Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-4 (section)

=== 4.2.3 Mitigation Efforts in Sub-national and Non-state Action Plans and Policies ===

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The decision adopting the Paris Agreement stresses the importance of ‘stronger and more ambitious climate action’ by non-government and sub-national stakeholders, ‘including civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other sub-national authorities, local communities and indigenous peoples’ ( [[#UNFCCC--2015a|UNFCCC 2015a]] ). The Marrakech Partnership for Global Action, launched in the 2016 UNFCCC Conference of Parties by two ‘high-level champions,’ further formalised the contributions of non-government and sub-national actors taking action through seven thematic areas (e.g., energy, human settlements, industry, land-use, etc.) and one cross-cutting area (resilience). Since then, non-state actors, for example, companies and civil society, and sub-national actors, such as cities and regions, have emerged to undertake a range of largely voluntary carbon mitigation actions ( [[#Hsu--2018|Hsu et al. 2018]] , 2019) both as individual non-state actors (NSAs in the following) and through national and international cooperative initiatives, or ICIs ( [[#Hsu--2018|Hsu et al. 2018]] ). ICIs take a variety of forms, ranging from those that focus solely on non-state actors to those that engage national and even local governments. They can also range in commitment level, from primarily membership-based initiatives that do not require specific actions to those that require members to tackle emissions reductions in specific sectors or aim for transformational change.

Quantification of the (potential) impact of these actions is still limited. Almost all studies estimate the potential impact of the implementation of actions by NSAs and ICIs, but do not factor in that they may not reach their targets. The main reason for this is that there is very limited data currently available from individual actors (e.g., annual GHG inventory reports) and initiatives to assess their progress towards their targets. A few studies have attempted to assess progress of initiatives by looking into the initiatives’ production of relevant outputs ( [[#Chan--2018|Chan et al. 2018]] ). Quantification does not yet cover all commitments and only a selected number of ICIs are analysed in the existing literature. Most of these studies exclude commitments that are not (self-)identified as related to climate change mitigation, those that are not connected to international networks, or those that are communicating in languages other than English.

Non state action could make significant contributions to achieving the Paris climate goals ( ''limited evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). However, efforts to measure the extent to which non-state and sub-national actors go beyond national policy are still nascent ( [[#Hsu--2019|Hsu et al. 2019]] ; [[#Kuramochi--2020|Kuramochi et al. 2020]] ) and we do not fully understand the extent to which ambitious action by non-state actors is additional to what national governments intend to do. Sub-national and non-state climate action may also have benefits in reinforcing, implementing, or piloting national policy, in place of or in addition to achieving additional emissions reductions ( [[#Broekhoff--2015|Broekhoff et al. 2015]] ; [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al. 2016]] ; [[#Hsu--2017|Hsu et al. 2017]] ).

Quantification of commitments by individual NSAs are limited to date. Attempts to quantify aggregate effects in 2030 of commitments by individual non-state and sub-national actors are reported by ( [[#Hsu--2019|Hsu et al. 2019]] ; [[#Kuramochi--2020|Kuramochi et al. 2020]] ). [[#Kuramochi--2020|Kuramochi et al. (2020)]] estimate potential mitigation by more than 1,600 companies, around 6,000 cities and many regions (cities assessed have a collective population of 579 million, and regions 514 million). Individual commitments by these sub-national regions, cities and companies could reduce GHG emissions in 2030 by 1.2 to 2.0 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 compared to current national policies scenario projections, reducing projected emissions by 3.8–5.5% in 2030, if commitments are fully implemented and do not lead to weaker mitigation actions by others (Figure 4.1 left). In several countries, NSA commitments could potentially help meet or exceed national mitigation targets.

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[[File:a34312bb4ea2d9a4efc4689b0fd8f78b IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Figure_4_1.png]]

'''Figure 4.1 | Emissions reduction potential for non-state and sub-national actors by 2030.''' Source: data in left panel from [[#Hsu--2020|Hsu et al. (2020)]] , right panel from Lui et al. (2020).

Quantification of potential emission reductions from international cooperative initiatives have been assessed in several studies, and recently synthesised ( [[#Hsu--2020|Hsu et al. 2020]] ; [[#Lui--2021|Lui et al. 2021]] ), with some initiatives reporting high potential. In Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1, we report estimates of the emissions reductions from 19 distinct sub-national and non-state initiatives to mitigate climate change. The table shows wide ranges of potential mitigation based on current, target or potential membership, as well as a wide diversity of actors and membership assumptions. Current membership reflects the number of non-state or sub-national actors that are presently committed to a particular initiative; while targeted or potential membership represents a membership goal (e.g., increasing from 100 to 200 members) that an initiative may seek to achieve ( [[#Kuramochi--2020|Kuramochi et al. 2020]] ). When adding up emission reduction potentials, sub-national and non-state international cooperative initiatives could reduce up to about 20 Gt of CO 2 -eq in 2030 ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-8|Chapter 8]] also presents data on the savings potential of cities and it suggests that these could reach 2.3 GtCO 2 -eq annually by 2030 and 4.2 GtCO 2 -eq annually for 2050.

Non-state action may be broader than assessed in the literature so far, though subject to uncertainty. The examples in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1 do not include initiatives that target the emissions from religious organisations, colleges and universities, civic and cultural groups, and, to some extent, households, and in this sense may underestimate sub-national potential for mitigating emissions, rather than overestimate it. That said, the estimates are contingent on assumptions that sub-national and non-state actors achieve commitments – both with respect to mitigation and in some cases membership – and that these actions are not accounted for in nor lead to weakening of national actions.

Care is to be taken not to depict these efforts as additional to action within national NDCs, unless this is clearly established ( [[#Broekhoff--2015|Broekhoff et al. 2015]] ). There are potential overlaps between individual NSAs and ICIs, and across ICIs. [[#Kuramochi--2020|Kuramochi et al. (2020)]] propose partial and conservative partial effect methods to avoid double counting when comparing ambition, a matter that merits further attention. As the diversity of actions increased, the potential to count the same reductions multiple times increases.

Equally important to note here is that none of the studies reviewed in Figure 4.1 quantified the potential impact of financial sector actions, for example, divestment from emission intensive activities ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-15#15.3|Section 15.3]] has a more detailed discussion of how financial actors and instruments are addressing climate change). Moreover, only a limited number of studies on the impact of actions by diverse actors go beyond 2050 (Table 4.4), which may reflect analysts’ recognition of the increasing uncertainties of longer time horizons. Accurate accounting methods can help to avoiding counting finance multiple times, and methods across mitigation and finance would consider counting carbon market flows and the tons reduced. As Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1 indicate, activities by businesses have potential to significantly contribute to global mitigation efforts. For example, the SBTi (Science Based Targets initiative) encourages companies to pledge to reduce their emissions at rates which according to SBTi would be compatible with global pathways to well below 2°C or 1.5°C, with various methodologies being proposed (Andersen et al. 2021; [[#Faria--2019|Faria and Labutong 2019]] ). Readers may note, however, that the link between emissions by individual actors and long-term temperature goals cannot be inferred without additional assumptions (Box 4.2). In the energy sector, some voluntary initiatives are also emerging to stop methane emissions associated with oil and gas supply chains. The Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP) is a voluntary initiative lead by the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, which has recently published a comprehensive framework for methane detection, measurement and reporting ( [[#UNEP--2020b|UNEP 2020b]] ).

Initiatives made up of cities and sub-national regions have an especially large potential to reduce emissions, due to their inclusion of many actors, across a range of different geographic regions, with ambitious emissions reduction targets, and these actors’ coverage of a large share of emissions ( [[#Kuramochi--2020|Kuramochi et al. 2020]] ). [[#Hsu--2019|Hsu et al. (2019)]] find largest potential in that area. Several sub-national regions like California and Scotland have set zero emission targets ( [[#Höhne--2019|Höhne et al. 2019]] ), supported by short- and medium-term interim goals ( [[#Scottish%20Government--2020b|Scottish Government 2020b]] ; [[#State%20of%20California--2018|State of California 2018]] ). Sharing of effort across global and sub-global scales has not been quantified, though one study suggests that non-state actors have increasingly adopted more diverse framings, including vulnerability, human rights and transformational framings of justice ( [[#Shawoo--2020|Shawoo and McDermott 2020]] ). Initiatives focused on forestry have high emissions reduction potential due to the current high deforestation rates, and due to the ambitious targets of many of these forestry initiatives, such as the New York Declaration on Forests’ goal to end deforestation by 2030 ( [[#Höhne--2019|Höhne et al. 2019]] ; [[#Lui--2021|Lui et al. 2021]] ), although the Initiative acknowledges that insufficient progress has to-date been made towards this goal ( [[#NYDF%20Assessment%20Partners--2020|NYDF Assessment Partners 2020]] ). On the other hand, uncertainties in global forest carbon emissions (and therefore potential reductions) are high and despite a multitude of initiatives in the sector, actually measured deforestation rates have not declined since the initiative was announced in 2014 (Sections 7.2 and 7.3.1). Moreover, not all initiatives are transparent about how they plan to reach their goals and may also rely on offsets.

Initiatives focused on non-CO 2 emissions, and particularly on methane, can achieve sizable reductions, in the order of multiple GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 (Table 4.4). The Global Cement and Concrete Association (formerly the Cement Sustainability Initiative), has contributed to the development of consistent energy and emissions reporting from member companies. The CSI also suggested possible approaches to balance GHG mitigation and the issues of competitiveness and leakage ( [[#Cook--2011|Cook and Ponssard 2011]] ). The member companies of the GCCA (CSI) have become better prepared for future legislation on managing GHG emissions and developed management competence to respond to climate change compared to non-member companies in the cement sector ( [[#Busch--2008|Busch et al. 2008]] ; [[#Global%20Cement%20and%20Concrete%20Association--2020|Global Cement and Concrete Association 2020]] ). Accordingly, the cement industry has developed some roadmaps to reach net zero GHG around 2050 ( [[#Sanjuán--2020|Sanjuán et al. 2020]] ).

It is also important to note that individual NSAs and ICIs that commit to GHG mitigation activities are often scarce in many crucial and ‘hard-to-abate’ sectors, such as iron and steel, cement and freight transport (Chapters 10 and 11). Sub-national and non-state action efforts could help these sectors meet an urgent need to accelerate the commercialisation and uptake of technical options to achieve low zero emissions (Bataille 2020).

'''Table 4.4 | Emissions reduction potential for sub-national and non-state international cooperative initi''' '''atives by 2030.'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Sector

! Leading actor

! Name

! Scale

! Target(s)

! colspan="2"| 2030 emissions reduction potential compared to no policy, current policies or NDC baseline (GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 )

! Membership assumptions

|-
!
! ''Min''

! ''Max''

!
|-
| Energy efficiency

| Intergovernmental (UNEP)

| United for Efficiency (U4E)

| Global (focus on developing countries)

| Members to adopt policies for energy-efficient appliances and equipment

| 0.6

| 1.25

| Current membership

|-
| Energy efficiency

| Intergovernmental

| Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance Deployment (SEAD) Initiative

| Global

| Members to adopt current policy best practices for energy efficiency product standards

| 0.5

| 1.7 (excl. China)

| Current membership

|-
| Buildings

| Business

| Architecture 2030

| Global (focus on North America)

| New buildings and major renovations shall be designed to meet an energy consumption performance standard of 70% below the regional (or country) average/median for that building type and to go carbon-neutral in 2030

| 0.2

| 0.2

| Current membership

|-
| Transport

| Business (aviation sector)

| Collaborative Climate Action Across the Air Transport World (CAATW)

| Global

| Two key objectives: (i) 2% annual fuel efficiency improvement through 2050, (ii) stabilise net carbon emissions from 2020

| 0.3

| 0.6

| Current membership

|-
| Transport

| Business

| Lean and Green

| Europe

| Member companies to reduce CO 2 emissions from logistics and freight activity by at least 25% over a five-year period

| 0.02

| 0.02

| Current membership

|-
| Transport

| Hybrid

| Global Fuel Economy Initiative (GFEI)

| Global

| Halve the fuel consumption of the LDV fleet in 2050 compared to 2005

| 0.5

| 1.0

| Current membership

|-
| Transport

| Business

| Below50 LCTPi a

| Global

| Replace 10% of global transportation fossil fuel use with low-carbon transport fuels by 2030

| 0.5

| 0.5

| Scaled-up global potential

|-
| Renewable energy

| Business

| European Technology &amp; Innovation Platform Photovoltaic (ETIP PV)

| Europe

| Supply 20% of electricity from solar Photovoltaic PV technologies by 2030

| 0.2

| 0.5

| Current membership

|-
| Renewable energy

| Intergovernmental (African Union)

| Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)

| Africa

| Produce 300 gigawatt (GW) of electricity for Africa by 2030 from clean, affordable and appropriate forms of energy

| 0.3

| 0.8

| Current membership

|-
| Renewable energy

| Hybrid

| Global Geothermal Alliance (GGA)

| Global

| Achieve a five-fold growth in the installed capacity for geothermal power generation and a more than two-fold growth in geothermal heating by 2030

| 0.2

| 0.5

| Targeted capacity

|-
| Renewable energy

| Business

| REscale LCTPi a

| Global

| Support deployment of 1.5 TW of additional renewable energy capacity by 2025 in line with the IEA’s 2°C scenario

| 5

| 5

| Scaled-up global potential

|-
| Renewable energy

| Business

| RE100 initiative

| Global

| 2,000 companies commit to source 100% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2030

| 1.9

| 4

| Targeted membership

|-
| Forestry

| Hybrid

| Bonn Challenge/Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force (GCFTF)/New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF)

| Global

| End forest loss by 2030 in member countries and restore 150 million hectares of deforested and degraded lands by 2020 and an additional 200 million hectares by 2030

| 3.8

| 8.8

| Scaled-up global potential

|-
| Non-CO 2 emissions

| Government

| Climate &amp; Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)

| Global

| Members to implement policies that will deliver substantial short-lived climate pollutants (SLCP) reductions in the near to medium-term (i.e., by 2030) for HFCs and methane

| 1.4

| 3.8

| Current membership

|-
| Non-CO 2 emissions

| Intergovernmental (World Bank)

| Zero Routine Flaring

| Global

| Eliminate routine flaring no later than 2030

| 0.4

| 0.4

| Current membership

|-
| Multisectoral

| Cities and regions

| Under2 Coalition

| Global

| Local governments (220 members) aim to limit their GHG emissions by 80 to 95% below 1990 levels by 2050

| 4.6

| 5

| Current membership

|-
| Multisectoral

| Cities and regions

| Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate &amp; Energy (GCoM)

| Global

| Member cities have a variety of targets (+9,000 members)

| 1.4

| 1.4

| Current membership

|-
| Multisectoral

| Cities and regions

| C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40)

| Global

| 94 member cities have a variety of targets, aiming for 1.5°C compatibility by 2050. The network carries two explicit goals: (i) to have every C40 city develop a climate action plan before the end of 2020 (Deadline 2020), which is to ‘deliver action consistent with the objectives of the Paris Agreement’ and (ii) to have cities achieve emissions neutrality by 2050

| 1.5

| 3

| Current membership

|-
| Agriculture

| Business

| Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) LCTPi a

| Global

| Reducing agricultural and land-use change emissions from agriculture by at least 50% by 2030 and 65% by 2050. 24 companies and 15 partners

| 3.7

| 3.7

| Scaled-up global potential

|-
| Multisectoral

| Business

| Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi)

| Global

| By 2030, 2000 companies have adopted a science-based target in line with a 2°C temperature goal

| 2.7

| 2.7

| Targeted membership

|}

Source: [[#Hsu--2020|Hsu et al. (2020)]] . Note a As of December 2020 most of the Low Carbon Technology Partnerships (LCTPi) initiatives are defunct, except the Climate Smart Agriculture programme.

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