Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-6 (section)

==== 6.2.4.1 Energy Infrastructure ====

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Energy infrastructure underpins modern economies and quality of life. Disruption to power or fuel supplies impacts upon all other infrastructure sectors, and affects businesses, industry, healthcare and other critical services both within and across jurisdictional boundaries ( [[#Groundstroem--2019|Groundstroem and Juhola, 2019]] ). The economic impacts of climate change risks are significant, for example in the EU, the expected annual damages to energy infrastructure, currently €0.5 billion yr −1 , are projected to increase 1612% by the 2080s ( [[#Forzieri--2018|Forzieri et al., 2018]] ). In China, 33.9% of the population are vulnerable to electricity supply disruptions from a flood or drought ( [[#Hu--2016|Hu et al., 2016]] ), whilst in the USA, higher temperatures are projected to increase power system costs by about USD 50 billion by the year 2050 ( [[#Jaglom--2014|Jaglom et al., 2014]] ). In a study of 11 Central and Eastern European countries, researchers found that energy poverty is exacerbated by existing infrastructure deficits and energy efficient building stock, as well as income inequality, which can lead to reduced economic productivity ( [[#Karpinska--2020|Karpinska and Śmiech, 2020]] ). Climate change is expected to alter energy demand ( [[#Viguié--2021|Viguié et al., 2021]] ), for example heatwaves increase spot market prices ( [[#Pechan--2014|Pechan and Eisenack, 2014]] ), with a disproportionate impact on the poorest and most vulnerable populations. Energy infrastructure are susceptible to a range of climate risks (Cronin, Anandarajah and Dessens, 2018), whilst issues pertaining to energy demand are considered by Working Group III.

Climate change can, for example, influence energy consumption patterns by changing how household and industrial consumers respond to short-term weather shocks, as well as how they adapt to long-term changes ( [[#Auffhammer--2014|Auffhammer and Mansur, 2014]] ). Recent studies from Stockholm, Sweden, show that future heating demand will decrease while cooling demand will increase (Nik and Sasic Kalagasidis, 2013). A study from the USA showed that climate change will impact buildings by affecting peak and annual building energy consumption ( [[#Fri--2014|Fri and Savitz, 2014]] ). From an infrastructure standpoint, the vulnerability of current hydropower and thermoelectric power generation systems may change due to changes in climate and water systems and projected reduction of usable capacities ( [[#van%20Vliet--2016|van Vliet et al., 2016]] ; [[#Byers--2016|Byers et al., 2016]] ). These examples show how energy infrastructure planning under climate change must take into account a greater number of scenarios and investigate impacts on particular energy segments ( [[#Sharifi--2016|Sharifi and Yamagata, 2016]] ).

'''Electricity generation.''' Electricity generation infrastructure can be directly damaged by floods, storm and other severe weather events. Furthermore, the performance of renewables (solar, hydro-electric, wind) is affected by changes in climate.

Most thermoelectric plants require water for cooling, many are therefore situated near rivers and coasts and thus vulnerable to flooding. Increases in water temperature or restrictions on cooling water availability affect hydroelectric and thermoelectric plants. A 1°C increase in the temperature of water used as coolant yields a decrease of 0.12–0.7% in power output ( [[#Mima--2015|Mima and Criqui, 2015]] ; Ibrahim, [[#Ibrahim--2014|Ibrahim and Attia, 2014]] ). Excess biological growth, accelerated by warmer water, increases risk of clogging water intakes ( [[#Cruz--2013|Cruz and Krausmann, 2013]] ). While some regions are expected to experience increased capacity under climate change (namely India and Russia), global annual thermal power plant capacity is ''likely'' to be reduced by between 7% in a mid-century RCP2.6 scenario and 12% in a mid-century RCP8.5 scenario ( [[#van%20Vliet--2016|van Vliet et al., 2016]] ). Worldwide, hydroelectric capacity reductions are projected at 0.4–6.1% ( [[#van%20Vliet--2016|van Vliet et al., 2016]] ). Analysis of the UK’s water for energy generation abstractions showed that an energy mix of high nuclear or carbon capture technologies could require as much as six times the current cooling water demands (Byers, Hall and Amezaga, 2014; [[#Byers--2016|Byers et al., 2016]] ).

Increasing temperatures improve the efficiency of solar heating but decrease the efficiency of photovoltaic panels, and deposition and abrasive effects of wind-blown sand and dust on solar energy plants can further reduce power output, and the need for cleaning (Patt, Pfenninger and Lilliestam, 2013). Projected changes in wind and solar potential are uncertain; the trends vary by region and season (Burnett, Barbour and Harrison, 2014; [[#Cradden--2015|Cradden et al., 2015]] ; Fant, Schlosser and Strzepek, 2016). In an RCP8.5 scenario, [[#Wild--2015|Wild et al. (2015)]] conservatively calculate a global reduction of 1% per decade between 2005 and 2049 for future solar power production changes due to changing solar resources as a result of global warming and decreasing all-sky radiation over the coming decades. However, positive trends are projected in large parts of Europe, the south-east of North America and the south-east of China.

'''Electricity Transmission and Distribution.''' Electricity transmission and distribution networks span large distances, with overhead power lines often traversing exposed areas. Power lines and other assets, such as substations, are often located near population centres, including those in floodplains. Structural damage to overhead distribution lines will increase in areas projected to see more ice or freezing rain (e.g., most of Canada), snowfall (e.g., Japan) or wildfires (e.g., California, USA) ( [[#Bompard--2013|Bompard et al., 2013]] ; [[#Mitchell--2013|Mitchell, 2013]] ; [[#Sathaye--2013|Sathaye et al., 2013]] ; [[#Jeong--2018|Jeong et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ohba--2020|Ohba and Sugimoto, 2020]] ). Electricity outages may last for prolonged periods of time and across vast areas, in addition to potentially disproportionately affecting poorer or more vulnerable communities. Increases in windstorm frequency and intensity increase the risk of direct damage to overhead lines and pylons, in many locations this is limited but [[#Tyusov--2017|Tyusov et al. (2017)]] calculate an increase as high as 30% in parts of Russia. Where the mode of failure is recorded, transmission pylons are seen to be more susceptible to wind damage, whilst distribution pylons are more ''likely'' to be affected by treefall and debris (Karagiannis et al., 2019). Increased temperatures can lead to the de-rating (lower performance) of power lines, whose resistance increases with temperature with efficiency reductions of 2–14% being projected by 2100 ( [[#Cradden--2013|Cradden and Harrison, 2013]] ; [[#Bartos--2016|Bartos et al., 2016]] ).

'''Fuels Extraction and Distribution.''' Non-electric energy infrastructure is susceptible to many of the same impacts as electric infrastructure. Extreme weather events impact extraction (onshore and offshore) and refining operations of petroleum, oil, coal, gas and biofuels. Disruption of road, rail and shipping routes (see [[#6.2.5|Section 6.2.5.2]] ) interrupts fuel supply chains. However, there are a number of risks that are specific to these sectors. Heat can lead to expansion in oil and gas pipes, increasing the risk of rupture ( [[#Sieber--2013|Sieber, 2013]] ), whilst heatwaves and droughts can reduce the availability of biofuel (Moiseyev et al., 2011; Schaeffer et al., 2012). Subsidence and shrinkage of soils damages underground assets such as pipes intakes ( [[#Cruz--2013|Cruz and Krausmann, 2013]] ), while additional human activity such as extractive drilling may induce earthquakes, as observed in the northern Dutch province of Groningen ( [[#Van%20der%20Voort--2015|Van der Voort and Vanclay, 2015]] ). In Alaska, USA, the thaw of permafrost and subsequent ground instability is estimated to lead to USD 33 million damages to fuel pipelines in an end-of-century RCP8.5 scenario (Melvin et al., 2017), with low-lying coastal deltas particularly vulnerable ( [[#Schmidt--2015|Schmidt, 2015]] ).

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