Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-3 (section)

=== CCP3.2.2 Observed Impacts of Climate Change on Human Systems in Desert and Semiarid Areas ===

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Climate change and desertification, alongside other drivers of degradation, reduce dryland ecosystem services, leading to losses of biodiversity, water, food and impacts on human health (Section [[#CCP4.2.3|CCP4.2.3]] ) and well-being ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Mirzabaev--2019|Mirzabaev et al., 2019]] ) resulting in disruption to the economic structures and cultural practices of affected communities ( [[#Elhadary--2014|Elhadary, 2014]] ; [[#Middleton--2017|Middleton, 2017]] ).

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==== CCP3.2.2.1 Sand and Dust Storms ====

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Desertification and SDS can cause substantial socioeconomic damage in drylands ( [[#UNEP--1992|UNEP, 1992]] ; [[#Opp--2021|Opp et al., 2021]] ) over both the short and long term. Short-term impacts occur on health, food production systems, infrastructure (damaging buildings, energy systems and communications), transport and related economic productivity, air and road traffic, and costs incurred in clearing sand and dust from deposition areas ( [[#Mirzabaev--2019|Mirzabaev et al., 2019]] ). In the Arab region increasing frequency of SDS events is projected to further exacerbate water scarcity and drought ( [[#ESCWA--2017|ESCWA, 2017]] ). Longer-term costs include loss of ecosystem services, biodiversity and habitat, chronic health problems, soil erosion and reduced soil quality (particularly through nutrient losses and deposition of pollutants), and disruption of global climate regulation ( [[#Middleton--2018|Middleton, 2018]] ; [[#Allahbakhshi--2019|Allahbakhshi et al., 2019]] ). Dust deposition nevertheless can offer environmental and economic benefits, bringing important nutrients that improve and sustain soil fertility (Marticorena et al., 2017). Preventing and reducing SDS entails upfront investment costs but full benefit–cost analyses of different measures compared to the costs of inaction are scarce and need to consider the likely frequency and magnitude of SDS events (Tozer and Leys, 2013).

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==== CCP3.2.2.2 Human Health ====

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The potential impacts of climate change, recurrent droughts and desertification on human health in drylands include: higher risks from water scarcity (linked to deteriorating surface and ground water quality and water-borne diseases; [[#Stringer--2021|Stringer et al., 2021]] ), food insecurity and malnutrition ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.2.3.4|Section 16.2.3.4]] ) in the absence of sufficient imports, respiratory, cardiovascular and infectious diseases caused by SDS ( [[#Mirzabaev--2019|Mirzabaev et al., 2019]] ), potential displacement and migration and mental health consequences (Chapter 7; [[#Stringer--2021|Stringer et al., 2021]] ) and heat stress ( [[#Dunne--2013|Dunne et al., 2013]] ; [[#Zhao--2015|Zhao et al., 2015]] ; [[#Russo--2016|Russo et al., 2016]] ). SDS negatively impact human health through various pathways, causing respiratory, cardiovascular diseases and facilitating infections ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Díaz--2017|Díaz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Goudarzi--2017|Goudarzi et al., 2017]] ; [[#Allahbakhshi--2019|Allahbakhshi et al., 2019]] ; [[#Münzel--2019|Münzel et al., 2019]] ). SDS can cause mortality and injuries related to transport accidents ( [[#Goudie--2014|Goudie, 2014]] ). Research from China suggests that prenatal exposure to SDS can affect children’s cognitive function ( [[#Li--2018|Li et al., 2018]] ). The pollutants that are entrained and ingested or inhaled closely link to the land management strategies in source areas.

Droughts are among the natural hazards with the highest adverse impacts on human populations ( [[#Mishra--2010|Mishra and Singh, 2010]] ; Arias et al., 2021). Although droughts represented just 4% of hazard events, their impacts amounted to 31% of affected people (29 million) ( [[#Louvain--2019|Louvain, 2019]] ). Drought exposure relates to a higher risk of undernutrition ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5.2.3.6|Section 16.5.2.3.6]] ), among vulnerable populations ( [[#Kumar--2016|Kumar, 2016]] ), particularly children ( [[#IFPRI--2016|IFPRI, 2016]] ) for whom the impacts can lead to lifelong consequences through stunted growth, impaired cognitive ability and reduced future educational and work performance (UNICEF/WHO/WBG, 2019). The corresponding costs of children stunting in terms of lost economic growth can be of the order of 7% of per capita income in developing countries (Galasso and Wagstaff, 2018).

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==== CCP3.2.2.3 Agro-ecological Food Systems, Livelihoods and Food Security ====

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Rising temperatures, variation in rainfall patterns and frequent extreme weather events associated with climate change have adversely affected agro-ecological food systems and pastoral systems in some drylands ( [[#Zhu--2013|Zhu et al., 2013]] ; [[#Amin--2018|Amin et al., 2018]] ), especially in developing countries ( [[#Haider--2014|Haider and Adnan, 2014]] ; [[#Ahmed--2016|Ahmed et al., 2016]] ; [[#ur%20Rahman--2018|ur Rahman et al., 2018]] ) where desertification is a key challenge to agricultural livelihoods. Recurrent droughts in recent decades, coupled with wind erosion (particularly of fine sediment which gives soil its water-holding capacity and nutrients), affected vast areas in Argentina, leading to land abandonment and agricultural fields being covered by sand and invasive plants ( [[#Abraham--2016|Abraham et al., 2016]] ). Temperature increases have contributed to reduced wheat yields in arid, semiarid and dry sub-humid zones of Pakistan ( [[#Sultana--2019|Sultana et al., 2019]] ). Agricultural production in the drylands of South Punjab is experiencing irreversible impacts since the grain formation phase has become swifter with a warmer climate, leading to improper growth and reduced yields ( [[#Rasul--2011|Rasul et al., 2011]] ).

[[#Aslam--2018|Aslam et al. (2018)]] regard climate change impacts as particularly threatening to the livestock sector, water and food security, and the economy beyond agriculture in South Punjab, particularly as yields decrease. In the livestock sector across global drylands (WGI TS.4.3.2.10), observed impacts include reduction of plant cover in rangelands, reduced livestock and crop yields, loss of biodiversity and increased land degradation and soil nutrient loss (Van de Steeg, 2012; [[#Mganga--2015|Mganga et al., 2015]] ; [[#Ahmed--2016|Ahmed et al., 2016]] ; [[#Mohamed--2016|Mohamed et al., 2016]] ; [[#Eldridge--2018|Eldridge and Beecham, 2018]] , Arias et al., 2021), as well as injury and livestock death due to SDS. This is particularly worrisome for traditional pastoralists who find themselves with fewer safety nets and more limited adaptive capacities than in the past, particularly where mobility, access and tenure rights are becoming restricted (Box CCP3.1) and where use of technologies such as mobile phones can result in mixed effects, as found in Morocco ( [[#Vidal-González--2018|Vidal-González and Nahhass, 2018]] ). Observed SDS impacts can increase food production costs and threaten sustainability more generally ( [[#Middleton--2017|Middleton, 2017]] ).

Woody plant encroachment and greening may be masking underlying land degradation processes and losses of ecosystem services, livelihood and adaptation options in pastoral livelihood systems ( [[#Reed--2015|Reed et al., 2015]] ; [[#Chen--2019a|Chen et al., 2019a]] ). Woody encroachment alters ecosystem services, particularly in rangelands, resulting in reduction of grass cover, hindering livestock production (Anadón et al. 2014), reducing water availability (Honda and Durigan 2016, [[#Stringer--2021|Stringer et al., 2021]] ) but increasing availability of wood (Mograbi et al., 2019).

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==== CCP3.2.2.4 Gender Differentiated Impacts ====

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Impacts of desertification, climate change and environmental degradation, as well as vulnerability and capacity to adapt, are gendered. Differences are determined by socially structured gender-specific roles and responsibilities, ownership of, access to and control over natural resources and technology, decision making, and capacity to cope and adapt to long-term changes ( [[#Mirzabaev--2019|Mirzabaev et al., 2019]] ; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18). Assessments of the gender dimension of desertification and climate change impacts and responses are scarce, and highly context specific. For example, in many lower income countries, rural women produce most of the household food, and are responsible for food preparation and collecting fuelwood and water from increasingly distant sources ( [[#Mekonnen--2017|Mekonnen et al., 2017]] ; Droy, 2020). Drought and water scarcity particularly affect women and girls in drylands because they need to spend more time and energy collecting water and fuelwood, have less time for education or income-generating activities, and may be more exposed to violence ( [[#Sommer--2014|Sommer et al., 2014]] ) and less able to migrate as an adaptation option. Women are also commonly excluded from family and community decision making on actions to address desertification and climate change, yet their engagement in climate adaptation is critical. International policy efforts are currently seeking to better recognise and address this challenge ( [[#Okpara--2019|Okpara et al., 2019]] ).

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==== CCP3.2.2.5 Climate Change, Migration and Conflict ====

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Dryland populations pursuing traditional land-based livelihood options are generally mobile due to a highly fluctuating resource base (Box CCP 3.1). Many rural dwellers in drylands also move to urban areas for seasonal work, which can have positive impacts in terms of remittances. While reasons for migration vary and can be positive or negative, oppression and human rights abuses, lack of livelihood opportunities and food insecurity tend to be among the main push factors, while emerging opportunities at the rural–urban nexus present lucrative pull factors (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). In a survey in Libya in 2016, 80% of migrants interviewed said they had left home because of economic hardship ( [[#Hochleithner--2018|Hochleithner and Exner, 2018]] ), which in drylands under water scarcity linked to climate change, would be exacerbated.

Causes of migration and violent conflict need to be seen in a wider historical, agrarian, political, economic and environmental context, in a multi-scalar perspective integrating levels of analysis from the local to the global ( [[#Glick%20Schiller--2015|Glick Schiller, 2015]] ). Quantitative studies tend to conclude that climate change has so far not significantly impacted migration including in drylands ( [[#Owain--2018|Owain and Maslin, 2018]] ), although with some disagreement ( [[#Lima--2016|Lima et al., 2016]] ; [[#Missirian--2017|Missirian and Schlenker, 2017]] ). In a study of the climate change–migration–conflict interface, [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al. (2019)]] found limited empirical evidence supporting a link between climatic shocks, conflict and asylum-seeking for the period 2006–2015 from 157 countries. The authors found evidence of such a link for the period 2010–2012 relating to some countries affected by the Arab Spring and concluded that the impact of climate on conflict and migration is limited to specific time periods and contexts.

The same lack of general causality is largely concluded on the specific link between climate change and conflict ( [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ; [[#Buhaug--2015|Buhaug et al., 2015]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ), but a minority of quantitative studies argue for a stronger causal association ( [[#Hsiang--2013|Hsiang et al., 2013]] ). [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al. (2019)]] found considerable agreement among experts that climate variability and change have influenced the risk of organised armed conflict within countries, but they also agreed that other factors, such as state capacity and level of socioeconomic development, played a much larger role. These factors also play a role in determining adaptation possibilities and in shaping the enabling environment ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.5.2|Section 8.5.2]] ).

Qualitative case studies tend to frame conflict and migration within a larger political, economic and historical context. A number of studies from African drylands find that land dispossession is a key driver of both migration and conflict resulting from large-scale resource extraction or land encroachment, often associated with processes of elite capture and marginalisation ( [[#Benjaminsen--2009|Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009]] ; [[#Benjaminsen--2009|Benjaminsen et al., 2009]] ; [[#Cross--2013|Cross, 2013]] ; [[#Glick%20Schiller--2015|Glick Schiller, 2015]] ; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2017; [[#Obeng-Odoom--2017|Obeng-Odoom, 2017]] ; [[#Bergius--2020|Bergius et al., 2020]] ). By undermining livelihoods, exacerbating poverty and setting rural population groups adrift, land dispossession in the Sahel may lead to increased migration to urban areas, to rural sites of non-farm employment (e.g., mines) ( [[#Chevrillon-Guibert--2019|Chevrillon-Guibert et al., 2019]] ) or out of the country. In addition, it may lead to other types of reactions including violent resistance ( [[#Oliver-Smith--2010|Oliver-Smith, 2010]] ; [[#Cavanagh--2015|Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2015]] ; [[#Hall--2015|Hall et al., 2015]] ) as already seen in the Sahel in terms of the emergence of jihadist armed groups ( [[#Benjaminsen--2019|Benjaminsen and Ba, 2019]] ). Major drivers of the current crisis in Mali include decades of bureaucratic mismanagement and widespread corruption, the spill-over of jihadist groups from Algeria after the civil war there in the 1990s and the current civil war in Libya. Climate change has played a marginal role as a driver of conflicts in the Sahel ( [[#Benjaminsen--2012|Benjaminsen et al., 2012]] ; [[#Benjaminsen--2019|Benjaminsen and Hiernaux, 2019]] ) but has potential to exacerbate the situation in the future with regards to migration and conflict ( [[#Owain--2018|Owain and Maslin, 2018]] ).

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