Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.3.1 Material Endowments ===

<div id="h2-5-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Material endowments are natural and economic resources, such as fossil fuels and renewable energy, forests and land, and economic or financial resources, which tend to shape developments of domestic climate governance ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Friedrichs--2013|Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013]] ; [[#Lachapelle--2013|Lachapelle and Paterson 2013]] ; [[#Bang--2015|Bang et al. 2015]] ; [[#Lamb--2020|Lamb and Minx 2020]] ). Most countries’ social and economic systems are largely developed on the basis of their material endowment, and thus they contribute to shape the distribution of political power in that country ( [[#Hall--2001|Hall and Soskice 2001]] ). Material endowments are by no means the only influencing factor, and actors may succeed to either circumvent or exploit material endowments to impact climate governance ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Green--2017|Green and Hale 2017]] ; [[#Aklin--2020|Aklin and]] [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ).

Since countries are not bound by their material endowment, countries with similar material endowments may differ in climate governance, whereas those with notable differences in material endowments may have similar policies. For instance, countries with rich fossil fuel endowments are found either adopting rather ambitious emission reduction targets and measures, or remaining weak in developing domestic climate policies ( [[#Eckersley--2013|Eckersley 2013]] ; [[#Farstad--2019|Farstad 2019]] ). Further, countries with radically different electricity systems and energy resource potentials are found developing rather similar renewables support schemes such as feed-in-tariff subsidies and competitive tendering programmes ( [[#Dobrotkova--2018|Dobrotkova et al. 2018]] ; [[#Vanegas%20Cantarero--2020|Vanegas Cantarero 2020]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). Some policy instruments are widely applied in both developed and developing countries with similar or different material endowment. For example, renewable energy auctions have been experimented by over 100 countries by the end of 2018 ( [[#IRENA--2019|IRENA 2019]] ).

Rich carbon-intensive resources and well developed infrastructure can make low-carbon activities relatively less economically profitable, and negatively influence some perceptions of climate mitigation potential ( [[#Bertram--2015a|Bertram et al. 2015a]] ; Erickson et al. 2015). If effective climate policies are introduced despite this, they can alter the importance of country’s material endowments in a way that underpin more forceful climate governance over time. For instance, policy interventions to limit fossil fuel exploitation or support renewable energy deployment may change the value of these energy resources over time ( [[#Schmitz--2015|Schmitz et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ürge-Vorsatz--2018|Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2018]] ; [[#Chailleux--2020|Chailleux 2020]] ; [[#Colgan--2021|Colgan et al. 2021]] ).

Developing countries face additional material constraints in climate governance due to challenges associated with underdevelopment and scarce economic or natural resources ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Hence, many developing countries design domestic climate mitigation policies in combination with policy goals that address various developmental challenges ( [[#von%20Stechow--2016|von Stechow et al. 2016]] ; [[#Deng--2017|Deng et al. 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ; [[#Campagnolo--2019|Campagnolo and Davide 2019]] ), such as air quality, urban transportation, energy access, and poverty alleviation ( [[#Klausbruckner--2016|Klausbruckner et al. 2016]] ; [[#Li--2016|Li et al. 2016]] ; [[#Melamed--2016|Melamed et al. 2016]] ; [[#Slovic--2016|Slovic et al. 2016]] ; [[#Khreis--2017|Khreis et al. 2017]] ; [[#Geall--2018|Geall et al. 2018]] ; [[#Xie--2018|Xie et al. 2018]] ). Combining climate and developmental policies for beneficial synergies should not overlook potential trade-offs and challenges ( [[#Dagnachew--2018|Dagnachew et al. 2018]] ; [[#Ellis--2019|Ellis and Tschakert 2019]] ; [[#Peñasco--2021|Peñasco et al. 2021]] ) ( [[#13.7.2|Section 13.7.2]] for wider discussion).

<div id="13.3.2" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="political-systems"></span>