Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-12 (section)

=== 12.3.3 CDR Governance and Policies ===

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As shown in Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter, CDR fulfils multiple functions in different phases of ambitious mitigation: (i) further reducing net CO 2 or GHG emission levels in the near term; (ii) counterbalancing residual emissions (from hard-to-transition sectors like transport, industry, or agriculture) to help reach net zero CO 2 or GHG emissions in the mid term; (iii) achieving and sustaining net-negative CO 2 or GHG emissions in the long term. While inclusion of emissions and removals on managed land (LULUCF) is mandatory for developed countries under UNFCCC inventory rules ( [[#Grassi--2021|Grassi et al. 2021]] ), not all Annex I countries have included land-based biological removals when setting domestic mitigation targets in the past, but updated NDCs for 2030 indicate a shift, most notably in the European Union ( [[#Gheuens--2021|Gheuens and Oberthür 2021]] ; [[#Schenuit--2021|Schenuit et al. 2021]] ). The early literature on CDR governance and policy has been mainly conceptual rather than empirical, focusing on high-level principles (see the concerns listed in the introduction to [[#12.3|Section 12.3]] ) and the representation of CDR in global mitigation scenarios ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-3#3.2.2|Section 3.2.2]] ). However, with the widespread adoption of net zero targets and the recognition that CDR is a necessary element of mitigation portfolios to achieve net zero CO 2 or GHG emissions, countries with national net-zero emissions targets have begun to integrate CDR into modelled national mitigation pathways, increase research, development and demonstration (RD&amp;D) efforts on CDR methods, and consider CDR-specific incentives and policies ( [[#Honegger--2021b|Honegger et al. 2021b]] ; [[#Schenuit--2021|Schenuit et al. 2021]] ) (Box 12.1). Nevertheless, this increasing consideration of CDR has not yet extended to net-negative targets and policies to achieve these. While the use of CDR at levels that would lead to net negative CO 2 or GHG emissions in the long term has been assumed in most global mitigation scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C, net-negative emissions trajectories and BECCS as the main CDR method modelled to achieve these have not been mirrored by corresponding UNFCCC decisions so far ( [[#Fridahl--2017|Fridahl 2017]] ; [[#Mohan--2021|Mohan et al. 2021]] ). Likewise, only a few national long-term mitigation plans or legal acts entail a vision for net-negative GHG emissions ( [[#Buylova--2021|Buylova et al. 2021]] ), for example Finland, Sweden, Germany and Fiji.

For countries with emissions targets aiming for net zero or lower, the core governance question is not whether CDR should be mobilised or not, but which CDR methods governments want to see deployed by whom, by when, at which volumes and in which ways ( [[#Minx--2018|Minx et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bellamy--2019|Bellamy and Geden 2019]] ). The choice of CDR methods and the scale and timing of their deployment will depend on the respective ambitions for gross emissions reductions, how sustainability and feasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences and social acceptability evolve ( [[#Bellamy--2018|Bellamy 2018]] ; [[#Forster--2020|Forster et al. 2020]] ; [[#Fuss--2020|Fuss et al. 2020]] ; [[#Waller--2020|Waller et al. 2020]] ; [[#Clery--2021|Clery et al. 2021]] ; [[#Iyer--2021|Iyer et al. 2021]] ; [[#Rogelj--2021|Rogelj et al. 2021]] ). As examples of emerging CDR policymaking at (sub-)national levels show, policymakers are beginning to incorporate CDR methods beyond those currently dominating global mitigation scenarios, that is, BECCS and afforestation/reforestation ( [[#Bellamy--2019|Bellamy and Geden 2019]] ; [[#Buylova--2021|Buylova et al. 2021]] ; [[#Schenuit--2021|Schenuit et al. 2021]] ; [[#Uden--2021|Uden et al. 2021]] ) (Box 12.1). CDR policymaking is faced with the need to consider method-specific timescales of CO 2 storage, as well as challenges in MRV and accounting, potential co-benefits, adverse side effects, interactions with adaptation and trade-offs with SDGs ( [[#Dooley--2018|Dooley and Kartha 2018]] ; [[#McLaren--2019|McLaren et al. 2019]] ; [[#Buck--2020|Buck et al. 2020]] ; [[#Honegger--2020|Honegger et al. 2020]] ; [[#Brander--2021|Brander et al. 2021]] ; [[#Dooley--2021|Dooley et al. 2021]] ; [[#Mace--2021|Mace et al. 2021]] ) (Table 12.6). Therefore, CDR governance and policymaking are expected to focus on responsibly incentivising RD&amp;D and targeted deployment, building on both technical and governance experience with already widely practised CDR methods like afforestation/reforestation ( [[#Lomax--2015|Lomax et al. 2015]] ; [[#Field--2017|Field and Mach 2017]] ; [[#Bellamy--2018|Bellamy 2018]] ; [[#Carton--2020|Carton et al. 2020]] ; [[#VonHedemann--2020|VonHedemann et al. 2020]] ), as well as learning from two decades of slow-moving CCS deployment ( [[#Buck--2021|Buck 2021]] ; [[#Martin-Roberts--2021|Martin-Roberts et al. 2021]] ; [[#Wang--2021|Wang et al. 2021]] ). For some less well-understood methods and implementation options, such as ocean alkalinisation or enhanced weathering, investment in RD&amp;D can help in understanding the risks, rewards, and uncertainties of deployment ( [[#Nemet--2018|Nemet et al. 2018]] ; [[#Fajardy--2019|Fajardy et al. 2019]] ; [[#Burns--2020|Burns and Corbett 2020]] ; [[#Goll--2021|Goll et al. 2021]] ).

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