantaged and socially vulnerable groups, e.g., accessible meeting locations/venues, local languages and culturally appropriate meeting protocols. * Involve local leaders who will champion adaptation and help mainstream findings to be integrated into C&S decision-making. * Inclusive processes help address conflict and drivers of vulnerability and promote just adaptation | '''Napier (0.07 million), Hawkes Bay, New Zealand (0.18 million, open coast):''' Collaboration between local authorities and Indigenous People (Māori) involving stakeholders led to co-designed long-term strategy with implementation commitment. '''Manila, Philippines (14 million; open coast):''' Metro-wide planning and infrastructure provisions that foster climate justice and resilience explored, with community-based actions. |- | '''Social conflict: safe arenas of engagement''' * Use flexible and enabling processes based in local institutions that are robust and fair, supported by governing authorities. * Attend to local social dynamics and reduce elite domination. * Use local and Indigenous knowledge and science. * Use institutional improvisation to address local concerns. * Use trusted independent facilitators. * Incentivise participation by disadvantaged groups. * Focus on improving risk literacy, optimism and capacity for joint problem-solving. * Use joint, collaborative activities to facilitate public dialogue, and secure institutional support for action. * Enable ongoing deliberation and social learning. * Make continual adjustments as circumstances change, e.g., build shared understanding about locally relevant thresholds beyond which alternative courses of action need to be actioned. | '''Napier (0.07 million), Hawkes Bay, New Zealand (0.18 million, open coast):''' Active involvement of local communities, Indigenous People (Māori) and research community to co-produce fit-for-purpose long-term coastal hazard risk strategy. '''Rotterdam, the Netherlands (0.65 mill.; delta):''' Delta Programme institutionalised multi-level adaptation governance with strong accountability mechanisms. '''Greater London, UK (8.9 mill.; estuary):''' Long-term provisions for at-risk Thames Estuary including major protective works, embedded in Greater London Spatial Development Plan and London Climate Change Partnership, championed by strategic leadership and supported by the public and strong technical capability. |} <div id="CCP2.4.4" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="ccp2.4.4-enabling-climate-resilient-development-for-cities-and-settlements-by-the-sea"></span>
Summary:
Please note that all contributions to ClimateKG may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here.
You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see
ClimateKG:Copyrights
for details).
Do not submit copyrighted work without permission!
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)
Search
Search
Editing
IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-2
(section)
Add languages
Add topic