Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-12 (section)

=== Box 12.1 | Case Study: Emerging CDR Policy, Research and Development in the United Kingdom ===

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Climate change mitigation policies in the UK have been motivated since 2008 by a domestic, legally-binding framework. This framework includes a 2050 target for net zero greenhouse gas emissions, interim targets and an independent advisory body called the Climate Change Committee ( [[#Muinzer--2019|Muinzer 2019]] ). It has led successive UK governments to publish mitigation plans to 2050, causing policy to be more forward looking ( [[#Averchenkova--2021|Averchenkova et al. 2021]] ).

The UK’s targets include emissions and removals from LULUCF. In 2008 the target for 2050 was an economy-wide net emissions reduction of at least 80% below 1990 levels. Even the first government plans to achieve this target proposed deployment of removal methods, specifically afforestation and wood in construction, increased soil carbon and BECCS ( [[#HM%20Government--2011|HM Government 2011]] ).

Box 12.1

Adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 caused the government to change the legislated 2050 target to a reduction of at least 100% (i.e., net zero). Since then, removal of CO 2 and other greenhouse gases has received greater prominence as a distinct topic. The most recent national plan (published October 2021) proposes deployment not only of the methods mentioned above, but also DACCS, biochar and enhanced weathering. The government has committed to amend accounting of UK targets to include a wider range of removal methods beyond LULUCF, and set a target of 5 MtCO 2 yr –1 from methods such as BECCS, DACCS and enhanced weathering by 2030. It is consulting on markets and incentives for deployment, and exploring new requirements for MRV ( [[#HM%20Government--2021|HM Government 2021]] ).

In parallel to these policy developments, the UK funds research into technical, environmental and social aspects of removal ( [[#Lezaun--2021|Lezaun et al. 2021]] ). Research on some elements (e.g., forestry, CCS, soils, bioenergy) have been funded for well over a decade, but the first programme dedicated to greenhouse gas removal ran during 2017–2021. This has been followed by two new programmes with greater focus on demonstration, totalling GBP100 million over four years ( [[#HM%20Government--2021|HM Government 2021]] ). A wide variety of methods is supported in these programmes, covering approaches such as CO 2 capture from seawater and capture of methane from cattle, in addition to those included already in national mitigation scenarios.

Deployment of removal methods has lagged behind expectations, as national targets for tree planting are not being met and infrastructure for CO 2 transport and storage is not yet in place ( [[#Climate%20Change%20Committee--2021|Climate Change Committee 2021]] ). While public awareness around carbon removal is low, studies indicate support in general, provided it is perceived as enhancing rather than impeding action to reduce emissions ( [[#Cox--2020a|Cox et al. 2020a]] ).

Since the enhancement of carbon sinks is a form of climate change mitigation ( [[#Honegger--2021a|Honegger et al. 2021a]] ), CDR governance challenges will in many respects be similar to those around emissions reduction measures, as will policy instruments like RD&amp;D funding, carbon pricing, tax or investment credits, certification schemes, and public procurement (Sections 13.4, 13.6, 14.4 and 14.5). Effectively integrating CDR into mitigation portfolios can build on already existing rules, procedures and instruments for emissions abatement ( [[#Torvanger--2019|Torvanger 2019]] ; [[#Fridahl--2020|Fridahl et al. 2020]] ; [[#Zakkour--2020|Zakkour et al. 2020]] ; [[#Honegger--2021b|Honegger et al. 2021b]] ; [[#Mace--2021|Mace et al. 2021]] ; [[#Rickels--2021|Rickels et al. 2021]] ). Additionally, to accelerate RD&amp;D and to incentivise CDR deployment, a political commitment to formal integration into existing climate policy frameworks is required ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Lomax--2015|Lomax et al. 2015]] ; [[#Geden--2018|Geden et al. 2018]] ; [[#Honegger--2018|Honegger and Reiner 2018]] ; [[#VonHedemann--2020|VonHedemann et al. 2020]] ; [[#Schenuit--2021|Schenuit et al. 2021]] ). To avoid CDR being misperceived as a substitute for deep emissions reductions, the prioritisation of emissions cuts can be signalled and achieved with differentiated target setting for reductions and removals ( [[#Geden--2019|Geden et al. 2019]] ; [[#McLaren--2019|McLaren et al. 2019]] ). Similarly, sub-targets are conceivable for different types of CDR, to prioritise preferred methods according to characteristics such as removal processes or timescales of storage ( [[#Smith--2021|Smith 2021]] ).

IPCC guidance on quantifying removals is available for land-based biological CDR methods ( [[#IPCC--2006|IPCC 2006]] , 2019), but has yet to be developed for other CDR methods (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2018). Challenges with development of estimation algorithms, data collection, and attribution between sectors and countries will need to be overcome ( [[#Luisetti--2020|Luisetti et al. 2020]] ; [[#Wedding--2021|Wedding et al. 2021]] ). Trusted methodologies for MRV, required to enable private sector participation. will need to address the permanence, leakage, and saturation challenges with land- and ocean-based biological methods ( [[#Mace--2021|Mace et al. 2021]] ). Protocols that also capture social and ecological co-benefits could encourage the adoption of biological CDR methods such as SCS, biochar, A/R and blue carbon management ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#VonHedemann--2020|VonHedemann et al. 2020]] ; [[#Macreadie--2021|Macreadie et al. 2021]] ).

Private capital and companies, impact investors, and philanthropy will play a role in technical demonstrations and bringing down costs, as well as creating demand for carbon removal products on voluntary markets, which companies may purchase to fulfil corporate social responsibility-driven targets ( [[#Friedmann--2019|Friedmann 2019]] ; [[#Fuss--2020|Fuss et al. 2020]] ; [[#Joppa--2021|Joppa et al. 2021]] ). Niche markets can provide entry points for limited deployment of novel CDR methods ( [[#Cox--2019|Cox and Edwards 2019]] ), but targeting currently existing revenue streams by using CO 2 captured from the atmosphere in Enhanced Oil Recovery and other utilisation routes ( [[#Mackler--2021|Mackler et al. 2021]] ; [[#Meckling--2021|Meckling and Biber 2021]] ) is contested, and highlights the importance of choosing appropriate system boundaries when assessing supply chains ( [[#Tanzer--2019|Tanzer and Ramírez 2019]] ; [[#Brander--2021|Brander et al. 2021]] ). While the private sector will play a distinct role in scaling CDR, governments will need to commit to developing infrastructure for the transport and storage of CO 2 , including financing, permitting, and regulating liabilities ( [[#Sanchez--2018|Sanchez et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mace--2021|Mace et al. 2021]] ; [[#Mackler--2021|Mackler et al. 2021]] ).

International governance considerations include global technology transfer around CDR implementation options ( [[#Batres--2021|Batres et al. 2021]] ); land use change that could affect food production and land condition and cause conflict around land tenure and access ( [[#Dooley--2018|Dooley and Kartha 2018]] ; [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al. 2019]] ; [[#Milne--2019|Milne et al. 2019]] ); and efforts to create sustainable and just supply chains for CDR ( [[#Fajardy--2020|Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2020]] ; [[#Tan--2021|Tan et al. 2021]] ), such as resources used for BECCS, enhanced weathering, or ocean alkalinisation. International governance would be particularly important for methods posing transboundary risks, especially for ocean-based methods. Specific regulations have so far only been developed in the context of the London Protocol, an international treaty that explicitly regulates ocean fertilisation and allows parties to govern other marine CDR methods like ocean alkalinity enhancement ( [[#GESAMP--2019|GESAMP 2019]] ; [[#Burns--2020|Burns and Corbett 2020]] ; [[#Boettcher--2021|Boettcher et al. 2021]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.4.5|Section 14.4.5]] ).

Engagement of civil society organisations and publics will be important for shaping CDR policy and deployment ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Public awareness of CDR and its role in national net zero emissions strategies is generally very low ( [[#Cox--2020a|Cox et al. 2020a]] ), and perceptions differ across countries and between methods ( [[#Bertram--2020|Bertram and Merk 2020]] ; [[#Spence--2021|Spence et al. 2021]] ; [[#Sweet--2021|Sweet et al. 2021]] ; [[#Wenger--2021|Wenger et al. 2021]] ). When awareness increases, social processes will shape political attitudes on CDR ( [[#Shrum--2020|Shrum et al. 2020]] ), as will efforts to frame particular CDR methods as ‘natural’ or ‘technological’ ( [[#Osaka--2021|Osaka et al. 2021]] ), and the policy instruments chosen to support CDR ( [[#Bellamy--2019|Bellamy et al. 2019]] ). Lack of confidence in CDR implementation options from both publics and investors, and lack of trust in project developers ( [[#Cox--2020b|Cox et al. 2020b]] ) have hampered support for CCS ( [[#Thomas--2018|Thomas et al. 2018]] ) and are expected to affect deployment of CDR methods with geological storage ( [[#Gough--2019|Gough and Mander 2019]] ). On local and regional scales, CDR projects will need to consider air and water quality, impacts to human health, energy needs, land use and ecological integrity, and local community engagement and procedural justice. Bottom-up and community-driven strategies are important for deploying equitable carbon removal projects ( [[#Batres--2021|Batres et al. 2021]] ; [[#Hansson--2021|Hansson et al. 2021]] ).

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